Efficiency and responsiveness of supply chains in the high-tech electronics industry : a system dynamics-based investigation by Minnich, Dennis
Dennis Minnich
Efficiency and Responsiveness 
of Supply Chains in the 
High-Tech Electronics Industry
A System Dynamics-Based Investigation 
D
e
n
n
i
s
 
M
i
n
n
i
c
h
E
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
c
y
 
a
n
d
 
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
i
v
e
n
e
s
s
 
o
f
 
S
u
p
p
l
y
 
C
h
a
i
n
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
H
i
g
h
-
T
e
c
h
 
E
l
e
c
t
r
o
n
i
c
s
 
I
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
Organizations can design planning systems for supply chain 
management in different ways in order to achieve the multiple objectives 
of supply chain management. In this book, a System Dynamics simulation 
model is used to assess the performance of planning approaches for 
supply chains in the high-tech electronics industry on the dimensions of 
responsiveness and effi ciency. Supply chains in this industry are subject 
to a number of challenges that complicate the achievement of these two 
objectives, including short product life cycles and long component lead 
times. In recent years, companies experienced both decreasing delivery 
performance and increasing cost. The simulation results show that while 
the current planning approach in typical supply chains in this industry 
is not capable of supporting high responsiveness at the same time as 
high effi ciency, it is possible to modify the planning system to achieve 
simultaneous improvements on both of these dimensions. Building on 
this simulation model, the book provides practical guidelines on how 
organizations can align the supply chain planning approach with different 
product characteristics and transform their supply chains into systems that 
are both responsive to customer demand and effi cient.
. 
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A. Efficient, Responsive, or Both – Strategic Supply 
Chain Design 
Until the late 1990s and early 2000s, the structure of supply chains in the high-
tech electronics industry was similar to that of automotive supply chains. Mo-
bile phone manufacturers, for example, were vertically integrated and operated 
their own assembly plants.1 Then, continuous and rapid price erosion for high-
tech products and strong global competition, combined with rapid advances in 
technology, led to strong pressure to reduce costs, enhance flexibility and limit 
risk exposure. This created a more complex reality for companies such as IBM, 
requiring them to search global partners and build world-leading competences.2
The ‘all from one source’ corporate conglomerates in the 1980s and 1990s were 
not able to cope with these challenges.3 This forced many players to offshore 
parts of their value chains, in particular their personnel- and capital-intensive 
production plants, with hopes to achieve greater flexibility. For example, Erics-
son, Sweden-based global leader in digital networks, was forced to sell off sev-
eral of its plants in Europe to contract manufacturers abroad, such as Flextronics 
and Solectron.4 Offshoring was possible because moving electronics manufac-
turing plants abroad is relatively easy. Primary target countries for outsourced 
production sites were China, India, Mexico and Brazil.5
                                                          
1  Cf. Appleyard, Melissa M., Clair Brown and Greg Linden: Wintel and Beyond: 
Leadership in the Net World Order, 2004, Working Paper cwts-01-2004, Institute of 
Industrial Relations, University of California, 
http://repositories.cdlib.org/iir/cwts/bdetwps/cwts-01-2004, retrieved on: 12 Septem-
ber 2006, pp. 1–2 and Alicke, Knut: Planung und Betrieb von Logistiknetzwerken – 
Unternehmensübergreifendes Supply Chain Management, 2nd ed., Heidelberg 2005, 
p. 245. 
2  Cf. Lin, Grace et al.: Extended-Enterprise Supply-Chain Management at IBM Per-
sonal Systems Group and Other Divisions, in: Interfaces, Vol. 30 (2000), No. 1, p. 8 
and Berggren, Christian and Lars Bengtsson: Rethinking Outsourcing in Manufactur-
ing: A Tale of Two Telecom Firms, in: European Management Journal, Vol. 22 
(2004), No. 2, p. 217. 
3  Cf. Alicke: Planung und Betrieb von Logistiknetzwerken, p. 245. 
4  Cf. Berggren and Bengtsson: Rethinking Outsourcing in Manufacturing, p. 216. 
5  Cf. Roberts, Bill: Beyond the China mystique, in: Electronic Business, 1 March 
2006, 2006, http://www.reed-electronics.com/eb-mag/article/CA6310932, retrieved 
on 8 August 2006, p. 1. 
2Managers at Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) such as, for exam-
ple, Ericsson and Nokia, argued that using contract manufacturers should im-
prove flexibility because these companies are able to level production across 
several customers.6 Significant cost savings were also projected, primarily 
through better availability of working capital as fixed costs are converted to 
variable costs.7 However, many OEMs had missed adapting their internal proc-
esses and structures to the new environment. This created a “heterogeneous and 
chaotic structure of value chains”, particularly because different steps in the 
production process are performed by different companies.8 In the case of Erics-
son, “the production efficiencies were never improved. Instead of outsourcing 
being an alternative to plant closure the new owners had to lay off the trans-
ferred employees and shut down the facilities”.9
In general, OEMs were faced with collapsing supply chain performance, 
with both decreasing delivery performance and increasing cost. One global 
high-tech company, for example, at one point had an overall delivery accuracy 
of less than 15 percent, which caused lost sales of 20 to 30 percent.10 Complex 
forecasting and planning systems that are not aligned across the supply chain, 
combined with the inherent complexity of the high-tech electronics market, are 
a primary reason for this performance failure. Such suboptimal planning in the 
high-tech industry is primarily caused by the complex outsourcing relationships 
with incompatible IT systems and unclear information flows.11 Information 
flows, in general, are a major concern in complex supply chains.12 A responsive 
supply chain, which Fisher suggests for innovative products, such as many high-
tech electronics products, requires an information flow and policies from the 
market place to supply chain members in order to hedge inventory and available 
                                                          
6  Cf. Berggren and Bengtsson: Rethinking Outsourcing in Manufacturing, p. 219. 
7  Cf. Hilmola, Olli-Pekka, Petri Helo and Matthias Holweg: On the outsourcing dy-
namics in the electronics sector: the evolving role of the original design manufac-
turer, 2005, Working Paper 04/2005, Judge Institue of Management, University of 
Cambridge, http://www-
innovation.jbs.cam.ac.uk/publications/hilmola_outsourcing.pdf, retrieved on: 10 Sep-
tember 2006, p. 2. 
8  Cf. Alicke: Planung und Betrieb von Logistiknetzwerken, p. 245. 
9  Berggren and Bengtsson: Rethinking Outsourcing in Manufacturing, p. 216. 
10  Cf. Karlsson, Axel: Supply Chain Management Interview: Applying Our Know-
How, 2006, McKinsey & Company, Inc., 
http://www.mckinsey.com/clientservice/operations/supplychain/ourexpertise/index.as
p, retrieved on: 23 October 2006, p. 1. 
11  Cf. Pande, Aditya, Ramesh Raman and Vats Srivatsan: Recapturing your supply 
chain data, in: McKinsey on IT, Vol. 7 (2006), p. 16. 
12  Cf. Forrester, Jay W.: Industrial dynamics: A major breakthrough for decision mak-
ers, in: Harvard Business Review, Vol. 36 (1958), No. 4, pp. 40–42. 
3production capacity against uncertain demand.13 In the high-tech industry, the 
trend to outsource production is stretching supply chains across the globe. As a 
consequence, access to critical data about the supply chain has become difficult 
or impossible, as details about quality, inventory levels or manufacturing capac-
ity are no longer available. For example, “a computer hardware company’s sup-
ply planner, trying to meet a spike in demand for certain products, needs capac-
ity and inventory information from several components suppliers and several 
contract manufacturers, but the data may be locked up in the IT systems or 
spreadsheets of a dozen or more companies”.14 In this industry and elsewhere, 
supply chain planning and control policies are often suboptimal. This results in 
inefficient systems that cannot satisfy customer demand appropriately, or only at 
very high cost. Demand is highly uncertain, product life cycles are short, prices 
are eroding and supplier lead times are long.15 Additionally, forecasting is prob-
lematic because forecasts often reflect the interests of various stakeholders in 
the companies that are part of the supply chain. At the same time the transmis-
sion of the forecasts through the supply chain does not work well.16
The changes in the structure of the high-tech electronics industry imply that 
“the new competitive battle is no longer between individual companies but be-
tween multi-company supply chains”17, a perception that can be traced back to 
Michael Porter’s research in 1990, but also to Charles Fine’s “Clockspeed” in 
1998.18 In this dynamic industry in particular, competition is not only taking 
place on the level of the final product, but firms also compete on the efficiency 
                                                          
13  Cf. Fisher, Marshall L.: What is the Right Supply Chain for Your Product?, in: Har-
vard Business Review, Vol. 75 (1997), No. 2, p. 108. 
14  Pande, Raman and Srivatsan: Recapturing your supply chain data, p. 16. 
15  Cf. Aertsen, Freek and Edward Versteijnen: Responsive Forecasting and Planning 
Process in the High-Tech Industry, in: The Journal of Business Forecasting, Vol. 25 
(2006), No. 2, p. 33. 
16  See, for example, Kaipia, Riikka, Hille Korhonen and Helena Hartiala: Planning 
nervousness in a demand supply network: an empirical study, in: The International 
Journal of Logistics Management, Vol. 17 (2006), No. 1, p. 95. 
17  Cf. Kok, Ton G. de et al.: Philips Electronics Synchronizes Its Supply Chain to End 
the Bullwhip Effect, in: Interfaces, Vol. 35 (2005), No. 1, p. 37, see also Lambert, 
Douglas M. and Martha C. Cooper: Issues in Supply Chain Management, in: Indus-
trial Marketing Management, Vol. 29 (2000), No. 1, p. 65. 
18  See Porter, Michael E.: The competitive advantage of nations, New York 1990, p. 3 
and Fine, Charles H.: Clockspeed: Winning Industry Control in the Age of Tempo-
rary Advantage, Reading, MA 1998, pp. 74–75 and 99–101. See also Lummus, 
Rhonda R. and Robert J. Vokurka: Defining supply chain management: a historical 
perspective and practical guidelines, in: Industrial Management & Data Systems, 
Vol. 99 (1999), No. 1, p. 11. 
4and quality of the underlying supply chain network they operate in.19 The qual-
ity of the coordination and planning of supply chain activities becomes an im-
portant competitive differentiator.  
More than two decades before a Harvard Business Review article put supply 
chain management on the agenda of top management as an “essential ingredient 
of competitive success”20, Jay W. Forrester used a methodology called System 
Dynamics to develop insights on supply chain dynamics that continue to drive 
research in supply chain management today21. Considering the complexity in 
many industries, such as the high-tech sector, it is essential to recognize that the 
feedback structure of a system creates its behaviour, and that redesigning these 
structures influences the ability of members of the system to alter its behaviour. 
All decisions taken at any point in the system, such as a supply chain, are em-
bedded in multiple feedback loops and change the behaviour of the entire sys-
tem. System Dynamics provides a means to enhance the understanding of a sys-
tem and assess the long-term consequences of policy changes, taking into ac-
count delays. In particular, System Dynamics simulation is a useful tool to 
evaluate the impact of decision rules on supply chain performance.22
In the following, a System Dynamics simulation model is developed and 
used to identify appropriate ways to design supply chains such that they can 
cope with these challenges. Efficiency and responsiveness are two objectives of 
supply chain management. Whether or not high performance can be achieved on 
both dimensions at the same time, however, is questionable. Responsiveness can 
be defined as the “the ability of the supply chain to respond purposefully and 
within an appropriate time-scale to customer requests or changes in the market-
                                                          
19  Cf. and Linden, Greg: Building Production Networks in Central Europe: The Case of 
the Electronics Industry, 1998, Working Paper 26, BRIE, University of Berkeley, 
http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edu/~briewww/publications/WP126.pdf, retrieved on: 21 
September 2006, p. 3.  
20  Cf. Sharman, Graham: The rediscovery of logistics, in: Harvard Business Review, 
Vol. 62 (1984), No. 5, p. 71. 
21  See Forrester, Jay W.: Industrial Dynamics, Waltham, MA 1961 and Akkermans, 
Henk and Nico Dellaert: The rediscovery of industrial dynamics: the contribution of 
system dynamics to supply chain management in a dynamic and fragmented world, 
in: System Dynamics Review, Vol. 21 (2005), No. 3, p. 174. 
22  Cf. Milling, Peter M.: Systemtheoretische und kybernetische Empfehlungen für das 
Supply Chain Management, in: Scholz, Christian (Ed.): Systemdenken und Virtualis-
ierung. Unternehmensstrategien zur Vitalisierung und Virtualisierung auf der Grund-
lage von Systemtheorie und Kybernetik, Berlin 2002a, p. 284. 
5place”.23 In contrast, a supply chain can be considered to be efficient if the focus 
is on cost reduction and no resources are wasted on non-value added activities.24
As Lee notes, “the best supply chains aren’t just fast and cost-effective. They 
are also agile and adaptable, and they ensure that all their companies’ interests 
stay aligned”.25 Decision makers in supply chains face conflicting priorities and 
need to weigh and balance various performance objectives, such as delivery 
performance or supply chain costs, and need to find appropriate ways to im-
prove performance on one or both of these dimensions. There may be planning 
approaches that achieve both, increased efficiency and increased responsive-
ness, at the same time and optimise the balance between the two for different 
types of products. By developing a System Dynamics simulation model of a 
multi-tier supply chain system in the high-tech electronics industry, this work 
investigates the impact of altering key aspects of the planning activities in the 
supply chain with the objective of determining the scope for potential improve-
ments in both responsiveness and efficiency of supply chains in this industry. 
The model developed by the author allows simulation of the dynamics in supply 
chains as complex as those in the high-tech industry and supports the identifica-
tion of appropriate supply chain planning approaches for high-tech electronics 
products. While the model serves primarily as a basis for research, the findings 
are of high practical relevance. The System Dynamics model can support deci-
sion makers in managing supply chains according to the goals of responsiveness 
and efficiency.
The simulation results show that while the current planning approach in 
typical supply chains in the high-tech electronics industry is not capable of sup-
porting high responsiveness at the same time as high efficiency, the planning 
system can be modified to achieve simultaneous improvements in both of these 
dimensions. The results provide practical guidelines on how to align the supply 
chain planning approach with different product characteristics and their life cy-
cle phases, with the objective to balance responsiveness and efficiency of the 
supply chain. 
I. Conflicting Priorities in Supply Chains 
The term “supply chain management” was first used by Oliver and Webber in 
1982, who introduced it as a new perspective that views the supply chain as a 
                                                          
23  This definition is derived and explained in more detail in section A.II, p. 15. 
24  Cf. Naylor, J. Ben, Mohamed M. Naim and Danny Berry: Leagility: Integrating the 
lean and agile manufacturing paradigms in the total supply chain, in: International 
Journal of Production Economics, Vol. 62 (1999), p. 108. 
25  Lee, Hau L.: The Triple-A Supply Chain, in: Harvard Business Review, Vol. 82 
(2004), No. 10, p. 102. 
6single entity rather than splitting it into different functional areas.26 They com-
bine ideas from previous research to create a broader concept for addressing 
what is to be known as supply chain issues. The word “supply chain” can be 
traced back to 1978, where it was used by Burns and Sivazlian who moved be-
yond previous research that concentrated on inventory control for individual 
suppliers and analysed the “dynamic behavior of the multi-echelon supply sys-
tem”.27 Already in 1958, Forrester outlined the principles of supply chain man-
agement, without calling it as such, as studying and managing the complex in-
terrelationships within a production-distribution system.28 Between then and 
today, both terms have been defined and redefined in different ways.29 The defi-
nitions provided below characterize supply chains and supply chain manage-
ment from a systems point of view, which at its core has the basic belief that 
coordinating across different parts of the system can produce a result greater 
than that possible through non-coordinated actions.30 These thoughts are ad-
dressed subsequently, following the definitions of supply chains and supply 
chain management.31
                                                          
26  Cf. Oliver, Keith R. and Michael D. Webber: Supply-chain management: logistics 
catches up with strategy (reprint of the original article from 1982), in: Christopher, 
Martin G. (Ed.): Logistics: The strategic issues, London 1992, pp. 64–66. 
27  Cf. Burns, James F. and Boghos D. Sivazlian: Dynamic Analysis of Multi-Echelon 
Supply Systems, in: Computers & Industrial Engineering, Vol. 2 (1978), No. 4, 
p. 181. The work by Burns and Sivazlian is strongly linked to System Dynamics. It is 
an engineering analogue to Jay W. Forresters early work at the MIT in the 1960s and 
originates from the servomechanism route to feedback that provided useful insights 
for supply chain management. Cf. section C.I.1 and Towill, Denis R.: Industrial dy-
namics modelling of supply chains, in: International Journal of Physical Distribution 
& Logistics Management, Vol. 26 (1996), No. 2, p. 23. 
28  Cf. Forrester: Industrial dynamics: A major breakthrough for decision makers, 
pp. 40–41. 
29  For a concise summary of the different supply chain schools of thought refer to 
Bechtel, Christian and Jayanth Jayaram: Supply Chain Management: A Strategic Per-
spective, in: The International Journal of Logistics Management, Vol. 8 (1997), No. 
1, p. 17. 
30  Cf. Bowersox, Donald J.: Physical Distribution Development, Current Status, and 
Potential, in: Journal of Marketing, Vol. 33 (1969), No. 1, p. 64. See also Simchi-
Levi, David, Philip Kaminsky and Edith Simchi-Levi: Designing and managing the 
supply chain: Concepts, strategies, and case studies, 2nd ed., New York 2003, pp. 1–
4.
31  For a thorough review of the different definitions of the terms supply chain and sup-
ply chain management refer to Hammer, Andreas: Enabling Successful Supply Chain 
Management – Coordination, Collaboration, and Integration for Competitive Advan-
tage, Mannheim 2006, pp. 7–47. 
7Stevens defines the term supply chain as follows: 
“The supply chain… is the connected series of activities which is con-
cerned with planning, coordinating and controlling material, parts and fin-
ished goods from suppliers to the customer. It is concerned with two dis-
tinct flows through the organisation: material and information. The scope 
of the supply chain begins with the source of supply and ends at the point 
of consumption. It extends much further than simply a concern with the 
physical movement of material and is just as much concerned with sup-
plier management, purchasing, materials management, manufacturing 
management, facilities planning, customer service and information flow as 
with transport and physical distribution.”32
Manufacturing supply chains, as opposed to service supply chains, which are 
not discussed here, transform raw materials into products that are useful for the 
end customer. There are multiple flows that need to be managed in industrial 
companies. Two of the most important ones in supply chain management are 
material flows and information flows. Material flows refer to products being 
transported between and within different supply chain nodes. Information flows 
refer to transferring information between the supply chain nodes, both upstream 
and downstream, on aspects such as customer orders, demand forecasts, inven-
tory levels and capacity availability. Such information can be shared with some 
nodes and not with others, and can be updated with varying frequencies.33 Be-
sides material and information flows, there are also money, manpower and capi-
tal equipment flows. Forrester emphasizes that it is critical to understand that all 
of these flows are not independent from each other but are interlinked and influ-
ence each other in ways that are difficult to predict.34 Stevens recognizes these 
interrelationships in his description of the objective of supply chain manage-
ment: 
“The objective of managing the supply chain is to synchronise the re-
quirements of the customer with the flow of material from suppliers in or-
der to effect a balance between what are often seen as the conflicting goals 
                                                          
32  Stevens, Graham C.: Integrating the Supply Chain, in: International Journal of Physi-
cal Distribution & Materials Management, Vol. 19 (1989), No. 8, p. 3. Note that this 
definition does not include product take back, remanufacturing and reverse logistics 
that are today also seen as parts of supply chain management. For more details on 
these aspects of supply chain management refer to Thun, Jörn-Henrik and Jan-Peter 
Mertens: Simulating the Impact of Reverse Logistics on the Bullwhip Effect in 
Closed-Loop-Supply Chains using System Dynamics, EurOMA International Con-
ference – Moving Up the Value Chain, Glasgow 2006. 
33  Cf. Selldin, Erik: Supply chain design – conceptual models and empirical analyses: 
http://www2.ipe.liu.se/es/dr/Avhandling%202005-02-20.pdf, 2005, Doctoral Thesis, 
Linköping Institute of Technology, retrieved on: 19 September 2006, p. 3. 
34  Cf. Forrester: Industrial dynamics: A major breakthrough for decision makers, p. 37. 
8of high customer service, low inventory investment and low unit cost. The 
design and operation of an effective supply chain is of fundamental impor-
tance to every company.”35
This implies a synchronisation of the different members in supply chains, 
which typically are not linear chains with one-to-one, business-to-business rela-
tionships. Instead, supply chains can often be thought of as networks with mul-
tiple nodes, where different supply chain members can interact with one or mul-
tiple other nodes.36 The goal of supply chain management can be summarized as 
the coordination and integration of all activities involved in delivering a product 
into a seamless process, focusing on managing relationships between different 
supply chain echelons and other parts of the supply chain system and not the 
optimization of individual components of that system.37
In line with this objective, Ellram and Cooper define the term supply chain 
management as: 
“Supply chain management is an approach whereby the entire network – 
from suppliers through to the ultimate customers, is analyzed and man-
aged in order to achieve the “best” outcome for the whole system.”38
While concise, the notion of achieving the “‘best’ outcome for the whole 
system”, as described in the above definition of supply chain management, re-
quires clarification. Within a single company, according to Porteus and Whang, 
it is difficult to align the performance measures for different departments with a 
single set of actions taken by all involved decision makers that maximizes the 
performance of the system as a whole.39 Three different perspectives with regard 
to the goals of supply chain management can be distinguished. These are a (1) 
the strategic perspective, focusing on the long-term decisions relating to the 
supply chain, (2) the tactical perspective, focusing on managing the supply 
                                                          
35  Stevens: Integrating the Supply Chain, p. 3. 
36  Cf. Zhang, Yong and David Dilts: System dynamics of supply chain network organi-
zation structure, in: Information Systems and eBusiness Management, Vol. 2 (2004), 
No. 2–3, pp. 187–191 and Lambert and Cooper: Issues in Supply Chain Manage-
ment, p. 65. 
37  Cf. Lummus and Vokurka: Defining supply chain management, p. 11 and Larson, 
Paul D. and Arni Halldorsson: Logistics versus supply chain management: an inter-
national survey, in: International Journal of Logistics: Research & Applications, Vol. 
7 (2004), No. 1, p. 18. 
38  Ellram, Lisa M. and Martha C. Cooper: The Relationship Between Supply Chain 
Management and Keiretsu, in: The International Journal of Logistics Management, 
Vol. 4 (1993), No. 1, p. 1. See also Simchi-Levi, Kaminsky and Simchi-Levi: De-
signing and managing the supply chain, pp. 1–4. 
39  Cf. Porteus, Evan L. and Seungjin Whang: On Manufacturing/Marketing Incentives, 
in: Management Science, Vol. 37 (1991), No. 9, p. 1166. 
9chain and implementing the strategy, and (3) the operational perspective, which 
is concerned with operating the supply chain on a day-to-day basis.40 In many 
cases, the strategic goals of the organization cannot be aligned with the opera-
tional problems and actions taken by decision makers. Therefore decisions will 
be taken with respect to objectives of the decision maker that are not necessarily 
aligned with the objectives of the organization as a whole.  
For example, the performance of employees in the sales department may be 
measured by the customer service level. Customer service in itself is often a 
major determinant of the long-term success of a company. The sales force is 
often responsible for preparing the forecasts, e.g. in the high-tech electronics 
industry, yet forecast accuracy is often not part of their incentive scheme. This 
can cause over-forecasting by the sales people as they attempt to build up a 
cushion to maintain the customer service level. For example, Williams observed 
at On Semiconductor in the late 1990s that “knowing how resources are allo-
cated at the time, Sales quickly learned that the higher the forecast number the 
larger the capacity reservation they would get”. This encouraged them to pre-
pare extremely high forecasts that were eventually adjusted by the manufactur-
ing, planning and finance departments to accommodate their own functional 
objectives.41 Similarly, consider a central planning department whose perform-
ance is evaluated based on inventory levels, and not total supply chain cost. As a 
consequence, the planners may focus on lower batch sizes and stock levels 
without consideration for costs this might incur elsewhere in the system. The 
manufacturing plants, in turn, may focus on total conversion costs (vs. budget), 
and not on production reliability, quality, flexibility or waste. This behaviour 
could cause reduced flexibility, increased lot sizes, and increased fixed cost. As 
a final example, the purchasing department may be evaluated based on im-
provements in the cost of purchased materials, and not based on the reliability of 
the chosen suppliers. This can cause reductions in the reliability and quality of 
the end product, which could have a major impact on the achievement of the 
strategic goals of the organization.  
This phenomenon of decision-makers aligning their actions to subordinate 
goals rather than to the organizational goals is known in organization theory as 
subgoal identification.42 As a consequence, the organizational goals can be 
missed, even if the performance measures for different functions are achieved – 
for example, at a fourth-party logistics (4PL) provider in the electronics industry 
                                                          
40  Cf. Stevens: Integrating the Supply Chain, p. 4 and Simchi-Levi, Kaminsky and Sim-
chi-Levi: Designing and managing the supply chain, pp. 8–9. 
41  Cf. Williams, Tim: Forecasting Journey at On Semiconductor, in: The Journal of 
Business Forecasting, Vol. 25 (2006), No. 1, p. 29. 
42  Cf. Simon, Herbert A.: Rational Decision Making in Business Organizations, in: The 
American Economic Review, Vol. 69 (1979), No. 4, p. 500. 
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analysed by Godsell et al. the targets for performance measures are functionally 
driven. As a consequence, while the 3-day delivery target, which is something 
that is directly controllable by the organization, is consistently achieved, 
99.7 percent of the orders were delivered after the date at which the customer 
requested the goods, with an average delay of 16 days.43 In this case, perform-
ance measures focus on the part of the supply chain where the company is in 
direct control, and not on what is important to the customer. A related difficulty 
is that personal agendas and rivalry also frequently influence the decisions taken 
by people in the organization.44
Regarding the supply chain as a whole, individual entities in that chain may 
have different objectives. Supply chain managers face conflicting priorities that 
involve trade-offs between volume, speed, quality and costs. These trade-offs 
can be caused, for example, by inflexibilities in machines, people or systems, 
but also by an unclear guideline for decision makers on how to take decisions.45
Such potential trade-offs that are involved in strategic decision making have an 
impact on how performance improvements can be achieved.46 Performance of 
supply chains can be measured on various dimensions. In their decision-making 
processes supply chain planners need to consider a diverse set of aspects, in-
cluding the potentially high costs of supply chain management, the size of in-
ventory levels, the quality of customer service, inter-departmental conflicts and 
the re-structuring of goals across the supply chain.47
If the strategic objective of supply chain management in an organization 
were to maximize the responsiveness to customer requests at the lowest total 
cost, measured by delivery performance and inventory turnover, respectively, 
different outcomes are possible. In this example, the cost of potential lost sales 
by not being able to deliver on time needs to be balanced with the cost of carry-
ing larger amounts of inventory, which increases as the inventory turn rate de-
creases. An optimum operating point would achieve 100 percent delivery per-
formance and a very high inventory turnover. Consider the performance of the 
supply chains A, B and C as visualised in Figure A-1, page 12, which shows the 
                                                          
43  Cf. Godsell, Janet et al.: Customer responsive supply chain strategy: An unnatural 
act?, in: International Journal of Logistics, Vol. 9 (2006), pp. 54–55. 
44  This was pointed out by by Carly Fiorina, former Chairman and CEO of Hewlett-
Packard, Palo Alto, during a talk on “Tough Choices” on 18 October 2006 at the 
Sloan School of Management. See  A video recording of the talk is available at 
http://mitsloan.mit.edu/corporate/dils.php. 
45  Cf. Porter, Michael E.: What is strategy?, in: Harvard Business Review, Vol. 74 
(1996), No. 6, p.  69. 
46  Cf. Porter: What is strategy?, pp. 68–70 and Sharman: The rediscovery of logistics, 
p. 77. 
47  Cf. Stevens: Integrating the Supply Chain, p. 5. 
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position of the three supply chains in a two-dimensional space with respect to 
the degrees of efficiency and responsiveness. Assume that each of the three sup-
ply chain managers exerts the same amount of effort in achieving the strategic 
objective and applies the same management practices and tools to the same ex-
tent. However, based on their different individual decisions, the performance 
outcomes are not equal. Supply chain A achieves a high level of responsiveness 
at a low level of efficiency because inventory costs are relatively high. Supply 
chain C achieves the opposite, i.e. high efficiency and low responsiveness. Sup-
ply chain B achieves medium efficiency and medium responsiveness. The line 
connecting the three points in Figure A-1 then represents the maximum respon-
siveness that can be achieved for a given cost level if the three supply chain 
managers apply all management practices and tools available to them to the 
fullest extent. This is called the performance frontier. Given the conditions, i.e. 
available management practices and tools and a given cost level, no higher per-
formance can be achieved.48 The companies below the performance frontiers do 
not exploit the full potential of available management practices and technology 
and perform worse than possible at the benchmark. Such a performance frontier 
for efficiency and responsiveness of supply chains can, for example, be identi-
fied through a survey. One all respondents have been plotted on such a two-
dimensional scale, the performance frontier can be identified by connecting the 
points that have the best linear combinations of efficiency and responsiveness.49
Since the strategic objective in this example is the maximization of respon-
siveness to customer requests at the lowest cost, one can now observe that while 
the three companies operate on the performance frontier none of the three sup-
ply chains truly achieves the strategic objective. Now consider another supply 
chain manager, who uses different management practices to manage supply 
chain D. While supply chain D performs better than B on both dimensions, it 
does not exceed the maximum performance for responsiveness achieved by A 
and the maximum performance for efficiency achieved by C. For a given cost 
level, however, D outperforms the supply chains on the original performance 
frontier with regard to responsiveness, i.e. the two objectives were not subject to 
a trade-off but simultaneously attainable. Supply chain E, finally, achieves an 
improvement on both dimensions that shifts the maximum performance on both 
dimensions to an extent that could not achieved individually by the other supply 
                                                          
48  Cf. Schmenner, Roger W. and Morgan L. Swink: On theory in operations manage-
ment, in: Journal of Operations Management, Vol. 17 (1998), No. 1, pp. 107–110 and 
Hammer: Enabling Successful Supply Chain Management, pp. 22–25. 
49  Cf. Selldin, Erik: Supply chain frontier: achieving excellence in efficiency and re-
sponsiveness, EurOMA International Conference on Operations and Global Competi-
tiveness, Fontainebleau 2004, p. 542. 
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chains. Supply chain E dominates the other supply chains on both performance 
dimensions, responsiveness and efficiency. 
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Figure A-1: Potential Responsiveness-Efficiency Trade-Off 
In addition to the overall trade-offs relating to the strategic objectives of 
supply chain management as a whole, any member of a supply chain may at-
tempt to optimize the chain for its own best interests, as opposed to attempting 
to achieve – possibly to the detriment of own performance objectives – the 
commonly agreed on goals for the “best” performance of the whole system. 
Striving for such a commonly agreed goal may involve transfer payments to 
those supply chain members that may experience higher costs. However, as 
supply chains in the high-tech electronics industry today are fragmented into 
operationally and legally independent companies, companies frequently opti-
mize locally and attempt to “game the system instead of coordinating and opti-
mizing the entire supply chain”.50 Attempting such optimization based on own 
goals as opposed to synchronising the supply chain may have unintended conse-
quences. When a plant shifts ownership of inventory to its suppliers, for exam-
ple, this causes an increase in inventory costs for these suppliers. This in turn 
                                                          
50  Cf. Kok et al.: Philips Electronics Synchronizes Its Supply Chain to End the Bull-
whip Effect, p. 37. 
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increases component prices for the plant. Reducing the inventory levels across 
the entire supply chain, in contrast, can lead to a competitive advantage.51 An 
integrated supply chain strategy needs to recognize these trade-offs and can then 
achieve a balance between supply chain responsiveness and efficiency by modi-
fying the planning and control approaches as necessary.52
II. Reconciliation of Responsiveness and Efficiency 
A physical function and a market mediation function can be distinguished as 
two functions of supply chain management. Understanding the difference is a 
prerequisite for understanding the concepts of responsiveness and efficiency in 
supply chains. According to Fisher, the physical function of a supply chain in-
cludes the conversion of materials into components and finally finished goods, 
storage of those items and their transportation from one point in the supply 
chain to the next.53 The purpose of the market mediation function is to ensure 
that the “variety of products reaching the marketplace matches what customers 
want to buy”.54 As Yücesan and Van Wassenhove note, past research often fo-
cused more on the physical role than on the market mediation role.55
In an efficient supply chain, suppliers, manufacturers and retailers manage – 
implicitly through independent ordering processes between tiers or through ex-
plicit coordination of ordering decisions of the different supply chain elements – 
their activities in order to meet predictable demand at the lowest cost. The focus 
is on maintaining high average utilization rates in manufacturing, generating 
high inventory turns and generally minimizing inventory levels in the supply 
chain, and selecting suppliers primarily for cost and quality.56 Coordinating a 
supply chain to achieve efficiency is a difficult task. In the high-tech electronics 
industry, for example, consider Hewlett-Packard’s supply chain for computer 
monitors. Having outsourced much of the manufacturing process to contract 
manufacturers, the problem in this supply chain was that the suppliers were not 
always aware of their role in the supply chain – “they often didn’t even know 
                                                          
51  Cf. Morais, Richard C.: Damn the torpedoes, in: Forbes, 14 May 2001, 2001, p. 2. 
52  Cf. Stevens: Integrating the Supply Chain, p. 3 and Sharman: The rediscovery of 
logistics, p. 77. See also Oliver and Webber: Supply-chain management: logistics 
catches up with strategy , pp. 65–69. 
53  Cf. Fisher: What is the Right Supply Chain for Your Product?, p. 107. 
54  Fisher: What is the Right Supply Chain for Your Product?, p. 107. 
55  Cf. Yücesan, Enver and Luk N. Van Wassenhove: Supply-Chain.net: The Impact of 
Web-Based Technologies on Supply Chain Management, 2002, Working Paper 
2002/05/TM/CIMSO 26, The Centre for Integrated Manufacturing and Service Op-
erations, INSEAD, http://ged.insead.edu/fichiersti/inseadwp2002/2002-05.pdf, re-
trieved on: 19 September 2006, p. 3. 
56  Cf. Fisher: What is the Right Supply Chain for Your Product?, p. 108. 
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that HP was the ultimate destination for their resin or compound”. This encour-
aged the suppliers to carry a lot of inventory to be prepared for potential orders. 
Unexpected delivery delays that caused lost revenue for all members of the sup-
ply chain were similarly common.57
A responsive supply chain, in contrast, requires an information flow and 
policies from the market place to supply chain members in order to hedge inven-
tory and available production capacity against uncertain demand.58 Accurately 
fulfilling customer orders is an important determinant for the success of such a 
supply chain.59 The notion of responsiveness in supply chains is closely linked 
to the origins of systems thinking. Its understanding, and along with that its 
definition, has evolved over time. A number of authors define the responsive-
ness of a system by linking it exclusively to external events. Ackoff, for exam-
ple, defines the response of a system as follows: 
“A response of a system is a system event for which another event that 
occurs to the same system or to its environment is necessary but not suffi-
cient; that is, a system event produced by another system or environmental 
event (the stimulus). Thus a response is an event of which the system itself 
is a coproducer.”60
This implies that the system can only respond to external stimuli but not to 
internal events alone, since Ackoff considers the triggering of events without 
external stimuli as “acts”.61 Holweg relates responsiveness to supply chain man-
agement and responsive order fulfilment systems and considers the external 
“stimulus” to be the customer order, treating it as an exogenous input to the 
supply chain. 62 Other authors, such as Gonçalves et al., question that demand is 
exogenous to the system and find that considering demand as an exogenous in-
put to the supply chain system provides results that underestimate the true feed-
                                                          
57  Cf. Hammer, Michael: The superefficient company, in: Harvard Business Review, 
Vol. 70 (2001), September, p. 86. 
58  Cf. Fisher: What is the Right Supply Chain for Your Product?, p. 108. 
59  Cf. Lee, Hau L.: Aligning Supply Chain Strategies with Product Uncertainties, in: 
California Management Review, Vol. 44 (2002), No. 3, p. 114. 
60  Ackoff, Russell L.: Towards a System of Systems Concepts, in: Management Sci-
ence, Vol. 17 (1971), No. 11, p. 664. 
61  Cf. Ackoff: Towards a System of Systems Concepts, p. 664, and Reichhart, Andreas 
and Matthias Holweg: Creating the Customer-responsive Supply Chain: A Recon-
ciliation of Concepts, 2006, forthcoming in: International Journal of Operations & 
Production Management, http://www-
innovation.jbs.cam.ac.uk/publications/reichhart_creating.pdf, retrieved on: 10 Sep-
tember 2006, pp. 8–9. 
62  Cf. Holweg, Matthias: The three dimensions of responsiveness, in: International 
Journal of Operations & Production Management, Vol. 25 (2005b), No. 7, p. 605. 
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back effects in supply chains, as demand depends on the supply chain perform-
ance.63 It is important to take the system boundaries into account when defining 
responsiveness and it is a prerequisite for defining responsiveness to define the 
system’s customers. The reason is that responsiveness can differ at different 
nodes in the system. When considering the end customer, high responsiveness is 
typically a requirement, while internal customers, such as the next stage in a 
production process, could require less responsiveness due to the presence of raw 
material buffer stocks, long lead times and large batch sizes.64
With regard to supply chain-related definitions of responsiveness, Holweg 
also emphasizes the aspect that responsiveness relates only to the response to 
events that are external to the system studied, as opposed to system internal 
events. Holweg highlights customer demand as a major external stimulus, yet 
there are other conceivable inputs to supply chain systems that cause responses 
in supply chain systems, such as changes in the marketplace. As noted above, it 
may not be appropriate for all purposes to model customer demand as being 
external to the system, yet it is appropriate to measure responsiveness to end 
customer demand nonetheless. Based on Holweg65 and Reichhart and Holweg66,
for the purpose of this work the following definition of supply chain respon-
siveness is adopted: 
Supply chain responsiveness is the ability of the supply chain to respond 
purposefully and within an appropriate time-scale to customer requests or 
changes in the marketplace. 
System internal events, such as machine break-downs or process output 
variations, as well as the overall structure of the system, have an impact on and 
determine supply chain responsiveness. This is captured by the concept of sup-
ply chain flexibility, defined as the generic ability of the supply chain to adapt to 
                                                          
63  Cf. Gonçalves, Paulo M., Jim Hines and John D. Sterman: The impact of endogenous 
demand on push-pull production systems, in: System Dynamics Review, Vol. 21 
(2005), No. 3, pp. 211–213. See also Hanssmann, Fred: Optimal Inventory Location 
and Control in Production and Distribution Networks, in: Operations Research, Vol. 
4 (1959), No. 4, p. 484. 
64  Cf. Reichhart and Holweg: Creating the Customer-responsive Supply Chain, p. 10f, 
and Holweg, Matthias: An investigation into supplier responsiveness – Empirical 
evidence from the automotive industry, in: The International Journal of Logistics 
Management, Vol. 16 (2005a), No. 1, p. 111. 
65  Cf. Holweg: The three dimensions of responsiveness, p. 605 and p. 608. Holweg’s 
definitions are based on and extend Kritchanchai, Duangpun and Bart L. MacCarthy: 
Responsiveness of the order fulfilment process, in: International Journal of Opera-
tions & Production Management, Vol. 19 (1999), No. 8, pp. 812–817. 
66  Cf. Reichhart and Holweg: Creating the Customer-responsive Supply Chain, p. 10. 
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internal and/or external influences.67 Reichhart and Holweg argue that respon-
siveness should be measured at the end customer stage only, and that flexibility 
is a requirement and prerequisite to achieving responsiveness to short-term end 
customer demand changes. Being responsive to customer demand, as per this 
definition, requires internal flexibility to be able to react to problems that occur 
within the supply chain.68
Improving responsiveness in a supply chain can incur costs for three primary 
reasons: (1) excess inventories may need to be maintained, (2) excess buffer 
capacity may need to be provided and (3) investments to reduce lead times may 
need to be made. Boeing, for example, at the end of the 1990s failed to achieve 
sufficient buffer capacity or inventory levels by pursuing a lean manufacturing 
strategy without considering the variability of demand in the aerospace industry. 
As a consequence, Boeing was less able to react to a large demand increase than 
its sole competitor Airbus Industrie and lost market share.69 If, as in this exam-
ple, end-user demand is subject to sudden, unpredictable variations, it is not 
sensible to implement lean manufacturing at the interface with the end user.70
Regarding investments made to reduce lead times, consider the automotive in-
dustry. The current car supply chain allows for little flexibility for responding to 
customer demand signals. This is not problematic in a market where vehicles are 
primarily sold from stock. However, in a build-to-order system, as Holweg et al. 
find, the majority of customers demand delivery within two to three weeks, 
which is not achievable in the current system.71 In general, the cost resulting 
from investments in responsiveness needs to be compared to the opportunity 
cost of lost sales resulting from stockouts or generally not being able to deliver 
at the date desired by the customer.72 Responsive supply chains aim to avoid 
                                                          
67  Cf. Holweg: The three dimensions of responsiveness, p. 608. 
68  Cf. Reichhart and Holweg: Creating the Customer-responsive Supply Chain, pp. 5–
11.
69  Cf. Naylor, Naim and Berry: Leagility: Integrating the lean and agile manufacturing 
paradigms in the total supply chain, p. 108 and p. 112. 
70  Cf. Fisher: What is the Right Supply Chain for Your Product?, p. 106 and Naylor, 
Naim and Berry: Leagility: Integrating the lean and agile manufacturing paradigms in 
the total supply chain, p. 112. 
71  Cf. Holweg, Matthias et al.: Towards responsive vehicle supply: a simulation-based 
investigation into automotive scheduling systems, in: Journal of Operations Man-
agement, Vol. 23 (2005), No. 5, pp. 510–511. See also Elias, Simon: New Car Buyer 
Behaviour, 2002, Research Survey Report April 2002, Cardiff Business School, Car-
diff University, 
http://www.3daycar.com/mainframe/publications/library/newcarbuyer.pdf, retrieved 
on: 9 October 2006, pp. 14–16. 
72  Cf. Thonemann, Ulrich et al.: Supply Chain Excellence im Handel – Trends, Erfolgs-
faktoren und Best-Practice-Beispiele, Wiesbaden 2005, p. 18. 
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such stockouts and therefore prioritise the ability to react to changing customer 
requirements.73
The three principal means companies have to buffer against changes in 
quantity demanded for specific products are inventory, capacity and time. Safety 
stocks, excess capacity and safety lead times all provide a time buffer to be able 
to react to demand variability.74 For suppliers in a supply chain, inventory lev-
els, lead-times, available capacity and batch size are important determinants of 
responsiveness.75 One could argue that one sensible approach to increase re-
sponsiveness could be to raise the inventory levels of finished goods or compo-
nents. These higher stock levels would allow more flexibility for reactions to 
changes in customer demand and reduce the required lead time. Increased in-
ventory levels do, however, reduce the efficiency of the supply chain since they 
are costly, both in terms of storage cost and cost of capital. Also, increasing in-
ventory for some products implies a reliance on a forecast that could be inaccu-
rate and leave the company with either lost sales or obsolete products, or both.76
This is related to the newsvendor or newsboy problem studied in behavioural 
operations research, where a newsvendor faces both overage and underage costs 
and needs to determine the number of newspapers to stock on a newsstand be-
fore observing customer demand.77 In companies, the problem of determining 
the appropriate inventory levels before knowing demand is amplified by differ-
ences in incentive structures in different departments. Porteus and Whang re-
mark that the trade-off between different performance measures, such as cus-
tomer service level and inventory costs, arises primarily because there is no per-
formance measure that is simultaneously maximized by a single set of actions 
taken by all involved decision makers.78 The trade-off between inventory and 
                                                          
73  Cf. Alicke: Planung und Betrieb von Logistiknetzwerken, p. 147. 
74  Cf. Hopp, Wallace J. and Mark L. Spearman: To Pull or Not to Pull: What Is the 
Question?, in: Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, Vol. 6 (2004), No. 
3, p. 145. 
75  Cf. Holweg, Matthias and Frits K. Pil: Flexibility First, in: Industrial Engineer, Vol. 
37 (2005), No. 6, p. 47. 
76  Cf. Kaipia, Riikka: The impact of improved supply chain planning on upstream op-
erations, 17th Annual NOFOMA Conference, Copenhagen 2005, p. 13. 
77  Thomas et al. analyse a two-component newsvendor problem in which two comple-
mentary components with different lead times must be purchased under demand un-
certainty regarding the product into which they are assembled. See Thomas, Douglas 
J., Donald P. Warsing and Xueyi Zhang: Forecast Updating and Supplier Coordina-
tion for Complementary Component Purchases, 2005, Working Paper, Smeal College 
of Business, The Pennsylvania State University, 
http://www.personal.psu.edu/faculty/d/j/djt11/papers/forecastupdate.pdf, retrieved 
on: 10 September 2006, pp. 1–32. 
78  Cf. Porteus and Whang: On Manufacturing/Marketing Incentives, p. 1166. 
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cost suggests that an increase in inventory may not be the optimal approach to 
increase responsiveness – or, as Hopp and Spearman phrased it: “inventory is 
the flower of all evil, and variability is its root”79, i.e. high inventory levels are a 
sign that something is suboptimal in the supply chain, and other strategies such 
as variability reductions may be more beneficial than inventory increases.80
Providing the right degree of responsiveness and having an efficient supply 
chain at the same time is a goal that is hard to achieve and that typically in-
volves trade-off decisions by management, since increased responsiveness can 
be perceived to come at the expense of reduced efficiency, and vice versa.81
However, there may be strategies, such as revised planning approaches, that 
restructure supply chain processes to achieve both higher responsiveness and 
higher efficiency at the same time and enable a supply chain to be responsive 
and efficient simultaneously. In doing this, there may well be internal trade-offs, 
such as increased inventory levels at a particular point in the supply chain. Ste-
vens points out that achieving the balance between responsiveness, e.g. service 
levels, and efficiency, e.g., costs, in a supply chain necessarily involves trade-
offs in some parts of the chain.82 Successful supply chain management in this 
view requires an integrated perspective of the entire supply chain. This is in line 
with research indicating that “there is always a trade-off” at some point in the 
system.83 Identifying strategies that simultaneously achieve efficiency and re-
sponsiveness is the goal of the research presented in this work. 
Responsiveness and efficiency are interrelated. They are directly and indi-
rectly linked and even involve feedback. In supply chains, the interrelationships 
between key parts of the system are complex. There are various players in the 
supply chain, and each of them addresses aspects of demand, production, and 
supply management, distribution, planning etc. Each of these aspects also inter-
acts with the others. These interrelationships form feedback loops that either 
                                                          
79  Hopp and Spearman: To Pull or Not to Pull: What Is the Question?, p. 146. 
80  Similarly, Martin Christopher notes that “uncertainty is the mother of inventory” and 
that inventory merely hides problems. Cf. Christopher, Martin G.: Logistics and Sup-
ply Chain Management: Creating Value-Adding Networks, 3rd ed., Harlow 2005, p. 
129.
81  Cf. Simchi-Levi, Kaminsky and Simchi-Levi: Designing and managing the supply 
chain, pp. 113–116, Olhager, Jan: Strategic positioning of the order penetration point, 
in: International Journal of Production Economics, Vol. 85 (2003), No. 3, p. 328 and 
Blackhurst, Jennifer et al.: An empirically derived agenda of critical research issues 
for manging supply-chain disruptions, in: International Journal of Production Re-
search, Vol. 43 (2005), No. 19 p. 4077. 
82  Cf. Stevens: Integrating the Supply Chain, p. 3. 
83  Cf. Hammer: Enabling Successful Supply Chain Management, pp. 72–73, and 
Schmenner and Swink: On theory in operations management, pp. 106–107. 
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reinforce or cancel out management initiatives in unintuitive ways. This is the 
case both when such initiatives are carried out by individual supply chain mem-
bers in an uncoordinated fashion as well as when supply chain members coordi-
nate their initiatives and attempt to align policies in the supply chain. These 
feedback loops make problem solving and decision making difficult because it 
is not at all obvious which combination of strategic or operational levers will 
have the desired effect in the short or long term. Catalan and Kotzab, for exam-
ple, identify a responsiveness loop in mobile phone supply chains, shown in 
Figure A-2. They argue that the current mobile phone supply chains in Denmark 
are positioned in a negative feedback loop, where lack of real time information 
exchanges reduces the efficiency of postponement strategies. This increases the 
bullwhip effect, which reduces demand transparency and time efficiency and in 
turn again reduces the real time information exchange due to a lack of relation-
ships.84 The same feedback loop can also be turned into a positive reinforcing 
feedback loop; however, this would require structural changes, such as building 
information sharing systems that rely on trust between selected partners.85
                                                          
84  Cf. Catalan, Michael and Herbert Kotzab: Assessing the responsiveness in the Danish 
Mobile phone supply chain, in: International Journal of Physical Distribution & Lo-
gistics Management, Vol. 33 (2003), No. 8, p. 683. 
85  Cf. Catalan and Kotzab: Assessing the responsiveness in the Danish Mobile phone 
supply chain, pp. 682–683. 
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Figure A-2: Responsiveness Loop86
As another example of such interrelationships, a deliberate increase in safety 
stock may raise responsiveness through increased product availability when 
customer needs change unexpectedly, reducing the required lead time. At the 
same time, such an increase in inventory levels raises the cost level both di-
rectly, i.e. through increased cost of capital and storage costs, as well as indi-
rectly, since the products on stock might not sell and eventually become obso-
lete. This increased cost level reduces the degree of efficiency. This is an exam-
ple for a trade-off between efficiency and responsiveness, which is visualised in 
Figure A-3.87 Specifically, it can be seen that increasing safety stock is a trade-
off decision because an increase in the responsiveness goal increases the will-
ingness to accept higher safety stock, while an increase in the efficiency goal 
reduces this willingness. The two goals balance each other, causing the system 
to finally adjust to a specific level of safety stock.  
                                                          
86  Adapted from Catalan and Kotzab: Assessing the responsiveness in the Danish Mo-
bile phone supply chain, p. 683. The snowball symbol  in Figure A-3 represents 
the loop polarity, indicating a reinforcing feedback loop. The definitions of link and 
loop polarity, related time behaviour and many examples can be found in Sterman, 
John D.: Business Dynamics – Systems Thinking and Modeling for a Complex 
World, Boston 2000a, pp. 135 et sqq. 
87  Cf. Minnich, Dennis A. and Frank H. Maier: Investigating Supply Chain Respon-
siveness and Efficiency with a System Dynamics-Based Model, EurOMA Interna-
tional Conference – Moving Up the Value Chain, Glasgow 2006a, pp. 337–338 and 
Minnich, Dennis A. and Frank H. Maier: Supply Chain Responsiveness and Effi-
ciency – Complementing or Contradicting Each Other?, 24th International Confer-
ence of the System Dynamics Society, Nijmegen 2006b, p. 5–6. 
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Figure A-3: Inventory Loops: Limits to Success88
As outlined previously, there may be investment opportunities that increase 
both the degree of efficiency and the degree of responsiveness of the supply 
chain. Hopp and Spearman describe the example of Moog, Inc., a producer of 
precision servo valves. This company used lean methods to eliminate waste, 
thus increasing efficiency. At the same time, they increased selected inventory 
buffers using sophisticated models to segregate certain problems in production, 
which were addressed later. All other inventory buffers were reduced, again 
increasing efficiency. The result “has been much greater responsiveness to the 
customer with improved service. The improved flow also resulted in an unex-
pected (for management) benefit – a greater than 5% improvement in productiv-
ity”.89 One other possibility for such an improvement of supply chain perform-
ance on both of these dimensions is to consider the structural conditions of both 
demand and supply in the (re-)design of the planning system.  
Depending on product characteristics, forecast quality etc., certain options 
may outperform others on both dimensions, responsiveness and efficiency. This 
could mean, for example, that such a move leads both to improvements in the 
                                                          
88  The scale symbol  and the snowball symbol  in Figure A-3 represent the loop 
polarities, indicating balancing and reinforcing feedback loops, respectively. See 
Sterman: Business Dynamics, pp. 135 et sqq. 
89  Cf. Hopp and Spearman: To Pull or Not to Pull: What Is the Question?, p. 146. 
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time it takes for the supply chain to adjust to changes in demand, as well as to 
reductions in safety inventory because of improvements such as lead time reduc-
tions. This is visualized in Figure A-4 below.90 Here, it can be seen that plan-
ning improvements are not a trade-off decision because both the responsiveness 
goal and the efficiency goal increase the willingness to invest in planning im-
provements. When either efficiency or responsiveness is improved through an 
improved planning system, willingness to invest shifts to the other goal. This 
behaviour causes a reinforcing feedback loop, since the investment aimed at 
achieving the respective other goal will again have a positive impact on the for-
mer. There is no boundary for investments in planning systems until both the 
efficiency and the responsiveness goal are reached, while there is one in the case 
of safety stock. 
These feedback relationships are explained for illustrative purposes at this 
point. They represent a meta-level of thinking that is not represented explicitly 
in the System Dynamics model developed later in this work. The time horizon 
for the developments described here is longer than that represented in the simu-
lation model, which simulates the supply chain behaviour for products with very 
short life cycles. 
                                                          
90  Cf. Minnich and Maier: Investigating Supply Chain Responsiveness and Efficiency 
with a System Dynamics-Based Model, pp. 338–339 and Minnich and Maier: Supply 
Chain Responsiveness and Efficiency, pp. 6–7. 
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Figure A-4: Planning Loops: Improvements for Growth 
There may also be performance measurement problems caused by time de-
lays in the system, leading to suboptimal future decisions. In supply chains, time 
delays are prevalent at various points. In addition to, for example, long supplier 
lead times, information about demand takes some time until it passes through 
the supply chain and might even be distorted on the way. As an example for a 
performance measurement problem that leads to wrong future decisions, con-
sider an investment in a manufacturing cycle time reduction. This investment 
may only show a measurable change in relevant performance measures after a 
certain time period, leading the company to believe that the investment did not 
cause the desired effects. Initially, performance of the process is reduced as the 
process is changed and throughput drops for a certain time period while im-
provements are being made. There is a time delay until results are obtained and 
the performance of the redesigned process is superior to that of the old process. 
This typical worse-before-better pattern, in turn, may lead decision makers to 
discontinue these or similar investments in the initial phase because of their per-
ceived lack of impact, which would have a negative effect on responsiveness.91
                                                          
91  On the worse-before-better pattern see, for example, Keating, Elizabeth K. et al.:
Overcoming the Improvement Paradox, in: European Management Journal, Vol. 17 
(1999), No. 2. 
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In addition to such internal policy issues, supply chains often face several 
other challenges that can reduce the responsiveness of the system. Examples 
include long component lead times, supply chain disruptions, erroneous compo-
nents, capacity constraints and missing information about actual end customer 
demand. Information flows, in general, are a major concern in complex supply 
chains. A responsive supply chain requires an information flow from the market 
place to supply chain members in order to hedge inventory and available pro-
duction capacity against uncertain demand.92 In the high-tech industry, access to 
critical data about the supply chain is difficult or impossible due to the global 
and fragmented supply chain structure.93 Supply chain planning and control 
policies are often suboptimal, which results in inefficient systems that cannot 
satisfy customer demand appropriately, or only at very high cost. 
The interrelatedness between responsiveness and efficiency suggests that ac-
tions taken to improve efficiency, such as investments in manufacturing cycle 
time reductions, or different policies, such as modified planning systems, could 
simultaneously lead to improvements in responsiveness. On the other hand, hav-
ing achieved a high degree of responsiveness allows management to direct its 
attention more towards efficiency and cost considerations. In view of this inter-
relatedness, a focus on responsiveness or efficiency does not necessarily involve 
a trade-off of the other – empirical studies show that “some plants have over-
come the apparent trade off between innovativeness and efficiency”.94
Thonemann et al. conducted a study of 33 fast-moving consumer goods 
(FMCG) retailers in four European countries, representing 25 percent of retail 
revenue in Europe.95 Their findings show that it is possible for companies to 
simultaneously keep investment and effort down while guaranteeing a high 
availability of goods. In the retail industry, high availability of goods means 
fully stocked shelves, i.e. this represents an inventory investment. Thonemann et 
al. evaluate the supply chain performance of those companies and contrast the 
two dimensions of goods availability, which is a measure for the responsiveness 
of the supply chain, and logistical effort, which is a measure for its efficiency.96
Their results, as visualised in Figure A-5, show that several companies, which 
they call champions, outperform their competitors on both dimensions, respon-
siveness and efficiency. 
                                                          
92  Cf. Fisher: What is the Right Supply Chain for Your Product?, p. 108. 
93  Cf. Pande, Raman and Srivatsan: Recapturing your supply chain data, p. 16. 
94  Cf. Thun, Jörn-Henrik: Supply Chain Management and Plant Performance – An Em-
pirical Analysis of the Fisher Model, Sixteenth Annual Conference of POMS, Chi-
cago 2005, pp. 8–9 and 14–16. 
95  Cf. Thonemann et al.: Supply Chain Excellence im Handel, p. 14. 
96  Cf. Thonemann et al.: Supply Chain Excellence im Handel, pp. 21–22.  
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Figure A-5: Supply Chain Performance of Companies in the European Retail Industry97
Similarly, research findings by Auramo et al. suggest that it is possible for 
supply chain members to increase their own operational efficiency while at the 
same time improving the service provided to their customers, i.e. responsive-
ness. According to Auramo et al. in their study of the production equipment 
industry for process industries such as chemical manufacturing or pulp and pa-
per mills, this movement away from the trade-off between responsiveness and 
efficiency can be achieved by cooperation between customers and suppliers, 
changing performance measures, using demand information for planning 
throughout the supply chain and reducing the number of stock keeping units 
                                                          
97  Adapted from Thonemann et al.: Supply Chain Excellence im Handel, p. 22. Used 
with permission. Goods availability is measured as the number of goods available on 
store shelves as a percentage of all merchandise carried. Effort is captured as cost for 
inventory and logistics as a percentage of revenues. The group of champions was 
identified by expressing the dimensions of service and effort as a percentage of reve-
nue, making the different companies comparable on both dimensions. 
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(SKUs) to be planned.98 Given the current structure of supply chains in the high-
tech industry, some of these measures are difficult to implement. 
Actions taken by supply chain members to improve efficiency may increase 
their ability to be responsive, and vice versa. In particular, alternative planning 
systems may allow improvements in both responsiveness and efficiency. For 
example, Kaipia and Holmström identify this need for alternative planning ap-
proaches, particularly for OEMs with wide product portfolios in volatile markets 
such as the high-tech electronics industry.99 The author is not aware of any 
simulation-based study indicating whether introducing alternative planning ap-
proaches is an enabler for improvements of both the responsiveness and the ef-
ficiency of a supply chain and, in general, to what extent supply chains can 
“push their performance frontiers to become more competitive”.100 In this con-
text several questions need to be answered. 
− Are there specific conditions under which trade-offs between efficiency 
and responsiveness are likely to occur and/or under which trade-offs 
can be avoided within the structure of a high-tech electronics supply 
chain? Is the currently dominant planning approach capable of support-
ing more responsive supply chain strategies while being efficient at the 
same time? 
− Which supply chain planning policies are required to provide sufficient 
responsiveness and efficiency for different products at any stage of the 
product life cycle? 
− How can trade-offs be resolved and both responsiveness and efficiency 
be achieved at the same time? 
− If trade-offs can be avoided, should a supply chain focus on efficiency 
during the initial stages of the product life cycle and then build respon-
siveness, or should responsiveness come first? 
                                                          
98  Cf. Auramo, Jaana, Kari Tanskanen and Johanna Småros: Increasing operational 
efficiency through improved customer service – a case from the process maintenance 
business, Logistics Research Network (LRN) 8th annual conference, London 2003, 
p. 2 and pp. 7–9. 
99  Cf. Kaipia, Riikka and Jan Holmström: Selecting the right planning approach for a 
product, in: Supply Chain Management: An International Journal, Vol. 12 (2007), 
No. 1, p. 7 and pp. 9–12. 
100  Cf.Kaipia and Holmström: Selecting the right planning approach for a product, p. 11 
and Reichhart and Holweg: Creating the Customer-responsive Supply Chain, pp. 27–
28.
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− What are the areas of maximum leverage, where current system features 
pose potential inhibitors to achieving increased responsiveness and effi-
ciency? 
These are aspects investigated in this work. The objective of the model is to 
capture generic structures and the intrinsic dynamics of supply chains and to 
understand the linkages and dynamics between responsiveness and efficiency in 
supply chains. 
B. Supply Chain Management in the High-Tech 
Electronics Industry 
In any industry, the goal of supply chain management is to satisfy customer re-
quirements efficiently. However, the level of difficulty of finding the appropri-
ate balance between responsiveness to customer requirements and efficiency 
depends on the industry considered. Supply chains can be designed in different 
ways for different types of products in order to address this potential trade-off 
between responsiveness to customer requirements and efficiency, but they are 
also subject to external factors and challenges. This chapter first provides an 
overview of the characteristics of production processes and supply chain struc-
tures in the high-tech electronics industry. This is followed by a discussion of 
the challenges that these supply chains face. The chapter concludes with a sec-
tion on why addressing these supply chain challenges is a critical issue for com-
panies in the high-tech electronics industry and elsewhere. 
I. Production Processes and Supply Chain Structures in the High-Tech 
Electronics Industry 
Manufacturing companies can be classified into industrial sectors according to 
the nature of the products they make. As Berry and Towill note, those bounda-
ries can become blurred when considering a supply chain, as such a chain may 
cross boundaries between industrial sectors.101 For example, consider a producer 
of semiconductors. These are essential components of high-tech electronics 
products, such as fashionable mobile phones, but are also used by car manufac-
turers in a different industrial sector, where they face relatively stable de-
mand.102 Manufacturing companies operating in the high-tech industry comprise 
both large and small companies in semiconductors and components, enterprise 
computing, data communications equipment, end-user devices and consumer 
electronics, software and services, industrial electronics and electro-medical 
equipment.103 The focus of this work is on the supply chain layers close to the 
end customer, thus excluding the details of the supply chain processes in, for 
                                                          
101  Cf. Berry, Danny and Denis R. Towill: Material Flow in Electronic Product Based 
Supply Chains, in: International Journal of Logistics Management, Vol. 3 (1992), 
No. 2, p. 78. 
102  Cf. Berry and Towill: Material Flow in Electronic Product Based Supply Chains, 
p. 78 and Pande, Raman and Srivatsan: Recapturing your supply chain data, p. 18. 
103  Cf. n.a.: Defining the high-tech industry, American Electronics Association, 2003, 
p. 5. 
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example, semiconductor fabs, which are discussed elsewhere.104 Similarly, 
software and computer-related services are excluded. Also, according to Axel 
Karlsson, partner at the consulting firm McKinsey & Company, Inc., the struc-
ture of typical upstream supply chains for companies that manufacture semicon-
ductors and components differs significantly from the general structure typically 
found in supply chains in the high-tech electronics industry, which is similar for 
many products.105 The companies making the semiconductors are suppliers for 
the supply chains coordinated by the OEMs. In the high-tech electronics indus-
try, these OEMs typically have a high degree of influence on the supply net-
work, which is why they are considered to be focal companies as they take a 
leadership role in their supply network.106
Supply chains for products in the high-tech electronics sector typically 
stretch from raw materials, such as silicon for wafer manufacturing and crude 
oil for the plastic used for injection molded cases, through several different 
component manufacturers who supply the final assembly plant with compo-
nents.107 From the final assembly plant, the products pass through companies 
such as network operators, distributors and/or electronic goods retailers to reach 
the end customer and ultimate user of the product.108 There are three main pro-
duction steps for most high-tech electronics products, such as network routers, 
mobile phones or MP3 players. These are (1) board printing, also known as 
printed circuit board assembly (PCBA), (2) final assembly and (3) software 
flashing, packaging and shipment. The final step of software flashing and pack-
ing is usually done in house by OEMs such as Nokia, Ericsson, Apple or Sony-
Ericsson, while a large percentage of the rest of the supply chain is often out-
sourced to contract manufacturers, such as Solectron. These contract manufac-
                                                          
104  See, for example, Gonçalves, Paulo M.: Demand Bubbles and Phantom Orders in 
Supply Chains, 2003, Doctoral Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; 
Gonçalves, Hines and Sterman: The impact of endogenous demand on push-pull pro-
duction systems; Johnson, Jeffrey D.: Managing Variability in the Semiconductor 
Supply Chain, 2005, Master's Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Lee, 
Young Hoon et al.: Supply chain model for the semiconductor industry in considera-
tion of manufacturing characteristics, in: Production Planning & Control, Vol. 17 
(2006), No. 5. 
105  Axel Karlsson, partner at McKinsey & Company, Inc., Stockholm, personal commu-
nication, 15 March 2006. 
106  Cf. Harland, Christine M. et al.: A Taxonomy of Supply Networks, in: Journal of 
Supply Chain Management, Vol. 37 (2001), No. 4, Fall, pp. 25–26. 
107  See, for example, Catalan and Kotzab: Assessing the responsiveness in the Danish 
Mobile phone supply chain, p. 671. 
108  Cf. Olhager, Jan et al.: Supply chain impacts at Ericsson – from production units to 
demand-driven supply units, in: International Journal of Technology Management, 
Vol. 23 (2002), No. 1/2/3, p. 47. 
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turers often have a role that exceeds that of providing production capacity ac-
cording to customer specifications and can encompass raw material purchases as 
well as product design and planning.109 Apple, for example, has an own facility 
for final assembly in Ireland. However, the company also relies on external 
vendors for final assembly, e.g. final assembly of all of Apple’s portable prod-
ucts (PowerBooks, iBooks, iPods) is performed by third-party vendors in Japan, 
Taiwan and China.110 Similarly, according to Angel Mendez, senior vice presi-
dent of worldwide manufacturing at Cisco, the company has “limited internal 
manufacturing” and outsources most manufacturing processes to contract manu-
facturers.111
As another example, on average, 35 percent of all mobile phone production, 
encompassing the manufacturing and sub-assembly steps as well as final assem-
bly, was performed by contract manufacturers in 2006.112 Different companies 
in the industry take different approaches to outsourcing, as is visualised for the 
                                                          
109  Cf. Kaipia, Korhonen and Hartiala: Planning nervousness in a demand supply net-
work, p. 97; Mason, Scott J. et al.: Improving electronics manufacturing supply chain 
agility through outsourcing, in: International Journal of Physical Distribution & Lo-
gistics Management, Vol. 32 (2002), No. 7, p. 613 and Wendin, Christine: Electron-
ics Manufacturing: EMS at a Crossroads, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2004, pp. 3–8. 
110  Cf. Apple Computer, Inc.: Form 10-Q: Quarterly Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 2006, p. 36. 
111  Cf. n.a.: At today's Cisco Systems, the fewer suppliers the better, in: Purchasing 
Magazine Online, 20 April 2006, 2006, 
http://www.purchasing.com/index.asp?layout=articlePrint&articleID=CA6324660, 
retrieved on 9 March 2007, pp. 1–2. 
112  Cf. Visiongain: Mobile Handset Outsourcing, 2006, Visiongain, 
http://www.reportbuyer.com/telecoms/handsets_devices/mobile_handset_outsourcing
.html, retrieved on: 9 March 2007, p. 1. In 2004, according to another source, 
40 percent of all mobile phone production was performed by contract manufacturers. 
See Coker, Bill: The ODM Threat to EMS, in: Circuits Assembly, February 2004, 
2004, p. 34. 
32
major mobile phone OEMs in Figure B-1. 113 Nokia and Motorola limited their 
share of handset production that is outsourced to about 20 percent in 2004, with 
Nokia deciding to “minimize outsourcing, unlike the rest of the industry” in 
order to keep control over the process, and Motorola attempting to “reach a bal-
ance between internal and external production”.114 Siemens outsourced around 
30 percent of its handset production at that time. SonyEricsson outsourced two 
thirds of its production, which makes it the greatest user of contract manufactur-
ers in this industry.115 SonyEricsson also relies heavily on outsourcing for its 
other activities, ranging from design and development of the products by ODMs 
to outsourcing the distribution and repair processes.116
                                                          
113  The information on worldwide mobile phone shipments was taken from the IDC 
Worldwide Quarterly Mobile Phone Tracker, published in various press releases on 
the IDC web site. See IDC: IDC – Press Release: Worldwide Mobile Phone Market 
Breaks 200 Million Unit Mark in 3Q05, 2005, IDC, 
http://www.idc.com/getdoc.jsp?containerId=pr2005_10_13_112836, retrieved on: 14 
October 2006; IDC: IDC – Press Release: A Strong Fourth Quarter Sends Worldwide 
Mobile Phone Shipments over 800 Million Unis for 2005, 2006a, IDC, 
http://www.idc.com/getdoc.jsp?containerId=prUS20056906, retrieved on: 14 Octo-
ber 2006; IDC: IDC – Press Release: Worldwide Mobile Phone Market Exhibits 
Strong Year-Over-Year Growth on Continued Strength of Developing Markets, 
2006c, IDC, http://www.idc.com/getdoc.jsp?containerId=pr2006_04_19_142525, re-
trieved on: 14 October 2006 and IDC: IDC – Press Release: Mobile Phone Shipments 
Continue Robust Growth in the Second Quarter, 2006b, IDC, 
http://www.idc.com/getdoc.jsp?containerId=pr2006_07_19_162102, retrieved on: 14 
October 2006. 
114  Cf. Coker: The ODM Threat to EMS, p. 34;  Morais: Damn the torpedoes, p. 2 and 
Reinhardt, Andy: The Making of a Nokia Phone, in: Business Week online, 3 August 
2006, 2006a, 
http://images.businessweek.com/ss/06/08/makingof_nokia/index_01.htm, retrieved 
on 9 March 2007, p. 1. 
115  Cf. Wu, Jeffrey: OEMs and EMS - Foxconn makes inroads with Sony Ericsson, in: 
EMSNow, 7 December 2005, 2005, 
http://www.emsnow.com/npps/story.cfm?id=15971, retrieved on 9 March 2007, 
pp. 1–2. 
116  Cf. Bowman, Robert J.: Looking Backward: Sony Ericsson Takes on Challenge Of 
Reverse Logistics, in: Global Logistics and Supply Chain Strategies 2006, 
http://www.pressroom.ups.com/staticfiles/articles/514.pdf, retrieved on 9 March 
2007, pp. 1–4. 
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Figure B-1: Outsourcing in the Mobile Phone Industry: Handset Shipments of the Top-5 
players in the Mobile Phone Industry (2004) 
Supply chains in this industry consist of multiple fabrication, assembly, test-
ing and packaging sites that are often located in different countries.117 The sim-
plified supply chain depicted in Figure B-2, for example, has two inbound 
                                                          
117  Cf. Lee et al.: Supply chain model for the semiconductor industry in consideration of 
manufacturing characteristics, p. 518. 
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chains, even though in reality there would be multiple.118 The upper one repre-
sents circuit boards, which are electronic components that are needed for final 
assembly. The chipset suppliers need to use sub-suppliers to obtain, for exam-
ple, wafers. These wafer suppliers need other raw materials, such as silicon. 
These relationships are not represented in the figure. The lower inbound chain to 
final assembly (FAT) deals with other components, for example flips for mobile 
phones. The Other FAT supplier making those flips will need its own suppliers 
that deliver, for example, plastics (the 2nd tier supplier). Those plastics suppli-
ers again need raw materials, such as plastic granules, which are made from oil 
or through reverse logistics processes from recycled plastics parts.119 Those up-
stream suppliers are not in the focus of the discussion in this work, which is why 
they are not represented explicitly in the graph. In this work, the focus is on pol-
icy structures at the first tier suppliers, final assembly and testing and software 
flashing and packing stages. 
Chipset 
supplier
Board 
printing 
Final 
assembly 
and testing
Software 
flashing and 
packing
Other tier 1 
supplier
Other tier 2 
supplier
Upstream Downstream
Tier 2 Suppliers Tier 1 Suppliers OEM or Contract 
Manufacturer
OEM or Service 
Provider
Customer
Customer
Figure B-2: Supply Chain with Two Sample Inbound Chains 
                                                          
118  This simplified approach to visualizing a supply chain in the high-tech industry is 
also taken by Olhager et al.: Supply chain impacts at Ericsson, p. 47. See also 
Catalan and Kotzab: Assessing the responsiveness in the Danish Mobile phone sup-
ply chain, p. 672, for a more complex representation of the relationships. The defini-
tion of first tier suppliers, second tier suppliers etc. depends on the position of the 
supply chain node considered as the focal company. In this work, while the OEMs 
are focal companies, software flashing and packing and final assembly and testing 
are considered as the central parts of the manufacturing process, even though both of 
these may be outsourced to other companies. The suppliers to final assembly are 
called the first tier suppliers in line with other representations of similar supply 
chains. 
119  Cf. Catalan and Kotzab: Assessing the responsiveness in the Danish Mobile phone 
supply chain, p. 671. 
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Board Printing. The board printing (BP) stage is a fully automated process 
that is highly capital- and technology intensive.120 The process requires standard 
components, such as silicon wafers, as well as more complex components, such 
as integrated circuits and chipsets. These components are typically imported 
from other countries, which creates uncertain supply lead times.121 The circuit 
boards are typically assembled in this way: “after the arrival of components 
from suppliers…the components are mounted on both sides of the board. The 
primary side is mounted first. This side contains most of the components. After 
rotating the board, the secondary side is mounted. This stage results in a surface 
mounted assembly”, which is then tested for quality to separate functional 
boards from those with defects.122 At board printing, each product typically has 
only one variant; for example, 40 different mobile phone models require 40 dif-
ferent boards. The board printing production step is typically a bottleneck proc-
ess, since excess capacity is costly. While the equipment is capable of making a 
high variety of board designs, it is an economic necessity to operate the equip-
ment at board printing at a high utilization rate.123 Nonetheless, periods with 
overcapacity could also be observed in the past, for example when capacity 
utilization dropped from 80 percent in the late 1990s to 17 percent in 2001, and 
later recovered to between 40 and 80 percent in 2003.124
Final Assembly and Testing. The second stage of manufacturing is the final 
assembly and testing (FAT) process. This process is usually very manual, which 
is why it typically happens in China or other low cost countries, leading to rela-
tively long delivery lead times. For example, in mobile phone production, this 
production step involves assembling the display and keypad into the product, as 
well as testing the device. In mobile phone production, each product gets about 
20 versions at this stage, through different types of cover or faceplate colours 
                                                          
120  Cf. Chang, Shih-Chia, Neng-Pai Lin and Chwen Sheu: Aligning manufacturing fle-
xibility with environmental uncertainty: evidence from high-technology component 
manufacturers in Taiwan, in: International Journal of Production Research, Vol. 40 
(2002), No. 18, p. 4769 and Trovinger, Sheri Coble and Roger E. Bohn: Setup Time 
Reduction for Electronics Assembly: Combining Simple (SMED) and IT-Based 
Methods, in: Production and Operations Management, Vol. 14 (2005), No. 2, 
pp. 207–208. 
121  Cf. Chang, Lin and Sheu: Aligning manufacturing flexibility with environmental 
uncertainty, p. 4769. 
122  Cf. Olhager et al.: Supply chain impacts at Ericsson, p. 49 and Reinhardt: The Mak-
ing of a Nokia Phone, p. 7. 
123  Cf. Chang, Lin and Sheu: Aligning manufacturing flexibility with environmental 
uncertainty, p. 4769; Kok et al.: Philips Electronics Synchronizes Its Supply Chain to 
End the Bullwhip Effect, p. 40 and Aertsen and Versteijnen: Responsive Forecasting 
and Planning Process in the High-Tech Industry, p. 33. 
124  Cf. Wendin: Electronics Manufacturing: EMS at a Crossroads, p. 12. 
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and localized keypads.125 Final assembly plants typically keep small stocks of 
component inventories whose size depends on the type of product and the mate-
rial used. For example, some components such as aluminium have longer lead 
times than others, such as plastics. At this stage of production, there is usually 
50 percent more capacity available than needed.126
Software Flashing and Packing. Before the final software flashing and pack-
ing production step (SWF) there is a sizable inventory of semi-finished prod-
ucts, which is critical for short-term flexibility. The size of this stock is specified 
by the OEM and depends on the type of product. For example, stocks of stan-
dard mobile phones are typically larger than those of specialized mobile phones, 
such as phones co-branded with an operator, which are expensive to stock. At 
software flashing, after receipt of a customer order the software is flashed on the 
device, the manual, charger and other desired accessories are put into the box, 
and the package is then shipped to the customers, which are companies such as 
network operators or distributors.127 The reason that this step can only begin 
after receipt of a customer order is that the customers, for example mobile 
phone operators, often require customized products, with unique software and 
features that they expect to be installed by the OEM.128 This production step can 
happen in the same plant as final assembly and testing and is typically con-
trolled by the OEM; for example, Nokia customizes the products at the final 
distribution centre with a serial number (IMEI), software, and special features, 
such as logoed faceplates or special keypad buttons.129 The alternative is to ship 
semi-finished products to regional distribution centres and have the flashing 
done in the local markets, which is often more expensive. Now, there are around 
1,000 product versions, while some pieces of software or chargers are the same 
across products. At this production stage, there is typically 400 percent more 
capacity available than needed.130
                                                          
125  Cf. Reinhardt, Andy: Nokia's Magnificent Mobile-Phone Manufacturing Machine, in: 
Business Week online, 3 August 2006, 2006b, 
http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/aug2006/gb20060803_618811.htm, 
retrieved on 9 March 2007, p. 1. 
126  Based on personal communication with Axel Karlsson, partner at McKinsey & Com-
pany, Inc., Stockholm, on 31 March 2006. 
127  Cf. Olhager et al.: Supply chain impacts at Ericsson, p. 47 and p. 49. 
128  Cf. Reinhardt: Nokia's Magnificent Mobile-Phone Manufacturing Machine, p. 1. 
129  Cf. Reinhardt: Nokia's Magnificent Mobile-Phone Manufacturing Machine, p. 1. 
130  Based on personal communication with Axel Karlsson, partner at McKinsey & Com-
pany, Inc., Stockholm, on 31 March 2006. 
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II. Challenges for High-Tech Electronics Supply Chains 
Supply chains face a number of challenges that can reduce the responsiveness of 
the system. Examples include long component lead times, erroneous compo-
nents, capacity constraints, complex technologies and missing information about 
actual end customer demand. There are also internal challenges for supply 
chains, such as mismanagement of the planning process. In particular the high-
tech electronics industry is – compared to other industries – confronted with a 
large number of challenges to supply chain management; the most important 
ones are summarized in Table B-1. The combination of these challenges leads to 
delays in both the flow of information and the flow of materials and requires 
long-term planning.131
Table B-1: Challenges in the High-Tech Electronics Industry132
Challenges Other industries facing these 
challenges (examples) 
Short product life cycle and rapid price erosion Pharma, Retail (fashion apparel) 
Volatile and unpredictable demand, especially 
for new products 
Retail (fashion apparel) 
Stock keeping unit (SKU) proliferation caused 
by customization requirements 
Consumer packaged goods 
Long lead time for key components Retail (fashion apparel) 
High supply uncertainty Some food produce 
Demanding customer requirements on lead time 
and volume flexibility 
Automotive 
Global low cost country (LCC) based supply 
chain leading to higher end-to-end complexity 
Automotive, Retail (fashion 
apparel)
Complicated product design involving 
thousands of components 
Automotive 
High inventory cost and risk of obsolescence Automotive 
                                                          
131  Cf. Kaipia, Korhonen and Hartiala: Planning nervousness in a demand supply net-
work, p. 95. 
132  Adapted from Jayaram, Kartik et al.: Segmented Approach to Supply Chain Man-
agement System Design in High Tech, McKinsey & Company, Inc., 2006, p. 4 and 
extended based on Burruss, Jim and Dorothea Kuettner: Forecasting for Short-Lived 
Products: Hewlett-Packard's Journey, in: Journal of Business Forecasting Methods & 
Systems, Vol. 21 (2002), No. 4, p. 9 and Lee: Aligning Supply Chain Strategies with 
Product Uncertainties, p. 108. 
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Some of these challenges are not unique and experienced in other industries 
as well, such as the fashion industry. For example, Christopher et al. as well as 
Hochmann find that short life cycles, high volatility, seasonality and low pre-
dictability, high stock keeping unit (SKU) complexity, long materials lead times 
and capacity constraints are among the characteristics of the fashion industry.133
Other challenges are present in the consumer packaged goods industry, such as 
SKU proliferation. Similarly, automotive companies, such as General Motors, 
faced an environment with national markets and trade barriers until the 1990s. 
Today, the environment they operate in is perceived to be more global, with 
fewer trade barriers and higher customer expectations. New entrants to the in-
dustry caused and continue to cause a proliferation of model offerings and 
brands.134 This is similar to the development observed in the high-tech electron-
ics industry. The combination of all of these challenges makes supply chains in 
the high-tech electronics industry a good example for a complex system, provid-
ing a large variety of issues to be analysed.135
1. Demand Pattern and Product Life Cycle Variations 
Short product life cycles, volatile demand, frequent introductions of new prod-
ucts and price erosion are some of the characteristics of the environment that 
companies in the high-tech industry operate in. Product life cycles are an ex-
pression of the time behaviour of unit sales volume of a specific product, or 
product category, from product introduction to withdrawal of that product from 
the market.136 In a broader view, the concept of a product life cycle also includes 
                                                          
133  Cf. Christopher, Martin G., Robert Lowson and Helen Peck: Creating agile supply 
chains in the fashion industry, in: International Journal of Retail & Distribution Man-
agement, Vol. 32 (2004), No. 8, p. 367; Christopher, Martin G. and Denis R. Towill: 
Developing market specific supply chain strategies, in: International Journal of Lo-
gistics Management, Vol. 13 (2002), No. 1, pp. 2–7; and Hochmann, Stephen: Flexi-
bility – Finding the Right Fit, in: Supply Chain Management Review, Vol. 9 (2005), 
No. 5, p. 10. 
134  This was pointed out by by G. Richard Wagoner, Chairman and CEO of General 
Motors, Detroit, during a talk on “Leadership in the Automotive Industry” on 11 Oc-
tober 2006 at the Sloan School of Management. A video recording of the talk is 
available at http://mitsloan.mit.edu/corporate/dils.php. 
135  See also Beckman, Sara and Kingshuk K. Sinha: Conducting Academic Research 
with an Industry Focus: Production and Operations Management in the High Tech 
Industry, in: Production and Operations Management, Vol. 14 (2005), No. 2, p. 117. 
136  Cf. Harrell, Stephen G. and Elmer D. Taylor: Modeling the Product Life Cycle for 
Consumer Durables, in: Journal of Marketing, Vol. 45 (1981), No. 4, p. 70. 
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the research and development processes.137 The underlying idea of the product 
life cycle concept is that the demand pattern for a product changes over time. 
The product life cycle is typically described as having four distinct phases, in-
troduction, growth, maturity and decline, with sales following a typical pattern. 
Sales increase at first as more and more people adopt the product, and eventu-
ally start to decrease when the market is saturated.138 Some authors, such as 
Dhalla and Yuspeh, argue that this concept is incapable of capturing the dynam-
ics of the real world since every product and every situation is different. In par-
ticular, they find that misperceptions about expected developments can lead to 
suboptimal decision-making that can be avoided by not subjecting decisions to 
the concept of the product life cycle.139 This point is in line with the insights 
drawn from the System Dynamics methodology about complex systems and has 
implications for decision makers in marketing and other areas. Nonetheless, the 
merit of the product life cycle model is that it is simple and intuitive.140 The dy-
namics of the actual system are complex, which means that the development of 
unit sales over time may look very different from what is typically presented as 
the generic product life cycle. The use of the term product life cycle in this work 
serves the purpose to highlight that (1) products in the high-tech industry are on 
the market for a relatively short time and (2) the demand characteristics vary 
over this time period. 
Product life cycles in the high-tech electronics industry are characterised by 
a strong increase in demand during the introduction phase, followed by a grad-
ual downward trend during maturity and finally an end-of-life demand drop, 
often caused by a new product generation being introduced.141 This is visualised 
for a short life cycle product in Figure B-3 below. 
                                                          
137  Cf. Milling, Peter M.: Modeling innovation processes for decision support and man-
agement simulation, in: System Dynamics Review, Vol. 12 (1996), No. 3, p. 211 and 
Milling, Peter M. and Frank H. Maier: Invention, Innovation und Diffusion – Eine 
Simulationsanalyse des Managements neuer Produkte, Berlin 1996, pp. 30–35. 
138  Cf. Milling and Maier: Invention, Innovation und Diffusion, p. 33. 
139  Cf. Dhalla, Nariman K. and Sonia Yuspeh: Forget the product life cycle concept, in: 
Harvard Business Review, Vol. 54 (1976), No. 1, pp. 102–103. 
140  Cf. Thorelli, Hans B. and Stephen C. Burnett: The Nature of Product Life Cycles for 
Industrial Goods Businesses, in: Journal of Marketing, Vol. 45 (1981), No. 4, p. 97 
and Milling and Maier: Invention, Innovation und Diffusion, p. 34. 
141  Cf. Burruss and Kuettner: Forecasting for Short-Lived Products, p. 10. 
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Typical Product Life Cycle for a High-Tech Product*
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Figure B-3: Typical Product Life Cycle for a Short Life Cycle High-Tech Product142
a. Product Launches, Innovation and Proliferation of Product Portfolio 
The fast entrance rate of new technologies in the high-tech industry causes short 
product life cycles for many high-tech products. In such an environment, with 
high expenditures for research and development and sharp declines in prices 
after the launch of the products, introducing new products to the market quickly 
is an important success factor.143 However, the environment the companies face 
in the high-tech industry is complex, and it has been argued that “companies [in 
industries that boast high degrees of innovation] are literally innovating them-
selves out of business” as reductions in the product life cycle may not lead to 
sustained increases in revenues and profits. In particular, this may be the case 
when the new product generations are offered at lower prices, which is usually 
                                                          
142  Based on information from Burruss and Kuettner: Forecasting for Short-Lived Prod-
ucts, p. 10. 
143  Cf. Milling, Peter M.: Understanding and managing innovation processes, in: System 
Dynamics Review, Vol. 18 (2002b), No. 1, p. 80 and Helo, Petri: Managing agility 
and productivity in the electronics industry, in: Industrial Management + Data Sys-
tems, Vol. 104 (2004), No. 7, p. 568.  
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the case in the high-tech industry.144 Empirical data on personal computer life 
cycles between 1974 and 1992 suggest that the short and shortening product life 
cycles for personal computers are primarily caused by new entrants to the indus-
try, with incumbents not systematically reducing the lifetimes of their own 
product lines.145 Some companies may appear to avoid the acceleration trap as it 
was called by von Braun, but there are other challenges.  
According to Kaipia et al. new printer models and mobile phones are today 
launched into the market every month, compared to once or twice a year in pre-
vious years.146 Companies in this industry have an incentive to introduce prod-
ucts to the market quickly as reductions in the time to market for new products 
have been shown to affect market share positively.147 For example, Nokia brings 
around 40 new mobile phone models to the market each year.148 This challenge 
is also present in other supply chains, such as the fashion apparel industry. The 
Spanish apparel company Inditex, for example, famous for the Zara brand, in-
troduces 20,000 new models per year. The design for these styles is in most 
                                                          
144  Cf. Braun, Christoph-Friedrich von: The Acceleration Trap in the Real World, in: 
Sloan Management Review, Vol. 32 (1991), No. 4, p. 46. For a detailed discussion 
that uses System Dynamics modelling to analyze this so-called acceleration trap, re-
fer to Minnich, Dennis A.: Substitution Effects and The Acceleration Trap – A Sys-
tem Dynamics Perspective on Substitution Effects with Shortening Product Life Cy-
cles, 2003, Bachelor Thesis, International University in Germany. 
145  Cf. Bayus, Barry L.: An Analysis of Product Lifetimes in a Technologically Dynamic 
Industry, in: Management Science, Vol. 44 (1998), No. 6, p. 772. 
146  Cf. Kaipia, Korhonen and Hartiala: Planning nervousness in a demand supply net-
work, p. 97. 
147  Cf. Milling and Maier: Invention, Innovation und Diffusion, pp. 202–208; and 
Milling, Peter M. and Andreas Größler: Management von Material- und Informa-
tionsflüssen in Supply Chains: System-Dynamics-basierte Analysen, 2001, Ar-
beitspapier der Fakultät für Betriebswirtschaftslehre der Universität Mannheim, 
http://iswww.bwl.uni-mannheim.de/lehrstuhl/mitarbeiter/agroe/scm_sd.pdf, retrieved 
on: 9 August 2006, pp. 80–84, who analyse the market share effect of early or de-
layed market entry with a System Dynamics model. See also Datar, Srikant et al.:
Advantages of Time-Based New Product Development in a Fast-Cycle Industry, in: 
Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. 34 (1997), No. 1, p. 36 and Milling, Peter M., 
Uwe Schwellbach and Jörn-Henrik Thun: The Role of Speed in Manufacturing, 
POMS First World Conference on Production and Operations Management, Sevilla 
2000, p. 2. 
148  Virki, Tarmo: Mobile games publishers pressured to merge, in: Reuters, 12 May 
2006, 2006, http://go.reuters.co.uk/, retrieved on 16 September 2006, p. 1 
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cases copied from designs already available in the marketplace.149 This particu-
lar company is only able to achieve such a high number of new product intro-
ductions by producing 75 percent of its products in Europe, close to its head-
quarters. Also, the company does not rely on outsourcing at all, even for areas 
such as store construction and information technology.150 The Spanish apparel 
manufacturer can design, produce and deliver its new products to retailers 
within a time frame of only two weeks at the fastest and therefore quickly react 
to market trends.151
In the high-tech industry, not only is the success of each individual product 
highly uncertain, but there is an interplay between consecutive product genera-
tions that creates additional uncertainties.152 Short product life cycles imply that 
the window of revenue opportunity, which is the time in which a financial return 
can be obtained on invested resources, is only available for a limited time – 
ramp-up and ramp-down curves are steep, but also difficult to predict, while at 
the same time the maturity phase can be short as newly introduced products re-
place older generations.153 The margins during product introduction are particu-
larly important, as they represent a large portion of the profit potential of a 
product.154 This can also be observed in the fashion apparel industry, where 
companies such as Zara, with product life cycles that are often as short as one 
                                                          
149  Cf. Cordon, Carlos: Value creation and globalization, in: Conradsen, Niels, Birgitte 
Malm and John Sarborg Pedersen (Eds.): Værdiskabelse ifremtidens virksomhed – 
Nye muligheder iden globale konkurrence, Copenhagen 2005, pp. 35–36 and Kumar, 
Sumit: Supply Chain Strategies in the Apparel Industry: The Case of Victoria's Se-
cret, 2005, Master's Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, p. 86. 
150  Cf. Cordon: Value creation and globalization , pp. 35–36. 
151  Cf. Kaipia, Korhonen and Hartiala: Planning nervousness in a demand supply net-
work, p. 98. 
152  Cf. Erhun, Feryal, Paulo Gonçalves and Jay Hopman: Moving from Risks to Oppor-
tunities: A Process to Manage New Product Transitions, 24th International Confer-
ence of the System Dynamics Society, Nijmegen 2006, p. 3. See also Milling: Mod-
eling innovation processes for decision support and management simulation, p. 211 
and Milling and Maier: Invention, Innovation und Diffusion, pp. 89–90. 
153  Cf. Catalan and Kotzab: Assessing the responsiveness in the Danish Mobile phone 
supply chain, p. 677; Helo: Managing agility and productivity in the electronics in-
dustry, pp. 568–569 and p. 573 and Kok et al.: Philips Electronics Synchronizes Its 
Supply Chain to End the Bullwhip Effect, p. 45. 
154  Cf. Fisher, Marshall L. et al.: Making supply meet demand in an uncertain world, in: 
Harvard Business Review, Vol. 72 (1994), No. 3, pp. 85–87; Sterman: Business Dy-
namics, p. 744; and Sterman, John D.: System Dynamics in Action: Managing the 
Supply Chain in a High-Velocity Industry, 2000b, Unpublished Manuscript, Sloan 
School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, p. 1. 
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month, need to ensure to sell as much as possible of the product at full price.155
In the high-tech electronics industry, the product life cycle can be as short as a 
few months. Personal computers and mobile phones, for example, are manufac-
tured for only two to 13 months before a new product generation is introduced, 
while industrial electronics can have a life cycle of five to 15 years.156 Therefore 
companies have to introduce new product generations again and again – as their 
products progress through the product life cycle, competing firms introduce new 
technologies and products that make existing products obsolete. Due to this 
process of product emergence and decay, companies must continuously develop 
and introduce new generations of products on the market, introduce a larger 
number of customer-specific variants and phase-out other products at the same 
time.157
It is difficult to identify and predict new trends reliably, which means that 
companies need to be able to respond quickly to changes in market condi-
tions.158 BenQ had to declare its German mobile phone subsidiary BenQ-
Siemens bankrupt in 2006 following significant losses. One of the reasons for 
this development is alleged to be that the company was often late to recognize 
trends in the industry, such as mobile phones with built-in MP3 players, cam-
eras or colour displays.159 The characteristics of mobile phones are shifting from 
being complex, engineered products, to mass-oriented fashion products, which 
requires handset manufacturers to “expand their portfolios in order to compre-
hensively fulfil market demands with regard to air interface, form factor, techni-
cal specifications, multimedia capability” etc., as a research analyst notes.160
This implies that new models and innovations are demanded by the market con-
tinuously, requiring changes to the bill of materials and possibly changes in the 
                                                          
155  Cf. Hochmann: Flexibility – Finding the Right Fit, p. 11. 
156  Cf. Hilmola, Helo and Holweg: On the outsourcing dynamics in the electronics sec-
tor, p. 9 and Kaipia, Korhonen and Hartiala: Planning nervousness in a demand sup-
ply network, p. 97. 
157  Cf. Minnich: Substitution Effects and The Acceleration Trap, p. 2; Kaipia, Korhonen 
and Hartiala: Planning nervousness in a demand supply network, p. 97; Helo: Manag-
ing agility and productivity in the electronics industry, pp. 568–569; Milling and 
Maier: Invention, Innovation und Diffusion, p. 33 and Erhun, Gonçalves and Hop-
man: Moving from Risks to Opportunities, p. 2. 
158  Cf. Kok et al.: Philips Electronics Synchronizes Its Supply Chain to End the Bull-
whip Effect, p. 44. 
159  Cf. Höfinghoff, Tim: Gekauft, getäuscht, geschlossen, in: Spiegel Online, 28 Sep-
tember 2006, 2006, http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/0,1518,439862,00.html, retrie-
ved on 28 September 2006, p. 1. 
160  Cf. Catalan and Kotzab: Assessing the responsiveness in the Danish Mobile phone 
supply chain, p. 677 and IDC: IDC – Press Release: Worldwide Mobile Phone Mar-
ket Breaks 200 Million Unit Mark in 3Q05, p. 1. 
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suppliers that are used. Due to their importance, the planning and execution of 
such product development and introduction processes in companies in the high-
tech electronics industry is a critical success factor for the companies and re-
quires a comprehensive approach with regard to decision making.161
b. Original and Induced Demand Uncertainty and Variability 
Customer demand in the high-tech industry is highly volatile and uncertain. Ad-
ditionally, variability is added to the demand signal as information about it is 
used by the supply chain members and communicated through the system in a 
distorted way. Harrison distinguishes demand uncertainty from demand variabil-
ity, noting that uncertainty in demand is caused by unplanned orders or changes 
in order volumes, while demand variability refers to the magnitude of the fluc-
tuations in demand that are communicated to the supply chain system.162 The 
reasons for demand uncertainty and variability are diverse, and are composed of 
both original customer demand uncertainty, which is exogenous to the supply 
chain system, and self-induced customer demand variability, which is endoge-
nous to the system. 
Original Customer Demand Uncertainty 
Original customer demand uncertainty may be lower than one might expect 
based on observations of demand data. Such original variation in demand can be 
attributed to seasonal and random demand fluctuations. 
Seasonal fluctuations are a common phenomenon in the demand patterns of 
many high-tech products. In many countries, Christmas time is a period where 
increased sales for high-tech products can be observed – for many products, 
including computers, mobile phones, DVD players and video game consoles, 
this is the peak selling season.163 For example, the monthly sales pattern for 
DVD players in the United States since their introduction in 1997 is reproduced 
                                                          
161  Cf. Erhun, Gonçalves and Hopman: Moving from Risks to Opportunities, pp. 1–21, 
who propose a process to facilitate decision making during product transitions and 
tested that process at Intel. For a comprehensive System Dynamics-based discussion 
of product development and introduction processes refer to Milling and Maier: In-
vention, Innovation und Diffusion. See also Milling: Understanding and managing 
innovation processes, pp. 80–82. 
162  Cf. Harrison, Alan: An Investigation of the Impact of Schedule Stability on Supplier 
Responsiveness, in: The International Journal of Logistics Management, Vol. 7 
(1996), No. 1, p. 83. 
163  See, for example, n.a.: Seasonal But Saturated Mobile Market, in: Business & Fi-
nance Magazine, 2 December 2004, 2004, who describe Christmas sales of mobile 
phones in Ireland. 
45
in Figure B-4.164 The sales peaks around Christmas in each year can clearly be 
observed. In other markets, similar trends are observed during other, significant 
periods of the year, such as Chinese New Year at the end of January.165 This 
seasonal buying behaviour is particularly important for consumer products, with 
less impact on corporate sales for products such as computers.166
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Figure B-4: History of Monthly Sales of DVD players in the US 
Demand for high-tech electronics products is also subject to large random 
fluctuations, known as high-frequency noise, on a day-to-day basis in terms of 
both product options and volume, which is a challenge to companies operating 
in this industry. These transient variations in demand arise from reasons such as 
weather or changes in consumer sentiment and liquidity.167 However, end cus-
tomer demand is not observable for the OEMs, since they receive their orders 
from intermediaries. This structural characteristic can lead to self-induced de-
mand variability.  
                                                          
164  The data for Figure B-4 were obtained from n.a.: CEA DVD Player Sales, 2007, 
http://www.thedigitalbits.com/articles/cemadvdsales.html, retrieved on: 1 April 2007. 
165  Cf. Grinsven, Lucas van: Cellphone sales exceed bullish outlooks: 510 million units 
in 2003: Total for 2004 will top 560 million, in: National Post, 4 February 2004, 
2004, p. 1. 
166  Cf. Mills, Kristin: Christmas PC sales stable but not spectacular, in: Computerworld 
New Zealand, 18 January 1999, 1999, p. 1. 
167  Cf. Sterman, John D. et al.: Getting Big Too Fast: Strategic Dynamics with Increas-
ing Returns and Bounded Rationality, 2007, forthcoming in: Management Science, 
p. 10. 
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Induced Demand Variability and the Bullwhip Effect 
Some of the variability in demand in the high-tech industry is self-induced by 
the supply chain members. For example, Lertpattarapong interviewed senior 
managers at a manufacturer of electronics products providing components for 
the PC industry, i.e. an upstream supplier. Many of the people interviewed be-
lieved that the oscillations in demand that caused large variations in inventory 
levels were caused by exogenous factors, while the later analysis with a System 
Dynamics model indicated that the oscillations were in fact caused endoge-
nously by the feedback structure of the system.168 As an example for the large 
demand variability for many high-tech products, consider the time behaviour of 
the daily customer requested shipment dates for a mobile phone over the period 
of one year, which is shown in Figure B-5.169 With orders by intermediaries, 
such as mobile phone operators or major retailers, fluctuating in a range be-
tween 0 percent and almost 1,000 percent of average demand, which is indexed 
at 100 in the diagram, forecasting turns into a gamble for the OEM. Some of this 
variability could be due to variability in actual end customer demand, while 
other parts could be caused by structural characteristics of the supply chain.  
                                                          
168  Cf. Lertpattarapong, Chalermmon: Applying system dynamics approach to the sup-
ply chain management problem, 2002, Master's Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, p. 68 and p. 85. 
169  Empirical data based on a real high-tech electronics product, i.e. a mobile phone. 
Company name, product and the order of magnitude of actual order volume have 
been disguised to protect the company’s proprietary information. The insights drawn 
from the disguised data are the same insights that were drawn from the real data. For 
demand patterns of other high-tech products, refer to Parmar, Varun: Supply Chain 
Architecture in a High Demand Variability Environment, 2005, Master's Thesis, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, pp. 15–18 and Kaipia, Korhonen and Har-
tiala: Planning nervousness in a demand supply network, pp. 103–107. 
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Figure B-5: Daily Orders for a Sample High-Tech Product (Mobile Phone) 
The high degree of uncertainty about end customer demand is amplified 
through the supply chain as first the retailers and then the OEMs adjust their 
forecasts and orders in both quantities and delivery dates in an attempt to absorb 
the uncertainty in original end customer demand.170 Forrester remarks that such 
adjustments can lead to oscillations in orders and production because of difficul-
ties in demand signal processing and because of non-zero lead-times.171 This can 
lead to the erroneous conclusion that sales are seasonal even in industries where 
sales are, in fact, not seasonal.172 This is known as the Forrester effect.173 A dif-
ferent but related dynamic behaviour pattern is the so-called rationing game, 
which, for example, Heikkilä observes in some supply chains within Nokia.174
The rationing game refers to customers consistently providing forecasts that are 
higher than the actual demand that is later observed. The reasoning behind the 
                                                          
170  Cf. Chang, Lin and Sheu: Aligning manufacturing flexibility with environmental 
uncertainty, p. 4769 and Parmar: Supply Chain Architecture in a High Demand Vari-
ability Environment, p. 15. 
171  Cf. Forrester: Industrial Dynamics, pp. 201–206. See also Disney, Stephen M. and 
Denis R. Towill: On the bullwhip and inventory variance produced by an ordering 
policy, in: Omega, Vol. 31 (2003), No. 3, p. 157. 
172  Cf. Forrester: Industrial dynamics: A major breakthrough for decision makers, p. 45. 
173  Cf. Disney and Towill: On the bullwhip and inventory variance produced by an or-
dering policy, p. 157. 
174  Cf. Heikkilä, Jussi: From supply to demand chain management: efficiency and cus-
tomer satisfaction, in: Journal of Operations Management, Vol. 20 (2002a), No. 6, 
p. 758. 
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rationing game is that it occurs when the customers expect supply to be limited, 
for example when they experience significant delivery delays due to capacity 
limitations at the supplier. The customers believe that the supplier rations supply 
and typically face an incentive structure that encourages them to attempt not to 
be out of stock. Therefore they issue orders that exceed the quantity they would 
order if supply were unlimited in order to secure more units and secure a place 
in the queue at the supplier.175 The forecasting systems at suppliers receiving 
those inflated orders have no possibility to identify that the data are inflated and 
thus treat them as regular orders. The customers, on the other hand, will cancel 
these additional orders, also known as phantom orders, as soon as the receive 
the desired products.176 Being one of the causes of the bullwhip effect, this is 
known as the Houlihan effect.177 Houlihan’s findings suggest that the effect can 
amplify and that the over-ordering can cause even more shortages, which in turn 
causes additional over-ordering and increased build-up of safety stocks.178
It has been mentioned above that the Christmas sales surge or other similar 
seasonal demand surges are more pronounced with private buyers than with 
corporate buyers. However, “seasonal” effects can be observed even in the cor-
porate business. For example, for one product of Cisco’s Optical Networking 
Group, Parmar observes a demand of less than 12 units for all but one month in 
2003. During December, demand increased to 78 units.179 A reason may be the 
incentive system for sales people, since they typically operate based on regular, 
e.g. monthly, quarterly, or yearly, goals. According to Lee et al., this can lead to 
end-of-month, end-of-quarter or end-of-year order surges, with sales people 
signing orders prematurely in an attempt to fulfil their quotas.180 This common 
phenomenon, often referred to as the hockey stick, could explain some of the 
spikes in Figure B-5 above. Also, the companies running material requirements 
planning (MRP) systems may generate their purchase orders at regular intervals, 
e.g. at the beginning of each month, which could cause order cycles to overlap 
                                                          
175  Cf. Lee, Hau L., V. Paddy Padmanabhan and Seungjin Whang: Information Distor-
tion in a Supply Chain: The Bullwhip Effect, in: Management Science, Vol. 43 
(1997b), No. 4, p. 551. 
176  Cf. Gonçalves: Demand Bubbles and Phantom Orders in Supply Chains, pp. 89–141. 
177  Cf. Disney and Towill: On the bullwhip and inventory variance produced by an or-
dering policy, p. 158. 
178  Cf. Houlihan, John B.: International Supply Chain Management, in: International 
Journal of Physical Distribution & Materials Management, Vol. 17 (1987), No. 2, 
p. 57 and Wendin: Electronics Manufacturing: EMS at a Crossroads, p. 13.  
179  Cf. Parmar: Supply Chain Architecture in a High Demand Variability Environment, 
p. 15. 
180  Cf. Lee, Hau L., V. Paddy Padmanabhan and Seungjin Whang: The bullwhip effect 
in supply chains, in: Sloan Management Review, Vol. 38 (1997a), No. 3, p. 96. 
49
and contribute to the bullwhip effect through “MRP jitters”.181 Order batching 
can also lead to increased upstream variability in the supply chain, and refers to 
the practice of placing orders in batches in order to gain economies of scale in 
the ordering process. This could, for example, be the result of the calculation of 
economic order quantities and is known as the Burbridge effect.182 Finally, sea-
sonality in corporate sales could be driven by financial concerns; e.g. in the 
pharmaceutical industry large orders may be placed by distributors at the end of 
the financial year for tax purposes or to look less attractive to a potential ac-
quirer.183 The author experienced the hockey stick behaviour himself in a case 
where incoming orders surged at the end of every month, causing significant 
turbulence in the planning systems of the company that was affected. The author 
also obtained anecdotal evidence from several other similar cases, including e.g. 
the German operations of a Taiwanese computer company, where corporate 
sales for personal computers spike every December.184
Speculative buying to take advantage of unstable prices is an additional 
source of self-induced demand variability.185 Sales promotions, for example, can 
cause erratic order patterns and distort original demand data, as demand is now 
different than it would have been without the promotion.186 Customers stock up 
on the cheaper products, which causes sales to drop as soon as the promotion 
ends.187 With insufficient information sharing between supply chain members, 
this can become a major reason for upstream demand volatility. In a related 
case, Bhattacherjee describes that in the generic drugs industry speculative buy-
                                                          
181  Cf. Lee, Padmanabhan and Whang: Information Distortion in a Supply Chain: The 
Bullwhip Effect, pp. 96–97. 
182  Cf. Disney and Towill: On the bullwhip and inventory variance produced by an or-
dering policy, p. 158. 
183  Cf. Bhattacherjee, Anol: Beginning SAP R/3 Implementation at Geneva Pharmaceu-
ticals, in: Communications of the Association for Information Systems, Vol. 4 
(2000), No. 2, p. 7. 
184  Since these are corporate sales, this observation is unlikely to be related to the 
Christmas sales surge for home computers. 
185  Moyaux and McBurney argue for the contrary. In their preliminary work, they pre-
sent a computer simulation model that indicates that speculative buying could be a 
means to reduce the bullwhip effect and thus volatility in the supply chain. See 
Moyaux, Thierry and Peter McBurney: Reduction of the Bullwhip Effect in Supply 
Chains through Speculation, 2006, Working Paper, Department of Computer Sci-
ence, University of Liverpool, http://www.csc.liv.ac.uk/~moyaux/moyaux06ae.pdf, 
retrieved on: 17 October 2006, pp. 6–9. 
186  Cf. Lee, Hau L. and Seungjin Whang: Information sharing in a supply chain, in: In-
ternational Journal of Technology Management, Vol. 20 (2000), No. 3/4, p. 378 and 
Alicke: Planung und Betrieb von Logistiknetzwerken, p. 108. 
187  Cf. Alicke: Planung und Betrieb von Logistiknetzwerken, p. 108. 
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ing by customers is a major cause of difficulties. In this industry, “prices of 
drugs are typically reassessed at the start of every fiscal year, and the distribu-
tors may place very large orders at the end of the previous year to stock up on 
drugs whose prices are expected to increase next year”.188 This cannot be ad-
dressed with safety stock due to the high cost of keeping inventories and low 
margins in the industry.189
All of these behaviours are related to what is known as the bullwhip effect, 
which is a term used to describe the amplification of demand variability from a 
downstream supply chain node to an upstream supply chain node.190 However, 
the systematic errors made by decision-makers who face a complex environ-
ment with multiple feedback loops, time delays and nonlinearities lead to the 
existence of the bullwhip effect even in the absence of the aforementioned be-
haviours. Even when demand is stationary and fully known to all members in a 
supply chain, without forecasts being submitted through the supply chain, with-
out any reasons for the hockey stick phenomenon, without sales promotions and 
without speculative buying (as prices are constant), the bullwhip effect still oc-
curs, as demonstrated by Croson and Donohue, Sterman and Dogan and Ster-
man.191 Reasons for this observation relate to the bounded rationality of decision 
makers, discussed in more detail in section C.I.1, and include cognitive limita-
tions and inherent difficulties in managing a complex system. More specifically, 
these boundedly rational behaviours of decision makers in supply chains include 
anchoring in the choice of the desired inventory level to the initial level (as op-
posed to determining the optimal inventory levels), misperceptions of time lags 
(e.g., between placing and receiving orders), and not accounting appropriately 
for the supply line of materials on order.192
                                                          
188  Bhattacherjee: Beginning SAP R/3 Implementation at Geneva Pharmaceuticals, p. 7. 
189  Cf. Bhattacherjee: Beginning SAP R/3 Implementation at Geneva Pharmaceuticals, 
p. 7. 
190  Cf. Lee, Padmanabhan and Whang: Information Distortion in a Supply Chain: The 
Bullwhip Effect, p. 546. 
191  Cf. Croson, Rachel and Karen Donahue: Behavioral Causes of the Bullwhip Effect 
and the Observed Value of Inventory Information, in: Management Science, Vol. 52 
(2006), No. 3, pp. 327–335; Sterman, John D.: Modeling Managerial Behavior: Mis-
perceptions of Feedback in a Dynamic Decision Making Experiment, in: Manage-
ment Science, Vol. 35 (1989), No. 3, pp. 328–338; Dogan, Gökhan and John D. Ster-
man: "I'm not hoarding, I’m just stocking up before the hoarders get here", 24th In-
ternational Conference of the System Dynamics Society, Nijmegen 2006, pp. 6–33. 
192  Cf. Croson and Donahue: Behavioral Causes of the Bullwhip Effect and the Ob-
served Value of Inventory Information, pp. 332–333 and Sterman: Modeling Mana-
gerial Behavior, pp. 334–335. 
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c. Pressure for Reduced Cost Levels  
Short product life cycles create a pressure for companies to reduce both the time 
to develop new products and the time it takes to introduce them on the market. 
This needs to be achieved without major cost increases, as Morita et al. point 
out, because the prices of new product generations are in many cases lower than 
those of previous generations.193 Such decreases in product prices over time can 
be observed for many mass-produced goods. Price erosion is typically caused by 
advances to manufacturing processes, learning effects and increased competi-
tion.194 The pace at which prices fall in the high-tech industry is particularly 
fast, which poses a challenge for companies operating in this industry. For ex-
ample, the mobile phone Motorola V290 experienced a 20 percent drop in sell-
ing price within three months, after a period of five months of relatively con-
stant prices.195 The average retail price of DVD players in the United States of 
America declined by nearly 40 percent between the first half of 1997 and the 
second half of 1998.196 The average retail price of desktop PCs was found to 
decline by more than 50 percent over the first year of the product life cycle, 
while many component prices decline between one percent per week (a 
40 percent reduction in one year) and two percent per week (a 65 percent reduc-
tion in one year).197 Holding large amounts of inventory in such an environment 
is therefore not desirable due to the reduction in value. Similarly, for notebook 
computers the selling price of a model typically erodes faster than the price of 
its components, making it necessary to “upgrade [the] model periodically to 
maintain profit margins”.198 Price erosion thus creates a pressure to manage 
                                                          
193  Cf. Morita, Michiya et al.: High Speed Competence and Short Product Life Cycle, 
POMS First World Conference on Production and Operations Management, Sevilla 
2000.
194  Cf. Helo: Managing agility and productivity in the electronics industry, p. 569. 
195  Cf. Liu, Bin et al.: Two-Stage Ordering Decision for a Short-Life-Cycle Product, in: 
Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering, Vol. 15 (2006), No. 3, p. 343. 
196  Cf. Liegey, Paul R.: Developing an Hedonic Regression Model For DVD Players In 
the U.S. CPI, 2001, U.S. Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpidvd.htm, retrieved on: 20 October 2006, p. 1. 
197  Cf. Lee, Hau L. et al.: Price Protection in the Personal Computer Industry, in: Man-
agement Science, Vol. 46 (2000), No. 4, p. 467, Khouja, Moutaz and Sungjune Park: 
Optimal lot sizing under continuous price decrease, in: Omega, Vol. 31 (2003), No. 
6, p. 539 and Kapuscinski, Roman et al.: Inventory Decisions in Dell's Supply Chain, 
in: Interfaces, Vol. 34 (2004), No. 3, p. 191. See also Milling: Modeling innovation 
processes for decision support and management simulation, pp. 211–212. 
198  Rutherford, Derek P. and Wilbert E. Wilhelm: Forecasting notebook computer price 
as a function of constituent features, in: Computers & Industrial Engineering, Vol. 37 
(1999), No. 4, p. 826. 
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supply chains efficiently and is closely linked to the short duration of the prod-
uct life cycles in this industry. 
2. Product Complexity 
Another reason that makes supply chains in the high-tech industry, for example, 
difficult to manage is the high complexity of the products. A typical mobile 
phone consists of 400 components, ranging from resistors and capacitors to 
processors, colour displays, and keypads; a mobile phone OEM such as Nokia 
assembles up to 275 million parts per day.199 Product complexity may even be 
increasing, as new products may have a more complex manufacturing process 
than previous generations. Such increased complexity may lead to higher manu-
facturing times and lead times, which reduces the ability to respond to changes 
in demand.200 Managing material flows is a key capability that is needed to suc-
cessfully operate in such an environment. A study on the relationship between 
product complexity and vertical integration in the automotive industry by Novak 
and Eppinger suggests that vertical integration may be more suitable for com-
plex products than outsourcing; they find a significant positive relationship be-
tween product complexity and vertical integration.201 Their finding suggests the 
outsourcing trend in high-tech may be suboptimal as the complex products may 
be handled better by a vertically integrated supply chain. 
3. Mismatch of Customer Requirements and Supplier Capabilities 
Companies in the high-tech industry face a situation where the supplier lead 
times for some components are very long while at the same time their customers 
demand short order-to-delivery (OTD) lead times as well as a high degree of 
customization. The mismatch between long planning horizons and market re-
quirements for lead time and volume flexibility may lead to significant problems 
in the supply chain.202 During the last decades, companies in many industries 
have come under pressure to meet increasing standards in the variety of prod-
                                                          
199  Cf. Reinhardt: Nokia's Magnificent Mobile-Phone Manufacturing Machine, p. 1. 
200  Cf. Lertpattarapong: Applying system dynamics approach to the supply chain man-
agement problem, p. 7 and p. 35. 
201  Cf. Novak, Sharon and Steven D. Eppinger: Sourcing By Design: Product Complex-
ity and the Supply Chain, in: Management Science, Vol. 4 (2001), No. 1, p. 189 
and pp. 202–203. 
202  Cf. Kaipia, Korhonen and Hartiala: Planning nervousness in a demand supply net-
work, p. 96 and Reinhardt: Nokia's Magnificent Mobile-Phone Manufacturing Ma-
chine, p. 1. 
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ucts offered and their delivery performance.203 In particular, since the beginning 
of the 1990s the critical success factors for manufacturing companies have 
evolved from including only cost and quality to also including time. This devel-
opment is regarded as an important turning point in operations management as it 
has an influence on many different markets, with particular relevance for the 
business to business market.204 Companies in the high-tech electronics industry 
are especially influenced by this trend of customers demanding more differenti-
ated products within shorter delivery times. This is leveraged by companies 
such as Dell, a company focusing on the direct delivery of customized computer 
products within short lead times.205 Customers demand not only continuous re-
ductions in lead times but also expect that their orders are delivered punctually – 
an aspect that well-designed supply chains can exploit as a potential competitive 
advantage.206
A complication to achieving this goal is that some components needed for 
manufacturing high-tech products have long and variable manufacturing lead 
times. In the case of Cisco, components for networking products have lead times 
ranging between two and 24 weeks.207 Expensive application-specific integrated 
circuits (ASICs), for example, are unique to the respective product.208 In mobile 
phone production, for instance, each mobile phone model uses boards with dif-
ferent integrated circuits. Producing the wafers required to make the integrated 
circuits is a complex process characterised by long lead times, yield variations 
and capacity limitations.209 Equipment can also fail as machines break down. 
Also, the lead times in the supply chain and the output of the processes may 
                                                          
203  Cf. McCutcheon, David M., Amitabh S. Raturi and Jack R. Meredith: The Customi-
zation-Responsiveness Squeeze, in: Sloan Management Review, Vol. 35 (1994), No. 
2, pp. 91–92. 
204  Cf. Milling, Schwellbach and Thun: The Role of Speed in Manufacturing, p. 2; Helo: 
Managing agility and productivity in the electronics industry, pp. 568–589. and 
Thun, Jörn-Henrik et al.: Production Cycle Time as a Source of Unique Strategic 
Competitiveness – An Empirical Analysis based on the "World Class Manufactur-
ing"-Project, POMS First World Conference on Production and Operations Manage-
ment, Sevilla 2000, pp. 1–2. 
205  Cf. Helo: Managing agility and productivity in the electronics industry, pp. 567–568 
and Christopher, Martin G. and Denis R. Towill: Supply chain migration from lean 
and functional to agile and customised, in: Supply Chain Management, Vol. 5 (2000), 
No. 4, p. 212. 
206  Cf. Milling, Schwellbach and Thun: The Role of Speed in Manufacturing, pp. 2–3. 
207  Cf. Parmar: Supply Chain Architecture in a High Demand Variability Environment, 
p. 20. 
208  Cf. Kok et al.: Philips Electronics Synchronizes Its Supply Chain to End the Bull-
whip Effect, p. 39. 
209  Cf. Gonçalves: Demand Bubbles and Phantom Orders in Supply Chains, p. 72–81. 
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vary and prices can change.210 All of these uncertainties in the supply chain af-
fect the performance of the system. The process of wafer and integrated circuit 
production is a bottleneck in many high-tech electronics supply chains and re-
quires planners to consider the possibility of disruptions in the flow of compo-
nents from the suppliers.211 In 2000, for example, a fire caused by lightning 
damaged millions of microchips in a Philips plant. Customers of that plant in-
cluded Nokia and Ericsson. While Nokia was able to switch production to other 
suppliers almost immediately, Ericsson employed a single-sourcing policy and 
as a consequence faced disrupted production for months, causing lost sales of 
US$400 million.212 As setting up a wafer-fabrication facility (fab) takes a long 
time and is very expensive, with the equipment used being extremely complex 
and costly, high utilization rates need to be maintained and it is expensive to 
provide excess capacity.213 However, the level of preparedness for such disrup-
tions differs for different companies, as the above example showed. 
Regarding the duration of the manufacturing and shipment processes, the 
process of making the wafers alone, including wafer testing, can take 12 weeks. 
Assembly of the integrated circuits is also a complex process. This involves 
fabricating complex devices on the silicon wafers, testing these for functional-
ity, separating them into dies and mounting these in substrates, final testing and 
                                                          
210  Cf. Kaipia: The impact of improved supply chain planning on upstream operations, 
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able Our Factory Ramps, in: Intel Technology Journal, Vol. 9 (2005), No. 3, p. 186; 
Gonçalves: Demand Bubbles and Phantom Orders in Supply Chains, p. 76 and 
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configuration.214 This process can take another 3 weeks.215 Finally, transporta-
tion times can be an additional cause of long lead times, since the components 
for many products come from multiple countries and regions.216 Ritter and 
Sternfels note that sending high-tech electronics products by sea, with shipment 
times of several weeks, can translate into price declines of two to six percent.217
In the high-tech industry, this particular problem can often be addressed by us-
ing air shipments, as the volume per kilo is small. Nevertheless, in sum, the 
complete turn time for a supply chain can be several months.218
Cisco’s Optical Networking Group, for example, faces a low volume of or-
ders combined with a high configurability of the products. For most components 
that are built into Cisco’s equipment, lead times range between 10 and 16 
weeks. At the same time, its customers require shipment of 90 percent of the 
orders within 15 days. This situation, combined with large order variability and 
uncertainty, requires Cisco to build the products to stock and ship them as the 
customers order them.219 The car industry is confronted with similar problems. 
Holweg et al. note that the average order-to-delivery lead time for built-to-order 
volume cars in Europe is 48 days. While studies show that customers are inter-
ested in being able to configure cars to their personal preferences, many are not 
willing to wait more than three weeks to receive them.220 This phenomenon is 
called the customization-responsiveness squeeze.221 Additionally, suppliers fur-
ther upstream in the car supply chain also face the problem of customers de-
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nology Journal, Vol. 9 (2005), No. 3, p. 223. 
215  Cf. Kok et al.: Philips Electronics Synchronizes Its Supply Chain to End the Bull-
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218  See also Helo: Managing agility and productivity in the electronics industry, p. 571f., 
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manding short lead times while their raw materials suppliers operate unrespon-
sive, large-scale batch production systems222, which is similar to the situation in 
the high-tech industry. 
Short product life cycles require that demand can be met particularly in the 
first weeks after the product launch. This implies that forecasts for long lead 
time components, such as integrated circuits, need to be developed and produc-
tion quantities may need to be committed several months before the launch of 
the product.223 This task is complex, since it may be difficult to estimate cus-
tomer demand accurately, especially for innovations. When Philips, for exam-
ple, introduces a new DVD player model the planners initially prepare only a 
rough estimate of total life cycle sales, with forecasts that look up to 26 weeks 
into the future being very inaccurate.224 For products with many variants that are 
sold in several different markets, such as mobile phones, this is even more diffi-
cult, particularly when forecasting variant-specific components with long lead-
times. To complicate the problem further, contract manufacturers are often re-
sponsible for the procurement of long lead-time raw materials and components 
from second tier suppliers.225 Due to the lack of transparency in supply chains in 
the high-tech industry, the information that is available to the contract manufac-
turers for preparing forecasts is often distorted and insufficient, and does not 
correspond to “end-customer demand information with a short information lead-
time” that Kaipia et al. identify as prerequisites to manage this process well.226
This problem is well known in other industries with unpredictable demand, such 
as the fashion apparel industry. With lead times of several months, component 
manufacturers can be left with either excess inventory of unpopular items or 
face shortages of items that are in high demand.227
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4. Supply Chain Complexity 
The complexity of supply chains in the high-tech electronics industry is high 
relative to many other industries. Managing such supply chains is particularly 
difficult because the industry is fragmented due to outsourcing and related de-
velopments, forecasts are inaccurate and planning systems are complex. Com-
plexity can be understood as consisting of two components, detail complexity 
and dynamic complexity. Detail complexity itself is constituted by the number 
of elements in a system and the number and type of interconnections and rela-
tionships between these elements. Dynamic complexity, in contrast, is caused by 
variability of the behaviour of a system over time or by variability of the struc-
ture of a system.228 The fragmented structure of the high-tech electronics indus-
try with many players itself creates detail complexity, and time delays and other 
aspects of the new system structure contribute to dynamic complexity. 
a. Fragmentation of Industry and Outsourcing 
Most companies in the high-tech electronics industry were vertically integrated 
until the late 1990s or early 2000s. Strong global competition and pressure for 
cost reductions, along with an increasingly competitive environment and short-
ening product life cycles, meant that the traditional approach of vertical integra-
tion seemed to not provide sustainable competitive advantage.229 One of the 
major reasons for the shift to outsourcing in many industries is that the compa-
nies were not able to manage the complexity and risk of a large and complex 
supply chain within a single company and believed that outsourcing and global 
diversification would solve this problem.230 Contrary to what many managers 
may have expected, their actions often did not simplify processes. Instead, they 
created highly fragmented networks of independent and semi-independent or-
ganizations, with decentralized decision-making, lack of central coordination 
and regional division of labour.231 The complexity of these fragmented networks 
overwhelms managers and greatly limits their ability to focus on the most im-
portant opportunities. Chang et al. argue that such fragmentation creates even 
greater environmental uncertainty and a higher need for flexibility, as plants that 
                                                          
228  Cf. Größler, Andreas, André Grübner and Peter M. Milling: Organisational adapta-
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230  Cf. Akkermans and Dellaert: The rediscovery of industrial dynamics, p. 175. 
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produce for divisions within the same vertically integrated company are more 
insulated from market pressures than companies operating in the open market.232
However, the advantages and disadvantages of vertical integration depend on 
the product, as for generic products with multiple customers contract manufac-
turers are able to level demand better than the customers could if they were to 
produce the products themselves.233
Supply chains in the high-tech industry are often spread over multiple coun-
tries with an elaborate regional division of labour.234 Typically, a high-tech elec-
tronics OEM in a high-cost country represents the centre of gravity in high-tech 
electronics supply chains and will coordinate activities in medium- and low-cost 
countries that are often carried out by contract manufacturers.235 For example, 
wafers may be produced in Germany that are sent to Singapore, where the inte-
grated circuits are produced. These are shipped to China, were the boards are 
printed. Final assembly happens in Mexico, and the customer receives the prod-
uct from a distribution centre in the United States. The process is coordinated 
from corporate headquarters in Japan. This material flows are visualised in 
Figure B-6. The total lead time can range between two and six months, includ-
ing several weeks of transit time. For example, Philips Electronics faces a total 
value chain lead time of between 17 and 22 weeks for its DVD players, CD 
players and personal computers.236 Such global production processes inevitably 
create logistics challenges. Transportation delays increase the amount of plan-
ning that is necessary as well as the risk of product obsolescence, while invento-
ries may need to be kept at strategic points to ensure that customer demand can 
be fulfilled within the expected lead time.237
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Figure B-6: Global Supply Chain Example 
The task of contract manufacturers was originally limited to printed circuit 
board assembly. Today, these companies play a large role in high-tech elec-
tronics supply chains. Their capabilities allow them to manage and handle al-
most every aspect of the manufacturing process at the same level of quality as 
the established electronics manufacturers.238 These capabilities reach beyond the 
manufacturing and logistics operations, as original design manufacturers 
(ODMs) are able to carry out the complete development processes for new 
products.239 The expected benefits of such relationships for the OEMs include 
reductions in the amount of capital required, the ability to turn fixed costs into 
variable costs, access to know-how about production processes, increased flexi-
bility and reduced time to market.240 For example, when Nokia was facing in-
creasing pressure in 2005 to introduce a so-called clamshell phone in their prod-
uct range they decided to buy the complete product design from a Japanese 
ODM, BenQ. This step reduced the investment risk resulting from conducting 
the research and development in-house and simultaneously allowed them to 
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introduce the product to the market relatively quickly.241 Nonetheless, OEMs 
wishing to engage in such relationships need to consider the risks involved in 
using contract manufacturers or original design manufacturers, which include 
loss of market visibility, loss of the ability to manufacture the product, less con-
trol of the manufacturing process and less inventory visibility.242
b. Sales Forecasting 
Low forecast accuracy exacerbates the structural challenges to the business fur-
ther. The forecast error of demand increases the higher the inherent deviations in 
demand are and the worse the planning capabilities of the company are.243 In-
herent deviations of demand can be measured using the coefficient of variation 
of demand. The second aspect that influences the uncertainty of a demand fore-
cast are the forecasting abilities of the company, which generally are not well 
developed before the product is introduced and at the initial stage of a product’s 
life cycle. However, in the high-tech industry forecasts several months into the 
future are required, particularly for long lead-time components, and currently 
drive the business, as flexibility is expensive.244 At this early stage, the manu-
facturer does not know with any certainty what the life cycle pattern will be, 
which causes forecast accuracy to decrease the longer the forecasting horizon 
is.245 Forecasts are adjusted based on the interests of different stakeholders, their 
expectations and actual demand that is observed, all of which can be misleading 
indicators.246
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Particularly for new products, standard forecasting techniques that depend 
heavily on historical data are not applicable.247 Predicting which of the new 
products introduced in any given year are going to succeed and which are going 
to fail is very error-prone. Maier finds that most products fail in the market-
place, with 60 percent of the products that are introduced into the market failing 
for economic reasons.248 Even more difficult is the prediction of the develop-
ment of sales in the first few weeks of the product life cycle, i.e. during the 
ramp-up phase. Initially slow demand often increases very quickly at some 
point, with uncertainty remaining about the timing and the final volume.249 This 
creates an environment where creating the initial forecasts sent to suppliers be-
comes similar to taking a bet. This is one of the major challenges to companies 
operating in the high-tech industry, which is often addressed by inflating the 
original realistic forecast.250
While it is difficult to accurately forecast demand before and shortly after 
the market introduction of a new product, this becomes easier as the product 
reaches the maturity stage of the product life cycle. The forecasting capabilities 
of a company are influenced by a learning curve.251 However, imperfect infor-
mation sharing and coordination within and across companies in the high-tech 
electronics industry is one of the most important challenges that slow this learn-
ing process and leads to unrealistic forecasts.252 Demand is also inherently vola-
tile, which means that there is a possibility of developing an inaccurate forecast 
near the end of the product life cycle. This can lead to high inventory levels of 
components or finished goods that may become obsolete as the product is taken 
from the market, which is particularly costly in the high-tech electronics indus-
try due to high product costs and short product life cycles. For example, until 
2005 Cisco’s Optical Networking Group incurred excess and obsolescence in-
ventory expenses of around US$13 million per year. At the same time, the com-
pany was facing a large demand forecast error, which exceeded 1,000 percent in 
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some cases, delays in customer order fulfilment and increasing inventory lev-
els.253 The items on stock were often not the ones requested by the customers. 
To address this issue, Burruss and Kuettner developed a forecasting model that 
is explicitly designed for products that face high demand volatility, short life 
cycles and become obsolete quickly.254 Their approach begins with a normalized 
base line product life cycle forecast that is based on past experience with other, 
similar products. This forecast is then adjusted for known seasonality patterns in 
the product segment, planned promotions or planned price reductions.255 Also, 
companies in this industry frequently plan market exit and production ramp-
down of products that are replaced by newer product generations significantly 
before a decline in sales can actually be observed. Such a reduction in the fore-
cast when sales are still high may, however, pose a psychological problem for 
planners as they observe stockouts and increasing sales but are simultaneously 
required to reduce the forecasts for a planned product phase-out.256 Nonetheless, 
the actual ramp-down may be volatile and unpredictable as some customers may 
want to stock up on spare parts or cheap prices increase the demand for the 
product.257
Figure B-7 shows the accuracy of the 13-week forecast for an actual high-
tech consumer product, such as a computer.258 With forecast volumes fluctuat-
ing between zero percent and 400 percent of actual customer orders, unplanned 
shortages in production capacity or key component supply are likely to arise, 
particularly if there are long supplier lead times.  
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Figure B-7: Forecast Accuracy for a Sample High-Tech Consumer Product 
Similarly, in a sample of six supply chains of Nokia Networks, with custom-
ers for technology used in mobile telecommunications networks in six different 
countries, the forecasts prepared by the customers had forecast errors, as meas-
ured by the mean absolute deviation259, that range between 41 percent and 
105 percent.260 The reason for the large differences in the forecasts lies primar-
ily in the nature of demand, which is highly volatile. New information that be-
comes available on the market as well as order acquisitions and cancellations 
require numerous adjustments and updates to the initial forecasts for a particular 
time period.261
The quality of information available to decision-makers is also suboptimal, 
since OEMs receive their orders from intermediaries, such as network operators, 
distributors and/or electronic goods retailers, and not directly from the end cus-
tomer.262 This means that the people involved in the forecasting process at the 
OEM have limited access to demand data, while at the same time the informa-
tion they receive may be delayed and distorted, for example due to conflicting 
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priorities of decision-makers at various points in the supply chain.263 For exam-
ple, information on a sales promotion or on the repositioning of a product to a 
new market might not be passed on to suppliers, which for them means a sud-
den, unpredictable increase in demand. Information sharing and collaboration 
are important, but often difficult to achieve.264 The common behaviour of indi-
vidual forecast adjustments at each supply chain node is one of the primary 
causes of the bullwhip effect, which increases upstream volatility in supply 
chains.265 These adjustments amplify small changes in end-customer demand 
and also reflect other aspects, such as information about supply constraints or 
management expectations, and have an impact on demand forecasts throughout 
the supply chain.266 For example, in his analysis of mobile phone supply chains 
Heikkilä concludes that such multi-step forecasting processes lead to lower sup-
ply chain efficiency.267 Similarly, at Cisco individual forecast adjustments at 
each supply chain node caused inflated demand forecasts throughout the supply 
chain, which encouraged inventory build-up. In a situation where sales were in 
fact going down rather than up, Cisco had to write off inventory worth US$2.2 
billion.268
It has been argued that increased demand visibility in the supply chain can 
reduce the bullwhip effect in supply chains, but not completely eliminate it. 
Chen et al., for example, find that making demand information available 
throughout the supply chain reduces the bullwhip effect, but does not eliminate 
it.269 In the high-tech industry, some authors observe a recent increase in the 
visibility of downstream demand through making point-of-sales (POS) data, 
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sell-through data and inventory levels accessible throughout the supply chain.270
Observations from supply chains of major companies in high-tech supply chains 
today suggest, however, that while there is a trend to attempt to make such in-
formation more readily available this is often not possible at the moment. For 
example, there is often little transparency in inventory levels and is perceived to 
be difficult to realize such transparency. Companies in the industry often share 
such information only for a few critical long lead time components, e.g. using 
diagrams on walls or Excel sheets. Often the willingness to share information is 
there, but such exchanges are done on an ad hoc basis using e-mails and spread-
sheet documents.271
In some cases, the forecasts generated by teams of experts using detailed and 
sophisticated modelling that requires expensive IT infrastructure have a lower 
forecasting accuracy than the original sales forecast. In other cases, history-
based forecasts that rely only on extrapolation of past orders, for example 
through moving averages or exponential smoothing, provide a lower forecast 
deviation even for a high-volatility market segment than forecasts prepared by 
forecasters who “tend to massage the data”.272 In an experiment conducted by 
Paich and Sterman, subjects consistently fail to forecast the sales peak for a 
product, even after having earned extensive expertise with the task, which leads 
to excess capacity and large losses.273 Therefore there is not necessarily a posi-
tive correlation between the effort put into forecasting and the quality of the 
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result, possibly allowing companies to reduce forecasting and planning effort by 
planning only important products in detail and extrapolating others.274
c. Complexity of Planning Systems 
Supply chain planning can be defined as the “set of supply chain activities that 
focus on matching demand with material and production capacity availability 
and formulate plans and schedules based on meeting that demand and company 
goals.”275 According to Williams, supply chain planning has four components: 
(1) demand management and forecasting, (2) inventory planning and sourcing, 
(3) planning and scheduling and (3) materials management.276 As demand man-
agement and forecasting, sourcing and materials management are addressed in 
the previous sections, this section focuses on the practical problems of the plan-
ning and inventory management systems in supply chains in the high-tech elec-
tronics industry. Scheduling is not in the focus of the discussion. More details 
on the fit of different planning systems in different circumstances are provided 
later in section B.II.5.  
Many supply chains in the high-tech industry are driven by a push logic. The 
term “push-based system” has been defined and used in many different ways, 
along with “pull-based system”277, and for the purpose of this work the follow-
ing definitions are adopted. In a push-based system, material processing is 
started when (1) material is available and (2) processing capacity of the next 
step is available. In a pull-based system, material processing is started when (1) 
material is available, (2) processing capacity of the next step is available and (3) 
an external trigger arrives. In other words, as visualised in Figure B-8 below, a 
push-based system is driven by a forecast, while a pull-based system is driven 
by actual downstream demand. 
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Figure B-8: Decision rules and production control – Push vs. Pull (simplified illustra-
tion) 
Planning systems often rely on accurate and reliable forecasts, which facili-
tate the balancing of demand requirements and supply capabilities.278 In the 
automotive industry, for example, vehicle production in many markets is still 
primarily driven by forecasts and not by customer orders, with vehicles being 
sold to the customers from existing finished goods inventory.279 In the high-tech 
industry, accurate forecasts are often not available. The transparency on supply 
chain metrics, such as inventory levels at other nodes in the chain, is also low.280
Inaccuracy in the forecast that is pushed through the system months before the 
product is launched to the market leads to several difficulties.  
Firstly, the forecasts are adjusted by each member of the supply chain before 
this new, updated forecast, which is now less related to the original forecast, is 
passed on to the next upstream supply chain node, as can be seen in Figure B-9 
below. Multiple planning systems are involved in adjusting the forecasts, which 
implies that production through the push-based supply chain is driven by inac-
curate forecasts. As discussed in the previous section, the information that is 
used as an input for planning is also often flawed. Additionally, the planning 
systems relying on MRP logic are subject to intrinsic “nervousness”, i.e. low 
stability of the plans, due to managerial decision-making as well as the com-
                                                          
278  Cf. Kaipia: The impact of improved supply chain planning on upstream operations, 
p. 2. 
279  Cf. Holweg et al.: Towards responsive vehicle supply, p. 507. 
280  Cf. Kaipia: The impact of improved supply chain planning on upstream operations, 
p. 2 and Kaipia, Korhonen and Hartiala: Planning nervousness in a demand supply 
network, p. 96. 
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puter control algorithms used.281 For example, Kaipia et al. analyse the supply 
chain of a global electronics manufacturer and find that the demand that the 
suppliers face is highly unstable, e.g. for the first tier suppliers even the plans 
for the next week have a forecast error of more than 70 percent.282 Also, differ-
ent components with different lead times are produced based on different fore-
casts, as for products with shorter lead times more recent information about ac-
tual demand can be gathered and used in developing the forecasts.283 Nonethe-
less, the delays involved in communicating these adjusted forecasts to the sup-
pliers are often very long, which means that it could take several weeks until 
fundamental a change in customer demand has an impact on the production 
processes at suppliers.284
For any member of such a system, these complex interrelationships are very 
difficult to understand and manage. As the planning systems are often extremely 
complex, requiring decisions at multiple stages and covering different parts of 
the supply chain, understanding how the system functions as a whole becomes 
impossible.285 Decision makers also face complications such as unclear objec-
tives and lack information they would need in order to make informed decisions. 
This aspect is exacerbated due to the reliance on outsourcing in this industry as 
well as through the nature of the first-generation enterprise resource planning 
(ERP) systems that are frequently used. Both of these aspects make it more dif-
ficult to share information across company boundaries as there is a lack of close 
collaboration and supply chain integration.286 As Akkermans and Dellaert note, 
“the irony we face in supply networks today [is]: companies have been split into 
smaller, independent units because it was so difficult to coordinate their opera-
                                                          
281  Cf. Kaipia, Korhonen and Hartiala: Planning nervousness in a demand supply net-
work, p. 100; Akkermans and Dellaert: The rediscovery of industrial dynamics, 
p. 176; Morecroft, John D. W.: Influences from Information Technology on Industry 
Cycles – A Case Study in Manufacturing Industry, 1979, Doctoral Thesis, Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology, pp. 222–224; and Wilding, Richard D.: Chaos Theory: 
Implications for Supply Chain Management, in: International Journal of Logistics 
Management, Vol. 9 (1998), No. 1, pp. 47–55. 
282  Cf. Kaipia, Korhonen and Hartiala: Planning nervousness in a demand supply net-
work, p. 105. 
283  Cf. Thomas, Warsing and Zhang: Forecast Updating and Supplier Coordination for 
Complementary Component Purchases, p. 1. 
284  Cf. Kok et al.: Philips Electronics Synchronizes Its Supply Chain to End the Bull-
whip Effect, p. 40. 
285  Cf. Kaipia: The impact of improved supply chain planning on upstream operations, 
p. 2. 
286  Cf. Akkermans and Dellaert: The rediscovery of industrial dynamics, p. 175 and 
Catalan and Kotzab: Assessing the responsiveness in the Danish Mobile phone sup-
ply chain, p. 682. 
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tions, but this has made such coordination even more difficult, at a time when 
one of the main original reasons for this difficulty, inadequate information tech-
nology, is no longer relevant”.287 There are various limitations of enterprise re-
source planning (ERP) systems, which are used for planning, controlling and 
recording the transactions of running a business and provide real-time access to 
information in a consistent manner throughout an organisation, with regard to 
supply chain management.288 For example, there is insufficient functionality in 
crossing organizational boundaries, which is exacerbated by the use of different 
ERP packages by different members of the supply chain. Also, ERP systems 
lack flexibility in reacting to changes in supply chain requirements, particularly 
as these systems sometimes make it difficult to accommodate different modes of 
collaboration with different supply chain partners. In supply chains that need to 
be highly responsive to market needs, the composition of the supply chain may 
change from one customer order to the next, which is difficult to handle with 
such systems. Such limitations make information sharing and, as a consequence, 
decision making difficult and allow only little reliance on data obtained from 
other companies. Therefore, the plans are often not coordinated and frequently 
modified. 
As a consequence of these difficulties, employees working in the operations 
of a firm often generate their own forecasts for their work after determining that 
what they receive from, for example, the marketing department is “always 
wrong”. Plans that lack credibility and are fundamentally and frequently 
changed subsequently can be neglected in terms of execution. This could be 
observed at Cisco, for example.289 Similarly, if in a company that uses a push 
production system for its supply chain the sales forecast is not linked to demand 
planning, this forces production planners to constantly make short-term adjust-
ments and routinely override the material requirements planning (MRP) system. 
As a result, such a company may face difficulties to keep production running at 
a stable rate. This high level of uncertainty causes companies to be unable to 
                                                          
287  Akkermans and Dellaert: The rediscovery of industrial dynamics, p. 175. See Huang, 
George Q., Jason S.K. Lau and K.L. Mak: The impacts of sharing production infor-
mation on supply chain dynamics: a review of literature, in: International Journal of 
Production Research, Vol. 41 (2003), No. 7 for a research review on information 
sharing in supply chains. 
288  The limitations described in the following are identified by Akkermans, Henk A. et 
al.: The impact of ERP on supply chain management: Exploratory findings from a 
European Delphi study, in: European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 146 
(2003), No. 2, pp. 297–299. See also Webster, Scott: Principles and Tools for Supply 
Chain Management, New York 2008, pp. 13–20. 
289  Cf. Parmar: Supply Chain Architecture in a High Demand Variability Environment, 
p. 14. 
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manage supply chains to fit the demand pattern and market requirements, leav-
ing the system such as that shown in Figure B-9 unable to satisfy customer de-
mand appropriately and on time.290 At the same time, these same companies 
may carry high safety stocks.291
2nd tier 
suppliers
1st tier 
suppliers
Final 
assembly 
and testing
Software 
flashing and 
packing
Components Manufacturing Distribution
Major buffer stock
Orders
Forecast 
Forecast 
adjustment
Material 
C
Push
Driven by forecast
Pull
Driven by actual demand
Figure B-9: Push Logic in Supply Chain Creates High Inventory Levels and/or Stockouts 
This leads to the second difficulty in supply chain planning, which is that 
buffer stocks are set-up by each of the different entities of the supply chain 
based on individual incentives, aimed at covering the uncertainty arising from 
both demand and supply volatility. These stocks often build up unintentionally 
and cannot always considered to be strategically placed inventory positions.292
Additionally, inventory can build up at the downstream end of the supply chain 
if actual demand is lower than the forecast, while shortages can occur in the 
opposite case. Due to the short product life cycles, plans for component pro-
curement and production need to be ramped down already significantly before 
the product is eventually taken from the market, maybe even before it has 
                                                          
290  See also Vorst, Jack G.A.J. van der and Adrie J.M. Beulens: Identifying sources of 
uncertainty to generate supply chain redesign strategies, in: International Journal of 
Physical Distribution & Logistics Management, Vol. 32 (2002), No. 6, p. 413. 
291  Cf. Parmar: Supply Chain Architecture in a High Demand Variability Environment, 
p. 14 and Kaipia: The impact of improved supply chain planning on upstream opera-
tions, pp. 2–3. 
292  Cf. Catalan and Kotzab: Assessing the responsiveness in the Danish Mobile phone 
supply chain, p. 682. 
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reached its sales peak, which may be a psychological problem for planners.293
Excess inventory is costly because material can become obsolete, capital is tied 
up that could be used for other items, items can get lost, space is wasted on the 
wrong types of inventory, time is wasted looking for items and time is wasted 
counting items that are not needed. Similarly, shortages are costly because 
products cannot be produced as they wait for raw materials, purchase orders 
need to be expedited, material needs to be shipped between stores or ware-
houses, the tendency to over-order grows with the same item being ordered mul-
tiple times, and ordering costs go up. 
Third, the performance of competing products is also unpredictable. Short 
periods of low availability may drive customers to competing products, chang-
ing a predicted top selling product into a weak seller – or, vice versa, tuning one 
of the weak sellers into an unexpected success if a competitor needs to delay the 
introduction of a product for a few weeks.294 In a push-based system, the fore-
cast continues to drive the supply chain system, so variations in demand can 
lead to large inventory write-offs due to obsolescence or to situations in which 
demand cannot be fulfilled due to stock-outs, causing costs in both cases. A 
main reason for this risk are the long lead times that require plans to be submit-
ted to suppliers months ahead of the customer order and delivery date.295
Fourth, the high amount of product variants that is often observed in the 
high-tech electronics industry creates additional difficulties. In order to plan the 
supply for components properly, demand needs to be known on a detailed vari-
ant level several weeks or even several months before the customer places an 
order. With mobile phones, for example, there are different product types, coun-
try-specific variants e.g. relating to the logo-print or the keypad, as well as dif-
ferent colours, leading to a large number of forecast positions to be planned.296
For example, if there are 20 different product types, sold in 60 countries, with 
each variant being available in 10 different colours, there would be 12,000 dif-
ferent variants to be planned, which represents a large challenge for the OEMs. 
Modelling the planning processes for a product mix with different variants is 
                                                          
293  Cf. Sterman: Managing the Supply Chain in a High-Velocity Industry, p. 5 and 
Gonçalves: Demand Bubbles and Phantom Orders in Supply Chains, p. 28. 
294  Cf. Sterman: Managing the Supply Chain in a High-Velocity Industry, p. 6. 
295  Cf. Kaipia and Holmström: Selecting the right planning approach for a product, p. 3. 
296  Cf. Reinhardt: Nokia's Magnificent Mobile-Phone Manufacturing Machine, p. 1. 
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beyond the scope of this work, but researchers have suggested a variety of tools 
to reduce the complexity of planning and increase the accuracy of the plans.297
5. Alignment of Product Characteristics and Supply Chain Design over the 
Product Life Cycle 
Differences in the characteristics of products and their markets create different 
requirements for supply chain management. In volatile markets, for example, 
supply chain capabilities may be required that are less important for products 
where demand is highly predictable. Also, these requirements may change over 
the product life cycle. Supply chain design therefore needs to consider the re-
quirements of the products to be supplied via that chain. Different planning ap-
proaches may provide a means to tailor supply chains to different products. In 
general, the alignment of products, supply chains and planning systems is an 
area of academic interest.298 Past contributions focus on the alignment of manu-
facturing processes and product characteristics299, on the alignment of planning 
approaches and product characteristics300 and on the alignment of supply chain 
design with product characteristics301. A comprehensive analysis of the align-
ment different planning approaches and products in a multi-echelon supply 
chain, using a System Dynamics simulation model, has not yet been completed. 
In the following, the potential of strategically matching supply chain types with 
certain types of products is evaluated, followed by a discussion of the impor-
tance of selecting appropriate planning processes for a supply chain. 
Many authors see responsiveness and efficiency as distinct strategies that are 
closely linked to different types of products. Multiple characteristics can be used 
                                                          
297  See, for example, Framiñán, José M., Andreas Reichhart and Matthias Holweg: 
Modelling Supply Chain Responsiveness, EurOMA International Conference – Mov-
ing Up the Value Chain, Glasgow 2006, pp. 215–224, who analyze mix responsive-
ness using a computer simulation model. Approaches that consider the attach rates, 
i.e. the percentage of orders that have a certain option, are also suggested to reduce 
planning complexity. See n.a.: The Product Mix challenges of the Electronics Indus-
try – Option and Parts Forecasting, 2005, Emcien Whitepaper, Emcien, 
http://www.emcien.com/emcien_resources/documents/eForecastwhitepaper6_26_05.
pdf, retrieved on: 15 October 2006, pp. 2–3, and Kapuscinski et al.: Inventory Deci-
sions in Dell's Supply Chain, pp. 195–205. 
298  Cf. Selldin: Supply chain design, p. 5. 
299  Cf. Hayes, Robert H. and Steven C. Wheelwright: Link manufacturing process and 
product life cycles – Focusing on the process gives a new dimension to strategy, in: 
Harvard Business Review, Vol. 57 (1979), No. 1, pp. 134–138. 
300  Cf. Berry, William L. and Terry Hill: Linking Systems to Strategy, in: International 
Journal of Operations & Production Management, Vol. 12 (1992), No. 10, p. 10. 
301  Cf. Fisher: What is the Right Supply Chain for Your Product?, p. 109. 
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to describe and distinguish products from a supply chain perspective. These 
include production volume, number of variants, accepted lead-time, demand 
uncertainty, demand volatility and in general the product life cycle over time.302
Fisher, for example, distinguishes innovative products with short product life 
cycles and functional, more commodity-like products.303 Functional products 
“satisfy basic needs, which don’t change much over time…, have a stable, pre-
dictable demand and long life cycles”.304 They are also characterised by rela-
tively low contribution margins, low product variety and long order lead 
times.305 Innovative products, in contrast, are characterised by short product life 
cycles, high contribution margins, high product variety and unpredictable de-
mand. Electronic products and fashion goods are examples for this category.306
Fisher then provides recommendations for the strategic alignment of supply 
chains. According to Fisher, the requirements for supply chain management are 
different for these distinguished types of products – for products that are innova-
tive and reflect new trends demand is less predictable than for products that ful-
fil basic needs, such as sugar.307 He suggests that functional products require a 
focus on efficient processes, while innovative products require a focus on re-
sponsive processes, as visualised in Table B-2 below.308 The uncertainty of de-
mand for innovative products makes supply chain responsiveness a critical ca-
pability, since stockouts should be avoided in particular if the products have 
high contribution margins. For functional products aspects of efficiency, i.e. 
focusing on the elimination of waste or non-value added activities across the 
chain, prevail management’s attention.309
                                                          
302  Cf. Selldin: Supply chain design, p. 2. 
303  Cf. Fisher: What is the Right Supply Chain for Your Product?, p. 106. 
304  Fisher: What is the Right Supply Chain for Your Product?, p. 106. 
305  Cf. Childerhouse, Paul and Denis R. Towill: Engineering supply chains to match 
customer requirements, in: Logistics Information Management, Vol. 13 (2000), No. 
6, p. 339. 
306  Cf. Childerhouse and Towill: Engineering supply chains to match customer require-
ments, p. 344. 
307  Note that every product initially is innovative – even certain types of sugar were at 
one point in time an innovation. See Fisher: What is the Right Supply Chain for Your 
Product?, p. 106. 
308  Cf. Fisher: What is the Right Supply Chain for Your Product?, p. 109. 
309  Cf. Huang, Samuel H., Mohit Uppal and Jan Shi: A product driven approach to 
manufacturing supply chain selection, in: Supply Chain Management, Vol. 7 (2002), 
No. 4, p. 193. 
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Table B-2: Matching Supply Chains with Products – The Fisher Model310
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A small number of empirical tests of the Fisher model have been carried out 
by different authors. Two important questions arise: (1) do companies match 
supply chain design and product type and (2) how is the supply chain perform-
ance affected by a match or a mismatch. Selldin and Olhager survey 128 Swed-
ish manufacturing companies and then map their fit between product character-
istics and supply chain design on a scatter diagram.311 Similarly, using data from 
the international High Performance Manufacturing-research project, Thun 
analyses the fit between responsiveness and efficiency in a sample of 96 manu-
facturing companies with a high degree of SCM implementation, as defined by 
measures such as supply chain planning, customer involvement, supplier part-
nership and supplier involvement.312 Relating to the first question, both studies 
identify that the plants are positioned around a downward-sloping diagonal 
when plotting the points into a diagram similar to Table B-2, which indicates an 
aggregate tendency of companies fitting their supply chains with the type of 
product, as claimed by Fisher. Both studies also find significant variation of data 
points around this downward trend line, suggesting that there is no clear-cut 
matrix as suggested by Fisher, but that instead supply chains are positioned on a 
                                                          
310  Adapted from Fisher: What is the Right Supply Chain for Your Product?, p. 109. 
311  Cf. Selldin, Erik and Jan Olhager: Linking products with supply chains: testing 
Fisher's model, in: Supply Chain Management: An International Journal, Vol. 12 
(2007), No. 1, pp. 44–49. 
312  Cf. Thun: Supply Chain Management and Plant Performance, pp. 8–16. 
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continuum between responsiveness and efficiency, while products are posi-
tioned on a continuum between innovativeness and functionality.313
Selldin and Olhager perform statistical analyses on the data and find that the 
companies with responsive supply chains use them for both functional and in-
novative products, and that companies with innovative products use both re-
sponsive and efficient supply chains for these products. Specifically, they find 
that the combination of functional products with efficient supply chains, and 
vice versa, is statistically significant at the 0.01 level, while the combinations 
involving innovative products and responsive supply chains are not, indicating 
that fewer companies with innovative products match the responsive supply 
chain to these products compared to companies with functional products using 
an efficient supply chain.314 Thun’s findings relating to the second question 
about how supply chain performance is affected by a match or mismatch can be 
linked to this finding by Selldin and Olhager. In general, Thun’s results indicate 
that plants that match their supply chain structure with the product perform bet-
ter on several performance measures. Plants in efficient supply chains perform 
better on three of the six dimensions analysed, i.e. unit cost of manufacturing, 
inventory turnover and cycle time, when the supply chain is matched with the 
product type, i.e. functional products, as opposed to the mismatch case of inno-
vative products being handled with an efficient supply chain. Plants in efficient 
supply chains perform worse on fast delivery and flexibility to change volume 
when they handle functional products than when they handle innovative prod-
ucts. This result is counter-intuitive, but Thun remarks that the significance level 
is not always satisfactory due to sample size limitations315. No significant differ-
ence between match and mismatch could be observed for on-time delivery per-
formance. When responsive supply chains are matched with innovative prod-
ucts, they perform better than the mismatch cases (i.e. responsive supply chains 
handling functional products) on the dimensions of fast delivery and flexibility, 
but worse on unit cost of manufacturing, inventory turnover and cycle time, 
indicating a trade-off between responsiveness and efficiency. Again, no differ-
ence could be observed for on-time delivery performance, which could poten-
tially indicate, according to Thun, that “on-time delivery functions as a key 
driver for efficient supply chains and responsive supply chains. A high on-time 
delivery ratio supports both, efficiency and responsiveness”.316 In addition, 
                                                          
313  Cf. Selldin and Olhager: Linking products with supply chains, pp. 46–47 and Thun: 
Supply Chain Management and Plant Performance, p. 13. The trend line identified by 
Selldin and Olhager is non-significant, with a number of companies being in the 
mismatch cells. 
314  Cf. Selldin and Olhager: Linking products with supply chains, pp. 46–47. 
315  Cf. Thun: Supply Chain Management and Plant Performance, p. 15. 
316  Cf. Thun: Supply Chain Management and Plant Performance, pp. 14–15.  
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however, Thun also finds, similar to Selldin and Olhager, that the supply chain 
performance differences between match and mismatch cases are smaller for 
responsive supply chains than for efficient supply chains, which could mean that 
“some plants have overcome the apparent trade off between innovativeness and 
efficiency”.317 In a study of 22 supply chains in North America, South America 
and Europe, Ramdas and Spekman find that high-performing companies that 
deal with innovative products “are more likely to engage in supply chain man-
agement to enhance revenue” and that practices and reasons for engaging in 
supply chain management that distinguish high-performers from low-performers 
differ depending on the product category the companies deal with, i.e. func-
tional or innovative. 318 This also indicates potential differences between firms’ 
ability to achieve high performance in their supply chains.  
These findings are in contrast with Fisher, who argues for a strict categoriza-
tion with a matrix structure matching supply chains and products as in Table 
B-2.319 Selldin and Olhager perform similar analyses on the Swedish dataset, 
and find that significant differences between matches and mismatches in 
Fisher’s matrix can be observed for the performance measures supply chain 
cost, delivery speed and dependable deliveries. The results of Selldin and Ol-
hager as well as those of Thun are summarized in Table B-3 below. Similar to 
Thun’s results, Selldin and Olhager also find that some companies are attempt-
ing to get the “best of two worlds” by mixing characteristics from responsive 
and efficient supply chains.320
                                                          
317  Cf. Thun: Supply Chain Management and Plant Performance, pp. 8–9. and pp. 14–
16.
318  Cf. Ramdas, Kamalini and Robert E. Spekman: Chain or Shackles: Understanding 
What Drives Supply-Chain Performance, in: Interfaces, Vol. 30 (2000), No. 4, p. 18 
and p. 21. The authors note that further research is needed to establish causal rela-
tionships.
319  Cf. Fisher: What is the Right Supply Chain for Your Product?, p. 109. See also 
Selldin and Olhager: Linking products with supply chains, p. 49. 
320  Cf. Selldin and Olhager: Linking products with supply chains, p. 48. 
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Table B-3: Empirical Tests of the Fisher Model: An Overview321
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While Fisher’s seminal contribution has been widely quoted in relation to re-
sponsiveness322 and his principal ideas about the alignment of supply chain 
strategies with the type of product are plausible, some concerns with regards to 
the applicability of the Fisher model remain, both in general and specifically in 
the high-tech industry. One central issue is that some products can be either 
functional or innovative, or something in-between. An example for such prod-
ucts are cars, which Fisher also acknowledges.323 Holweg explains that in this 
industry, functional and innovative products are being built alongside each other 
“in the same factories, are using the same manufacturing processes and suppli-
ers, and thus invariably share the same supply chain”.324 Additionally, Fisher’s 
seven criteria to distinguish functional and innovative products – product life 
cycle, contribution margin, product variety, average margin of error in the fore-
                                                          
321  Based on results by Thun: Supply Chain Management and Plant Performance and 
Selldin and Olhager: Linking products with supply chains. 
322  For example, see Aitken, Childerhouse and Towill: The impact of product life cycle 
on supply chain strategy, p. 131, and Lee: Aligning Supply Chain Strategies with 
Product Uncertainties, p. 106. 
323  Cf. Fisher: What is the Right Supply Chain for Your Product?, p. 111. 
324  Holweg: An investigation into supplier responsiveness, p. 97. 
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cast at the time production is committed, average stockout rate, average forced 
end-of-season markdown as percentage of full price and lead time required for 
make-to-order products – do not allow for a categorization of products into two 
groups that are both mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive, and Fisher 
does not clarify how to categorize the products if only some of the criteria are 
fulfilled.325 As a consequence, attempting to categorize products using Fisher’s 
definitions results in some products being neither functional nor innovative, and 
in others being functional on some and innovative on other criteria. Airplanes, 
for example, fulfil most of the criteria for functional products as identified by 
Fisher, except long-term demand predictability.326 As the case of Boeing (see 
section A.II) shows, a focus on efficiency in the supply chain for such a product 
can cause a loss of market share to more flexible competitors, such as Airbus.327
It appears to be more sensible to think of products as being positioned on a con-
tinuum between functionality and innovativeness. In their empirical studies, 
both Thun and Selldin and Olhager find that both products and supply chains are 
positioned such on a continuum, as mentioned above. Fisher’s strict matrix 
categorization as in Table B-2, with products being strictly either innovative or 
functional, and supply chains being strictly either responsive or efficient, is not 
sufficient to characterise products and supply chains to their full extent, as prod-
ucts could have characteristics from both product types and supply chains could 
have characteristics from both supply chain types.328
A second problem is that some functional products may also have quick re-
sponse requirements of the supply chain – for example, milk and other dairy 
products are perishables with relatively stable demand patterns but limited shelf 
life. Also, companies often carry out promotions that can drastically change the 
otherwise stable and predictable demand patterns of products such as generic 
food. In such cases, pipeline stock is often “drained to no-one’s real advan-
tage”.329
                                                          
325  Cf. Fisher: What is the Right Supply Chain for Your Product?, pp. 106–109. 
326  See Fisher: What is the Right Supply Chain for Your Product?, p. 106. 
327  Cf. Naylor, Naim and Berry: Leagility: Integrating the lean and agile manufacturing 
paradigms in the total supply chain, p. 112. 
328  See Fisher: What is the Right Supply Chain for Your Product?, p. 109. See also 
Selldin and Olhager: Linking products with supply chains, p. 48; Selldin: Supply 
chain design, pp. 16–17; and Wong, Chee Yew et al.: Assessing responsiveness of a 
volatile and seasonal supply chain: A case study, in: International Journal of Produc-
tion Economics, Vol. 104 (2006), No. 2, pp. 719–720. 
329  Cf. Childerhouse and Towill: Engineering supply chains to match customer require-
ments, p. 338 and Fuller, Joseph B., James O'Conor and Richard Rawlinson: Tailored 
Logistics: The Next Advantage, in: Harvard Business Review, Vol. May-June 
(1993), p. 91. 
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Thirdly, demand uncertainty is an important aspect that is linked to the clas-
sification of innovative or functional products. In Fisher’s terms, innovative 
products are often characterized by a high degree of unpredictable demand un-
certainty, whereas functional, commodity-like products face a high degree of 
demand stability. This point needs to be seen critically, since many commodities 
are confronted with the typical bullwhip effects – one of the major concerns in 
supply chain management – upstream in the supply chain, with order batching, 
speculative buying, delays and suboptimal planning being the major reasons. 
Therefore, upstream supply chain members can be confronted with rather un-
predictable demand, even for commodities. Consequently, the required respon-
siveness in a supply chain depends on the anticipated uncertainty of demand. 
This means that the required responsiveness depends on both the inherent devia-
tions in demand and on the planning capabilities of the companies.330 This re-
lates not only to estimating the quantities demanded of certain products, but 
more generally to using market knowledge to exploit profitable opportunities in 
a volatile market place.331 A company’s ability to forecast and serve the demand 
for its products changes during a product’s life cycle – during ramp-up and 
phase-out, demand is less predictable than during maturity.332 This means that 
the supply chain requirements also change over the product life cycle, which is a 
factor many companies do not consider. 
There is a history of research focusing on the alignment of supply chain and 
manufacturing processes with the different phases of the product life cycle.333
Hayes and Wheelwright suggest different manufacturing approaches for differ-
ent phases of the product life cycle, beginning with a job shop processes during 
the start-up phase and continuing via batch processes, assembly line processes 
and continuous flow.334 Pagh and Cooper extend this discussion and, in focusing 
on supply chain postponement and speculation strategies, suggest that the focus 
during the initial stages of the product life cycle, introduction and growth, 
should be primarily on customer service. The authors also suggest anticipatory 
                                                          
330  Cf. Baiker: Anforderungen dynamischer Produkteigenschaften an die Gestaltung von 
Supply Chains, p. 64 and Chang, Lin and Sheu: Aligning manufacturing flexibility 
with environmental uncertainty, p. 4769. 
331  Cf. Naylor, Naim and Berry: Leagility: Integrating the lean and agile manufacturing 
paradigms in the total supply chain, p. 108. 
332  Cf. Alicke: Planung und Betrieb von Logistiknetzwerken, p. 147. 
333  See Jüttner, Uta, Janet Godsell and Martin G. Christopher: Demand chain alignment 
competence – delivering value through product life cycle management, in: Industrial 
Marketing Management, Vol. 35 (2006), No. 8, pp. 991–992, for a brief overview of 
the literature. 
334  Cf. Hayes and Wheelwright: Link manufacturing process and product life cycles, 
pp. 134–136. 
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manufacturing and logistics during this initial phase. For the rest of the product 
life cycle, maturation and decline, they suggest a strategy that “minimizes risk, 
uncertainty, and costs”.335 However, neither Pagh and Cooper nor Hayes and 
Wheelwright proceed to a discussion of how planning approaches in an entire 
supply chain should be designed in order to be appropriate for the entire product 
life cycle, particularly in industries where product life cycles are short. 
The objective of supply chain planning is to match supply chain capabilities, 
such as available material and production capacity availability, with the demand 
characteristics faced by the supply chain. Planning is therefore concerned with 
developing plans and schedules that allow to efficiently capture sales opportuni-
ties and to satisfy customer needs in terms of speed, location and product vari-
ability.336 The decision rules in different planning approaches that relate to the 
activities necessary in supply chain planning, such as demand forecasting, in-
ventory planning or materials management, have significant differences. In this 
context, pull systems, push systems and hybrid systems can be distinguished. 
In a push-based supply chain, material processing is started when (1) mate-
rial is available and (2) processing capacity of the next step is available. In other 
words, a push-based system is driven by a forecast as production and distribu-
tion decisions are based on long-term estimates of demand.337 This can be ad-
vantageous in situations where product life cycles are short, as production can 
be started before the growth phase of the product and reduced before the sales 
decline at the end of the product life cycle338 – the timing of these phases, how-
ever, may be highly uncertain, requiring a high degree of discipline from the 
planners. In a push-based supply chain, assumptions are made about the system 
and its losses in order to attempt to match the final output with the customer 
requirements. Typical assumptions in push-based MRP systems, which are rela-
                                                          
335  Pagh, Janus D. and Martha C. Cooper: Supply Chain Postponement and Speculation 
Strategies: How to Choose the Right Strategy, in: Journal of Business Logistics, Vol. 
19 (1998), No. 2, p. 22. 
336  Two parts of supply chain planning can be distinguished. Strategic planning is con-
cerned with the identification and evaluation of resource acquisition options with the 
objective of sustaining and enhancing a company’s competitive position over the 
long term. This work is more concerned with tactical planning, focusing on resource 
adjustment and allocation decisions over shorter planning horizons, e.g. for one 
product generation in the high-tech electronics industry. Cf. Shapiro, Jeremy F.: 
Modeling the Supply Chain, Duxbury 2007, pp. 307–308, Kaipia and Holmström: 
Selecting the right planning approach for a product, p. 3 and Kaipia: The impact of 
improved supply chain planning on upstream operations, p. 2. 
337  See, for example, Simchi-Levi, Kaminsky and Simchi-Levi: Designing and managing 
the supply chain, p. 121. 
338  Cf. Webster: Principles and Tools for Supply Chain Management, p. 39. 
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tively complex, include fixed demand and fixed lead times – if these conditions 
are not fulfilled, the original plan needs to be overridden. This can cause accu-
mulations of inventory, for example at the suppliers with capacity limits. 
In a pull-based supply chain, material processing is started when (1) material 
is available, (2) processing capacity of the next step is available and (3) an ex-
ternal trigger arrives. The external trigger would be the order from the immedi-
ate customer of the process, which can be either an internal or an external cus-
tomer. In other words, the production and distribution processes in a pull-based 
system are driven by actual downstream demand and not forecasted demand.339
According to Ohno, who, among other things, devised a pull-based system for 
Toyota: 
“Manufacturers and workplaces can no longer base production on desktop 
planning alone and then distribute, or push, them onto the market. It has 
become a matter of course for customers, or users, each with a different 
value system, to stand in the front line of the marketplace and, so to speak, 
pull the goods they need, in the amount and at the time they need 
them.”340
A pull-based system is simpler to implement than a push-based system and 
requires fewer interventions as the system reacts very quickly to small variations 
in demand. However, larger variations do require intervention by the planners as 
backlog situations are likely to occur. Since a pull-based planning approach is 
not driven by forecasted demand, difficulties may arise when demand is highly 
volatile and capacity is inflexible.341 On the other hand, another advantage of 
pull-based systems is the prevention of overproduction and excessive inventory 
levels, which are core objectives of the lean philosophy, through an explicit 
limit of the amount of orders that can be in the system.342 Other advantages are 
that pull-based systems are simple and easy to understand and that all processes 
in the supply chain are synchronised with the customer.343
A hybrid supply chain, also known as a push-pull system, combines the 
characteristics of pure push-based supply chains and pure pull-based supply 
chains. The initial stages of the supply chain, such as component suppliers, op-
                                                          
339  See, for example, Simchi-Levi, Kaminsky and Simchi-Levi: Designing and managing 
the supply chain, p. 121. 
340  Ohno, Taiichi: Toyota Production System: Beyond Large Scale Production, Cam-
bridge, MA 1988, p. xiv. See also Hopp and Spearman: To Pull or Not to Pull: What 
Is the Question?, p. 140. 
341  Cf. Webster: Principles and Tools for Supply Chain Management, p. 38. 
342  Cf. Hopp and Spearman: To Pull or Not to Pull: What Is the Question?, pp. 142–143. 
343  See Simchi-Levi, Kaminsky and Simchi-Levi: Designing and managing the supply 
chain, p. 122 and Hopp and Spearman: To Pull or Not to Pull: What Is the Question?, 
p. 137–138. 
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erate based on long-term forecasts, while the rest of the supply chain, for exam-
ple the assembly and shipment processes, is driven by realized demand.344 In the 
high-tech electronics industry, most supply chains are hybrid supply chains, as 
the last steps of software flashing and testing are mostly performed after receipt 
of an actual customer order. However, the planning approach used for the rest of 
the supply chain may vary and could be either be push-based or pull-based. This 
is represented in the different planning approaches analysed in this work. 
The different planning approaches may be more or less suitable for different 
types of products and at different phases of their life cycles. Selecting a plan-
ning approach that is appropriate to the environment can potentially improve the 
performance of the supply chain.345 For example, Simchi-Levi, Kaminsky and 
Simchi-Levi argue that push systems are more suitable if demand uncertainty is 
low, while pull systems are more suitable if demand uncertainty is high.346 Also, 
different phases of the product life cycle pose different challenges to the supply 
chain. When the product is introduced to the market, frequent design changes 
may need to be incorporated at all levels of the supply chain, with high require-
ments for innovation and responsiveness. Also, capacity needs to be ramped up 
quickly as the design becomes standardized, while at the same time stockouts 
should be avoided. In the maturity and decline phase excess inventories should 
be avoided, while at the same time efficiency of the system in general becomes 
important.347 It remains to be analysed whether pull-based or push-based supply 
chains are suitable even for short life cycle products with extremely high de-
mand volatility. The impact of long component lead times on the appropriate-
ness of the planning approach is a further issue of concern. One important con-
sideration is whether responsiveness can be achieved without adding complexity 
to the planning system, as additional complexity of the planning system would 
potentially work against the objective of having a responsive supply chain, par-
                                                          
344  Cf. Simchi-Levi, Kaminsky and Simchi-Levi: Designing and managing the supply 
chain, p. 122 and Gonçalves: Demand Bubbles and Phantom Orders in Supply 
Chains, p. 69. 
345  Cf. Olhager, Jan and Erik Selldin: Manufacturing planning and control approaches 
for supply chains: market alignment and performance, in: International Journal of 
Production Research, Vol. 45 (2007), No. 6, pp. 1481–1482; Kaipia: The impact of 
improved supply chain planning on upstream operations, pp. 11–14 and Byrnes, 
Jonathan: You Only Have One Supply Chain?, 2005, Working Knowledge for Busi-
ness Leaders, Harvard Business School, http://hbswk.hbs.edu/archive/4929.html, re-
trieved on: 11 October 2006, pp. 1–3. 
346  Cf. Simchi-Levi, Kaminsky and Simchi-Levi: Designing and managing the supply 
chain, pp. 123–125. 
347  Cf. Richardson, Peter R. and John R.M. Gordon: Measuring Total Manufacturing 
Performance, in: Sloan Management Review, Vol. 21 (1980), No. 2, pp. 48–49. 
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ticularly if unexpected events occur.348 For example, Berry and Hill describe a 
manufacturer of telecommunications switchgear that decided to outsource the 
production of components that were previously made in-house. The goal of such 
a move is often to increase the flexibility of the system, which is expected to 
have a positive effect on responsiveness. The company decided to retain its pre-
vious MRP system. The complex MRP system, however, was not able to handle 
issues of vendor scheduling and component inventory management well. This 
resulted in shortages and consequential reductions in the delivery performance 
because the planning system, while complex, was unable to cope with the new 
situation.349
In their study of the lighting industry, Childerhouse et al. suggest a segmen-
tation of products and supply chains and identify different planning approaches 
as optimal for different products in different phases of the product life cycle. 
Through a categorization with five dimensions, i.e. product variety, demand 
variability, duration of the product life cycle, demand volume and time window 
for delivery, they match different products to different planning approaches.350
Over the product life cycle the authors propose for the analysed products to use 
“design and build” in the introduction phase, “MRP” in the growth phase, 
“Kanban” in the maturity phase, “packaging centre” in the saturation phase and 
“MRP” in the product's decline phase.351 In subsequent research based on this 
case study and a literature review, they suggest to “pick and mix” from different 
supply chain management options, such as different production technologies, 
product modularization techniques, logistics, postponement, etc.352
Similarly, Jüttner et al. analyse the alignment of different supply chain 
strategies, which are aligned with the customer strategies followed by the or-
ganisation, with the product life cycle phases in the case of tobacco company. 
The authors find that product life cycle management and demand chain align-
ment have a mutually reinforcing relationship and that continuous monitoring, 
appraisals and changes are required in order to support the dynamic product 
                                                          
348  Cf. Prater, Edmund, Markus Biehl and Michael A. Smith: International supply chain 
agility: Tradeoffs between flexibility and uncertainty, in: International Journal of Op-
erations & Production Management, Vol. 21 (2001), No. 5/6, p. 835–838 and Kaipia: 
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6, p. 679 and p. 681. 
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352  Cf. Aitken, James et al.: Designing and Managing Multiple Pipelines, in: Interna-
tional Journal of Logistics, Vol. 26 (2005), No. 2, p. 92. 
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routing.353 The authors propose that merely selecting the right product-process 
strategies and running parallel systems is not sufficient.354
Kaipia and Holmström segment the product portfolio in the high-tech com-
pany they analyse in four categories, i.e. (1) commodity items with stable de-
mand, (2) seasonal or fashion items, (3) consumer durables, where total demand 
is predictable but sales of variants are not, and (4) new and innovative prod-
ucts.355 For each of these product categories, the authors suggest a different 
planning approach. For commodity items, the authors suggest an efficient re-
plenishment approach, which however requires inventory buffers in the supply 
chain to which the OEM has visibility. This is often not the case in current sup-
ply chains in the high-tech electronics industry. For seasonal or fashion items, 
the authors suggest once-off sales planning, in which new products are intro-
duced continuously and as the decided production quantity of a product is sold, 
the product is replaced by a new product. For consumer durables with many 
variants the authors suggest streamlined planning using attach rates, where ex-
isting plans for planning other products’ demand are used. This approach, how-
ever, is also difficult to implement in the high-tech electronics industry due to 
the difficulty in predicting the success or failure of a specific product, independ-
ent of their similarity to other, similar products. Finally, for innovative new 
products or product introductions the authors suggest expert-driven planning 
with accurate response to early sales, as originally suggested by Fisher et al.356
For the reasons outlined earlier, including long lead times for components, this 
is also difficult to implement in the high-tech electronics industry.  
An important consideration for the selection of appropriate supply chain 
planning processes in the high-tech electronics industry are the long supplier 
lead times and the potential for supply disruptions.357 Therefore, Christopher, 
Peck and Towill suggest a taxonomy based on lead times and demand predict-
ability. For products with long replenishment lead times, they suggest lean sup-
ply chain design if demand is predictable, which would mean to “make or 
                                                          
353  Cf. Jüttner, Godsell and Christopher: Demand chain alignment competence, p. 998. 
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pp. 9–11. For expert-based planning, see Fisher et al.: Making supply meet demand 
in an uncertain world, pp. 83–93 and Fisher, Marshall L. and Ananth Raman: Reduc-
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Operations Research, Vol. 44 (1996), No. 1, pp. 1–20. 
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source ahead of demand in the most efficient way”.358 While this is necessary to 
some extent in the high-tech electronics industry due to the long component lead 
times and potential for supply shortages and disruptions, such an approach en-
tails problems for supply chain management that need to be addressed with ap-
propriate planning mechanisms, for example through excess capacity or inven-
tory.359 If demand is unpredictable – as typical is in the high-tech electronics 
industry – Christopher et al. suggest leagile production and logistics postpone-
ment, where the final assembly steps are performed only after customer demand 
has been encountered.360 To some extent, the hybrid supply chains in the high-
tech electronics industry already follow such a hybrid, “leagile” strategy, as the 
software flashing and packing steps are only performed as actual demand is ob-
served. The product specificity of some of the components, however, makes 
supply chain planning a challenge even if postponement strategies are imple-
mented. This requires different approaches to design the supply chain efficiently 
and avoid costly inventory build-ups or stockouts. 
The methodology used in the studies presented in the preceding paragraphs 
is mostly case-based and does not verify the recommendations through com-
puter simulation modelling or similar techniques, which some authors recognize 
as a limitation.361 Also, for short life cycle products it may be infeasible to ad-
just the planning approach over the product life cycle, requiring a choice that is 
flexible enough to be adaptable to unexpected situations and other developments 
that occur over the product life cycle.362 The challenge for planners in the high-
                                                          
358  Cf. Christopher, Martin G., Helen Peck and Denis R. Towill: A taxonomy for select-
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tech industry today, where companies sell a wide portfolio of products in vola-
tile markets, is to design the planning approaches in the supply chain appropri-
ately and implement them successfully. This is one possibility for achieving 
both increased efficiency and responsiveness in such supply chains as good 
planning approaches reduce the need for management attention. The scarce re-
sources of management can then be dedicated to extraordinary situations, such 
as supply chain disruptions.363
III. Strategic Relevance of Supply Chain Challenges 
Supply chains in the high-tech electronics industry face a large number of chal-
lenges, caused both by the market characteristics and by past and current actions 
of the supply chain members. Addressing those challenges involves catering to 
multiple objectives. These include the responsiveness of supply chains to chang-
ing customer requirements and their overall efficiency. Both of these issues in 
supply chain design and management currently receive wide attention in the 
scientific community as well as in practice. Management of supply chain re-
sponsiveness is particularly important when operating in a competitive market 
where short lead times might be critical and inventory – which can allow fast 
response – is risky (e.g., because of product obsolescence), costly and therefore 
reduces efficiency. These aspects become even more important for innovative 
products with short product life cycles, where management of supply chain re-
sponsiveness is seen as a crucial capability and demand surges during product 
introduction need to be handled as well as market downturns.364 In the high-tech 
electronics sector, the share of purchased goods varies between 30 percent and 
90 percent of total manufacturing costs. The high value of many long-lead time 
components leads to high stock-out costs and simultaneously increases the im-
portance of inventory level and working capital management.365 At the same 
time, more commodity-like, functional products are generally assumed to re-
quire more efficient supply chains366, combined with minimisation of the bull-
whip effect. When supply chains are more able to react to changing market re-
quirements than necessary – i.e., having achieved a higher than necessary de-
gree of responsiveness – customers will have to carry the additional cost, which 
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is also problematic.367 The goal is to design the supply chain such that the 
“products may flow as required by the customer throughout the life cycle”.368
In a project that established a new supply chain planning approach at Philips 
Electronics, numerous improvements in both efficiency and responsiveness 
could be observed: reductions in inventory levels and obsolescence save 
US$5 million per year on a US$300 million turnover, while the abilities to re-
spond to upturns in the market and to make changes to the product mix were 
increased. At the same time, the delivery performance to the committed date 
could be improved, which represents an increase in the reliability in serving its 
customers. Those improvements represent an important competitive advantage, 
since the customers of Philips Electronics rely heavily on their products, with 
supply chain performance being a key differentiator. “For customers, a well-
coordinated supply chain is crucial for fast and flexible responses to changes in 
the market and a proactive attitude towards market opportunities”, as a manager 
involved in the project of introducing the new planning approach notes.369 Man-
aging such a change in supply chain strategy well is crucial, since a drastically 
different approach is likely to have an impact on other members of the supply 
chain, and potentially incurs additional costs in some parts of the chain.370
Dell’s supply chain is an example for a responsive supply chain. The OEM 
in the computer industry delays assembly and configuration of computers until 
an order is placed by a customer. At the same time, it designs products to use 
many common parts and uses expedited freight selectively to achieve increased 
flexibility.371 Component shortages are addressed by instant price reductions for 
some and increases for other components, consequently shaping demand, which 
is also used to reduce order fluctuations.372 The key characteristics of the Dell 
supply chain are speed, responsiveness, low inventory levels, and end to end 
visibility and connection.373
Supply chains can react to changes in a product’s demand volatility in vari-
ous ways. For example, in the retail industry, there are three primary methods to 
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control material flow – manual pull, automatic pull and push. Push, where the 
product is rolled out to the stores based on a central plan that considers experi-
ence from the past, information on demography, buyer behaviour, product and 
salvage value etc., is considered to be best suited for the initial ramp-up period 
by Thonemann et al.374 Later on, once demand is more predictable, automatic 
pull can be used where the IT system considers historical demand in the stores 
to reorder the product. Manual pull, where individual stores reorder based on the 
subjective judgements of store management, could be useful when special influ-
ences such as promotions need to be considered.375
A survey of consumer packaged goods companies in 2005 indicates that of 
those companies that tailor their supply chain approach to the product, the ones 
that consider changes in volatility of demand over time for the segmentation of 
their product portfolio are more successful. As shown in Figure B-10, 50 per-
cent of the best performing companies in supply chain management used volatil-
ity as a segmentation criterion, compared to only 27 percent of the other compa-
nies, which tend to use simpler criteria such as volume.376 This indicates that 
many companies do not realise the importance of tailoring the supply chain to 
the requirements a particular product has during the various stages of its life 
cycle. As the above examples show, there is no “one fits all” approach for suc-
cessful management of the supply chain, but different strategies may be appro-
priate in different industries, for different products and potentially at different 
stages of their product life cycles. 
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Figure B-10: Criteria Used to Segment Product Portfolio 
C. Modelling Supply Chains in the High-Tech 
Electronics Industry with System Dynamics 
The research objective is to capture the generic structures and intrinsic dynamics 
of supply chains in the high-tech electronics industry. An understanding of the 
linkages and dynamics between responsiveness and efficiency in supply chains 
allows the identification of policies that achieve increased responsiveness and 
efficiency at the same time. The methodology used to achieve this goal is Sys-
tem Dynamics (SD) and has its origins in control engineering and management. 
The SD perspective is based on explicitly modelling information feedback and 
delays to understand the dynamic behaviour of complex physical, biological, 
and social systems.377 In the following, the System Dynamics methodology is 
introduced. The rest of the chapter is devoted to describing the System Dynam-
ics model developed to analyse the balance between responsiveness and effi-
ciency in the high-tech electronics industry. 
I. Model Overview 
1. Applying the System Dynamics Methodology 
In the 1950s, Jay W. Forrester developed the field of System Dynamics at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)378. System Dynamics is grounded 
on several theories reaching further into the past that were put together to form a 
new field. One of these is servomechanism theory, which Forrester linked to the 
social sciences. Forrester himself, during World War II, developed servomecha-
nisms, or feedback control mechanisms, for the control of radar antennae and 
gun mounts, which linked the mathematical servomechanism theory with prac-
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tice.379 Forrester then laid the foundation for research on supply chain behaviour 
and characteristics with his seminal work on “Industrial Dynamics”, which is 
how he initially called the field.380 Servomechanism theory is one of the founda-
tions of System Dynamics as it is known today. The other is general systems 
theory, a field that was developed by von Bertalanffy in the 1940s and then ex-
tended, focusing on mathematically organising relationships into a coherent 
system.381 A third is control theory, with its roots in physics.382 With that there 
exists an “elegant and rigorous mathematical foundation” for the models devel-
oped in the System Dynamics field.383
System Dynamics provides a systematic approach to linking cause and effect 
in complex, dynamic situations. Systems can be complex for two reasons, (1) 
the structure of the system and (2) its dynamics.384 Even when the structural 
parameters of a system are known, it is not possible to determine how the sys-
tem behaves dynamically.385 System Dynamics recognizes that the structure of a 
system drives its behaviour over time. The central idea of System Dynamics is 
that the internal causal structure and characteristics of the whole system deter-
mine the behaviour we observe, and not single decision, external disturbances or 
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381  See Bertalanffy, Ludwig von: The history and status of general systems theory, in: 
Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 15 (1972), No. 4; Boulding, Kenneth E.: 
General Systems Theory – The Skeleton of Science, in: Management Science, Vol. 2 
(1956), No. 3; Ackoff: Towards a System of Systems Concepts and Hammer: Ena-
bling Successful Supply Chain Management, pp. 7–8. 
382  Cf. Maxwell, James C.: On Governors, in: Proceedings of the Royal Society of Lon-
don, Vol. 16 (1868). 
383  Cf. Sterman, John D.: All models are wrong: reflections on becoming a systems sci-
entist, in: System Dynamics Review, Vol. 18 (2002), No. 4, p. 503. 
384  Cf. Größler, Grübner and Milling: Organisational adaptation processes to external 
complexity, p. 255. See also Milling: Understanding and managing innovation proc-
esses, p. 85. 
385  Cf. Holweg et al.: Towards responsive vehicle supply, p. 511. 
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the characteristics of individual parts of the system.386 The theory of complex 
feedback loop systems developed by Forrester enables an understanding of the 
important causal relationships in the system.387 A feedback loop, as defined by 
Forrester, is “the structural setting within which all decisions are made”.388 Any 
decision made at some point in the system alters the system state, i.e. the behav-
iour of the system is now different from what it would otherwise have been. 
This is known as a feedback control system, where the environment causes a 
decision that in turn has an effect on the original environment.389 Future deci-
sions will now be based on this new, changed system state. Therefore, the sys-
tem “produces the decision which produces the action which produces change in 
the system”; there is an implied circularity of cause and effect.390
Decisions in any system are not based on the actual system state, but can 
only use information that is actually available to the decision makers.391 This 
information is only in rare cases complete, unbiased and current.392 Addition-
ally, human decision makers are subject to psychological and cognitive limita-
tions. Bounded rationality, an idea that is at the centre of the System Dynamics 
theory and has its roots in what is known as the Carnegie School, suggests that 
“decision making can never achieve the ideal of perfect (objective) rationality, 
but is destined to a lower level of intended rationality” and that the performance 
and success of an organization is primarily determined by the ability of the 
                                                          
386  Cf. Forrester: Industrial dynamics: A major breakthrough for decision makers, p. 40 
and Schieritz, Nadine and Peter M. Milling: Modeling the Forest or Modeling the 
Trees – A Comparison of System Dynamics and Agent-Based Simulation, 2003, 
http://iswww.bwl.uni-mannheim.de/Forschung/pr/sd03/p-na.pdf, retrieved on: 9 Sep-
tember 2006, p. 3. 
387  Cf. Shantzis, Steven B. and William W. Behrens III: Population Control Mechanisms 
in a Primitive Agricultural Society, in: Meadows, Dennis L. and Donella H. Mead-
ows (Eds.): Towards Global Equilibrium: Collected Papers, Cambridge, MA 1973, 
p. 259. 
388  Forrester, Jay W.: Market Growth as Influenced by Capital Investment, in: Industrial 
Management Review (currently published as the Sloan Management Review), Vol. 9 
(1968), No. 2, p. 84. This paper, pp. 83–86, provides a succinct introduction to For-
rester’s ideas on systems. 
389  Cf. Forrester: Industrial dynamics: A major breakthrough for decision makers, p. 39. 
390  Cf. Forrester: Market Growth as Influenced by Capital Investment, p. 84. 
391  This is referred to as the Baker Criterion, indicating that the inputs to all decision 
rules in models must be restricted to information actually avaiable to decision mak-
ers. Cf. Sterman: Business Dynamics, pp. 516–518. 
392  Cf. Schieritz and Milling: Modeling the Forest or Modeling the Trees, p. 4. 
94
members of the system to process information in a meaningful way.393 In supply 
chain management, Sterman uses the System Dynamics methodology to evalu-
ate how human “misperceptions of feedback” and the lacking ability to account 
for the supply line of orders affect the behaviour of a four-stage supply chain by 
conducting an experiment with human subjects. Sterman finds that even per-
fectly reasonable decision processes in a supply chain lead to unintended and 
dysfunctional results, such as oscillation and increased variability.394 Diehl and 
Sterman extend this work and find that when the feedback complexity of the 
supply chain system they studied was low, subjects could outperform a very 
simple “make no changes to system”-decision rule. However, most subjects 
were outperformed by the “make no changes to system”-rule as the complexity 
of the system was increased, e.g. through delays and more feedback effects.395
Therefore, even locally rational heuristics used by, for example, supply chain 
managers, can have unintended consequences, such as supply chain instabil-
ity.396 System dynamics models recognize bounded rationality explicitly when 
representing the structure of the decision-making processes in the system as 
feedback loops.397
Dynamic decision making problems such as those in supply chains, involv-
ing high-order systems of nonlinear integral and differential equations, pose 
significant computational burdens for a computation of an optimal solution, or 
                                                          
393  Cf. Morecroft, John D.W.: System Dynamics: Portraying Bounded Rationality, in: 
Omega, Vol. 11 (1983), No. 2, pp. 131–132. The Carnegie School is based on the no-
tion that decisions made by human decision makers are influenced by severe limita-
tions of their information processing and computing abilities. 
394  Cf. Sterman: Modeling Managerial Behavior, p. 337. 
395  Cf. Diehl, Ernst and John D. Sterman: Effects of feedback complexity on dynamic 
decision making, 1993, Sloan Working Paper 3608-93-MSA, Sloan School of Man-
agement, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
https://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/1721.1/2491/1/SWP-3608-28936061.pdf, retrieved 
on: 16 October 2006, pp. 15–16. See also Gonçalves: Demand Bubbles and Phantom 
Orders in Supply Chains, p. 19. 
396  Cf. Gonçalves: Demand Bubbles and Phantom Orders in Supply Chains, pp. 18–19. 
397  Cf. Größler, Andreas, Peter M. Milling and Graham Winch: Perspectives on rational-
ity in system dynamics – a workshop report and open research questions, in: Omega, 
Vol. 20 (2004), No. 1, pp. 78–79. 
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make that impossible.398 One can choose not to model the decision-making 
processes in a certain problem explicitly, introduce simplifying assumptions and 
thus reduce the problem sufficiently to face a problem that can be solved for an 
optimal solution. For example, one line of research on supply chain manage-
ment assumes fully rational agents, as opposed to locally and boundedly rational 
agents as mentioned above. Lee et al. attribute the bullwhip effect only to the 
infrastructure and related processes of the supply chain and not the decision 
makers’ locally and boundedly rational behaviour, arguing that the decision 
makers are fully rational.399 In contrast to Sterman’s work400, Lee et al. assume 
that the decision makers in the supply chain are “rational and optimizing” and 
they use “simple mathematical models…to explain the outcome of rational deci-
sion making”.401 Lee et al. do, however, acknowledge the work done by Forres-
ter, Sterman and others to explain the bullwhip effect.402 The approach of as-
suming perfect rationality and optimizing the performance has the disadvantage 
of potentially leading to results that differ from observed reality.403 For example, 
Croson and Donohue find that the bullwhip effect still exists even when the op-
erational causes of the bullwhip effect that were identified by Lee et al. (short-
age gaming, demand signalling, order batching and price fluctuations) are re-
moved from the system and demand is known to all parties.404 Modellers always 
face a trade-off between optimizing a simplified system that may not represent 
the real world well and developing a more realistic model that can lead to satis-
                                                          
398  Cf. Simon: Rational Decision Making in Business Organizations, p. 499 and 
Gonçalves: Demand Bubbles and Phantom Orders in Supply Chains, p. 32. See also 
Jain, Sanjay: Supply Chain Management Tradeoffs Analysis, Winter Simulation 
Conference, Washington, D.C. 2004, p. 1358;  Holweg, Matthias and Stephen M. 
Disney: The evolving frontiers of the bullwhip problem, EurOMA International Con-
ference on Operations and Global Competitiveness, Budapest 2005, p. 713; and 
Lertpattarapong: Applying system dynamics approach to the supply chain manage-
ment problem, p. 91. 
399  Cf. Lee, Padmanabhan and Whang: The bullwhip effect in supply chains, p. 95. 
400  Cf. Sterman: Modeling Managerial Behavior, pp. 321–322. 
401  Lee, Padmanabhan and Whang: Information Distortion in a Supply Chain: The Bull-
whip Effect, p. 548. 
402  Cf. Lee, Hau L., V. Paddy Padmanabhan and Seungjin Whang: Comments on "In-
formation Distortion in a Supply Chain: The Bullwhip Effect", in: Management Sci-
ence, Vol. 50 (2004), No. 12, p. 1887. 
403  Cf. Simon: Rational Decision Making in Business Organizations, p. 505; Sterman: 
Modeling Managerial Behavior, pp. 321–322. and Gonçalves: Demand Bubbles and 
Phantom Orders in Supply Chains, p. 19. 
404  Cf. Croson and Donahue: Behavioral Causes of the Bullwhip Effect and the Ob-
served Value of Inventory Information, pp. 323–324. 
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factory solutions.405 Simon calls this satisficing – “decision makers can satisfice 
either by finding optimum solutions for a simplified world, or by finding satis-
factory solutions for a more realistic world”.406 System Dynamics aims for the 
latter by aiming at representing the decision rules in the system realistically. 
In System Dynamics models, real-world processes are represented as stocks 
and flows between those stocks, using a set of integral and differential equations 
to mathematically capture the characteristics of the system. Those are the only 
two types of variables required to represent the activity within a feedback 
loop.407 Mathematics “forces clarity and precision upon the conjectures [about 
underlying mechanisms], thus enabling meaningful comparison between the 
consequences of basic assumptions and empirical facts”.408 Stock variables, or 
levels, represent the system condition at any point in time. They are accumula-
tions within the system; mathematically, level variables are integrations of the 
net difference between inflow and outflow to the stock over time.409 The conse-
quence of this modelling technique is that single objects flowing through the 
system cannot be identified; instead, the system is modelled from an aggregate 
point of view, representing the characteristics of objects via average proper-
ties.410 Flow variables, or rates, describe how and when decisions are made. 
“The rate equations are the policy statements in the system that define how the 
existing conditions of the system produce a decision stream controlling ac-
tion”.411 Flow variables represent the inflows and outflows to stock variables, 
hence their name. In the case of a supply chain model, those flows can be, for 
example, material flows or information flows, which are influenced by decision 
rules on orders, production etc. 
Computer simulation is a sophisticated means to understand the often highly 
counter-intuitive dynamics of the complex interrelations found in supply chains, 
particularly because it allows to study the overall effects of modifications on the 
whole supply chain, rather than limiting the analysis to the local effects in a sin-
gle manufacturing process or a single buffer.412 System Dynamics simulation 
creates an environment where new decision making structures can be tested sys-
                                                          
405  Cf. Simon: Rational Decision Making in Business Organizations, p. 499. 
406  Cf. Simon: Rational Decision Making in Business Organizations, p. 498. 
407  Cf. Forrester: Market Growth as Influenced by Capital Investment, p. 84. 
408  May, Robert M.: Uses and Abuses of Mathematics in Biology, in: Science, Vol. 303 
(2004), p. 791. 
409  Cf. Forrester: Market Growth as Influenced by Capital Investment, p. 85. 
410  Cf. Schieritz and Milling: Modeling the Forest or Modeling the Trees, p. 8. 
411  Forrester: Market Growth as Influenced by Capital Investment, p. 85. 
412  Cf. Shapiro: Modeling the Supply Chain, p. 240 and Hieta, Saku: Supply Chain 
Simulation with Logsim-Simulator, Winter Simulation Conference, Washington, 
D.C. 1998, p. 323. 
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tematically without the necessity of having access to empirical data on the struc-
ture. Such system modifications can be analysed and simulated in a controlled 
environment before carrying out similar changes in the real system. System Dy-
namics allows predicting the behaviour in complex systems by establishing a 
link between the structure of a system and its behaviour.413 It provides a frame-
work for understanding the complexity in such systems, e.g. supply chains.414
Traditional modelling methods, such as static spreadsheet models, often do 
not sufficiently account for the real factors that affect the dynamics of complex 
systems, such as supply chains in the high-tech industry.415 Akkermans and Del-
laert argue that many of the approaches developed in the past to develop SCM 
theory necessarily rely on assumptions that “are perhaps not even close to being 
realistic in practice”.416 System Dynamics is an approach that can capture many 
of the elements that are often ignored or assumed, by explicitly modelling feed-
back, perceived delays, bounded rationality and goal setting. SD “becomes 
therefore a perfect candidate to analyse the more complex settings of today’s 
supply chains and supply chain networks”, in particular because it is also useful 
in analysing process improvements in supply chains.417 While the System Dy-
namics approach necessarily relies on assumptions as well, its intention is to 
capture the real decision making processes that can be observed in the system. 
In complex supply chains, this aspect is particularly important, as a large num-
ber of variables need to be considered in order to enable a balanced analysis of 
the factors influencing responsiveness and efficiency.418 Other modelling ap-
proaches often do not capture interactions among processes that evolve over 
time, which can lead to potentially inaccurate results. Most importantly, such 
models may not consider feedback effects.  
                                                          
413  Cf. Schieritz and Milling: Modeling the Forest or Modeling the Trees, p. 8. 
414  Cf. Lee, Paul and Martin Davies: Reap or weep, in: Supply Management, Vol. 2 
(1997), No. 18, p. 38, and Avni, Tayfun: Simulation modeling primer – A review of 
simulation modeling, in: IIE Solutions, Vol. 31 (1999), No. 9, p. 39. 
415  Note that it is possible to develop a dynamic spreadsheet model, following the Sys-
tem Dynamics methodology. However, modern software packages simplify the proc-
ess significantly. For examples of spreadsheet-based System Dynamics models, see 
Evans, Gary N., Mohamed M. Naim and Denis R. Towill: Application of a simula-
tion methodology to the redesign of a logistical control system, in: International 
Journal of Production Economics, Vol. 56–57 (1998) and Holweg et al.: Towards re-
sponsive vehicle supply. 
416  Akkermans and Dellaert: The rediscovery of industrial dynamics, p. 180. 
417  Akkermans and Dellaert: The rediscovery of industrial dynamics, pp. 179–180. See 
also Forrester: Industrial Dynamics and Sterman: Business Dynamics. 
418  Cf. Holweg: The three dimensions of responsiveness, p. 603. 
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While the empirical studies discussed in section B.II.5 identify links between 
the supply chain type, product type and performance, the task remains to iden-
tify causal relationships.419 Many of the features observed in high-tech supply 
chains, such as delays in information and material flow and long planning hori-
zons, are connected to the systemic problems in supply chains identified by For-
rester.420 Following Simon’s remarks on model construction, the holistic System 
Dynamics model developed in this work retains a rich set of properties of the 
real world by modelling the total supply chain from customer order through to 
the component suppliers. This allows finding “satisfactory solutions for a more 
realistic world”, as opposed to determining optimal solutions that can only be 
found in a significantly simplified model that does not reflect reality as well.421
Previous System Dynamics studies into the high-tech supply chain have fo-
cused on subsystems of the supply chain, e.g. the work by Gonçalves and Gon-
çalves et al. on a semiconductor manufacturer422 and that by Forrester focusing 
on decision structures relating to market growth for a high-tech company423.
Lertpattarapong presents a System Dynamics simulation model relating to the 
supply chain structure of a high-tech company, but does not proceed to show 
how the system could be changed to achieve greater responsiveness and effi-
ciency.424 Kamath and Roy’s System Dynamics model analyses the costs of 
two-echelon supply chains for short life cycle products, with a focus on capacity 
expansion decisions, which are not relevant over the short life cycle of the prod-
                                                          
419  See, for example, Ramdas and Spekman: Chain or Shackles: Understanding What 
Drives Supply-Chain Performance, p. 21 and Holweg: The three dimensions of re-
sponsiveness, p. 617 and p. 613. 
420  Cf. Forrester: Industrial Dynamics, pp. 172–186; and Kaipia, Korhonen and Hartiala: 
Planning nervousness in a demand supply network, p. 95. 
421  Cf. Simon: Rational Decision Making in Business Organizations, p. 498. See also 
Holweg et al.: Towards responsive vehicle supply, who develop a simulation model 
of the automotive supply chain that has similar characteristics. 
422  See Gonçalves: Demand Bubbles and Phantom Orders in Supply Chains and 
Gonçalves, Hines and Sterman: The impact of endogenous demand on push-pull pro-
duction systems. 
423  See Forrester: Market Growth as Influenced by Capital Investment. 
424  See Lertpattarapong: Applying system dynamics approach to the supply chain man-
agement problem. 
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ucts considered in this work.425 Additionally, such two-echelon supply chains 
are by their nature a highly simplified abstraction from reality.  
The model developed in this work has the objective of investigating respon-
siveness and efficiency in a multi-echelon high-tech electronics supply chain. 
The research objective is achieved by modelling the planning approaches in 
such a supply chain and identifying appropriate planning approaches for prod-
ucts with different structural characteristics of demand and supply. By varying 
the structure of the system, i.e. simulating different planning approaches, operat-
ing points can be identified that achieve the desired responsiveness and effi-
ciency. Also, both centralised and decentralised planning processes throughout 
the supply chain are represented in the model presented in the following, which 
is an aspect that so far has not been examined with such models in detail.426 This 
work explicitly acknowledges the existence of feedback effects that affect deci-
sions elsewhere in the supply chain and endeavours to examine how these ef-
fects affect supply chain responsiveness and efficiency. The author develops a 
mathematical model that captures the underlying structure and dynamics of the 
processes in supply chains in the high-tech electronics industry. The System 
Dynamics model explicitly includes the impact that decision variables, such as 
desired safety stock levels, and the planning heuristics used have on supply 
chain performance.  
The model serves primarily as a basis for research, but research findings are 
expected to be of high practical relevance. The System Dynamics model can 
support decision makers in managing supply chains according to the goals of 
responsiveness and efficiency. Through cooperating with the consulting firm 
McKinsey & Company, Inc., a generic structure of supply chains similar to that 
described by Sterman427, Forrester428 and others, is combined with case-based 
input from practice and expert insights on the model results. 
                                                          
425  Cf. Kamath B., Narasimha and Rahul Roy: Supply Chain Structure Design for a 
Short Lifecycle Product: A Loop Dominance Based Analysis, Hawaii International 
Conference on System Sciences, Hawaii 2005, p. 4 and Kamath B., Narasimha and 
Rahul Roy: Capacity augmentation of a supply chain for a short lifecycle product: A 
system dynamics framework, 2006, forthcoming in: European Journal of Operational 
Research, pp. 4–6. 
426  Cf. Kaipia, Korhonen and Hartiala: Planning nervousness in a demand supply net-
work, p. 101 and Fransoo, Jan C., Marc J.F. Wouters and Ton G. de Kok: Multi-
echelon multi-company inventory planning with limited information exchange, in: 
Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 52 (2001), No. 7, pp. 830–832 and 
836f.
427  Cf. Sterman: Business Dynamics, pp. 709 et sqq. 
428  Cf. Forrester: Industrial Dynamics. 
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2. Model Boundary and Model Sectors 
The System Dynamics model represents different planning systems that are ei-
ther currently in place in typical supply chains in the high-tech industry or are 
conceived to be potential yet realistic approaches. Even though it may be theo-
retically possible to devise a system that incorporates all of the suggestions 
made by researchers on successful supply chain strategies, many of these are 
difficult to implement in practice, which is why the aspect of realism and im-
plementability is a consideration in this work. Typically, supply chains for high-
tech electronics products, such as mobile phones or network routers, are set up 
as hybrid push–pull production systems, with a varying extent of the use of each 
planning approach in the supply chain.429 The key distinction between different 
planning approaches in this System Dynamics model is achieved through differ-
ences in the decision-making policies of the supply chain members. Those lo-
cally rational decisions affect material orders, production levels and shipment 
rates in each period, and are based on information known to the different players 
in the supply chain, e.g. a forecast provided to them, as well as on own beliefs 
about future developments. Due to the aspects of bounded rationality outlined 
previously, such policies can lead to unexpected dynamic behaviour in the sys-
tem. 
The supply chain planning approach that currently predominates in the high-
tech industry is a push-based supply chain planning approach, based on a system 
with cascading forecasts through the supply chain, where the different supply 
chain members each use their own material requirements planning (MRP) sys-
tem. This push approach, based on long-term demand forecasts, is used by the 
supply chain members upstream of software flashing, up to a major buffer stock 
of semi-finished products. This buffer stock is located at the software flashing 
and packing production step. From there, the customer pulls the product and the 
final customization steps and shipment are performed within a very short lead 
time and driven by customer orders. In the mobile phone industry, for example, 
operators, such as T-Mobile or Vodafone, place their orders directly with the 
country representatives of the mobile phone OEMs, such as Nokia. Cisco calls 
such an approach “build to stock and ship to order”.430 This push approach until 
the major buffer stock, with forecasts that cascade upstream through the supply 
chain and are adjusted by each echelon, is the first planning approach that is 
modelled. The second approach replaces the cascading forecasts by central 
                                                          
429  See also Gonçalves, Hines and Sterman: The impact of endogenous demand on push-
pull production systems, p. 191, who describe the production process for semicon-
ductors at Intel. 
430  Parmar: Supply Chain Architecture in a High Demand Variability Environment, 
p. 12. 
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planning. The third approach is a pull-based system from the customer until the 
board printing stage. Suppliers to board printing, e.g. semiconductor chip manu-
facturers, still use a push approach, since the lead time for these components is 
very long, i.e. several weeks up to months. Each of these modelled planning 
approaches receives several different demand patterns as an input. This allows 
identification of the most appropriate approaches for the supply chain planning 
and ordering mechanisms for each of several demand scenarios with different 
demand uncertainty. 
The model considers the flows of information and materials through the 
supply chain, beginning with the forecasts used for early component orders and 
the initial customer order for a single product and ending with its delivery. Fi-
nancial flows can easily be added but are not in the focus of the current model 
and are therefore omitted. The underlying supply chain set-up is based on the 
structure of a typical high-tech supply chain and currently represents decision 
policies for four nodes plus the customer. The structure represented in the Sys-
tem Dynamics model consists of a customer, software flashing and packing, 
final assembly and testing, and two first tier suppliers in order to obtain a fun-
damental understanding of the underlying structure of the decision-making 
processes at the different supply chain nodes. In addition to board printing, a 
further first tier supplier to the final assembly stage is explicitly included in the 
model. Considering fewer supply chain tiers would have been a serious limita-
tion of the research. From this generalized structure, insights can be gained into 
the dynamic performance of the system and opportunities for improvement.  
Figure C-1 provides an overview of the model structure. At each step in the 
supply chain materials are converted to finished goods, while the finished goods 
at the supplier and board printing level then become inputs for the production 
process at the final assembly stage, and the finished goods at final assembly 
become inputs for the customization process at software flashing. At each of 
these echelons, there are thus materials, work in process and finished goods in-
ventory levels.  
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Figure C-1: Overview of the Structure of the System Dynamics Model 
The model boundary chart below summarizes the scope of the model by 
categorising the key variables as endogenous, exogenous and excluded from the 
model.431 Endogenous variables (“arising from within”) are defined within the 
scope of the model. Exogenous variables (“arising from without”) are input pa-
rameters that are constant over time or input variables that are dynamic over 
time. Excluded variables are outside the scope of the model. Listed below are 
concepts, not specific variables. The number of exogenous variables is kept as 
small as possible432, yet due to its nature several parameters are needed. 
                                                          
431  Cf. Sterman: Business Dynamics, p. 97. 
432  Cf. Sterman: Business Dynamics, pp. 96–97. 
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Table C-1: Model Boundary Chart 
Endogenous Exogenous Excluded 
Material orders Initial values of stocks Competition 
Forecast adjustments Original customer demand R&D costs 
Production processes Initial forecasts Product variants 
Order backlog Production capacity Customer demand 
changes due to delivery 
performance
Inventory levels Standard production and 
shipment delays 
Capacity adjustments 
Expected demand Machine failures and other 
external supply disruptions 
Inventory cost Desired days of stock  
Delivery performance Capacity limits  
Emergency orders   
   
Out of the criteria distinguishing different types of products, the model fo-
cuses on demand uncertainty, demand volatility and in general the product life 
cycle over time. The number of variants is beyond the scope of this work and 
therefore excluded from the model. The model covers one representative prod-
uct at a time. 
3. Measuring System Performance 
To assess the quality of policies and structural changes to the model, two key 
performance indicators (KPIs) are used to quantify the performance of the sup-
ply chain. There are many possible performance measures that can be used to 
track the efficiency and responsiveness of the modelled supply chain, which are 
the two areas of supply chain performance most commonly tracked in supply 
chain simulation models.433 The two most relevant ones for this work, covering 
many of the aspects of responsiveness and efficiency, are the total inventory 
cost incurred in the system, measured through inventory turns, and delivery per-
formance to customer request. These performance measures are strongly influ-
enced by a company’s business processes and important determinants for cus-
                                                          
433  Cf. Beamon, Benita M.: Measuring supply chain performance, in: International Jour-
nal of Operations & Production Management, Vol. 19 (1999), No. 3/4, pp. 277–278. 
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tomer satisfaction.434 Other performance measures relating to supply chain 
costs, such as operating costs, distribution costs and manufacturing costs435, are 
not explicitly measured because the different planning approaches, as modelled 
in this System Dynamics model, do not lead to changes in these performance 
measures. However, aspects of capacity utilization, for example, are discussed 
as they influence the operative efficiency of production at the suppliers. 
Delivery Performance to Customer Request. Delivery performance to cus-
tomer request is defined as the share of orders received by the customer on or 
before the requested delivery date. The value for delivery performance calcu-
lated in the model therefore in each time period refers to the delivery perform-
ance of all previous time periods. It is calculated as the fraction of cumulated 
demand delivered on or before the customer request date divided by the cumu-
lated customer demand436:
delivery performance to customer request = 
XIDZ
((cum demand requested for the current day 
  - cum orders not filled on time) 
 ,cum demand requested for the current day,1) 
The level of responsiveness of a supply chain is considered to be higher if 
the products can be delivered more reliably and with better quality.437 While 
product quality is excluded from the model, the delivery performance can be 
measured as the share of orders that are received by the customer on time, i.e. 
on or before the requested delivery date. This performance measure also implic-
itly considers lost sales, as low delivery performance, i.e. late deliveries, could 
cause customers to switch to competitors.438 The backlog building up at the dif-
ferent echelons of the supply chain can also be separately measured.439
The variable cum orders not filled on time is calculated as follows. The 
change of the value of this variable depends on the customer backlog in a pe-
riod, which measures the extent to which the demand by the customer has been 
                                                          
434  Cf. Reiner, Gerald: Customer-oriented improvement and evaluation of supply chain 
processes supported by simulation models, in: International Journal of Production 
Economics, Vol. 96 (2005), No. 3, p. 5. 
435  See Beamon: Measuring supply chain performance, p. 282. 
436  The XIDZ function performs division except when that division would be by 0, in 
which case it returns the third argument. 
437  Cf. Reichhart and Holweg: Creating the Customer-responsive Supply Chain, pp. 25–
26.
438  A different, and arguably less intuitive, approach to measuring the cost of lost sales is 
taken by Holweg et al., who include lost sales in the calculation of inventory cost. 
See Holweg et al.: Towards responsive vehicle supply, p. 513. 
439  See Beamon: Measuring supply chain performance, p. 283. 
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filled. Customer backlog is a stock variable that is increased by demand and 
reduced by shipments received by the customer. The inflow to the customer 
backlog is therefore demand for the current day, while the outflow is the receiv-
ing rate cust.
customer backlog =
INTEG (inflow customer backlog-outflow customer backlog,0) 
If the customer backlog at the end of a day, considering the demand and de-
liveries of that day, is less than or equal to zero, all orders for that day have 
reached the customer on or before the requested delivery date. Therefore, in 
such a case the value of cumulative orders not filled on time is not changed. On 
the other hand, if the customer backlog at the end of the day is larger than zero, 
it means that some of the customer orders have not been filled on time. There 
are three possibilities in such a case. 
1. Demand on a given day is smaller than the customer backlog at the end of 
the day. If demand on a given day is smaller than the ending backlog, there 
must have been a beginning backlog, which has not completely been ful-
filled. This also means that no part of the current day’s demand has been 
fulfilled. Therefore, in this situation demand for the current day is added to 
the cumulative orders not filled on time. 
2. Demand on a given day is larger than the customer backlog at the end of the 
day. In this situation, some of the demand for that day was filled, but some 
units remain in the backlog at the end of the day. This backlog therefore 
represents those units of the current day’s demand that have not yet been re-
ceived by the customer. The ending backlog is therefore added to the cumu-
lative orders not filled on time. 
3. Demand on a given day is equal to the ending customer backlog. If demand 
on a given day is equal to the ending customer backlog this means that the 
current day’s demand has not been delivered to the customer on time, and 
there are no further delayed orders. This value is therefore added to the cu-
mulative orders not filled on time. 
Note that due to the nonlinearity of the production and shipment delays in 
the model it can happen that an order is filled ahead of time, in which case cus-
tomer backlog is negative. In the supply chain structure modeled, with custom-
ers pulling from a stock of semi-finished products at software flashing, it is pos-
sible for a small amount of orders to arrive at the customer before the requested 
delivery date. However, these amounts are very small, occur independent of the 
planning approach and their inclusion in the performance measure of delivery 
performance to customer request would therefore not have added value. 
Inventory Turnover. The overall performance measure for inventory levels is 
inventory turnover, which measures the number of times capital that is invested 
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in components or goods to be sold, i.e. inventory, turns over in the course of the 
simulation duration. This performance measure, which is used to assess the ef-
fectiveness of inventory management, can be improved either by moving the 
same amount of products through the supply chain with a lower average inven-
tory or by moving more products through the supply chain with the same aver-
age inventory. It is therefore a performance measure that allows comparison of 
average inventory levels even if products, their demand or the supply chain 
structures are different.440 Inventory turns are calculated as the total customer 
demand over the simulation duration divided by the average over the entire 
simulation duration of the total capital invested in inventory at all supply chain 
nodes.441 In practice, inventory turns are normally calculated on a yearly basis; 
to achieve a single performance measure that allows the comparison over the 
entire product life cycle, this performance measure is calculated over the entire 
simulation duration in this work. The inventory turnover performance measure 
is weighted to ensure that the relative cost of inventory corresponds to the value-
added content in the supply chain. These weights are approximations based on a 
typical mobile phone supply chain, which is a good example for a high-tech 
electronics product.442 Actual cost data is not available as it is regarded as highly 
sensitive. Instead, the relative inventory cost at each stocking location in the 
supply chain is used as an approximation to measure the system’s performance, 
as shown in Table C-2. The component costs in the high-tech industry reflect 
between 30 percent and 90 percent of total manufacturing costs443. The chosen 
value of 70 percent is an estimate for the mobile phone industry, and lies within 
the range of values typically observed. This is equivalent to a 30 percent value-
added content of final assembly and software flashing, with the cost of the 
product at the finished goods inventory stage being weighted at 1 dollar per unit 
per day.444 Obsolescence costs and storage costs are not separately measured as 
                                                          
440  Cf. Speh, Tom: Calculating Warehouse Inventory Turnover, WERC, 2005, pp. 1–2. 
441  Total customer demand in this equation is measured in units of finished goods sold, 
and not as sales in currency terms (cost of goods sold). This calculation is valid to 
identify the inventory turns in this case as the cost of the products at the different 
supply chain echelons is also indexed, with finished goods having a cost of 1. Also, 
this approach avoids inconsistencies in valuation. Finally, the calculation approach 
used in the simulation is the most accurate approach to determine inventory turns, as 
it records inventory levels on continuous (daily) basis. See Speh: Calculating Ware-
house Inventory Turnover, pp. 1–2. 
442  The relative inventory cost data are approximations provided by Andrei Kokoev, 
associate at McKinsey & Company, Inc., Chicago, personal communication, 7 June 
2006.
443  Cf. Helo: Managing agility and productivity in the electronics industry, p. 569. 
444  A similar method of weighting inventory levels is used by Holweg et al.: Towards 
responsive vehicle supply, p. 512. 
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they are included in the relative inventory cost per unit and this measure is suf-
ficient for a comparison of the relative costs of the different supply chain plan-
ning approaches.445
Table C-2: Relative Inventory Cost per Unit 
Inventory Level Relative Inventory Cost 
(dollars/unit/day) 
Software Flashing & Packing  
 Inventory FG SWF 1 
 Inventory WIP SWF 0.9 
 Inventory RM SWF 0.9 
Final Assembly & Testing  
 Inventory FG FAT 0.9 
 Inventory WIP FAT 0.7 
 Inventory Boards FAT 0.5 
 Inventory RM FAT 0.2 
Board Printing  
 Inventory FG BP 0.5 
 Inventory WIP BP 0.45 
 Inventory RM BP 0.45 
Other Tier 1 Supplier  
 Inventory FG Sup 0.2 
 Inventory WIP Sup 0.2 
 Inventory RM Sup 0.1 
4. Model Formulation and Testing Process 
In order to provide a helpful tool for decision-making, the simulation model has 
to provide an adequate representation of underlying real world structures.446 The 
first versions of the System Dynamics simulation model were developed by the 
                                                          
445  See Beamon: Measuring supply chain performance, p. 279 and p. 282. 
446  Cf. Milling and Maier: Invention, Innovation und Diffusion, p. 187. 
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author using the Vensim software447, based on dynamic hypotheses and existing 
frameworks on modelling a supply chain in the high-tech industry. The author 
then obtained access to experts in the High-Tech, Supply Chain Management 
and Manufacturing practices at the consulting firm McKinsey & Company, Inc., 
as well as direct access to data from OEMs. 
A triangulation of methods was perceived to be important, because the ap-
propriate representation of the supply chain system is a prerequisite for the va-
lidity of the conclusions drawn from the simulation. Since testing the findings in 
real-world planning systems was not a realistic option, the author discussed the 
model with industry experts.448 Several structured interviews were conducted 
with high-tech industry experts, followed by a nine-day modelling workshop. 
During this workshop, the model was presented within an open forum and the 
author worked extensively with supply chain and industry experts who sug-
gested tests and policies that were run immediately and whose implications were 
discussed on the spot. The model was refined and revised significantly during 
the workshop, estimates for the parameters of the model were developed and 
implemented and the decision-making structures in high-tech firms were dis-
cussed, as well as possibilities to realistically represent them in the model.449 In 
addition, the author discussed the supply chain models and the simulation re-
sults with the members of the System Dynamics Group at MIT and incorporated 
numerous suggestions for improvements. At the end of this phase, the model 
was perceived to represent the structure of a typical supply chain in the high-
tech industry appropriately. Also, empirical demand and forecast data for repre-
sentative products was obtained to be used in the model testing phase and for 
the calibration of appropriate demand patterns to be used in the simulations. 
The model developed herein does not attempt to exactly replicate some time 
behaviour that was observed in the past. Instead, its parameters are flexible 
enough to allow adaptation to many situations, be it fictitious or real. In order to 
be able to use the model appropriately it is essential to be aware of its limita-
tions. While the model does capture the dynamics of supply chains well and can 
answer the research questions, it may be unsuitable for certain tasks. No simula-
tion model can reflect the complexity of a real system perfectly450, which is why 
                                                          
447  The modeling software used for the simulation models is Vensim® DSS for Win-
dows Version 5.5d. 
448  This approach is common; see, for example, Holweg et al.: Towards responsive ve-
hicle supply, p. 522. 
449  A similar approach with interviews and several modelling workshops together with 
industry experts was followed by Sterman, who analyses the dynamics of a company 
making personal computers. See Sterman: Managing the Supply Chain in a High-
Velocity Industry, pp. 10–11. 
450  Cf. Sterman: All models are wrong, p. 501and pp. 525–526. 
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the focus of any modelling effort, including this one, must be to reproduce the 
structure appropriately such that the dynamic behaviour derived from it can be 
analyzed. Models are necessarily simplifications; therefore, for example, the 
model does not attempt to represent every SKU in the product line of a high-
tech electronics company. Instead, the focus is on one particular product and on 
capturing the stock and flow structure of the supply chain at a more aggregate 
level. The model represents the interdependencies and feedbacks created by the 
behaviour of the actors, in particular the interactions between the different mem-
bers of the supply chain. Validation of the model thus refers to the problem that 
the model is intended to address – a model that was developed for a particular 
purpose can lead to incorrect conclusions in other contexts.451
Throughout its development, attention has been paid to ensure that the struc-
tures represented in the model and the time behaviour generated by it are rea-
sonable representations of real world developments. According to Milling, there 
are three steps in validating a simulation model, which can and in this research 
were carried out simultaneously: structural validation, parameter validation and 
behaviour validation.452 These three overlap, which becomes clear when con-
sulting other literature on model validation.453
Structural Validation. This is an important aspect of model validation, since 
it is essential to ensure that all hypotheses made in the model have a real world 
counterpart and that the model structure is valid compared to the real world sys-
tem. Past research has been consulted in the development of the model, as dis-
cussed in the previous sections. The representation that is used for physical and 
information flows in the supply chain, for example, has proved to be a useful 
representation of reality for more than three decades. Intuition and experience 
were, of course also important when developing the model. Nevertheless, many 
if not all of the underlying hypotheses are empirically sound and were verified 
with industry experts. 
Parameter Validation. The supply chain is adaptable to different conditions 
through various parameters. These include delays in information processing, 
                                                          
451  Cf. Forrester: Industrial Dynamics, p. 115 and the following other applications to 
operations management problems: Milling, Peter M.: Der technische Fortschritt beim 
Produktionsprozeß – Ein dynamisches Modell für innovative Industrieunternehmen, 
Wiesbaden 1974, p. 208 and Milling and Maier: Invention, Innovation und Diffusion, 
p. 188. 
452  Cf. Milling: Der technische Fortschritt beim Produktionsprozeß, pp. 208–209. 
453  For example, see Sterman: Business Dynamics, pp. 843–892 and Shreckengost, 
Raymond C.: Dynamic Simulation Models: How valid are they?, in: Rouse, B.A., 
N.J. Kozel and L.G. Richards (Eds.): Self-Report Methods of Estimating Drug Use: 
Meeting Current Challenges to Validity (NIDA Research Monograph 57), Rockville, 
MD 1985. 
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production and shipment delays and resulting lead times, capacity limitations 
and external shocks to the supply chain that can happen at board printing and at 
the supplier. Most of these parameters do not differ for comparing different 
planning approaches, which enables a comparison of performance measures 
purely based on changes in decision-making policies. The parameters are chosen 
to be realistic, yet they do not necessarily exactly model the development of a 
particular product. Instead, they are chosen in order to generate a realistic be-
haviour. This was confirmed with past research and real world data. The pa-
rameters of the System Dynamics model are determined both through analysis 
of data provided by sample companies and through expert estimations.454 Inputs 
into the model include demand patterns, forecast patterns and information about 
production and ordering policies. For products at different positions on the con-
tinuum between innovative and functional products, distinct demand patterns 
are represented in the model as well as structural differences in supply chain 
policies. The demand scenarios to reflect different types of products are cur-
rently represented in the model as input data read from a spreadsheet document 
that can be additionally modified using Vensim’s capabilities of, for example, 
random number and table functions. The analysis of simulation results begins 
with simple scenarios, such as constant demand with no variation, and only later 
proceeds to more complex product life cycles with random demand. Also, actual 
customer order data for specific products over their entire product life cycle are 
used as an input to the model during the model testing phase and were obtained 
from real world supply chains. This approach bases the analyses on two pillars: 
firstly, stochastically generated demand and forecast patterns within the model, 
and secondly, demand and forecast data for the complete product life cycle of 
different products, obtained from OEMs, to validate the model. 
Figure C-2 provides an overview of the lead times that characterise the sup-
ply chain in the three planning approaches.455 The production cycle time, which 
is the time span from the receipt of raw materials at the first tier supplier until 
receipt of the product by the customer456, is 30 days. This was confirmed with 
industry experts to be realistic and is also the standard throughput time identi-
fied by Catalan and Kotzab for a typical mobile phone supply chain as an exam-
ple.457 This value is indicated in the second column of Figure C-2 – the first tier 
                                                          
454  This approach is also, for example, taken by Reiner. See Reiner: Customer-oriented 
improvement and evaluation of supply chain processes supported by simulation mod-
els, p. 5. 
455  All of the delays used for production and shipment processes are third-order expo-
nential delays. 
456  Cf. Milling, Schwellbach and Thun: The Role of Speed in Manufacturing, p. 3. 
457  Cf. Catalan and Kotzab: Assessing the responsiveness in the Danish Mobile phone 
supply chain, p. 679. 
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suppliers receives their raw materials 30 days before the delivery date requested 
by the customer. As shown earlier the transportation lead times depend on the 
situation and are set to four days for all transportation processes in the model. In 
addition to the values shown in the figure, the lead time for an emergency sup-
plier of integrated circuits that can be used if backlogs occur at software flashing 
is 15 days plus five days shipment lead time when no inventory is on stock. Ini-
tially, however, the emergency chipset supplier does have 10,000 units of inven-
tory available. 
2nd tier supplier LT
• Chipset supplier:
• Receives order –76
• Delivers –30
• 2nd tier supplier
• Receives order 
–36
• Delivers –30
1st tier supplier LT
• Board printing:
• Receives product –30
• Start processing –29
• Finish processing –25
• Ships –24
• Other FAT supplier
• Receives product –30
• Start processing –29
• Finish processing –25
• Ships –24
FAT LT
• Receives product –20
• Start processing –19
• Finish processing –15
• Ship –14
SWF LT
• Receives product –10
• Start processing –9
• Finish processing –5
• Ship –4
Chipset 
supplier
Board 
printing 
Final assembly 
and testing
Software flashing 
and packing
Other tier 1 
supplier
Other tier 2 
supplier
Note: The indicated lead times (LT) are the number of days before the delivery date requested 
by the customer (–x means x days before the customer request date).
C
Figure C-2: Overview of Lead Times in the Supply Chain Model 
The base runs of the different planning approaches build the foundation for 
all following analyses. A summary of the parameters in the model is provided in 
Table C-3.458 Many of these parameters are also explained in the following 
model description. Note that in the model, each final product at software flash-
ing is composed of one finished good unit received from final assembly. Simi-
larly, each finished good at final assembly is composed of one finished good 
                                                          
458  This list is not comprehensive. In particular, it excludes switches, the inventory cost 
parameters and lead times that are listed elsewhere and those parameters that are only 
relevant in special cases and that therefore are explicitly discussed where they are 
relevant. 
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unit from each first tier supplier and each finished component at the first tier 
suppliers is composed of one unit of components received from the respective 
second tier supplier. 
Table C-3: Further Important Model Parameters 
Model Parameter Value in  
Base Case 
All models  
 TIME STEP 0.25 days 
 Correlation time constant for pink noise 4 days 
 Averaging time for adjustment for difference demand and  
 forecast at SWF/central planning 
10 days 
 Desired Backlog SWF 0 units 
 Averaging time Backlog SWF for emergency orders 14 days 
 Adjustment time for emergency orders 36 days 
 Batch size board printing 5,000 units 
 Capacity board printing 20,000 units/day 
 Capacity final assembly and testing 50,000 units/day 
 Initial value of emergency inventory at IC supplier 10,000 units 
 Initial values of all other stock variables in the model459 0 
Cascade only  
 Desired days of stock SWF 10 days 
 Inventory adjustment time SWF 6 days 
 Inventory adjustment time boards and raw materials FAT 6 days 
 Inventory adjustment time BP 46 days 
 Inventory adjustment time Sup 6 days 
 Desired raw materials inventory FAT (day 81 to 400) 100,000 units 
 Desired raw materials inventory BP and Sup (day 71 to 400) 100,000 units 
                                                          
459  The only exception is the market potential, which is set to a high enough value not to 
affect the dynamics of the simulation and is included to facilitate future development 
of the model. 
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Model Parameter Value in  
Base Case 
Push only  
 Desired days of stock SWF 10 days 
 Inventory adjustment time SWF 30 days 
Pull only  
 Averaging time for adjustment for difference demand and  
 forecast BP/Sup 
5 days 
 Desired days of stock at first tier suppliers 10 days 
 Inventory adjustment time BP 46 days 
 Inventory adjustment time Sup 6 days 
 Averaging time for estimating demand during lead time FAT 5 days 
 Expected lead time boards and other materials FAT 10 days 
 Expected lead time from FAT SWF 10 days 
 Order size SWF 1,000 units 
 Order size raw materials and boards FAT 1,000 units 
 Interval for calculation of safety stock at SWF and FAT 10 days 
 Safety factor z at SWF 1.65 
 Safety factor z at FAT 1.65 
Behaviour Validation. The model behaviour has to reflect reality as well as 
possible in order to ensure the validity of the conclusions drawn. The assump-
tions were therefore continuously tested. Throughout the development of the 
model, in fact, from the very early stages on, plausibility tests and consistency 
tests were carried out in order to ensure that the model is able to generate a be-
haviour consistently over several periods, as long as the parameters are reason-
able. In order to achieve this, the different parts of the model were often tested 
independently, without consideration of all other effects. For example, as dis-
cussed in the next section, the supply chain models were tested with and without 
adjustments to the forecasts. Similarly, the whole model was tested with various 
aspects, such as the calculation of the desired safety stock levels and/or others, 
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set to fixed values in order to observe the sensitivity of model behaviour to these 
variables. In addition, tests for extreme conditions were carried out; for exam-
ple, the reaction of the model to a very large one-time order was tested. The 
results were as expected. A dimensional test was also performed in order to 
check for possible errors in the units of the model variables. Several runs also 
showed that there is no time step problem. 
This model fulfils the requirements of a thorough validation, even though 
many of the parameters are estimates. All the hypotheses that are made are plau-
sible and observable in the real world. However, the results obtained should be 
regarded as relative indices, rather than absolute values.460
II. Model Structures and Equations for Different Planning Approaches 
In this section, the stock and flow structure, important feedback loops and 
model equations are described. Each subsystem or key decision is presented in 
turn, including a structural diagram followed by descriptions of the most impor-
tant equations. A detailed model listing is provided in the appendix. While it is 
sometimes argued that representing detail in the model comes at the expense of 
representing behavioural feedback, primarily due to lack of time and resources, 
this model balances complexity and simplicity such that the research questions 
can be answered but no unnecessary complexity is added. 
1. Cascade: Cascading Forecasts 
The upstream part of a typical supply chain in the high-tech electronics industry 
is set up as a hybrid planning system that is primarily push-based with forecasts 
that cascade through the supply chain. In such an approach, a central material 
requirements planning (MRP) system at software flashing and packing (SWF) 
sets the framework, while decisions are actually made separately by each eche-
lon. The supply chain members located upstream of SWF use MRP figures only 
as an indication and take their actual decisions based on personal opinions and 
other aspects. The product is then pulled by the customer from a stock of semi-
finished products at SWF, with the final customization steps being performed 
only after the order has been received. This hybrid supply chain planning ap-
proach is visualized in Figure C-3. 
                                                          
460  A similar argument is made by Holweg et al.: Towards responsive vehicle supply, 
p. 512. 
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Figure C-3: Push Approach with Cascading Forecasts through Supply Chain 
Long supplier lead times for chipsets needed for board printing (e.g., 46 
days) require that second tier suppliers base their production and shipments on a 
forecast. Such a forecast is initially prepared by the Original Equipment Manu-
facturers (OEMs), which typically run the software flashing part of the supply 
chain. This initial forecast is based on information from the sales people, who 
talk directly to customers and then aggregate the forecasts to product groups. 
The planners at SWF adjust this forecast to keep their raw materials inventory at 
the desired level. Then they communicate this adjusted forecast to the final as-
sembly and testing stage. Once the product is released to the market, this fore-
cast prepared by SWF is also adjusted based on the difference between the 
original forecast and actual customer demand to account for forecast errors. The 
planners at the SWF stage can additionally place emergency orders with the 
chipset suppliers. The chipset suppliers may be able to supply a limited amount 
of chipsets faster than usually – and typically at a higher cost. At the same time, 
the forecasts sent to the other echelons in the chain are adjusted to incorporate 
these emergency orders such that the components and products flow through the 
system until the buffer stock at SWF, where they are used to reduce the backlog. 
This complex situation is visualised in the simplified causal loop diagram in 
Figure C-4. 
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The planners at the final assembly and testing stage (FAT) receive the fore-
cast from SWF. They then adjust this forecast to keep their raw materials inven-
tory at final assembly at the desired level, which is typically only a few days of 
stock.461 This adjusted forecast is then communicated to their suppliers, such as 
board printing. Board printing and other suppliers to FAT receive this adjusted 
forecast and base their supplier orders on this forecast as well as own adjust-
ments for their desired raw materials inventory level.462 At this stage, the fore-
cast differs significantly from that initially developed by the sales people. There 
is no central planning, and “nobody is really in charge of the network as a 
whole”.463 This complexity is in addition to actual sales volume often fluctuat-
ing between 0 percent and 400 percent of the initial forecast developed by the 
sales people, and sometimes even more.464
                                                          
461  Cf. Lertpattarapong: Applying system dynamics approach to the supply chain man-
agement problem, p. 7 and p. 18. 
462  Cf. Catalan and Kotzab: Assessing the responsiveness in the Danish Mobile phone 
supply chain, p. 670 and p. 673, who describe the development of the forecast at vari-
ous stages in a mobile phone supply chain. 
463  Cf. Akkermans and Dellaert: The rediscovery of industrial dynamics, p. 135. 
464  Cf. Jayaram et al.: Segmented Approach to Supply Chain Management System De-
sign in High Tech, p. 6. See also Parmar: Supply Chain Architecture in a High De-
mand Variability Environment, p. 153 and Heikkilä: From supply to demand chain 
management, p. 757. 
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Figure C-4: Partial Causal Loop Diagram of Cascading Forecasts 
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The adjustments to the plan are typically based on the difference between ac-
tual demand as perceived by SWF and the original forecast, as well as on the 
size of the desired stock levels at each echelon and the desire to keep or reach 
this desired stock level.465 There are also other, less tangible factors – in many 
cases it is not very clear how exactly the process of adjustments is done and 
there is also empirical data confirming a certain degree of judgment and filtering 
involved in determining the forecast.466 However, anchoring the newly gener-
ated forecast to that originally produced and then making adjustments is a com-
monly observed decision rule.467
Material orders are based on forecasts with different time horizons for each 
of the supply chain members. Due to long lead times the board printing echelon 
will have to order its materials, in particular the chipsets, already several weeks 
or even months before the finished product eventually reaches the customer. 
The forecast that is available at this early stage is likely to differ more from ac-
tual demand than forecasts that need to cover a shorter time horizon. This in-
crease in forecast errors for forecasts that cover a longer time horizon is also 
endogenously represented in the model, as information about actual demand 
influences the long-term forecast only much later than the forecast for a shorter 
horizon. Each supply chain member adjusts the forecast based on own implicit 
or explicit decision making policies. For example, deviations of actual inventory 
levels and desired inventory at each echelon as well as deviations of forecasted 
demand and actual demand cause adjustments of forecasts and/or material or-
ders to a situation that differs from the expected development. A sudden in-
crease in demand beyond forecast levels therefore causes increases in material 
orders after some delay. Such decision making policies are specific to each sup-
ply chain member, and typically not coordinated with the rest of the supply 
chain. In the following, the stock and flow structure of the System Dynamics 
model for the planning approach with cascading forecasts is explained, includ-
ing a discussion of important model equations. 
                                                          
465  This was validated in personal communication with Axel Karlsson, partner at 
McKinsey & Company, Inc., Stockholm, on 5 June 2006. See also Gonçalves, Hines 
and Sterman: The impact of endogenous demand on push-pull production systems, 
p. 203 and p. 212. 
466  Cf. Gonçalves, Hines and Sterman: The impact of endogenous demand on push-pull 
production systems, pp. 195–196. 
467  Cf. Tversky, Amos and Daniel Kahneman: Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics 
and Biases, in: Science, Vol. 185 (1974), No. 4157, pp. 1128–1130. See also 
Sterman: Modeling Managerial Behavior, p. 334, who describes anchoring in the 
case of a desired stock level.  
119 
a. Software Flashing and Packing 
The processes at the software flashing and packing stage are driven entirely by 
customer demand. Nine days before the customer desires to receive the finished 
product, SWF begins processing. To trigger this process, customer demand for 
any given day is received by SWF nine days ahead of that day. These values, the 
demand Cust 9 days ahead variable, are read from an input file, which in this 
case is a spreadsheet document. In addition, through the Input variable, pink 
noise can be added to the demand. Pink noise is first-order autocorrelated noise 
where the next random variation depends in part on the previous variations. This 
is necessary to represent that one period’s demand is not independent of the last 
but depends to some degree on history, i.e. there is some inertia.468 The model 
was built to allow for a future inclusion of a Bass diffusion model to represent 
the diffusion of products in the market, yet in the current version of the model 
the market potential is set to a high enough value not to limit the dynamics of 
the model as customer demand is considered as an exogenous input.469 This is 
visualised in Figure C-5 below. 
Market
potential
Installed
basedemand adj Cust
9 days ahead
demand Cust 9
days ahead
+
delivery time
-
ini market
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+
ini installed base
demand for the
current day
+
<input from
excel file 9
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Figure C-5: Cascade: Customer Demand470
                                                          
468  Cf. Sterman: Business Dynamics, p. 917. 
469  The delivery time variable therefore also does not have any effect on the model dy-
namics, as the diffusion process is not limited by the market potential. Demand re-
quested for the current day is equivalent to the input data read from the spreadsheet. 
470  In System Dynamics diagrams, rectangles represent stock variables. Arrows with a 
valve symbol  represent flows into and out of stocks. Causal relationships between 
variables are indicated by arrows, with the plus and minus signs representing the link 
polarity. For further details refer to Sterman: Business Dynamics, pp. 137–141 and  
pp. 192–195. 
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SWF begins performing the final software flashing and packing steps nine 
days before the customer request date (CRD). This corresponds to the time it 
takes to perform these steps and ship the product to the customer. Figure C-6 
visualizes the order fulfilment process at SWF. Orders are received nine days 
ahead of time as incoming production requests SWF and flow into a stock of 
Backlog SWF. This backlog represents the amount of orders waiting to be pro-
duced and is depleted by production starts. The number of products whose pro-
duction begins in a given period is determined by (1) the desired orders in pro-
duction SWF, which are the desired amount of orders that should begin process-
ing at SWF, and (2) the availability of sufficient raw materials inventory (Inven-
tory RM SWF). The value of desired orders in production is calculated by taking 
the new incoming production requests, i.e. the orders that are supposed to begin 
processing at SWF because of incoming orders in this period, plus any orders 
that may have accumulated in the Backlog SWF. The equation is: 
desired orders in production SWF = 
MAX
 (0, 
  (Backlog SWF/minimum time to start production SWF) 
  + incoming production requests SWF) 
The feasible FG production SWF is then defined as either the amount of de-
sired orders in production SWF or possible production given the amount of raw 
materials available471, whichever is smaller: 
feasible production SWF = 
MIN
 ( desired orders in production SWF,
   Inventory RM SWF/materials used per FG unit SWF 
   /minimum time to start production SWF) 
Once production at SWF is started, the stock of Backlog SWF is reduced by 
the amount just calculated. 
                                                          
471  The variable materials used per FG unit SWF is included to allow possible future 
modifications of the model with more than one unit of raw materials used per fin-
ished good unit, and is set to 1. The minimum time to start production SWF is also set 
to 1. 
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Figure C-6: Cascade: Order Fulfilment at Software Flashing and Packing 
The production process at SWF, depicted in Figure C-7, is represented by a 
third-order exponential delay of the Feasible production SWF that converts ma-
terials into finished goods, flowing into the stock of Inventory FG SWF. The 
pipeline stock of work in process inventory is also computed to allow inventory 
cost calculations. As soon as the production process is finished and products 
reach the finished goods inventory they are shipped to the customer. The cus-
tomer then receives them after a third-order exponential shipment delay of four 
days. 
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Figure C-7: Cascade: Production at Software Flashing and Packing 
In the planning approach with cascading forecasts, the SWF echelon pre-
pares two forecasts that are sent to FAT, the next upstream echelon in the supply 
chain. Before the product is introduced to the market these forecasts are in-
tended to determine initial staging of components at second tier suppliers, i.e. 
(1) the supplier to the board printing stage and (2) the supplier to the first tier 
component supplier. Due to the supplier lead times, which are summarised in 
Figure C-2, p. 111, the forecast for board printing needs to have a horizon of 76 
days, while that for the other supplier has a forecast horizon of 36 days. The 
original forecasts for customer demand are read as input data from an Excel 
spreadsheet. This is necessary because before the product is introduced to the 
market the forecast needs to be based on information that is exogenous to the 
model. After the product introduction this forecast is adjusted by the planners at 
software flashing based on two factors, (1) an adjustment to account for the dif-
ference between the base forecast and actual demand once the product has been 
released to the market and (2) an adjustment to the forecast aimed at achieving a 
specified goal for the desired level of raw materials inventory at SWF. These 
adjustments can be switched on and off such that their impact on the system can 
be analysed. The overall structure of the forecast adjustment process at SWF is 
represented in Figure C-8. 
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Figure C-8: Cascade: Overview of Forecast Adjustments at Software Flashing 
The adjustment for the difference between actual demand and the original 
forecast is incorporated as a function of their fractional difference, which is mul-
tiplied with the base forecast. At the same time, the adjustment for the desired 
raw materials inventory level at SWF is added to (or subtracted from) from the 
forecast. The equation for the adjusted forecast for board printing that is pre-
pared by SWF is: 
adjusted forecast for BP by SWF = 
MAX(0,
((forecast 76 days out*adjustment to demand for BP SWF)
 + adjustment to Inventory RM SWF)) 
The variable forecast for board printing SWF is the one that is communi-
cated to FAT and is either the adjusted forecast or the original base forecast 
(forecast 76 days out), depending on the switch that can be used to toggle the 
adjustment on and off for simulation purposes.472 The forecast for the supplier is 
calculated in the same way; the rest of the section explains the adjustments us-
ing the case of the forecast for board printing that is used to procure chipsets as 
an example.  
The calculation for the adjustment for the difference between actual demand 
and forecast is performed as follows. First, the original base forecast that is read 
from the spreadsheet file with the input data is shifted by 76 days, i.e. the fore-
cast horizon, in order to align the forecast data with demand. This is shown in 
Figure C-9, which represents a forecast of customer demand for 10,000 units per 
day starting in period 100. 
                                                          
472  Except where otherwise indicated, this switch is set to 1, indicating that the forecast 
adjustments are active. 
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Figure C-9: Cascade: Illustration of Forecast Shift (Forecast for Board Printing) 
Then, a first-order exponential smoothing of the shifted forecast is per-
formed. This represents an averaging process that places more weight on more 
recent observations. Similarly, using the same delay constant, which is 10 days, 
for the exponential smooth, the actual demand data are smoothed exponentially. 
Such time delays in reacting to demand changes are in line with observations 
from actual supply chains, in which changes in customer demand are not imme-
diately communicated to the suppliers.473 This process therefore generates aver-
ages of the original forecast and actual demand, with a first-order delay being 
appropriate as more recent information on demand is expected to have a larger 
impact on current decisions than information that is older. As there could be 
random noise in real-world demand, calculating an average is sensible because 
adjustments would not be made on a day-to-day basis but only if systematic 
differences can be observed. Consider a case without such noise, for ease of 
explanation, in which the original forecast predicts constant customer demand of 
10,000 units per day starting in day 100, as visualised in Figure C-9 above. Ac-
tual demand turns out to be 12,000 units per day, starting in period 100 as pre-
dicted. In addition, there is a one-day pulse in demand of 36,000 units in period 
150. The averages using exponential smoothing with a delay time of 10 days for 
the two variables are as follows: 
                                                          
473  Cf. Kok et al.: Philips Electronics Synchronizes Its Supply Chain to End the Bull-
whip Effect, p. 40. 
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Figure C-10: Cascade: Illustration of Exponential Smoothing of Forecast and Demand 
(Averaged Forecast for Board Printing and Averaged Demand) 
The spike in orders of 36,000 units in period 150 is damped in the forecast 
adjustment through the averaging process. This means that the forecast is not 
immediately adjusted to more than three times its original value. Instead, the 
adjustment happens more slowly while more information about the demand pat-
tern is being evaluated in the exponential smoothing process.  
Two further modifications are necessary to compute the final adjustment to 
demand in the model. First, the fractional difference between demand and fore-
cast can only be computed if the denominator is not zero. Therefore, the XIDZ 
function is used, which sets the fractional difference to 1 whenever the averaged 
forecast is equal to zero. 
fractional difference demand and forecast for BP at SWF 
XIDZ
 (averaged demand for the current day for BP FC at SWF,
  averaged forecast for BP shifted to match demand SWF,
  1) 
Second, it needs to be ensured that when demand and forecast differ by a 
very large percentage, e.g. when the forecast is 100 units and actual demand is 
10,000, the adjustment to demand should not be 10,000 percent to a forecast for 
the future of perhaps 10,000 units. Instead, the forecast adjustment should con-
sider the development of average demand in recent periods. It is therefore lim-
ited to be no larger than a factor that is calculated as one plus the ratio between 
average demand and the original forecast for the future. In this example, average 
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demand over the last ten days could be 5,000 and the original forecast for the 
future (76 days out) is 10,000, so the adjustment would be limited to 50 percent. 
The adjusted forecast would then be 15,000, and not 1,000,000. 
adjustment to demand for BP SWF 
MIN
(fractional difference demand and forecast for BP at SWF,
 1 + XIDZ 
  (averaged demand for the current day for BP FC at SWF,
   forecast 76 days out, 0) 
)
The final factor that represents the adjustment to the forecast is shown in 
Figure C-11 below. Also, this model section is reproduced in Figure C-12. 
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Figure C-11: Cascade: Illustration of Adjustment to Demand (Forecast for Board Print-
ing) 
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Figure C-12: Cascade: Forecast Adjustment for Difference between Demand and Fore-
cast SWF (76-Day Forecast for Board Printing) 
The adjustment for the desired raw materials inventory level at SWF is cal-
culated through a goal-adjustment process as shown in Figure C-13. The aver-
age raw material inventory level at SWF is compared to the desired inventory 
level at SWF, which is the variable desired Inventory RM SWF, and the adjust-
ment to the forecast is calculated based on this difference and considering the 
inventory adjustment time SWF, i.e. the time over which the gap between the 
actual state and the desired state should be closed. Inventory levels are related to 
the customer service level, which is why it is desirable to correct these discrep-
ancies over time. The inventory adjustment time represents the number of time 
periods over which the forecast will be modified to adjust for the gap between 
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desired and actual inventory.474 Due to the delays in the supply chain, this ad-
justment will be subject to overshoots and undershoots, leading to fluctuations 
in the forecasts.475
Additionally, there is an option for the adjustment process to consider the 
amount of adjustments that were already made in the past. This corresponds to 
decision makers taking the supply line of materials already ordered into account. 
This behaviour can be switched on and off, as in reality the amount of materials 
already on order is often not considered.476 In the base case scenario, these ad-
justments for the supply line are therefore not made. The equation is: 
adjustment to Inventory RM SWF = 
((gap desired inventory and average inventory RM SWF 
  -(cumulated adjustment to inventory RM SWF 
    * switch consider cum adj to inventory RM SWF)) 
/inventory adjustment time SWF) 
*switch adjustment to Inventory RM SWF 
The desired inventory level is determined by multiplying a fixed number of 
desired days of stock SWF with the average customer demand experienced by 
software flashing. The number of days of stock is typically rather small and de-
termined by the planners at SWF.477 In this example, it is set to ten days to cover 
the expected order lead time. Planners at software flashing can observe cus-
tomer demand directly and use this information to determine which average 
demand can be expected over the time period to be covered by the raw materials 
inventory level. 
                                                          
474  Cf. Disney, Stephen M., Mohamed M. Naim and Denis R. Towill: Dynamic simula-
tion modelling for lean logistics, in: International Journal of Physical Distribution & 
Logistics Management, Vol. 27 (1997), No. 3/4, p. 179. 
475  Cf. Disney, Naim and Towill: Dynamic simulation modelling for lean logistics, 
p. 179. 
476  See, for example, Sterman: Modeling Managerial Behavior, p. 336. 
477  Cf. Lertpattarapong: Applying system dynamics approach to the supply chain man-
agement problem, p. 7 and p. 18. 
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Figure C-13: Cascade: Forecast Adjustment for Desired Raw Materials Inventory at 
SWF
Finally, the planners at software flashing can place emergency orders with 
alternative chipset suppliers that have shorter delivery delays. These emergency 
orders are based on the size of the backlog observed at the software flashing 
stage. Similarly to the adjustment for inventory, the amount of emergency or-
ders is calculated as a goal-adjustment process, with the goal being a backlog at 
software flashing of zero units. The structure is shown in Figure C-14. Again, 
there is an option to consider the amount of emergency orders that were already 
placed in the past, which can be switched on and off. In the base run, the emer-
gency orders placed in the past are not considered. 
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Figure C-14: Cascade: Emergency Order Placement at SWF 
b. Final Assembly and Testing 
The production process at the final assembly and testing stage is driven by the 
forecast received from SWF and emergency orders placed by SWF. The forecast 
sent by software flashing to final assembly is equal to that sent to the first tier 
supplier (not board printing), as this is the forecast with the shortest forecast 
horizon prepared by the planners at software flashing and thus the most current. 
The alternative would be to submit the forecast sent to board printing, which has 
a longer forecast horizon and therefore a higher forecast uncertainty. Those two 
variables, the forecast as well as emergency orders, constitute the inflow into the 
backlog at FAT, called the incoming forecast FAT, and represent the quantity of 
finished goods eventually to be shipped to the SWF, the immediate customer of 
FAT. This is shown in Figure C-15. 
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Figure C-15: Cascade: Order Fulfilment FAT 
The incoming forecast accumulates in a second stock called waiting for pro-
duction FAT. This stock represents the amount of orders that are awaiting the 
start of production. This backlog is reduced by the forecast fulfilment rate FAT.
The amount of orders that can enter the production process is limited by the 
amount of inputs to the production process that are available in the raw materi-
als inventory levels. This means that sufficient quantities of both boards and 
other materials need to be available. Also, a capacity limit restricts the maxi-
mum throughput through the production process. This is visualised in Figure 
C-16, which is simplified and for increased clarity does not display the mini-
mum times to start production and shipments, materials used per unit and initial 
values of stocks. In the model, first, the amount of production that is feasible 
based on the size of the raw materials inventory levels is calculated as feasible 
production based on inventory FAT.478
feasible production based on inventory FAT = 
MIN
 (Inventory Boards FAT/boards used per FG unit FAT, 
  Inventory RM FAT/materials used per FG unit FAT) 
/minimum time to start production FAT 
The capacity limit FAT is then either the physical capacity of the production 
process at FAT or the amount just calculated as the feasible production based on 
inventory, i.e. 
capacity limit FAT = 
MIN(capacity FAT,
    feasible production based on inventory FAT) 
                                                          
478  The minimum time to start production FAT is one day. 
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The number of production starts at FAT is then either the number of orders 
waiting to be produced, including those coming in on the day, or the calculated 
capacity limit, whichever is smaller: 
Production starts FAT = 
MAX(0,
 MIN 
  (waiting for production FAT/minimum time to start 
   production FAT+inflow waiting for production FAT, 
   capacity limit FAT) 
)
The product completion rate is calculated as a pipeline delay of desired pro-
duction, which allows tracking of the work in process inventory level. 
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Figure C-16: Cascade: Production at Final Assembly and Testing 
With regard to material orders, the planners at final assembly use a similar 
decision logic as is used as SWF for their forecasting process. One difference is 
that FAT adjusts the forecasts separately – as shown in Figure C-17, the adjust-
ment for the forecast sent to board printing is based on the actual and desired 
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level of the stock Inventory Boards FAT, while the adjustment for the forecast 
sent to the other supplier is based on the actual and desired level of the stock 
Inventory RM FAT. The second difference is the desired level of stock for raw 
materials and boards, which for FAT cannot be based on the observed orders. 
As this is a push production system, FAT does not receive any customer orders. 
Instead, the desired stock level is predetermined to a fixed level, which in the 
base scenario is 100,000 units between day 81 and 400479, corresponding to an 
estimation of average demand combined with the expected lead time of ten 
days. 
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Figure C-17: Cascade: Adjustments to Inventory at Final Assembly and Testing 
c. Board Printing 
Production at board printing is based on the forecast received from FAT as well 
as potential emergency orders placed by SWF, as shown in Figure C-18. Its 
structure is similar to that of production at FAT. In addition to a capacity limit, 
which constrains production and is fixed during the simulation length of one 
product life cycle480, board printing is also subject to a specific batch size. The 
                                                          
479  The inventory is needed from day 81 as the first unit, according to the forecast, is due 
to arrive at SWF in period 91. The ten days difference are composed of production 
and shipment delays. After period 400, no more inventory is needed in the supply 
chain as the product is scheduled to be taken from the market. 
480  Planning, construction and ramp of a new facility can take four to five years, which 
implies that capacity cannot be adjusted during a product life cycle. See, for example, 
Beckman and Sinha: Conducting Academic Research with an Industry Focus, p. 120 
and Gonçalves: Demand Bubbles and Phantom Orders in Supply Chains, p. 108. 
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production process will therefore not be initiated until enough raw materials are 
available to produce an entire batch, or multiple batches, of products. 
incoming forecast board orders BP
boards used per FG unit
emergency orders placed at BP
forecast for board printing FAT
Figure C-18: Cascade: Adjustments to Inventory at Final Assembly and Testing 
The process of limiting production based on orders waiting for production, 
batch size, capacity limitations and the availability of raw materials is visualised 
in Figure C-19. The largest possible RM outflow BP , considering the capacity 
limit and available raw materials inventory, is calculated as: 
largest possible RM outflow BP = 
MIN
 (capacity limit BP,
  Inventory RM BP 
   /materials used per FG unit BP 
   /minimum time to start production BP) 
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Figure C-19: Cascade: Production at Board Printing 
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This is used to calculate the maximum possible no of batches BP. To calcu-
late this variable, the INTEGER function is used to return the maximum number 
of batches that can be produced given the largest possible RM outflow just cal-
culated: 
maximum possible no of batches BP = 
INTEGER(largest possible RM outflow BP/batch size BP) 
Similarly, the INTEGER function is used to identify the quantity of batches 
that should be produced given the current order backlog, i.e. what would be pro-
duced if there were no constraints other than the batch size.  
desired no of batches BP = 
INTEGER(
 (waiting for production BP 
  / minimum time to start production BP 
  + inflow waiting for production BP) 
 / batch size BP) 
Finally, the desired production rate at board printing is calculated similarly 
as for final assembly using a MAX and a MIN function, i.e. 
desired production batched BP = 
MAX(0,
 MIN 
  (desired no of batches BP * batch size BP,
   maximum possible no of batches BP * batch size BP) 
 *(1-probablity of problem BP) 
)
The inclusion of a probability of problem BP-variable allows to restrain pro-
duction at BP to simulate additional supplier problems, such as machine fail-
ures, that could occur in a real system. This probability can be switched on and 
off and modified for any scenario. It is zero if not otherwise stated. 
The standard processes of material orders at the first tier suppliers are set up 
such that all orders placed are received by board printing 46 days later. To de-
termine the amount of materials to be ordered through the standard process of 
material orders, planners at board printing first consider the forecast received 
from final assembly. They then adjust this forecast with the same logic ex-
plained for the planners at SWF and FAT to the desired level of raw materials 
inventory at board printing, which is also 100,000 units in the base scenario481.
                                                          
481  In this case, the desired inventory level is set to 100,000 units between periods 71 
and 400, which again depends on the production and shipment delays until delivery 
at SWF and the end of the scheduled product life cycle. 
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Figure C-20: Cascade: Forecasting at Board Printing 
In addition, the planners at software flashing may have placed emergency 
orders with board printing. Those are handled through a different process, as 
they need to have a shorter lead time than is the case for regular, forecasted or-
ders. Emergency orders are processed by a different second tier supplier of inte-
grated circuits that has a specified level of emergency inventory on hand. This 
inventory of 10,000 units can reach BP within four days. Also, the emergency 
chipset supplier is able to produce additional chipsets within a lead time of 15 
days, which is significantly shorter than the 46 days that are assumed for the 
regular process. There are therefore two possibilities, (1) there is enough emer-
gency inventory available to cover for the emergency orders, in which case they 
are shipped to BP within 4 days and then processed through the rest of the sup-
ply chain, or (2) there is not enough emergency inventory available, in which 
case the inventory is shipped right away while additional supplies are produced 
with a production delay of 15 days. Each unit shipped out of inventory triggers a 
material order by the emergency IC supplier, such that inventory after a one-
time order will be back at the level of 10,000 units after around 15 days. At the 
same time, the forecast for the other first tier supplier to FAT is updated to re-
flect the increase in scheduled production through the emergency orders. 
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Figure C-21: Cascade: Emergency Orders at Emergency Integrated Circuit Supplier 
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d. Other First Tier Supplier 
The structure of production processes at the other first tier supplier (Sup) is 
similar to that at BP, except that there are no emergency order structures and no 
batch sizes in production. The amount of orders waiting for production at the 
supplier is determined by the forecast received from FAT and by emergency 
orders placed by SWF, as explained above. The adjustment to the forecast is 
again based on a desired level of raw materials inventory to be kept by the sup-
plier, and follows the same logic as at the other supply chain members. 
e. Impact of Forecast Adjustments if Demand is Known 
In summary, the adjustments to the forecast made by the different supply chain 
members in the planning approach with cascading forecasts are: 
− Adjustment for the difference between demand and forecast at SWF 
− Adjustment for the desired level of raw materials inventory at SWF 
− Emergency orders to account for backlog at SWF 
− Adjustment for the desired level of board inventory at FAT 
− Adjustment for the desired level of materials inventory at FAT 
− Adjustment for the desired level of raw materials at BP 
− Adjustment for the desired level of raw materials at Sup 
The scenario that is discussed in the following demonstrates the impact of 
the adjustments as well as their intended rationality. Consider a situation where 
demand is perfectly known to all parties. Customer demand is constant at 
10,000 units from period 100 to 299, and then experiences a step increase to 
12,000 units, which is the new value for demand from period 300 to period 399. 
The original forecasts, shifted appropriately as discussed above, expect exactly 
this demand pattern, as shown in Figure C-22. 
Now, assume that none of the players in the supply chain modify the original 
forecasts using any of the adjustment policies described above. Instead, the 
forecast is passed through the supply chain up to the second tier supplier without 
any changes. This resembles a situation in which customer demand is exactly 
known to SWF ahead of time, and all players in the supply chain trust that the 
initial forecast will not change. In such a case, one would expect processes in 
the supply chain to run smoothly, with no major inventory build-ups anywhere 
in the chain and also no major incidents of backlog. To evaluate whether this 
expectation is accurate, and whether the model is performing in the way it is 
expected to, given the policies that are represented, an evaluation of the behav-
iour over time of several model variables is necessary.  
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Figure C-22: Cascade: Customer Demand and Forecasts (Example to Illustrate Adjust-
ments to Forecast) 
First, consider customer backlog, which measures the extent to which the 
demand by the customer has been filled. One may have expected customer 
backlog to remain at zero throughout the simulation. As shown in Figure C-23, 
this is not the case at all times. However, the variations can be explained by the 
structural characteristics of the model and do not question its validity. 
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Figure C-23: Cascade: Customer Backlog (Example to Illustrate Adjustments to Fore-
cast) 
In period 93, around 7 days before the first delivery is expected by the cus-
tomer, the customer backlog has a negative value for the first time. This means 
that products are received by the customer that were not yet expected to arrive – 
they arrived earlier than scheduled. This can also be seen in Figure C-24, which 
shows customer demand for any given day as well as the rate at which products 
are received by the customer. The explanation for this behaviour lies in the na-
ture of the delay types used for the production process and shipments at SWF. In 
a third-order exponential material delay, the output does not react immediately 
to a change in the input. For example, when desired shipments rise from zero to 
10,000 they do not reach this value on the next day, but rise slowly at first, then 
more quickly until a point of inflection until they approach the target value of 
10,000.482 This behaviour can be observed in Figure C-24 around periods 100, 
300 and 400. For example, by period 98 the customer received 4,957 units (cu-
mulative), by period 99 8,949 and by period 100 the customer received 10,538 
units of the product. This situation balances as the system reaches equilibrium 
and the receiving rate approaches the ideal rate of 10,000 units per day. 
                                                          
482  See, for example, Sterman: Business Dynamics, pp. 417–421 and Milling, Peter M.: 
Verzögerungsglieder in der Simulationssoftware Vensim, 1997, Arbeitspapier der 
Fakultät für Betriebswirtschaftslehre der Universität Mannheim, http://is.bwl.uni-
mannheim.de/Forschung/Publikationen/delays.pdf, retrieved on: 17 March 2006, 
p. 11. 
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Figure C-24: Cascade: Customer Demand and Receiving Rate at Customer (Example to 
Illustrate Adjustments to Forecast) 
These delayed responses to changes in the system are the explanation for the 
cases of customer backlog even in a situation where demand is known to all 
parties. Also, the magnitude of the customer backlog is minor compared to the 
magnitude of daily orders. However, in the example case a customer backlog of 
between 2,500 and 4,000 units remains in the backlog stock for the entire time 
period where the increase in demand occurs, i.e. starting in period 300. This 
backlog is equivalent to less than half of a day’s customer demand. Nonetheless, 
with no adjustments to the forecast occurring and no emergency orders placed to 
adjust for the backlog at SWF, the inability of the system to recover the backlog 
has a negative impact on delivery performance to customer request. Delivery 
performance at the end of the simulation and product life cycle is 90 percent 
even in this scenario with steady demand and perfect forecasts. If the forecasts 
are incorrect and there are changes in demand, such a system would fail to react, 
resulting in constant misalignment of demand and supply.483 In this model, this 
effect is related to a misalignment of the overall production volume of the mod-
elled product with demand. In reality, as noted by Holweg et al., such misalign-
ment can happen on many layers, particularly when there are different product 
variants. Even if overall production volume is aligned to demand for a model, it 
                                                          
483  See also Holweg et al.: Towards responsive vehicle supply, p. 617, who describes a 
similar problem for a supply chain model of an automotive supply chain. 
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might be the case that the majority produced variants are blue, or have Japanese 
keypads, whereas customer demand may be much stronger for yellow devices 
with English keypads.484 The system therefore needs to respond to such changes 
and ensure rapid recovery of backlogs. 
Before analysing the impact of adjustments to the forecasts, consider the ef-
ficiency of such a supply chain system. In the simulation, the inventory turns 
over the duration of the simulation are 36, which is relatively high. As exam-
ples, Figure C-25 shows the raw materials inventory levels at SWF, FAT and 
Sup. The time behaviour is as expected, with the peaks as well as the small 
amount of materials inventory left at FAT after the simulation, which represents 
around one third of average daily demand, caused by the behaviour of the delays 
discussed above. The inventory levels for boards at FAT and for raw materials 
at BP behave in a similar way, as do all the other inventory levels. There are no 
major inventory build-ups in the system. While this high level of efficiency is 
positive, in a real system it is unrealistic that no adjustments would be made to 
the forecast if, for example, a backlog is observed. 
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Figure C-25: Cascade: Raw Materials Inventory Levels (Example to Illustrate Adjust-
ments to Forecast) 
Now, consider the same scenario allowing for only one adjustment, i.e. 
emergency orders being placed by SWF. Recall that the amount of emergency 
orders placed by SWF depends on the size of the backlog observed by SWF. In 
                                                          
484  Cf. Holweg et al.: Towards responsive vehicle supply, p. 517. 
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determining the amount of emergency orders placed, the cumulated emergency 
orders already placed (i.e., the supply line) are not considered in this example. 
The backlog considered by the planners at SWF in determining the amount of 
emergency orders is different from the customer backlog, as they do not know 
when the product actually reaches the customer. Their backlog is represented by 
the model variable Backlog SWF, which is the stock variable that is increased by
incoming production requests SWF and decreased by production starts SWF.
For them, the backlog thus cannot become negative. Figure C-26 shows the time 
behaviour of the backlog at SWF. In the simulation run without emergency or-
ders, the backlog persists until the end of the simulation (line 1). In the simula-
tion run that allows emergency orders, the backlog is eventually reduced to zero 
due to the additional orders placed by the planners at SWF (line 2). In total, the 
planners ordered 7,632 additional units through the channel of emergency or-
ders. This increased delivery performance to customer request from 90 percent 
to 93 percent, with inventory turns remaining at 36. 
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Figure C-26: Cascade: Backlog at Software Flashing (Example to Illustrate Adjustments 
to Forecast) 
Now consider a situation where all the discussed adjustments listed at the 
beginning of this section are made by all supply chain members. SWF may 
place emergency orders and in addition adjusts the forecast for their desired 
inventory level of 10 days of stock (i.e. around 100,000 units if demand is on 
average 10,000 units) as well as for the difference between the forecast and ac-
tual demand, and SWF, FAT, Sup and BP each adjust the forecast based on their 
desired raw materials inventory levels of 100,000 units, respectively. None of 
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the players take into account the supply line of materials already ordered, which 
is in line with empirical observations.485 In this simulation run, delivery per-
formance is at 80 percent, and inventory turns are down to 4.7. Figure C-27 and 
Figure C-28 show the original forecast from the input spreadsheet as well as the 
modified forecasts prepared by SWF and FAT in the simulation with all adjust-
ments active. The forecast prepared by FAT is sent to the second tier suppliers. 
In the previous simulations, the forecast prepared by SWF was equal to that 
prepared by FAT since there were no adjustments, but now significant variation 
around the original forecast can be observed, originating in the attempts of the 
various supply chain members to adjust the forecasts according to their individ-
ual decision rules. The comparison between the forecasts for board printing and 
the forecast for the supplier show that there is higher fluctuation in the final 
forecast for the supplier prepared by FAT than in the forecast for board printing 
prepared by FAT. This is in line with the reference framework model for mate-
rial flow in electronic product supply chains developed by Berry et al. Their 
model suggests smaller, more frequent oscillations downstream electronics sup-
ply chains and larger oscillations with lower frequency upstream in the chain.486
Even in this straightforward scenario, decisions are made by the different mem-
bers of the supply chain that are introducing significant volatility, upstream am-
plification and oscillation into the supply chain. Such decisions are, for exam-
ple, the desire by the planners at final assembly to achieve a certain desired level 
of raw materials inventory, causing significant adjustments to the forecast even 
before the product is introduced to the market. These decision rules are intend-
edly rational, as the implicit assumptions made by the decision makers about 
their decisions are sensible (e.g., adjusting the forecast upwards when demand is 
higher than expected) and would produce reasonable and sensible results “if the 
actual environment were as simple as the decision maker presumes it to be”.487
However, the decisions made have consequences that could not be expected by 
the decision makers due to their cognitive limitations and the feedback complex-
ity inherent in the system. 
                                                          
485  For example, Sterman finds that “even a perfect forecast will not prevent a manager 
who ignores the supply line from overordering”. Cf. Sterman: Modeling Managerial 
Behavior, p. 336. 
486  Cf. Berry, Danny, Denis R. Towill and Nick Wadsley: Supply Chain Management in 
the Electronics Products Industry, in: International Journal of Physical Distribution & 
Logistics Management, Vol. 24 (1994), No. 10, p. 22. 
487  Cf. Sterman: Business Dynamics, p. 603. 
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Figure C-27: Cascade: Forecasts for Board Printing (Example to Illustrate Adjustments 
to Forecast) 
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Figure C-28: Cascade: Forecasts for Other 2nd Tier Supplier(Example to Illustrate Ad-
justments to Forecast) 
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2. Push: Central Planning for Push Structures 
In an approach that is primarily based on push principles with central planning 
up to the software flashing production step, the different players in the supply 
chain do not adjust the forecast provided by the central planning unit. There is 
one global plan driving production at the upstream suppliers. This reduces con-
fusion in the supply chain as the original forecasts are not adjusted by each 
member of the supply chain. Anything that is produced by the suppliers based 
on the global plan is then pushed through the other production steps, board 
printing and final assembly, until the products reach the buffer stock at the SWF 
stage. This approach is visualized in Figure C-29. As in the planning approach 
with cascading forecasts, the central plan is adjusted based on the difference 
between the original forecast and actual customer demand. Also, it accounts for 
the desired raw material level at the SWF stage. In addition, there is again the 
possibility for emergency orders with the chipset suppliers. 
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Figure C-29: Push Approach with Central Planning until SWF Stage 
a. Software Flashing and Packing 
As in the Cascade-planning approach, the processes at the software flashing and 
packing stage are driven by customer demand only. The distinction of these two 
planning approaches is the preparation of the forecasts. In the approach with 
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central planning, a single central plan is prepared and communicated to the first 
tier suppliers that is based on the original forecast, the difference between that 
forecast and actual customer demand and the desired raw materials inventory 
level at software flashing. This plan is prepared by the central planners that are 
based at the software flashing and planning stage, which corresponds to the 
OEMs. The central plan is therefore developed in the same way as the forecast 
prepared by SWF in the planning approach with cascading forecast, considering 
both an adjustment to inventory based on a desired number of days of stock to 
be kept and an adjustment for the difference between actual demand and the 
original forecast. Emergency orders can also be placed. The model structure in 
this sector is equal to that in the Cascade-approach, which ensures comparability 
of the models. 
b. Final Assembly and Testing 
In the push-based planning approach with central planning the production proc-
ess at the final assembly and testing stage is driven by the amount of production 
that is feasible based on the raw materials that are available, i.e. there is no fore-
cast that drives production and production continues as long as enough raw ma-
terials, i.e. both boards and other supplies, are available. This is visualised in 
Figure C-30 and corresponds to pushing the parts through the supply chain, fol-
lowing the central plan that drives production at the suppliers. 
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Figure C-30: Push: Production at Final Assembly and Testing 
c. First Tier Suppliers 
In the push approach with central planning, the first tier suppliers, i.e. board 
printing and the other supplier to final assembly, receive the central plan and 
order the materials from their raw materials suppliers based on exactly this plan. 
Board printing orders the forecast through the standard channel and considers 
emergency orders separately, as in the Cascade-approach, while the supplier 
orders the forecast as well as the emergency orders from the same second tier 
supplier. This is shown in Figure C-31. Production at the first tier suppliers is 
then, similarly to that at final assembly, driven by the amount of materials they 
receive from their suppliers. 
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Figure C-31: Push: First Tier Supplier Orders 
3. Pull: Planning with Pull Loops 
In a pull-based planning approach, material orders at each supply chain echelon 
are based on actual demand and on changes to safety stock levels, as opposed to 
being based on a forecast, as in the push-based planning approaches. Such a 
pull-based supply chain planning system is suggested by Mason-Jones et al. for 
electronics supply chains, as it may enable a better combination of efficiency 
and responsiveness of the system than current approaches.488 Specifically, in 
each period a supply chain member orders materials to fulfil demand of a pe-
riod, as well as a potential additional adjustment to achieve the desired safety 
stock level.489 This approach is visualized in Figure C-32. For the different sup-
ply chain tiers modelled, i.e. software flashing and packing, final assembly and 
testing, and the first tier suppliers, details of the decision rules in the pull-based 
planning system are explained in the following. 
                                                          
488  Cf. Mason-Jones, Rachel, J. Ben Naylor and Denis R. Towill: Engineering the leagile 
supply chain, in: International Journal of Agile Management Systems, Vol. 2 (2000), 
No. 1, p. 58–61. 
489  Cf. Reiner: Customer-oriented improvement and evaluation of supply chain proc-
esses supported by simulation models, p. 407. 
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Figure C-32: Pull Loops 
a. Software Flashing and Packing 
The production and shipment processes at software flashing and packing as well 
as the preparation of the central plan are identical to those in the other two plan-
ning approaches. A central plan is necessary even in a pull approach since the 
first tier suppliers need to place orders with their suppliers according to a long-
term forecast. The difference of the pull approach lies in the policies regulating 
the receipt of materials from final assembly. In contrast to the push approaches, 
the pull approach triggers a shipment from final assembly to software flashing 
only when an order by software flashing has been placed. This ordering logic is 
based on a pull replenishment logic that is explained in the following.  
First, the number of orders to be placed with a specified order size is calcu-
lated. This number is then multiplied with the order size resulting in the amount 
of materials to be ordered each day. This value is accumulated in the stock Ma-
terials on order SWF that itself is reduced by the material arrival rate at soft-
ware flashing. 
The number of orders to be placed is calculated as follows. The material or-
ders consist of several factors that are summed up. First, the incoming produc-
tion requests SWF, which represents customer demand in the current period, are 
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part of material orders. Considering new incoming orders is, however, not suffi-
cient for driving the ordering process. Therefore the forecasted demand during 
the lead time until any orders are received from FAT also becomes part of the 
calculation, since this period needs to be covered with materials on order. This 
forecast for demand during the expected lead time fluctuates if demand is dif-
ferent from the original forecast, as the forecasts used for the calculation are the 
adjusted forecasts. Then, the safety stock size is added to the material orders. 
Also, the backlog at SWF is considered since orders need to be placed to con-
sider any orders that could not yet be fulfilled. From the sum of these values, the 
inventory position, i.e. the amount of materials on order plus the current inven-
tory level at SWF, is deducted. The inventory position represents the amount of 
materials already ordered or received, and creates a limit to the amount of orders 
that are in the system.490 The INTEGER function is finally used to identify the 
number of orders to be placed in each period when dividing the desired orders 
through the order size. This order size can also be limited to a maximum value; 
in the base case, the maximum order size is set to a high enough value not to 
limit the dynamics of the system. 
no of orders SWF = 
INTEGER
(
 ( 
  (incoming production requests SWF 
   * materials used per FG unit SWF 
   * time to place an order SWF) 
  + forecast demand in materials LT SWF 
  + safety stock size SWF 
  + initial stock SWF 
  + (Backlog SWF * materials used per FG unit SWF) 
  - Materials on order SWF 
  - Inventory RM SWF 
 ) 
 /order size SWF 
)
/time to place an order SWF 
The safety stock size at SWF is calculated as the standard deviation of de-
mand over the material lead time, which is 10 days, multiplied with a service 
level factor z, representing the number of standard deviations of demand to be 
covered by the safety stock level. In the base scenario this safety factor is set to 
1.65, which corresponds to a service level of 95 percent. The standard deviation 
of demand is calculated every 10 days using an algorithm developed by John D. 
                                                          
490  See Hopp and Spearman: To Pull or Not to Pull: What Is the Question?, pp. 142–143. 
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Sterman.491 Figure C-33 displays the time behaviour of the desired safety stock 
levels at SWF for three simulation runs. The first one represents a demand pat-
tern with constant demand of 10,000 units between day 100 and day 400, the 
second run represents a demand pattern with mean demand of 10,000 units but 
low noise in that demand pattern, i.e. variations with a standard deviation of the 
noise 0.1, and the third simulation run represents a demand pattern with a mean 
demand of 10,000 units and high noise with a standard deviation of 0.8. The 
safety stock level is zero in the no noise scenario, as no deviations in demand 
need to be covered. In the low noise scenario, the safety stock level fluctuates at 
a relatively low level and in the high noise scenario the safety stock size is the 
highest, as expected. One can also observe the recalculations of the safety stock 
level every 10 days based on the standard deviation of demand over the last 10 
days. 
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Figure C-33: Pull: Safety Stock at Software Flashing and Packing 
In addition to the safety stock size SWF variable there is also the possibility 
to include an additional initial stock SWF. This initial stock can incorporate 
                                                          
491  Cf. Sterman, John D.: Appropriate Summary Statistics for Evaluating the Historical 
Fit of System Dynamics Models, in: Dynamica, Vol. 10 (1984), Winter, pp. 51–66 
and Sterman: Business Dynamics, p. 874–880. The time interval of ten days is a rea-
sonable estimate for real-world pull-based planning systems, where safety stock lev-
els may be calculated even more frequently, such as daily or weekly. In other supply 
chains, however, this interval may also be longer. 
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planned safety stocks in the model even when currently no demand is observed, 
i.e. before the product introduction. Except where otherwise indicated, to simu-
late a pure pull-based system this initial stock is zero. 
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Figure C-34: Pull: Material Orders at Software Flashing and Packing 
b. Final Assembly and Testing 
Production and shipment processes at final assembly in the pull planning ap-
proach begin only after orders from software flashing have been received. Mate-
rial orders by final assembly are placed following similar policies as at software 
flashing. The incoming orders, i.e. current period demand, are the incoming or-
der rate FAT. This variable represents the sum of normal material orders placed 
by SWF at FAT and emergency orders. The only difference to the decision rule 
at the software flashing is that the expected demand in the materials lead time to 
be covered by materials on order is not based on a forecast, but on the five-day 
average of demand from software flashing that is observed by the planners at 
final assembly and testing. 
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c. First Tier Suppliers 
Production and shipment processes at board printing in the pull planning ap-
proach begin only after orders from FAT have been received. Standard material 
orders, however, are placed according to a forecast prepared by central plan-
ning. The orders are adjusted to account for the difference between that forecast 
and actually experienced demand, i.e. orders placed by FAT, and for a desired 
inventory level at BP. This desired stock level is determined by a desired num-
ber of days of stock based on average demand observed from final assembly. 
Emergency orders by SWF are placed separately as in the other two planning 
approaches. In the pull approach, additionally, if the initial staging of the supply 
chain is simulated these one-time orders are added to the material orders from 
second tier suppliers in their first forecasting period, respectively. This ensures 
that the supplies arrive on time in order to ensure that they can flow through the 
supply chain before the product life cycle begins. 
material orders BP
adjustment to desired material order rate BP
forecast for board printing SWF
incorporate initial stock into forecast boards
materials used per FG unit SWF
material orders Sup
adjustment to desired material order rate Sup
boards per material
Emergency orders to account for Backlog SWF
forecast for supplier SWF
incorporate initial stock into forecast materials
materials used per FG unit Sup
Figure C-35: Pull: First Tier Supplier Orders 
Similarly to board printing, production and shipment processes at the other 
first tier supplier in the pull planning approach begin only after orders from FAT 
have been received. Material orders, including emergency orders, are placed 
according to a forecast prepared by central planning. This forecast is adjusted to 
account for the difference between that forecast and actually experienced de-
mand, i.e. orders placed by FAT, and for a desired inventory level at the first tier 
supplier. The desired inventory level is determined by a desired number of days 
of stock based on average demand from FAT. 
D. Evaluation of Planning Policies to Achieve 
Responsiveness and Efficiency 
The planning processes in a supply chain for functional products should be de-
signed primarily to deliver at the lowest possible cost. Innovative products re-
quire processes that respond quickly to changes in demand in order to minimize 
stockouts and obsolete inventory.492 Even though high-tech products are gener-
ally considered to be innovative, even within the high-tech sector there are sig-
nificant differences in demand patterns and forecast stability. Using a System 
Dynamics simulation model to represent the supply chain structure in the high-
tech electronics industry, the impact of external effects, such as a strike at a 
supplier causing a component shortage, is analysed, as well as the consequences 
of internal changes in the supply chain structures and policies. Typically, de-
mand is most predictable during the maturity stage of the product life cycle, and 
rapid changes in demand can be observed during a product’s introductory, 
growth and decline stage.493 There are also structural differences in the demand 
patterns, such as demand volatility, which make forecasting extremely difficult 
and unstable. Therefore, a number of different order patterns are used as input 
data for the model, based on different products that are characterised by, for 
example, relatively stable or highly variable demand. Demand volatility is used 
here as a criterion for segmentation of the products because it is a major factor 
impacting supply chain performance.  
I. Dynamics of Tailoring Supply Chains to Product Requirements 
Products with different characteristics pose different challenges to supply 
chains. For example, higher demand volatility makes forecasting and the 
achievement of high delivery performance more challenging, increasing the 
need for responsiveness of the supply chain. While products with predictable 
demand require less responsiveness to changes in customer demand, there may 
be supply chain disruptions that require reactions to ensure on-time deliveries. 
In the following, the System Dynamics model is used to analyse how capable 
the three different planning approaches are in achieving high responsiveness and 
efficiency when confronted with a number of challenges, such as high demand 
volatility or low forecast accuracy. For each demand scenario discussed, the 
                                                          
492  Cf. Huang, Uppal and Shi: A product driven approach to manufacturing supply chain 
selection, p. 194. 
493  Cf. Chopra, Sunil and Peter Meindl: Supply Chain Management, Upper Saddle 
River, NJ 2004, p. 42. 
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simulation model provides insights on the extent of responsiveness and effi-
ciency achieved with the different planning approaches. 
1. Scenario 1: Steady Demand 
In the first demand scenario analysed with the simulation model customer de-
mand is constant at 10,000 units per day between the product introduction at day 
100 and market exit at day 400, as shown in Figure D-1. This corresponds to a 
cumulative demand of 3,000,000 units over the life cycle of the product. The 
initial forecasts are perfect, i.e. both the exogenous initial forecast for the sup-
plier and the forecast for board printing predict a demand of 10,000 units per 
day between day 100 and 400. In the base case, this scenario corresponds to one 
in which demand is stable and highly predictable. 
40,000
30,000
20,000
10,000
0
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
Time (Day)
demand for the current day: cascade steady no noise Widget/Day
Figure D-1: Demand for the Current Day: Steady, No Noise 
In such a situation, it should be relatively simple for a supply chain to 
achieve efficiency and responsiveness, at least compared to scenarios where 
demand is highly volatile and unpredictable. Nonetheless backlog situations 
occur in all of the three different planning approaches even though these fore-
casts are perfect. As shown in Figure D-2, the maximum backlog is equal to 
more than 10 days of demand for each planning approach, while the timing of 
these backlog incidents is different. In the pull-based planning approach, a pe-
riod with a large backlog occurs as soon as the product is introduced to the mar-
ket. This backlog is caused by the time delays inherent in a pull-based planning 
system that relies on forecasts only for the orders of materials from second-tier 
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suppliers. Unless a forecast is made and products are being manufactured before 
the product introduction (i.e., pushed through the supply chain) such a backlog 
is unavoidable, but also very harmful as the initial sales are often an important 
determinant of the financial success of a product.494 In the simulation of pull- 
based planning, the first units are delivered on time starting only about 75 days 
after the product introduction. At this point in time, it I likely that competitors 
will have captured parts of the market share. If the first product is delivered on 
time several months after the product introduction, it is more difficult to ensure 
the financial success of the product. Therefore, in practice, to avoid such initial 
backlogs pull-based systems rely on a forecast for the product introduction 
phase. The impact of such a plan for the product introduction phase is analysed 
later in this section. However, the pure pull approach is not the only planning 
approach in which backlog builds up as orders cannot be fulfilled. At later 
stages of the product life cycle, backlogs also occur in the push approaches with 
cascading forecasts and with central planning. 
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Figure D-2: Backlog at Software Flashing 
The backlog incidents, except for the initial backlog in the pull-based plan-
ning approach, are caused by adjustments to the forecast that are perfectly ra-
tional for the decision makers at the different supply chain echelons but lead to 
                                                          
494  Cf. Milling and Maier: Invention, Innovation und Diffusion, pp. 95–96. and pp. 202–
208. How such initial backlog situations can be avoided in the pull-based planning 
approach is analyzed in section D.I.1.f starting on page 163. 
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unintended consequences for the supply chain as a whole.495 In the push ap-
proach with central planning, for example, the planners at software flashing in-
tend to reach a level of raw materials inventory that represents 10 days of aver-
age demand as a safety buffer. Initially, the raw materials inventory level at 
software flashing is below that level, which is why the forecast is adjusted up-
wards, as shown in Figure D-3, which compares the initial forecast for board 
printing with the adjusted forecast actually sent to board printing. After the de-
lay involved in receiving the ordered materials, the inventory at software flash-
ing starts to build up, but in period 235 average inventory exceeds the desired 
level because the supply line of materials already on order is not considered by 
the planners in their decision making process for forecast adjustments (see 
Figure D-4, which shows the raw material inventory level at SWF). Therefore, 
the forecast is then adjusted downwards with the intention to counteract the in-
ventory build-up. This downward adjustment, which leads to lower levels of 
material orders from the second tier suppliers, is the cause for the backlog that 
begins to appear around period 350 (see Figure D-2). 
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Figure D-3: Push: Forecasts for Board Printing 
In the base case, while backlogs occur in all of the three different planning 
approaches modelled there are also periods with significant inventory build-ups 
at software flashing in each of the planning approaches, which can also be ex-
plained by the forecast adjustments. Again, as can be seen in Figure D-4, the 
                                                          
495  See also section C.I.1, where this common phenomenon is discussed in more detail. 
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timing and magnitude of these inventory build-ups is different. The fluctuations 
in the raw materials inventory level at SWF are highest in the Cascade planning 
approach, which results from the multiple forecast adjustments in the supply 
chain. With average demand at 10,000 units per day during the product life cy-
cle a maximum inventory level of nearly 800,000 units corresponds to 80 days 
of demand, or eight times the desired average inventory level. Such an inventory 
pile-up can easily cause space problems in the warehouse at software flashing 
and is an additional concern because of the potential for product obsolescence. 
Therefore, such high inventory levels are highly undesirable. In all planning 
approaches, there are also stock levels at the end of the product life cycle, which 
cannot be sold to customers as there is no further demand. These inventory 
build-ups can also be explained by adjustments to the forecasts that are made 
over time. In the pull-based planning approach, for example, an inventory build-
up at board printing in the middle of the product life cycle causes a reduction of 
chipset orders by the planners at board printing. This adjustment, in turn, causes 
a shortage of boards near the end of the product life cycle. This shortage creates 
a backlog of orders at software flashing and as a consequence leads to the 
placement of emergency orders, which are delivered to software flashing and 
help to reduce the backlog. Eventually, as the backlog has been reduced to zero 
and there is no further demand, these emergency orders remain in the stock of 
semi-finished products at software flashing. 
160 
800,000
700,000
600,000
500,000
400,000
300,000
200,000
100,000
0
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
Time (Day)
Inventory RM SWF : cascade steady no noise Materials
Inventory RM SWF : push steady no noise Materials
Inventory RM SWF : pull steady no noise Materials
Figure D-4: Raw Materials Inventory at Software Flashing 
With regard to the responsiveness and efficiency of the supply chain in this 
scenario without demand volatility, delivery performance ranges between 
64 percent and 85 percent in the three planning approaches with equally signifi-
cant differences in inventory turns, which evaluate inventory levels across the 
supply chain and not only at software flashing and packing. In the Cascade 
planning approach, inventory turns are only 4.7 compared to 16.8 in the Push 
approach and 16.2 in the Pull approach. The order of magnitude of these figures 
for inventory turns is in line with values from actual high-tech electronics com-
panies, such as IBM with inventory turns of 16.7, Nokia with inventory turns of 
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12.7, Motorola with 7.9 and Cisco Systems with 4.7 in 2005.496 For the supply 
chain as a whole, the average total inventory levels in the entire supply chain are 
equivalent to 106 days of stock for the planning approach with cascading fore-
casts, 30 days of stock in the push-based planning approach with central plan-
ning and 31 days for the pull-based planning approach.497 Average delivery per-
formance reaches 80 percent in the planning approach with cascading forecasts, 
85 percent in the push approach with central planning and 64 percent in the pull 
approach. Even in this simple demand scenario, none of the planning ap-
proaches achieves a delivery performance of close to 100 percent. This is due to 
the individual decision-making policies of the different supply chain members. 
 Capacity utilization at board printing also differs in the three planning ap-
proaches. In both the cascade and the push planning approach, production is 
ramped up around 25 days before the product is introduced to the market and 
soon reaches a level of 10,000 units per day. In the cascade approach, this pro-
duction level rises to 20,000 units, the maximum capacity at board printing, 
around day 130, i.e. 30 days after the market introduction of the end product. 
This level is kept until day 280 and then rapidly drops to a production volume 
significantly below average demand. In the push planning approach there are 
less fluctuations, with production first slowly rising above the average end cus-
tomer demand level due to the forecast adjustments by SWF and then slowly 
falling again. In the pull approach, there are large fluctuations in production 
shortly after the introduction of the product to the market and production at 
board printing remains constant at 10,000 units only from around day 200 on, 
with some more fluctuation near the end of the life cycle. Nonetheless, the cor-
relation between the incoming order rate at BP and the production rate at BP is 
0,65, indicating that board printing in this scenario has a relatively high capabil-
ity to produce what was demanded in the pull-based planning approach.498
In summary, the predictability of production when considering the initial 
forecasts and the demand pattern at board printing in this scenario is largest in 
the push-based planning approach, which is an important consideration for the 
initial planning of the supply chain set-up and capacity requirements. While the 
pull approach is similarly predictable later in the product life cycle in this de-
mand scenario, the production rate at board printing experiences a large amount 
of fluctuations at the beginning of the product life cycle. The planning approach 
                                                          
496  Cf. Kozik, Cathie: Motorola: Integrated Supply Chain (ISC) - Creating Sustainable 
Transformation, Motorola, 2007, p. 10. Dell, in contrast, achieves inventory turns of 
86.8 with its direct-sales model. 
497  Days of stock for the supply chain are calculated as the average aggregate value of 
inventory in the supply chain divided by the average customer demand over the 
simulation duration. 
498  See also Holweg et al.: Towards responsive vehicle supply, p. 514. 
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with cascading forecasts uses up the full capacity at board printing of 20,000 
units per day while demand is only 10,000 units per day. Both the push ap-
proach with central planning and the pull approach therefore manage to keep 
production at board printing at a rate close to the actual customer demand, even 
though in the pull approach significant fluctuations are experienced at the be-
ginning of the product life cycle. In contrast, the production rate at board print-
ing in the planning approach with cascading forecasts exceeds the level of cus-
tomer demand by far during an extended period of time, even when demand is 
constant at 10,000 units per day. 
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Figure D-5: Production Rate at Board Printing 
a. Increasing Desired Inventory Levels 
The desired raw materials inventory levels at the different echelons in the sup-
ply chain, whose calculation, as described earlier, depends on the planning ap-
proach, are the most important determinant of forecast adjustments in this sce-
nario with steady demand and perfect forecasts. Therefore, a sensitivity test is 
performed to identify the impact of increasing these desired safety stock levels 
on responsiveness and efficiency. In the cascade planning approach, delivery 
performance is 80 percent given the standard base case parameters. A sensitivity 
analysis that increases the desired days of stock at software flashing as well as 
the desired raw materials inventory levels at each echelon by a factor of up to 
two leads to a maximum delivery performance of 89%. At the same time, how-
ever, inventory turns fall from 4.7 to 1.9. The increase of desired days of stock 
at software flashing by a factor of up to two in the push planning approach leads 
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to a new level of inventory turns of 10.7, while delivery performance could only 
be improved by two percentage points. In the pull approach, the effect of in-
creasing the safety factors at SWF and FAT as well as the desired days of stock 
at board printing and the other first tier supplier is an increase in delivery per-
formance by five percentage points and a reduction in inventory turns from 16.2 
to 13.1. These results indicate for the theoretical scenario with constant demand 
and perfect forecasts that even with a significant increase in the safety stock 
levels it is not possible to achieve close to 100% delivery performance in all of 
the planning approaches. The push approach with central planning experiences 
the lowest relative improvement in delivery performance, but the performance 
of this planning approach has already been superior to the other two planning 
approaches in terms of responsiveness and efficiency in the base case scenario. 
Table D-1: Sensitivity to Increases in Desired Inventory Levels 
Steady Demand with Perfect Forecasts
Base Case  Increased Inventory499
 Delivery 
Performance
Inventory 
Turns
 Delivery 
Performance
Inventory 
Turns
Cascade 80% 4.7 
Mean: 87%
Max: 89% 
Min: 81% 
Mean: 2.8 
Max: 4.3 
Min: 1.9 
Push 85% 16.8 
Mean: 85%
Max: 87% 
Min: 85% 
Mean: 13.3 
Max: 16.8 
Min: 10.7 
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in
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Pull 64% 16.2 
Mean: 67%
Max: 69% 
Min: 64% 
Mean: 14.5 
Max: 16.1 
Min: 13.1 
                                                          
499  Multivariate sensitivity analysis over 500 simulations with the following variations: 
Cascade: desired days of stock SWF=RANDOM_UNIFORM(10,20), inventory size 
boards FAT, RM FAT, BP and Sup=RANDOM_UNIFORM(100000,200000); Push: 
desired days of stock SWF=RANDOM_UNIFORM(10,20); Pull: safety factors z at 
SWF and FAT=RANDOM_UNIFORM(1.65,2.33), desired days of stock BP and 
Sup=RANDOM_UNIFORM(10,20). 
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b. Simulating Forecast Error 
Forecasts are rarely as perfect as assumed in the preceding discussion. For ex-
ample, to analyse how the system reacts to a single unexpected perturbation of 
the input, consider a demand scenario in which customer demand is constant at 
10,000 units per day between the product introduction at day 100 and the middle 
of the intended product life cycle, i.e. day 249. From day 250, demand is con-
stant at 12,000 units, i.e. demand experiences an unexpected step increase. The 
initial forecasts are no longer perfect, as they predict a demand of 10,000 units 
per day between periods 100 and 400, as in the previous analyses. This corre-
sponds to a cumulative demand of 3,000,000 units, which in total is 300,000 
more than expected. The increase in demand is unexpected for each member of 
the supply chain, including the planners preparing the forecasts sent to the sup-
pliers before the product is introduced to the market. There will be therefore be 
adjustments to the forecasts and/or material orders, depending on the planning 
approach.
Figure D-6 provides an overview of the performance of the different plan-
ning approaches. In the base case scenario with demand of 10,000 units per day, 
the push planning approach again outperforms the pull and cascade planning 
approaches on both dimensions, responsiveness and efficiency. The most strik-
ing result of this simulation run is that the push approach in the scenario with an 
unexpected increase in demand outperforms the push planning approach in the 
scenario with steady, perfectly predictable demand, on both responsiveness and 
efficiency. This means that in this demand scenario the push-based planning 
approach is best able to handle small day-to-day deviations in demand as well as 
an unexpected 20 percent increased in demand. 
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Figure D-6: Sensitivity of Responsiveness and Efficiency to an Unexpected Step Increase 
in Demand 
Compared to the base case scenario with steady demand and perfect fore-
casts, a few observations can be made in the scenario with an unexpected step 
increase in demand. Firstly, the inventory turnover for the push approach with 
cascading forecasts and for the push approach with central planning is signifi-
cantly higher in the simulation with imperfect forecasts and a step increase in 
demand, independent of demand volatility. This increased efficiency can be 
explained by some of the excess inventory that has accumulated in the push ap-
proach being consumed by the step increase in demand. At the same time deliv-
ery performance for the planning approach with cascading forecasts is only 
slightly lower in the scenario with the step increase compared to steady demand. 
This small difference can be explained by the higher overall level of inventory 
throughout the supply chain in the cascade approach, which allows compensat-
ing for the increase in demand. Compared to the steady demand case, with cen-
tral planning the delivery performance in the step increase scenario is higher. 
This can be explained by an upward adjustment of the forecasts for the first tier 
suppliers after perception of the step increase in demand (see Figure D-7). 
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Figure D-7: Push: Adjustment of Forecast for Board Printing after a Step Increase in 
Demand
Regarding the pull approach, in the step increase scenario this planning ap-
proach performs worse than in the steady demand case on both dimensions, de-
livery performance and inventory turns. This is explicable since no excess in-
ventory is kept to cover this unpredicted major and permanent increase in de-
mand. 
Now, consider a scenario in which the planners preparing the initial forecast 
underestimate demand by 20%. The forecasts initially prepared thus assume a 
demand of 8,000 units per day, and not 10,000. All other conditions are un-
changed, including actual demand of 10,000 units per day and the length of the 
product life cycle. There is no unexpected step increase in demand. While back-
log situations occur in the scenario with perfect forecasts as well, the backlog 
situations in this scenario with incorrect forecasts are to some extent caused by 
the initial underestimation of demand. Therefore the first backlog occurs much 
earlier, i.e. as soon as the product is introduced to the market (see Figure D-8, 
which displays the backlog in the planning approach with cascading forecasts in 
the underforecast scenario compared to the scenario with accurate forecasts).  
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Figure D-8: Underforecast: Backlog at Software Flashing 
In a planning approach with no adjustments to the initial plan, the backlog 
would never disappear. Therefore, the response of the system to the demand 
change is that while the forecasts are adjusted to represent the higher demand 
level, supply chain planners also place emergency orders as they attempt to re-
cover the backlog as quickly as possible. These emergency orders are placed as 
long as a backlog occurs and, combined with the failure to adjust the other fore-
casts for the emergency orders that were placed, eventually cause an even larger 
inventory build-up near the end of the product life cycle than in the scenario 
with perfect forecasts, as shown in Figure D-9.  
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Figure D-9: Underforecast: Raw Materials Inventory at Software Flashing 
While the original forecast is adjusted downwards to consider the actual raw 
materials inventory level at software flashing that begins to exceed the desired 
inventory level shortly before day 350, the adjustment as shown in Figure D-10 
is too little, too late, as demand for the product ceases at day 400. Taken to-
gether, these factors cause a major inventory build-up at the end of the product 
life cycle. 
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Figure D-10: Underforecast: Forecast for Board Printing Prepared by Software Flash-
ing
The consequences of the incorrect forecasts are reductions in supply chain 
responsiveness and efficiency in all three planning approaches. The pull plan-
ning approach suffers the lowest reduction in inventory turns and delivery per-
formance compared to the scenario with perfect forecasts and therefore shows 
the least sensitivity to an underestimation of demand in this scenario. The push 
approach, whose performance on these dimensions was best in the base case 
with perfect forecasts with slightly higher efficiency and significantly lower 
delivery performance compared to the pull approach, now performs slightly 
worse than the pull approach in terms of delivery performance and slightly bet-
ter in terms of inventory turns, as shown in Figure D-11. The cascade planning 
approach performs worst on efficiency but achieves a slightly higher delivery 
performance than both other planning approaches. This is primarily caused by 
the higher inventory levels throughout the supply chain that allow a quicker 
elimination of backlog situations. 
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Figure D-11: Underforecast and Overforecast: Responsiveness vs. Efficiency 
The initial forecast could also err in the other direction, i.e. overestimate 
demand. This could be either due to an incorrect estimation of demand, or due 
to a purposeful inflation of the forecast. Inflating the forecast by, for example, 
20 percent is frequently done when actual demand is uncertain and product life 
cycles are short in order to ensure availability and increase delivery performance 
during the initial phase of the product life cycle.500 In the no noise scenario with 
steady demand, the results are surprisingly different for the three planning ap-
proaches. In the push-based planning approach with forecasts cascading through 
the supply chain, efficiency as measured by inventory turns increases from 4.7 
to 6.4, while delivery performance is reduced from 80 percent to 77 percent due 
to the overforecast and resulting adjustments within the supply chain. The push-
based planning approach with central planning achieves a delivery performance 
of 99 percent in the overforecast scenario, with a reduction in inventory turns 
                                                          
500  See, for example, the case of a product transition at Intel described in Erhun, Gon-
çalves and Hopman: Moving from Risks to Opportunities, pp. 16–18. See also 
Wendin: Electronics Manufacturing: EMS at a Crossroads, p. 13. 
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from 16.8 to 15.7. In the pull-based planning approach, an overforecast im-
proves both performance measures as inventory turns increase from 16.2 to 16.9 
and delivery performance increases from 64 percent to 77 percent. The primary 
explanation is that the reduction of the initial backlog through the overforecast 
avoids the need for emergency orders, which reduces inventory accumulations 
near the end of the product life cycle and therefore improves responsiveness of 
the supply chain as well as its efficiency. 
c. Effect of Random Demand Deviations 
In the base case scenario, demand is constant at 10,000 units per day throughout 
the product life cycle. In reality, however, demand is subject to variation over 
time. This demand volatility is now introduced in order to analyse its impact on 
the performance of the different planning approaches. The forecasts remain at 
10,000 units per day, and also mean demand is 10,000 units per day. Noise is 
added to the previously constant demand through a pink noise process, which is 
first-order autocorrelated noise where the next random variation depends in part 
on the previous variations. Using pink noise and not white noise, where all 
variation is independent, is necessary to represent that one period’s demand is 
not independent of the last but depends to some degree on history. This means 
that customer demand is subject to some inertia.501 In the simulations with ran-
dom noise, the supply chain performance measures discussed refer to the mean 
values obtained from a sensitivity analysis with 200 different random demand 
patterns. The values indicated for inventory turns and delivery performance to 
customer request are the mean values at the end of over 200 simulations with 
different noise seeds, i.e. 200 demand patterns with different noise patterns, 
each with a mean demand of 10,000 units per day. The standard deviation of the 
pink noise remains constant over these 200 simulations and is 0.1 in the low 
noise scenario and 0.8 in the high noise scenario. The high noise scenario may 
appear to assume a relatively large degree of variation. However, a comparison 
with the demand pattern for a real mobile phone shown in Figure B-5, page 47, 
reveals that in reality demand may be even more volatile than assumed in the 
simulations. The standard deviation of the real-world demand pattern for the 
sample mobile phone is 13,388 (when normalized to the same average demand 
level as in the simulation, i.e. 10,000 units per day) with a difference between 
the maximum and minimum demand of 96,822 units, while the simulated high 
noise demand pattern shown below, as an example, has a standard deviation of 
6,500 and a range of 30,805 units. 
                                                          
501  Cf. Sterman: Business Dynamics, p. 917. 
172 
40,000
30,000
20,000
10,000
0
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
Time (Day)
demand for the current day : cascade steady low noise Widget/Day
Figure D-12: Demand for the Current Day: Low Noise (example) 
40,000
30,000
20,000
10,000
0
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
Time (Day)
demand for the current day : cascade steady high noise Widget/Day
Figure D-13: Demand for the Current Day: High Noise (example) 
Driven by the variation in demand the planners in all planning approaches 
are confronted with the same problem – how to satisfy customer demand on 
time considering that the raw material receipts are unlikely to constantly coin-
cide with the requirements during a particular period. If demand is below the 
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forecast for a few days, inventory will build up, and if demand is higher than the 
forecast, the inventory levels will decline until eventually a backlog situation 
arises as demand can no longer be fulfilled. 
In each of the represented planning approaches the initial forecasts are modi-
fied to reflect differences between the original forecasts and actual demand as 
well as the desired level of inventory at software flashing. In the push approach 
and in the pull approach, these are the only changes to the forecast for the first 
tier suppliers that are made, while in the cascade scenario an additional adjust-
ment to that forecast is made by the planners at final assembly. Considering 
only the forecast adjustment made by software flashing, differences between the 
three scenarios can be observed, as shown in Figure D-14. In the two primarily 
push-based planning approaches, the structure of the adjustments to the forecast 
done by software flashing is exactly the same, while in the pull-based planning 
approach no adjustment to the desired level of inventory at software flashing is 
made. The major cause for the forecast deviations are differences in the devel-
opment of the level of raw materials inventory at software flashing, which is an 
important input for the determination of the adjustment for the desired level of 
raw materials inventory (see Figure D-15). For example, as the raw materials 
inventory level at SWF in the planning approach with cascading forecasts be-
gins to quickly rise above the desired level from shortly after day 150, the fore-
cast for board printing is adjusted downwards. As a consequence, the forecasts 
of future demand are not independent of current orders. If current orders are 
higher than the average forecast, inventory levels deplete and the forecast is 
adjusted upwards. Similarly, if current orders are lower than the average fore-
cast, inventory builds up and the forecast is adjusted downwards. Forecasts 
therefore respond strongly to recent events, even if the results of the change in 
the forecast will only have an impact on incoming materials several months in 
the future.502 Since such an adjustment for the desired inventory level is not 
made in the pull-based planning approach, the forecast stability is higher, which 
is beneficial for the upstream echelons in the supply chain. 
                                                          
502  This phenomenon is described for a company in the semiconductor industry in 
Sterman: Business Dynamics, pp. 449–462. 
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Figure D-14: Forecast for Board Printing prepared by Software Flashing (example, not 
averaged) 
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Figure D-15: Raw Materials Inventory at Software Flashing (example, not averaged) 
In the pull planning scenario, variations in demand influence the material or-
ders by software flashing and final assembly in several ways. Firstly, demand 
variations are passed on immediately through newly placed orders. Except for 
the smoothing caused by the minimum order size in the pull logic the material 
orders placed therefore have a similar level of volatility as the demand from that 
echelon’s customer.503 Secondly, the changes in the forecast by the central plan-
ners cause changes in the forecast for demand expected during the materials 
lead time, which affect the order size either positively or negatively. If actual 
demand is higher than the forecast, the forecast will be adjusted upwards by the 
                                                          
503  See also the analysis in section D.I.1.d. 
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central planners, and vice versa. This change then traverses through the supply 
chain as material orders are also adjusted in the same direction to cover the ex-
pected higher level of demand during the materials lead time. This is shown for 
one sample simulation in Figure D-16. Finally, the desired safety stock level 
depends directly on the variation in demand observed by SWF or FAT, respec-
tively. Every ten days, which corresponds to the lead time after which ordered 
materials are expected to be received, the volatility of demand is recalculated 
and the desired level of safety stock is adjusted. This is shown in Figure D-17. 
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Figure D-16: Pull: Forecasted Demand During the Expected Materials Lead Time at 
Software Flashing (example, not averaged) 
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Figure D-17: Safety Stock Size at Software Flashing (example, not averaged) 
In the low noise scenario, delivery performance is five to 14 percentage 
points lower than in the base case scenario and reaches 72 percent in the push 
approach with cascading forecasts, 71 percent in the push approach with central 
planning and 59 percent in the pull approach. Inventory turns in the simulation 
with low noise are almost the same as in the scenario with no noise for each of 
the planning approaches, i.e. no significant reduction in the level of efficiency 
could be observed. The only major impact of the small amount of noise in de-
mand was therefore a reduction in the delivery performance, with little impact 
on the efficiency of the supply chains. One reason for this observation is that the 
averages of demand used in decision making and forecasting smooth out small 
changes in demand such that the adjustments made to react to the changes in 
demand are relatively small. The push-based planning approach with central 
planning adapts best to this small amount of day-to-day variation in demand. 
While its delivery performance is only one percentage point lower than that in 
the planning approach with cascading forecasts, it achieves the highest effi-
ciency when comparing the three planning approaches. In the high noise sce-
nario, the changes in demand are much larger and not entirely smoothed out by 
the forecasting processes as both extended periods with significantly above av-
erage demand and significantly below average demand can occur, which is 
shown for a sample demand pattern in Figure D-12 and Figure D-13. Figure 
D-18 and Figure D-19 illustrate the resulting forecast adjustments. The dashed 
lines in each figure are the forecast sent to board printing in the scenario without 
noise. The drawn through line represents the mean forecast averaged over 200 
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sensitivity simulations in the scenarios with low noise and high noise, respec-
tively. While the forecast in the low noise scenario is very similar to the forecast 
in the no noise scenario, the discrepancy between the two is significant in the 
high noise scenario, which can be explained by the higher fluctuations in de-
mand and resulting inventory fluctuations. 
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Figure D-18: Push, Low Noise: Average Forecast Adjustments 
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Figure D-19: Push, High Noise: Average Forecast Adjustments 
In the high noise scenario, because of the larger variation in demand, deliv-
ery performance is at 50 percent in the cascade approach and thus 22 percentage 
points lower than in the low noise scenario. Delivery performance is 43 percent 
in the push approach (27 percentage points lower) and 26 percent in the pull 
approach (33 percentage points lower). With its higher average inventory levels 
throughout the supply chain and resulting lower efficiency, the cascade planning 
approach allows this result of a higher delivery performance than the other 
planning approaches could achieve. This is also visible in the behaviour over 
time graph of the backlog level at software flashing, reproduced in Figure D-21. 
The performance of pull in the high noise scenario is the worst of the three 
planning approaches, with customers having to face particularly long delivery 
delays in the initial phase of the product life cycle. This inability to deliver of 
the pure pull-based planning approach in the first phase of the product life cycle 
is almost unavoidable due to the pure pull nature of the system. In a later analy-
sis, planning for the product introduction through initial staging of the supply 
chain is analysed. Even though the push approach outperforms the other plan-
ning approaches on efficiency in the high noise scenario, this approach achieves 
only 43 percent delivery performance. 
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Figure D-21: Steady Demand: Average Backlog at Software Flashing504
                                                          
504  The plotted values are the average values over 200 simulations with different noise 
seeds, i.e. the average values for 200 different demand patterns with variation in the 
noise that is added to the base product life cycle. 
182 
Table D-2: Sensitivity of Responsiveness and Efficiency to Randomness in the Demand 
Pattern
Steady Demand with Perfect Forecasts
Base Case Low Noise505  High Noise506
Delivery 
Perf.
Inventory 
Turns
Delivery 
Perf.
Inventory 
Turns
 Delivery 
Perf.
Inventory 
Turns
Cascade 80% 4.7 72% 4.9 50% 4.6 
Push 85% 16.8 71% 16.7 43% 11.3 
Pl
an
ni
ng
 A
pp
ro
ac
h 
Pull 64% 16.2 59% 15.6 26% 9.3 
d. Changing Pull Parameters 
One critical question is whether the performance of the pull-based planning ap-
proach is affected by a modification of various order parameters, such as the 
frequency of updating the safety stock level, the minimum order size, and the 
maximum order size.507 These parameters may need to be adjusted when a fun-
damental demand change is experienced, since otherwise stockouts could oc-
cur.508 Changing these parameters, however, creates additional upstream de-
mand variability and thus may also cause disruptions in the supply chain. Dis-
ney and Towill and also Forrester, for example, find that continuously recalcu-
lating these inventory control parameters according to the demand signal causes 
fluctuations in production quantities. They suggest that slow reactions to 
                                                          
505  Mean values over 200 simulations with different noise seeds; standard deviation of 
white noise used for pink noise process is 0.1; this noise is added to the constant de-
mand. Pink noise is first-order autocorrelated noise where the next random shock de-
pends in part on the previous shocks. 
506  Mean values over 200 simulations with different noise seeds; standard deviation of 
white noise used for pink noise process is 0.8. 
507  See Krupp, James A.G.: Some Thoughts on Implementing "Pull" Systems, in: Pro-
duction and Inventory Management Journal, Vol. 40 (1999), No. 4, p. 36. See also 
Kaipia, Korhonen and Hartiala: Planning nervousness in a demand supply network, 
pp. 107–110, who discuss a related complication with regard to vendor managed in-
ventory. 
508  Cf. Krupp: Some Thoughts on Implementing "Pull" Systems, p. 36. 
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changes in the demand signal reduce variability by creating more stable inven-
tory levels and less fluctuation in production volumes.509 To test the impact of 
such parameter changes on the simulated pull-based planning approach, the de-
mand scenario with high variation in demand is selected, since it relies most on 
safety stock and generates the largest fluctuations in material orders. Three pos-
sible adjustments to the pull parameters are identified, which are 
4. Minimum order size. The minimum order size represents the smallest size of 
an order that can be placed at the supplier. A reduction of the minimum or-
der size leads to smaller and more frequent orders, which is one of the ob-
jectives of pull-based planning systems. 
5. Maximum order size. The maximum order size represents an upper limit to 
the amount of orders that can be placed at the supplier. Such a limit can be 
useful if capacity is limited upstream in the supply chain, in which case or-
ders beyond that limit cannot be fulfilled in any case. 
6. Frequency of updating desired size of safety stock levels. The frequency of 
updating the desired size of safety stock levels could also have an impact on 
the performance of the supply chain as it reflects changes in the variability 
of demand. 
These adjustments are tested with the model. As Table D-3 shows, however, 
none of the adjustments cause a significant improvement of either responsive-
ness of efficiency, suggesting that their importance in determining responsive-
ness and efficiency in the pull-based planning approach is secondary compared 
to other factors. Nonetheless, the aspect of forecast stability is an important de-
terminant of supply chain responsiveness510, but this stability is already higher 
in the pull-based planning approach than in the other planning approaches. 
                                                          
509  Cf. Disney, Stephen M. and Denis R. Towill: A procedure for the optimization of the 
dynamic response of a Vendor Managed Inventory system, in: Computers & Indus-
trial Engineering, Vol. 43 (2002), No. 1–2, p. 42; Forrester: Industrial Dynamics, 
p. 186 and Kaipia, Korhonen and Hartiala: Planning nervousness in a demand supply 
network, p. 100. 
510  See Harrison: An Investigation of the Impact of Schedule Stability on Supplier Re-
sponsiveness, p. 90. 
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Table D-3: Responsiveness vs. Efficiency: Modifying Pull Parameters 
Steady Demand with Perfect Forecasts
High Noise 
 Delivery Performance Inventory Turns 
Pull 26% 9.3 
Minimum order size 
reduced from 1,000 to 
100
26% 9.3 
Maximum order size 
limited to 20,000 25% 10 
Safety stock size update 
interval increased from 
10 days to 20 days 
26% 9.3 
Safety stock size update 
interval decreased from 
10 days to 5 days 
25% 9.4 S
up
pl
y 
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Combination of the 
above changes511 25% 10.0 
e. Comparing Responsiveness at the Same Level of Efficiency 
Since the push planning approach performs best on efficiency in the high noise 
scenario, one could modify some of the parameters, such as desired inventory 
levels, to attempt an improvement of the delivery performance. To allow an 
easier comparison of the three planning approaches, the parameters in the push 
and pull planning approaches were adjusted to reach the same level of inventory 
turns as the cascade planning approach. This analysis is done for the high noise 
demand scenario only. A level of inventory turns of 4.6 corresponds to an aver-
                                                          
511  Sensitivity analysis over 200 simulations incorporating all of the indicated changes. 
For the safety stock size update interval, the increase of the interval from 10 days to 
20 days is simulated. 
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age total inventory level that represents 106 days of stock in the supply chain, 
which is very high. In this scenario, the cascade planning approach achieves 
50 percent delivery performance at inventory turns of 4.6. If the desired days of 
stock for raw materials inventory at software flashing in the push approach with 
central planning are increased from 10 to 39, inventory turns of 4.6 are 
achieved. At the same time, delivery performance increases to 59 percent. For 
the pull approach, two different possibilities are explored. Firstly, the calculated 
safety stock levels only at software flashing are increased by a factor of 39, 
which leads to inventory turns of 4.6 and delivery performance of 54 percent. 
This represents an increase in the days of stock covered by safety stock from 
approximately from less than one day to approximately 30 days, which is much 
higher than what would typically be found in a pull system. Second, the safety 
stock levels at SWF are increased not only at SWF but also at FAT, by a factor 
19, respectively. With inventory turns again at 4.6, delivery performance is also 
54 percent. In this demand scenario, therefore, with relatively high inventories 
across the supply chain the cascade planning approach performs worst in terms 
of delivery performance. At the same level of efficiency as in the cascade plan-
ning approach, the push approach achieves a significantly higher delivery per-
formance. The pull approach with higher inventories throughout the supply 
chain and the pull scenario with higher inventories close to the market only, i.e. 
at SWF, perform only slightly worse than Push, but still better than cascade. 
Both push and pull, therefore, can be viable alternatives to the cascade planning 
approach.
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Table D-4: Comparing Responsiveness at the Same Level of Efficiency 
Steady Demand with Perfect Forecasts
High Noise 
 Delivery Performance Inventory Turns 
Cascade 50% 4.6 
Push – increased desired 
days of stock at SWF 
from 10 to 39 
59% 4.6 
Pull – increased safety 
stock at SWF by a factor 
of 40 
54% 4.6 
Su
pp
ly
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Pull – increased safety 
stock at SWF and FAT 
by a factor of 19 
54% 4.6 
f. Planning the Product Introduction in the Pull Approach 
While the pull approach does, on average, not perform as well as the push-based 
planning approach in the different cases tested above, one major problem of the 
pull-based approach is the low delivery performance in the initial phase of the 
product life cycle. In the push approach, the long term forecasts are used to pro-
duce materials before the introduction of the product in order to achieve avail-
ability of raw materials at all stages of the supply chain.512 Planning for this in-
troduction phase by initialising production before customer demand is observed 
could make the pull approach equally attractive as the push approach, with its 
simplicity making it particularly attractive.  
The software flashing and final assembly and testing stages therefore each 
order materials with the objective of having an initial stock of 100,000 units of 
components available when the product is introduced to the market. This inten-
tion of the two supply chain members is also known to the suppliers at the be-
ginning of the simulation, allowing them to begin production early enough. The 
value of 100,000 units corresponds to a rough estimation of the demand during 
the order lead time from the next upstream supply chain echelon. In period 120, 
                                                          
512  Cf. Sterman: Managing the Supply Chain in a High-Velocity Industry, p. 13. 
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i.e. 20 days after the product introduction, the desired amount of materials in 
stock to cover for the product introduction phase is reset to zero.  
In the demand scenario with steady demand and no noise, delivery perform-
ance in the pure pull-based planning approach was 64 percent with inventory 
turns at 16.2. The modification of planning for the product introduction in-
creases delivery performance to 66 percent, with inventory turns falling to 12.3. 
A small improvement in delivery performance is accompanies by a significant 
reduction of inventory turnover. However, delivery performance is at 
100 percent for two thirds of the product life cycle, as shown in Figure D-22. 
The reason for this is that board printing experiences an inventory build-up in 
the initial phase of the product life cycle and consequently adjusts the material 
orders from second tier suppliers downwards. This effect eventually leads to a 
shortage of chipsets starting on around day 250, as shown in Figure D-23. The 
push-based planning approach is less affected by such effects, which allows it to 
achieve a higher level of average delivery performance (85 percent). 
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Figure D-22: Delivery Performance to Customer Request: Planning the Product Intro-
duction
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Figure D-23: Raw Materials Inventory at Board Printing: Planning the Product Intro-
duction
The observations for the demand scenario with low noise are similar to those 
in the demand scenario with no noise. In the scenario with high noise, however, 
there is no reduction in efficiency but an improvement of average delivery per-
formance to 38 percent. Nevertheless, this average level of delivery perform-
ance is lower than that achieved, for example, by the push-based planning ap-
proach with central planning (43 percent). When considering the time behaviour 
of delivery performance, however, the pull-based planning approach with initial 
stock achieves higher delivery performance in the initial phase of the product 
life cycle, which then declines during the product life cycle to a level that in the 
end is lower than that of the push approach. In contrast, delivery performance of 
the push approach falls more quickly initially and is therefore lower than that of 
the pull approach in the initial phase of the product life cycle. This is shown in 
Figure D-24. Therefore, if initial sales are prioritized over later sales it may 
make sense to use such an initialized pull-based planning approach when de-
mand volatility is expected to be high. The pull-approach can therefore be a 
suitable planning approach when demand is highly volatile, as long as the initial 
product introduction phase is pre-planned through certain amounts of safety 
stock.
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Figure D-24: Steady: Average Delivery Performance to Customer Request513
                                                          
513  The plotted values are the average values over 200 simulations with different noise 
seeds, i.e. the average values for 200 different demand patterns with variation in the 
noise that is added to the base product life cycle. 
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Table D-5: Responsiveness vs. Efficiency: Planning for the Product Introduction (Steady 
Demand) 
Steady Demand with Perfect Forecasts (incl. Initialisation Stock)
Base Case Low Noise514  High Noise515
Delivery 
Perf.
Inventory 
Turns
Delivery 
Perf.
Inventory 
Turns
 Delivery 
Perf.
Inventory 
Turns
Pull with 
Initial 
Stock
66% 12.3 62% 12.1 38% 9.3 
Pure Pull 64% 16.2 59% 15.6 26% 9.3 
g. Overforecasting to Increase Responsiveness 
In section D.I.1.b, it has been shown that in a scenario with no noise, inflating 
the forecast increased the responsiveness in the push-based planning approach 
with central planning and in the pull-based planning approach. While this result 
has theoretical value, it remains to be analysed how such an inflation of the ini-
tial forecasts affects the performance of the supply chains if demand is subject 
to random variation. 
When demand is random and the initial forecast is 20 percent higher than 
average demand (10,000 units), delivery performance in both the low noise and 
the high noise scenario increases for all three planning approaches compared to 
the base case without such an overforecast.516 This is shown in Figure D-26 and 
Figure D-27. In the demand scenario with low noise, the highest average deliv-
ery performance is achieved by the push approach (88 percent), and in the high 
noise scenario the planning approach with cascading forecasts achieves the 
highest delivery performance (51 percent). For efficiency, as measured by in-
ventory turns, the situation is less clear. In the both the low noise and the high 
                                                          
514  Mean values over 200 simulations with different noise seeds; standard deviation of 
white noise used for pink noise process is 0.1; this noise is added to the constant de-
mand. Pink noise is first-order autocorrelated noise where the next random shock de-
pends in part on the previous shocks. 
515  Mean values over 200 simulations with different noise seeds; standard deviation of 
white noise used for pink noise process is 0.8. 
516  The only case in which delivery performance is not improved is the demand scenario 
with no noise in the planning approach with cascading forecasts, where delivery per-
formance decreases slightly from 80 percent to 77 percent. 
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noise scenario, the planning approach with cascading forecasts as well as the 
pull approach also achieve higher efficiency in the overforecast scenario com-
pared to the case with perfect forecasts. In these cases, therefore, an inflation of 
the forecast leads to simultaneous improvements of both responsiveness and 
efficiency of the supply chain. The push-based planning approach with central 
planning, however, achieves a lower inventory turnover in the low noise sce-
nario (15.5; 16.7 with perfect forecasts). In the high noise scenario, the push 
approach achieves the same inventory turnover compared to the case with per-
fect forecasts (11.3). This indicates that an overforecast in this planning ap-
proach leads to improved delivery performance, but can come at the expense of 
a reduction in efficiency. 
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Table D-6: Responsiveness vs. Efficiency: Overforecasting with Random Demand 
Steady Demand with Inflated Forecasts (20 percent overforecast)
Base Case Low Noise517  High Noise518
Delivery 
Perf.
Inventory 
Turns
Delivery 
Perf.
Inventory 
Turns
 Delivery 
Perf.
Inventory 
Turns
Cascade 77% 6.4 74% 6.5 51% 5.0 
Push 99% 15.7 88% 15.5 47% 11.3 
Pl
an
ni
ng
 A
pp
ro
ac
h 
Pull 77% 16.9 67% 15.8 28% 9.6 
2. Scenario 2: Different Product Life Cycles 
In the preceding analyses the main challenges to supply chains represented in 
the simulation runs are demand uncertainty and demand volatility. As a second 
source of demand dynamics, in the next demand scenarios customer demand 
follows a standard product life cycle pattern, as shown in Figure D-28. It is im-
portant to consider such product life cycles because the conclusions drawn from 
simple demand patterns may lead to misjudgements regarding the required re-
sponsiveness, particularly if forecasts are inaccurate.519 The product is intro-
duced at day 100 and demand is back at zero in period 400, as in the other sce-
narios. Also, mean demand over the total product life cycle is 10,000 units per 
day, leading to cumulative sales of 3,000,000 units, which is comparable to the 
other scenarios. In the first product life cycle represented (PLC1), sales increase 
slowly at first, then faster, up to a peak of slightly over 17,000 units around pe-
                                                          
517  Mean values over 200 simulations with different noise seeds; standard deviation of 
white noise used for pink noise process is 0.1; this noise is added to the constant de-
mand. Pink noise is first-order autocorrelated noise where the next random shock de-
pends in part on the previous shocks. 
518  Mean values over 200 simulations with different noise seeds; standard deviation of 
white noise used for pink noise process is 0.8. 
519  Cf. Francas, David et al.: Strategic Process Flexibility under Lifecycle Demand, 
2006, Mannheim Business School: Department of Logistics, http://minner.bwl.uni-
mannheim.de/hp/_files/forschung/reports/tr-2006-01.pdf, retrieved on: 5 September 
2006, pp. 4–5 and p. 27. 
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riod 250 and then start to decline again. The other product life cycle represented 
(PLC2) is similar to that shown in Figure B-3, with an initial sales peak of close 
to 17,000 units on day 130 followed by a gradual downward trend in demand 
and a steep drop at the end of the product life cycle. The initial forecasts predict 
exactly these product life cycles. 
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Figure D-28: Product Life Cycle 1 and 2: Demand Patterns 
a. Effect of Random Demand Deviations 
As in the previous demand scenarios, analyses are performed with demand that 
is not subject to random variations and that is therefore perfectly predictable in 
the base case with perfect forecasts, demand that is subject to a low degree of 
random variation with a standard deviation of the noise of 0.1 and with demand 
that is subject to a high degree of such variation with a standard deviation of the 
noise of 0.8.520 The performance of the different planning approaches under 
these conditions is discussed in the following. 
                                                          
520  To provide an indication of the standard deviation of the actual demand patterns, for 
the first product life cycle, a sample low noise demand pattern has a standard devia-
tion of 5,937 and a sample high noise demand pattern has a standard deviation of 
9,450. For the second product life cycle, a sample low noise demand pattern has a 
standard deviation of 3,754 and a sample high noise demand pattern has a standard 
deviation of 8,180. 
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Product Life Cycle 1 
For the first product life cycle, the performance of the planning approach that is 
based on cascading forecasts through the supply chain is similar to that in the 
previously analysed demand scenarios. This planning approach therefore seems 
to be relatively robust to changes in demand, as long as they are predicted cor-
rectly, but at the same time can only achieve a relatively low level of efficiency, 
lower than that of both other planning approaches in all scenarios. The first 
product life cycle modelled is best handled in terms of efficiency by the pull 
approach in the no noise and low noise scenario and by the push approach in the 
high noise scenario, while maximum responsiveness is achieved by the push 
approach in the no noise and low noise scenario and by the cascade approach in 
the high noise scenario. If average delivery performance is prioritized over effi-
ciency, then the push approach is the optimal choice for this demand scenario as 
long as there is only a low level of demand volatility. The planning approach 
with cascading forecasts achieves the highest level of average delivery perform-
ance if demand volatility is high. 
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In a scenario with large demand fluctuations, achieving high delivery per-
formance is intrinsically difficult due to the nonlinear delays of production and 
shipment processes at software flashing. As Figure D-29 shows for a sample 
simulation run in which the initial raw materials inventory at software flashing 
is high enough to cover the entire customer demand, matching customer demand 
for a given day with the receiving rate at the customer is difficult even if the 
products are in stock. In other words, the receiving rate at the customer in this 
ideal case with abundant demand is a smoothed flow in which the extreme val-
ues, such as demand spikes or zero demand, in customer demand for a given day 
are not matched to their full extent. Over 200 simulations with different noise 
seeds, average delivery performance is 75 percent, as units that are delivered 
late reduce delivery performance to values below 100 percent and such delays 
are to some degree unavoidable within the structure of the system. 
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Figure D-30: Demand vs. Receiving Rate at the Customer: PLC1, Simulation with Abun-
dant Inventory at Software Flashing 
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Table D-7: PLC1: Sensitivity of Responsiveness and Efficiency to Randomness in the 
Demand Pattern 
Product Life Cycle 1
Base Case Low Noise521  High Noise522
Delivery 
Perf.
Inventory 
Turns
Delivery 
Perf.
Inventory 
Turns
 Delivery 
Perf.
Inventory 
Turns
Cascade 78% 4.9 66% 4.6 44% 4.6 
Push 96% 10.7 83% 11.8 30% 7.6 
Pl
an
ni
ng
 A
pp
ro
ac
h 
Pull 81% 13.4 74% 13.4 18% 6.8 
Product Life Cycle 2 
In the case of the product life cycle PLC2, the planning approach with cascading 
forecasts is again characterised by the lowest level of inventory turns, independ-
ent of the demand variation. The push approach achieves the highest level of 
delivery performance in the scenarios with no noise and low noise, but is out-
performed by the planning approach with cascading forecasts in the scenario 
with high noise. The push-based planning approach achieves 86 percent delivery 
performance to customer request in the demand scenario without noise, 
74 percent in the low noise scenario, and 41 percent in the high noise scenario. 
While the pull-based planning approach outperforms the other planning ap-
proaches on efficiency in the scenarios with low noise and no noise, its delivery 
performance is consistently lower than that achieved by the alternative planning 
approaches. Delivery performance in the pull-based planning approach is 
60 percent in the no noise scenario, 56 percent in the low noise scenario, and 
24 percent in the high noise scenario. This is shown in Figure D-31. Depending 
on the objectives of the organisation, the lack of planning for the initial strong 
increase in demand and consequential high initial backlog makes the pure pull-
based planning approach unattractive. Both the push approach with central 
                                                          
521  Mean values over 200 simulations with different noise seeds; standard deviation of 
white noise used for pink noise process is 0.1; this noise is added to the demand. 
522  Mean values over 200 simulations with different noise seeds; standard deviation of 
white noise used for pink noise process is 0.8. 
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planning and that with cascading forecasts outperform the pull approach on de-
livery performance, with the approach with central planning being better than 
that with cascading forecasts on both performance dimensions except when de-
mand volatility is high. 
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Table D-8: PLC2: Sensitivity of Responsiveness and Efficiency to Randomness in the 
Demand Pattern 
Product Life Cycle 2
Base Case Low Noise523  High Noise524
Delivery 
Perf.
Inventory 
Turns
Delivery 
Perf.
Inventory 
Turns
 Delivery 
Perf.
Inventory 
Turns
Cascade 73% 3.8 70% 3.9 49% 4.0 
Push 86% 14.0 74% 14.3 41% 9.6 
Pl
an
ni
ng
 A
pp
ro
ac
h 
Pull 60% 16.2 56% 16.1 24% 8.4 
b. Planning the Product Introduction in the Pull Approach 
As identified previously, a major problem of the pull-based approach is the low 
delivery performance in the initial phase of the product life cycle. In order to 
accommodate this difficulty, as in the previous analysis of a planned product 
introduction, the product introduction is planned for by initialising production 
before customer demand is observed. Such adjustments can also be expected in 
real pull-based planning systems, where the product introduction phase requires 
intervention by the planners. The initial stock of components ordered by soft-
ware flashing and final assembly to cover for the first phase of the product life 
cycle is 100,000 units. This desired initial component inventory level is reduced 
to zero at day 120. 
Product Life Cycle 1 
As in the similar analyses for a mean demand of 10,000 units per day, the only 
scenario in which planning for the product introduction improves average deliv-
ery performance is the demand scenario with high demand uncertainty, as 
shown in Figure D-32. For the first product life cycle scenario with high de-
mand uncertainty, introducing an initial stock at SWF and FAT increases aver-
                                                          
523  Mean values over 200 simulations with different noise seeds; standard deviation of 
white noise used for pink noise process is 0.1; this noise is added to the demand. 
524  Mean values over 200 simulations with different noise seeds; standard deviation of 
white noise used for pink noise process is 0.8. 
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age delivery performance to 26 percent (from 18 percent) and increases inven-
tory turns to 7.3 (from 6.8). Therefore, in this case the introduction of such an 
initial stock is beneficial for responsiveness and efficiency.  
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Figure D-32: PLC1: Improvements of Responsiveness and/or Efficiency through Intro-
duction of Initial Stock in Pull Approach 
When considering the time behaviour of average delivery performance, as in 
the previous analysis, the pull approach with initial stock is also superior to the 
push approach in the demand scenario with high noise, especially in the initial 
phase of the product life cycle. Even though average delivery performance of 
the pull approach with initial stock is lower than in the push approach, as shown 
in Figure D-33, the strong performance during the product introduction phase 
makes the pull approach the more attractive choice in this regard. Note that de-
mand at the beginning of the first product life cycle is very low and only ex-
ceeds average demand of 10,000 units per day after day 175. This means that 
deviations from the customer request date for a small number of orders have a 
relatively large negative impact on delivery performance. 
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Figure D-33: PLC1: Average Delivery Performance to Customer Request525
Product Life Cycle 2 
As for the first product life cycle, planning for the product introduction in the 
pull planning approach does not improve average delivery performance or in-
ventory turns for the second product life cycle in the demand scenarios with no 
noise and low noise, respectively. In the demand scenario with high noise, the 
initial staging of the supply chain through pre-production of components and 
stocking these at software flashing and final assembly increases average deliv-
ery performance to 40 percent (from 24 percent) and increases inventory turns 
to 9.0 (from 8.4). The average value of delivery performance is almost equal to 
that in the push-based planning approach, with a difference of only one percent-
age point. Efficiency as measured by inventory turnover is slightly lower. How-
ever, as in the preceding discussion, the delivery performance in the initial 
phase of the product life cycle is higher in the pull planning approach.  
This can also be seen in Figure D-35, which compares the backlog at soft-
ware flashing in the push approaches and in the pull approach with initial stock. 
Also, it can be seen that the average backlog is higher in both push approaches, 
indicating that customers need to wait longer for their products than in the pull 
                                                          
525  The plotted values are the average values over 200 simulations with different noise 
seeds, i.e. the average values for 200 different demand patterns with variation in the 
noise that is added to the base product life cycle. 
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approach with initial stock. This means that customers in a pull approach ex-
perience delivery delays slightly more often than in a push approach, i.e. more 
orders are delayed, but these delays are significantly shorter. With average sales 
of 10,000 units per day, the backlog at software flashing is four days of demand 
at the most, while in the push approaches with central planning and cascading 
forecasts the backlog can reach 13 days of demand at the most. These are aver-
age values over all simulations, which means that for a specific product these 
values could be even higher. 
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Figure D-34: PLC2: Improvements of Responsiveness and/or Efficiency through Intro-
duction of Initial Stock in Pull Approach 
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Figure D-35: PLC2: Average Backlog at Software Flashing526
The stability of the forecasts provided to the component suppliers in the pull 
approach with initial staging of the supply chain is also high, which is beneficial 
for the supply chain. This can be seen when comparing the forecasts sent to 
board printing in the pull-based and push-based planning approach in Figure 
D-36 to the initial forecast corresponding to the expected product life cycle. 
                                                          
526  The plotted values are the average values over 200 simulations with different noise 
seeds, i.e. the average values for 200 different demand patterns with variation in the 
noise that is added to the base product life cycle. 
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Figure D-36: PLC2: Forecast for Board Printing (example, not averaged) 
A major drawback of the pull planning approach, however, is the large de-
gree of variation in the production rate at the suppliers, which is caused by the 
large variability in material orders by final assembly. As can be seen in Figure 
D-37 for a sample simulation run, production of components in the push ap-
proach with central planning, for example, follows the actual product life cycle 
relatively closely, even though production may be ramped up to the full capacity 
at board printing. This eliminates a large degree of the variation of end customer 
demand, which is beneficial to the efficiency of the supply chain as high and 
relatively stable capacity utilization is a success factor for efficient processes at 
board printing. In contrast, the production rate at board printing in the pull-
based planning approach experiences large fluctuations with subsequent periods 
of both production at the capacity limit as well as production at zero. This is 
caused by the direct transmission of demand data through the supply chain, 
where relatively large deviations in demand cause relatively large deviations in 
material orders, even if these are only issued in large batches. Such large varia-
tions can pose a major challenge to the production planners at the suppliers, as it 
may be difficult to adjust production output upwards and downwards within 
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these relatively short time intervals. Since the equipment is costly, the compa-
nies have a strong incentive to use it for producing other products, which may 
require changes to the set-up of the machines. In many board printing facilities, 
up to 50 percent of effective capacity is not utilized because of such set-ups.527
Such fluctuations in production volume have the potential to reduce quality and 
increase costs. 
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Figure D-37: PLC2: Production at Board Printing (example, not averaged) 
c. Comparing the Performance of Different Forecasts 
Since the initial forecasts are rarely perfect, several analyses are conducted to 
identify the reaction of the supply chain system to an incorrect forecast. 
Product Life Cycle 1 
Three different forecasts are used for the same demand pattern in order to ana-
lyse the sensitivity of the supply chain performance to incorrect forecasts. In the 
first analysis, demand follows the first product life cycle pattern (see Figure 
D-28) with no random noise added to the demand pattern. Three different initial 
forecasts are analysed, namely (1) a perfect forecast, forecasting demand exactly 
as in the first product life cycle pattern; (2) a steady forecast with 10,000 units 
                                                          
527  Cf. Beckman and Sinha: Conducting Academic Research with an Industry Focus, 
p. 120 and Trovinger and Bohn: Setup Time Reduction for Electronics Assembly, 
p. 205. 
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per day and (3) product life cycle 2 as a forecast for product life cycle 1. The 
adjustments to these inaccurate forecasts are dependent on the decision-making 
policies in the supply chain and a major determinant of the supply chain per-
formance. 
With both the steady demand forecast and the wrong product life cycle fore-
cast, the planning approach with cascading forecasts outperforms the other 
planning approaches on delivery performance and operates at the lowest level of 
efficiency. However, all planning approaches achieve only a very low level of 
delivery performance of between 12 percent and 36 percent. 
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Figure D-38: Responsiveness vs. Efficiency: PLC1, Different Forecasts, No Noise528
                                                          
528  Note that the scale of the y-axis was adjusted compared to previous analysis, since 
the worst delivery performance in this analysis is below 20 percent, which was the 
lower limit in the other diagrams. 
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Product Life Cycle 2 
For the second product life cycle, the forecasts used are (1) a perfect forecast, 
forecasting demand exactly as in the second product life cycle pattern; (2) a 
steady forecast with 10,000 units per day and (3) product life cycle 1 as a fore-
cast for product life cycle 2. At first, the demand pattern follows exactly the 
second product life cycle pattern, while in a second analysis demand variability 
is added to analyse its impact. 
In the no noise scenario, while the perfect forecast consistently outperforms 
the alternative forecasts, as expected, the performance differences are not as 
large as in the previous analysis of the first product life cycle. Cascade consis-
tently outperforms the other planning approaches on delivery performance, 
while the pull-based planning approach is the most efficient. The push approach 
with central planning does not outperform the other planning approaches on 
both dimensions, but provides a middle ground. In this scenario, the steady fore-
cast provides relatively good results, with the push-based planning approach 
with central planning deviating the most in performance from the perfect fore-
cast scenario. 
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Figure D-39: Responsiveness vs. Efficiency: PLC2, Different Forecasts, No Noise 
When considering high demand variability in the demand pattern, the plan-
ning approach with cascading forecasts performs almost equally on both per-
formance measures in the steady forecast case compared to the perfect forecast. 
If responsiveness is the primary objective, then the planning approach with cas-
cading forecasts achieves the highest performance using any of the three simu-
lated forecasts. 
211 
Responsiveness vs. Efficiency
High
25
Low
0
Low
0%
High
100%
Re
sp
on
si
ve
ne
ss
(d
el
iv
er
y 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
)
Efficiency
(inventory turns)
Cascade
Pull
 PLC2 perfect forecast
X PLC2 steady forecast (10,000/day)
{ PLC2 using PLC1 as forecast
Push
Cascade
Pull
Push
PushCascade
Pull
Figure D-40: Responsiveness vs. Efficiency: PLC2, Different Forecasts, High Noise 
d. Overforecasting to Increase Responsiveness 
In the demand scenarios where sales follow typical product life cycles, the ob-
servations about the impact of overforecasting on efficiency and responsiveness 
are similar to those made in the previous analysis with demand of 10,000 units 
per day. For example, consider an analysis of the demand scenario where sales 
follow the second product life cycle and demand is subject to large variations. In 
the planning approach with cascading forecasts, an overforecast improves deliv-
ery performance from 49 percent to 52 percent and improves inventory turns 
from 4.0 to 4.4. Similarly, in the push approach with central planning, overfore-
casting by 20 percent increases delivery performance from 41 percent to 
47 percent. At the same time inventory turnover increases from 9.6 to 9.9. In the 
pull-based planning approach without an initial stock to plan for the product 
introduction, overforecasting increases delivery performance from 24 percent to 
26 percent and simultaneously increases inventory turns from 8.4 to 8.9. In the 
pull-based planning approach with initial stock levels overforecasting has a 
smaller impact. While average delivery performance is increased from 
40 percent to 41 percent when the forecast is inflated by 20 percent, the effi-
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ciency increases from 9.0 inventory turns to 9.1 inventory turns. Similar obser-
vations can also be made for the first product life cycle, indicating that in each 
of the different demand scenarios analysed overforecasting is useful, as delivery 
performance as well as efficiency can be improved compared to the scenarios 
with perfect forecasts. In all planning approaches, therefore, it is sensible to 
overestimate the forecast slightly, as the consequences are typically positive on 
both performance dimensions, responsiveness and efficiency. In contrast, an 
underestimation of demand would have undesirable consequences. 
II. Simulating Disruptions and Response Options 
In addition to volatility in demand, disturbances to supply chains can also be 
disruptions in upstream supply. For example, the fire that broke out in a Philips 
plant in Albuquerque, New Mexico, in 2000 because of lightning disrupted the 
supply of radio-frequency chips for months.529 The fire lasted ten minutes and 
affected only a small production cell, but the consequences were more dramatic, 
as one of the clean rooms, an area in which very small amounts of dust can 
cause major damage, was affected.530 One customer of the chips produced in 
this plant, Nokia, was able to switch production to other suppliers almost imme-
diately by demanding the chips from other Philips plants, redesigning the chips 
so they could be produced elsewhere and convincing Japanese and U.S. suppli-
ers to supply the chips to them. In contrast, Ericsson employed a single-sourcing 
policy and as a consequence faced disrupted production for months, causing lost 
sales of US$400 million, which finally resulted in the decision to exit handset 
manufacturing completely and outsource production.531 Other examples of risk 
sources that can affect supply chains are natural disasters, such as hurricanes, 
and diseases, such as the foot-and-mouth disease which, for example, affected 
luxury car manufacturers due to lack of leather supply.532
In the following, by simulating a supply disruption at board printing during 
which production of boards ceases for ten days, between day 150 and 159, the 
capability of the three different planning approaches to react to such a disruption 
                                                          
529  Cf. Chopra and Sodhi: Managing Risk To Avoid Supply-Chain Breakdown, p. 53 
and Morais: Damn the torpedoes, p. 2. 
530  Cf. Norrmann, Andreas and Uld Jansson: Ericsson's proactive supply chain risk man-
agement approach after a serious sub-supplier accident, in: International Journal of 
Physical Distribution & Logistics Management, Vol. 34 (2004), No. 5, p. 441. 
531  Cf. Chopra and Sodhi: Managing Risk To Avoid Supply-Chain Breakdown, p. 53; 
Norrmann and Jansson: Ericsson's proactive supply chain risk management approach 
after a serious sub-supplier accident, pp. 441–442, and Morais: Damn the torpedoes, 
p. 2. 
532  Cf. Norrmann and Jansson: Ericsson's proactive supply chain risk management ap-
proach after a serious sub-supplier accident, p. 435. 
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is analysed for the demand scenario with steady demand and for the two product 
life cycles. The simulated disruption is not as large as the Albuquerque incident, 
which makes it more appropriate for an analysis within the fixed decision rules 
of the supply chain simulation model. A longer supply chain disruption would 
most likely cause actions that overrule existing policies, such as those that are 
today in place at Ericsson as a reaction to the Albuquerque incident, which in-
clude a large amount of interaction and cooperation with suppliers when han-
dling such incidents.533
1. Scenario 1: Steady Demand 
In the case of steady demand with no noise, the planning approach with cascad-
ing forecasts achieves the same level of responsiveness and efficiency in the 
scenario with the supply disruption as in the scenario without such a disruption, 
as shown in Figure D-41. This can be explained by the high amount of inventory 
held throughout the supply chain that can buffer the supply disruption. The pull 
planning approach achieves lower efficiency and responsiveness, which is in 
line with expectations that a supply disruption will cause backlog situations as 
well as adjustments to the forecast and emergency orders that lead to higher 
inventory levels at the end of the life cycle. Nevertheless, the push-based plan-
ning approach with central planning achieves slightly higher responsiveness and 
slightly higher efficiency compared to the scenario without the supply disrup-
tions. The explanation for this observation is that the level of raw materials in-
ventory at software flashing is higher than the desired level when the supply 
disruption occurs. Therefore, a backlog situation following the disruption is 
avoided. At the same time, the raw materials inventory at software flashing is 
depleted more quickly following the supply disruption, causing an upward ad-
justment to the forecasts for the suppliers. This upward adjustment allows a 
quicker reduction of the backlog that occurs at the end of the product life cycle, 
allowing a slight increase in overall responsiveness (see Figure D-42, Figure 
D-43 and Figure D-44). 
                                                          
533  Cf. Norrmann and Jansson: Ericsson's proactive supply chain risk management ap-
proach after a serious sub-supplier accident, p. 453. 
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Figure D-41: Responsiveness vs. Efficiency: Supply Disruption, Steady Demand, No 
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Figure D-42: Supply Disruption: forecast for board printing SWF 
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Figure D-43: Supply Disruption: Backlog at Software Flashing 
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Figure D-44: Supply Disruption: Raw Materials Inventory at Software Flashing 
The same behaviour can be observed in the demand scenario with low noise, 
as depicted in Figure D-45 below. Again, the push-based planning approach 
outperforms the other two planning approaches on both responsiveness and effi-
ciency.
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Figure D-45: Responsiveness vs. Efficiency: Supply Disruption, Steady Demand, Low 
Noise
In the scenario with high noise, the supply disruption has a smaller impact 
on the supply chain performance. This can be explained by the higher level of 
demand volatility and resulting adjustments, such as, for example, increased 
safety stocks in the pull-based planning approach. The planning approach with 
cascading forecasts suffers no reduction in efficiency or responsiveness, while 
both the push approach with central planning and the pull-based planning ap-
proach are faced with a minor reduction in delivery performance and efficiency 
compared to the case without the supply chain disruption. 
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219 
Table D-9: Steady Demand: Sensitivity of Responsiveness and Efficiency to Supply 
Disruptions
Steady Demand with Perfect Forecasts – With Supply Disruption
No Noise Low Noise534  High Noise535
Delivery 
Perf.
Inventory 
Turns
Delivery 
Perf.
Inventory 
Turns
 Delivery 
Perf.
Inventory 
Turns
Cascade 80% 4.7 72% 4.9 50% 4.6 
Push 88% 17.0 74% 16.9 43% 11.0 
Pl
an
ni
ng
 A
pp
ro
ac
h 
Pull 54% 15.4 51% 15.0 24% 9.2 
2. Scenario 2: Different Product Life Cycles 
For both simulated product life cycles, a disruption at board printing reduces 
delivery performance only in the pull-based planning approach and to a small 
extend in the push approach with central planning. The performance of the 
planning approach with cascading forecasts is not influenced by such a disrup-
tion, again due to the relatively high level of inventory throughout the supply 
chain. This means that in the planning approach with cascading forecasts a ten 
day disruption in the production of boards does not have a negative effect on the 
performance of the supply chain as measured by delivery performance and in-
ventory turns. In the scenario with high demand volatility, the situation is simi-
lar. In these scenarios, however, the impact of the supply disruption on delivery 
performance is even smaller than in the scenarios without demand volatility, 
which can be explained by larger safety stock levels in the pull-based planning 
approach and lower initial levels of delivery performance in all planning ap-
proaches (see also Figure D-47). All simulated planning approaches are there-
fore capable of handling the simulated disruption to board printing without sig-
nificant performance reductions. 
                                                          
534  Mean values over 200 simulations with different noise seeds; standard deviation of 
white noise used for pink noise process is 0.1; this noise is added to the constant de-
mand.
535  Mean values over 200 simulations with different noise seeds; standard deviation of 
white noise used for pink noise process is 0.8. 
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Table D-10: PLC1: Sensitivity of Responsiveness and Efficiency to Supply Disruptions 
Product Life Cycle 1 – With Supply Disruption
No Noise Low Noise536  High Noise537
Delivery 
Perf.
Inventory 
Turns
Delivery 
Perf.
Inventory 
Turns
 Delivery 
Perf.
Inventory 
Turns
Cascade 78% 4.9 67% 4.9 43% 4.6 
Push 96% 10.2 78% 10.3 27% 6.9 
Pl
an
ni
ng
 A
pp
ro
ac
h 
Pull 73% 13.8 67% 13.5 17% 6.7 
Table D-11: PLC2: Sensitivity of Responsiveness and Efficiency to Supply Disruptions 
Product Life Cycle 2 – With Supply Disruption
No Noise Low Noise538  High Noise539
Delivery 
Perf.
Inventory 
Turns
Delivery 
Perf.
Inventory 
Turns
 Delivery 
Perf.
Inventory 
Turns
Cascade 73% 3.8 70% 3.9 49% 4.0 
Push 88% 14.6 76% 14.8 41% 9.4 
Pl
an
ni
ng
 A
pp
ro
ac
h 
Pull 50% 14.7 47% 15.1 22% 8.1 
                                                          
536  Mean values over 200 simulations with different noise seeds; standard deviation of 
white noise used for pink noise process is 0.1; this noise is added to the demand. 
537  Mean values over 200 simulations with different noise seeds; standard deviation of 
white noise used for pink noise process is 0.8. 
538  Mean values over 200 simulations with different noise seeds; standard deviation of 
white noise used for pink noise process is 0.1; this noise is added to the demand. 
539  Mean values over 200 simulations with different noise seeds; standard deviation of 
white noise used for pink noise process is 0.8. 
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Figure D-47: Responsiveness vs. Efficiency: Supply Disruption, PLC2, High Noise 
III. Achieving Responsiveness and Efficiency over the Product Life Cycle 
The push-based planning approach with cascading forecasts is currently pre-
dominant in the high-tech electronics industry. The preceding analyses have 
shown that independent of the demand pattern the supply chain can be redes-
igned such that both responsiveness and efficiency are improved. When operat-
ing at the same level of efficiency, both the push approach with central planning 
and the pull approach enable levels of delivery performance and efficiency that 
are higher than in the planning approach with cascading forecasts. In addition, 
in the demand scenarios with high volatility planning for the product introduc-
tion in the pull approach through the initial staging of components in the supply 
chain increases delivery performance even further, in particular in the introduc-
tion phase of the product life cycle. 
A detailed analysis of the results shows that the efficiency of the planning 
approach with cascading forecasts is relatively low compared to the other plan-
ning approaches. In general, both the push approach with central planning and 
the pull approach outperform planning with cascading forecasts regarding in-
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ventory turns. However, the responsiveness when planning with cascading fore-
casts is relatively higher in most scenarios, particularly if demand is subject to 
random noise. This is due to the buffer stocks at all nodes of the supply chain. 
Nevertheless, the responsiveness in this planning approach in all simulations 
across all demand scenarios never exceeds 90 percent.  
 Achieving improved responsiveness and efficiency at the same time is diffi-
cult in this approach because of uncoordinated decision making policies at the 
supply chain nodes and lack of transparency in the system. Overforecasting, for 
example, in this planning approach can improve responsiveness and efficiency 
in some demand scenarios. However, in other scenarios, like those without 
noise, overforecasting can reduce average delivery performance because of re-
sulting adjustments by the supply chain members and consequential backlog 
build-ups. Such overforecasting is therefore not recommendable in such a plan-
ning system. The reason for companies to rely on a planning system with cas-
cading forecasts is mostly that these structures are already in place and that it is 
difficult to improve the information flows in the supply chain system because of 
the high degree of fragmentation of the supply chain.  
The push-based planning approach with central planning performs well on 
both responsiveness and efficiency. It outperforms planning with cascading 
forecasts on efficiency in all scenarios and on responsiveness in all no noise-
and low noise-scenarios. In the high noise-scenarios, the push-based planning 
approach with central planning achieves the highest efficiency, but the planning 
approach with cascading forecasts achieves the highest delivery performance. 
Pull-based planning in its pure form, i.e. without a plan for the product in-
troduction phase, outperforms the push approach with central planning on effi-
ciency in the two product life cycle scenarios (no noise and low noise only). 
This lower level of average inventory in the system, combined with the other 
characteristics of this planning approach, are responsible for the relatively low 
level of delivery performance achieved. In terms of delivery performance, the 
pull-based approach in the base case performs worst in most scenarios. This also 
causes the highest amount of costly emergency orders. However, when planning 
for the product introduction by introducing an additional initial stock during the 
product introduction phase, average delivery performance can be significantly 
improved in demand scenarios with high demand uncertainty. Furthermore, effi-
ciency as measured by the inventory turn rate is only slightly lower than in the 
push approach. 
The decisions taken to achieve appropriate supply chain performance on 
both dimensions, efficiency and responsiveness, need to take into consideration 
aspects related to the product life cycle. These considerations are related to the 
discussion of the challenges to supply chains in the high-tech industry as well as 
to the simulation results. In particular, sales in the initial phase of the product 
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life cycle are important, as higher prices can be charged and product life cycles 
are often very short. Also, the actions of competitors are unpredictable. There-
fore, high delivery performance is especially desirable during the initial phase of 
the product life cycle. For the typical product life cycle of a high-tech product as 
modelled in the simulations, the time behaviour of delivery performance over 
time varies significantly among the different planning approaches. As an exam-
ple Figure D-48 shows delivery performance for the demand scenario of the 
product life cycle PLC2 with high noise. Both push-based planning approaches 
achieve delivery performance at the beginning of the product life cycle that 
ranges between 100 percent and around 50 percent. The pull-based planning 
approach in its pure form is unable to deliver on time from the beginning of the 
product life cycle – the first unit is delivered on time around day 250 – and 
therefore a large amount of sales are potentially lost as customers move to com-
petitors. 
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Figure D-48: Delivery Performance to Customer Request (example, not averaged) 
It has been shown that in such a demand scenario planning for the product 
introduction by producing a certain amount of products before customer demand 
is first observed can increase delivery performance with only a small reduction 
in efficiency. As Figure D-49 illustrates for a sample simulation of the PLC2 
demand scenario with high demand volatility, such an initial stock enables the 
achievement of an average delivery performance that is similar to that achieved 
when planning with cascading forecasts. However, as shown in Figure D-35, 
page 205, the backlog in the pull approach is on average lower than in the other 
224 
two planning approaches, indicating that the delivery delays faced by the cus-
tomers are also shorter in the pull approach. While the planning approach with 
cascading forecasts enables the highest average level of delivery performance in 
this demand scenario when compared to the other planning approaches, the per-
formance of the pull approach is superior in the initial phase of the product life 
cycle and also achieves lower backlog accumulations. In this example with ini-
tial stock, the range of delivery performance is between 75 percent and 
100 percent in the first weeks after the product introduction. At the same time a 
level of inventory turns is achieved on average that is better than in the planning 
approach with cascading forecasts.540
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Figure D-49: Delivery Performance to Customer Request (example, not averaged) 
In addition, both the push approach and the pull approach with initial staging 
of the supply chain are able to react to supply chain disruptions in a meaningful 
way, such that delivery performance only experiences a small reduction. On 
average, delivery performance in the different demand scenarios with low and 
high noise is only reduced by one or two percentage points, depending on the 
planning approach and the demand scenario, if production at board printing is 
disrupted for 10 days. 
                                                          
540  See also section D.I.2.b. As in the preceding discussion, an initial stock of 100,000 
units is introduced for the raw materials inventory levels at software flashing and fi-
nal assembly. 
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Due to the characteristics of the two push-based planning approaches, both 
are subject to major inventory build-ups at all stages of the supply chain both 
during and at the end of the product life cycle. Inventory build-ups are particu-
larly detrimental downstream in the supply chain due to the higher value of the 
products as they near completion. The two push-based planning approaches 
produce based on forecasts and not based on actual demand. Therefore the aver-
age inventory levels downstream in the supply chain are higher in these plan-
ning approaches than in the pull-based planning approach. As Figure D-50 illus-
trates for the product life cycle demand pattern PLC2 with high demand varia-
tion as an example, the planning approach with cascading forecasts has the 
highest average inventory levels. These inventories are distributed relatively 
evenly among the supply chain layers in this planning approach.541 Because of 
its multiple inventory locations and decentralised decision making, the planning 
approach with cascading forecasts has a high risk of mismanaged inventory. 
This problem is observable in actual high-tech electronics supply chains, such as 
those of Hewlett-Packard, where too much inventory was often held in supply 
chains with a large number of stocking locations.542 Similarly, in the push-based 
planning approach there is a major stocking location downstream the supply 
chain at software flashing and no inventory buffers at final assembly. Here, 
there is also a large average inventory of semi-finished products at software 
flashing, corresponding to 20 days of stock on average. This is also a concern in 
the real world. At Hewlett-Packard, for instance, the problem of holding inven-
tory primarily at the final stage of the supply chain is that inventory at this stage 
is fully differentiated and therefore most expensive.543 The differences in the 
value of inventory across the supply chain nodes is represented through the in-
ventory cost factors in the model.544 Downstream inventory build-ups, as well as 
inventory build-ups at final assembly, are avoided through pull-based planning.  
                                                          
541  The inventory values in Figure D-50 are the average inventory levels over the simu-
lation duration at each supply chain node, calculated as the average of 
200 simulations with different noise seeds, i.e. 200 different demand patterns each 
with PLC2 as a basis and different random variation in demand. All values are 
rounded to full 5,000. 
542  Cf. Billington et al.: Accelerating the Profitability of Hewlett-Packard's Supply 
Chains, p. 70. 
543  Cf. Billington et al.: Accelerating the Profitability of Hewlett-Packard's Supply 
Chains, p. 70. 
544  Refer to the relative inventory cost table developed in section C.I.3. 
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Average Raw Materials Inventory Levels 
over the Simulation
Thousand Euros
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Figure D-50: Average Raw Materials Inventory Levels over the Simulation Duration 
(PLC2, high noise) 
A major concern with regard to short product life cycles is inventory of 
products and components that is unsold at the end of the product life cycle. This 
is shown in Figure D-51 for the demand scenario with the product life cycle 
PLC2, perfect forecasts and high noise, as an example.545 Due to the different 
decision making policies in the pull approach, with no adjustments for desired 
inventory levels, inventory of semi-finished products at software flashing at the 
end of the product life cycles is also significantly lower than in the other plan-
ning approaches, independent of the demand pattern. Nevertheless, inventory 
build-ups in the pull approach may still occur at the upstream suppliers, which 
are driven by a forecast. There, however, the cost of inventory per unit is sig-
nificantly lower, which also reduces the damage if obsolete inventory needs to 
be discarded. In the example, the raw materials inventory levels at software 
flashing at the end of the simulation in the push approach with cascading fore-
casts correspond to 675,000 Euros and in the push approach with central plan-
ning to 420,000 Euros. In the pure pull planning approach the raw materials at 
software flashing at the end of the simulation are only 45,000 Euros. In the pull 
                                                          
545  The indicated values are the averages of the ending inventory levels over 200 simula-
tions with different noise seeds. 
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approach with initial staging of components for the first phase of the product life 
cycle, the end raw materials inventory level at software flashing in this demand 
scenario is worth 50,000 Euros on average. To put these values into perspective, 
consider that total sales over the product life cycle are 3,000,000 units, with 
each finished goods unit valued at 1 Euro.546 At the first tier suppliers, mean 
inventory levels at the end of the simulations are highest in the pull-based plan-
ning approaches, with 270,000 Euros (Pull) and 180,000 Euros (Pull with initial 
stock). More expensive downstream inventory is avoided to a large extent. The 
results in all of the other simulations with different levels of demand volatility 
are comparable. 
Inventory levels at the end of the product life cycle can therefore, on aver-
age, reach up to almost 50 percent of total sales, as in the planning approach 
with cascading forecasts. Selling these products may require an additional effort 
towards the end of the product life cycle, for example through a promotion or 
price reductions. Compared to the push approach with central planning, the pull 
approach that plans for the product introduction therefore achieves a comparable 
delivery performance with lower average inventory levels in the supply chain at 
the end of the simulation, and higher inventory turnover over the course of the 
product life cycle.  
                                                          
546  The valuation at 1 Euro is related to the relative inventory cost table developed in 
section C.I.3. Since these are relative values, the insights are independent of the ac-
tual price of the product, which is likely to be higher than 1 Euro. 
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Average Raw Materials Inventory Levels 
at the End of the PLC
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Figure D-51: Average Raw Materials Inventory Levels at the End of the Product Life 
Cycle (PLC2, high noise) 
E. Implementing Robust Policies for an Efficient and 
Responsive Supply Chain Strategy 
The use of a holistic System Dynamics simulation model representing decision 
making policies in supply chains in the high-tech electronics industry enables a 
variety of insights that extend previous quantitative, qualitative and empirical 
work. The System Dynamics model is a valuable tool for evaluating changes to 
the planning policies that are currently in place. It allows the systematic testing 
of new decision making structures in a controlled environment without requiring 
access to detailed empirical data. The findings based on the analyses of the vari-
ous simulation runs have implications both for theory and future research as 
well as for the practical implementation of such planning policies in the high-
tech electronics industry. Based on the literature review, expert input and analy-
ses of the simulation model, several conclusions could be reached.  
It has been shown that it is possible to design the planning policies in the 
high-tech electronics industry in such a way that the performance of the supply 
chain is improved on both dimensions, responsiveness and efficiency. Regard-
ing the two analysed alternatives, a simple pull-based planning system that plans 
for the initial phase of the product introduction can perform similarly or better 
than a centrally planned push system on both dimensions of supply chain per-
formance, responsiveness and efficiency. This observation is independent of the 
demand characteristics of the product. In particular, the pull system with an ini-
tial stock performs better on delivery performance in the first phase of the prod-
uct life cycle. At the same time, such a pull-based system generates smaller ac-
cumulations of backlog at software flashing and therefore allows shorter deliv-
ery delays.  
These findings have a number of implications. First, they show that both ob-
jectives, responsiveness and efficiency, can be achieved in a supply chain with 
one planning approach. Segmenting the product portfolio and setting up differ-
ent supply chains may not be necessary. This result is valuable, as running mul-
tiple supply chain planning approaches within an organization can be challeng-
ing. A practical example is a microcomputer equipment manufacturer with a 
wide product range that changed the planning and production processes from 
batch processes scheduled with a MRP system to a simple pull-based planning 
system with small order quantities. As a result, the manufacturing lead-times 
could be reduced from 75 days to four days, increasing the responsiveness. At 
the same time, efficiency was improved through lower inventory levels and 
avoidance of obsolete stock, which previously was a major problem.547 Such 
                                                          
547  Cf. Berry and Hill: Linking Systems to Strategy, p. 10. 
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lower inventory levels, in particular avoiding expensive stocks of semi-finished 
products downstream the supply chain, are also achieved with the pull-based 
planning approach in the simulation model. 
A second implication of the findings is related to this example. Push-based 
planning approaches are more difficult to implement than pull planning ap-
proaches, in particular if the supply chain crosses multiple organizational 
boundaries. The finding resulting from the simulations indicating that pull ap-
proaches can be used even in environments with high demand uncertainty and 
long component lead times is therefore valuable if one considers aspects of im-
plementation. Planners in push planning systems depend on information about 
capacities, inventory levels, and generally the structure of the supply chain. For 
example, if information about supply chain disruptions at the supplier side is not 
communicated to the supply chain planners, as in this model, then their observa-
tions of such disruptions will only occur after a significant time delay.  
In contrast, a pull-based system needs much less information and depends 
entirely on local decision rules at each supply chain echelon, which would im-
mediately adjust to supply chain disruptions, for example, through local deci-
sion heuristics. Such a system does, however, require a certain degree of organ-
izational discipline as overriding the decision heuristics needs to be avoided. 
The only act of planning that is needed is the long-term forecast that is commu-
nicated to the suppliers. As has been shown, these forecasts can be more stable 
in a pull-based planning system. This is advantageous for the supply chain. 
Moreover, inflating the initial forecasts, i.e. overforecasting demand, may im-
prove both responsiveness and efficiency in such a pull-based planning system, 
while erring in the other direction and underforecasting demand has a negative 
effect on delivery performance. However, such overforecasting should be car-
ried out with extreme care, as it may cause order cancellations and as a conse-
quence severe disruptions to the planning processes in the supply chain. 
However, there are also notable drawbacks to implementing the pull-based 
planning approach in the high-tech electronics industry. A complication when 
implementing pull systems in such an environment with a high potential for 
demand variability is that the production rate at suppliers may be subject to 
large fluctuations if these are integrated in the pull-based planning system. 
These fluctuations may require higher average inventory levels at the suppliers. 
If there were several product variants, however, that use some of the same base 
components that could be produced on the same line at board printing, then this 
could smooth the overall production rate. Nokia, for example, produces generic 
“engines” for its mobile phones in a process with very long lead times. These 
engines can later be transformed into unique built-to-order phones within a very 
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short time frame.548 The feasibility of a pull-based planning system therefore 
depends on the product characteristics in terms of mix variability as well as the 
flexibility of changing production volumes at board printing. Reductions in set-
up times therefore become important, as the high equipment cost requires high 
levels of capacity utilization and multiple products may have to be produced on 
the same equipment.549 This is particularly relevant if demand variability is 
high. Also, the suppliers may need to be financially compensated for larger 
variations in demand that cause increases and fluctuations of their raw materials 
inventory levels and may require increases in flexibility. 
A large number of variables needed to be considered in order to provide in-
sights into the balance between responsiveness and efficiency in the high-tech 
electronics industry. In any System Dynamics simulation model, a balance 
needs to be found between representing the structures and policy levers in the 
system well while capturing the feedback effects that are typically unaccounted 
for by the mental models of decision makers.550 As the dynamics of the system 
behaviour emerge from the interactions of the different parts of the system, cap-
turing the interlinkages and feedback effects is more important than adding a 
large amount of detail in representing the individual parts of the system.551 The 
System Dynamics model developed in this work is consistent with a wide spec-
trum of available information, including past research and qualitative assess-
ments obtained through interviews with industry experts. Nevertheless, the 
model necessarily relies on a number of assumptions, each of which could serve 
as an indicator for potential future research. One of the most important limita-
tions of the model is that only one product is considered in each simulation run, 
with no consideration of different product variants. Framiñán, Reichhart and 
Holweg provide some initial pointers into this research area, and extending the 
existing model to incorporate the dynamics of changes in the product mix is a 
promising area for future research.552 The model could further be extended to 
cover multiple product generations, which would also allow the inclusion of 
long-term capacity decisions into the model. Currently, these capacity decisions 
are excluded because due to the long delays for capacity acquisitions in this in-
dustry they have no relevance within the relatively short product life cycles 
                                                          
548  Cf. Reinhardt: Nokia's Magnificent Mobile-Phone Manufacturing Machine, p. 1. 
549  Cf. Beckman and Sinha: Conducting Academic Research with an Industry Focus, 
p. 120. 
550  Cf. Sterman: Business Dynamics, pp. 61–62 and p. 81. 
551  Cf. Sterman: Business Dynamics, p. 81. 
552  See Framiñán, Reichhart and Holweg: Modelling Supply Chain Responsiveness. 
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modelled.553 Incorporating demand as an endogenous variable also promises 
further insights, as, for example, shown by Gonçalves et al. for the semiconduc-
tor industry.554 Also, stochastic throughput times at board printing are currently 
incorporated implicitly through the third-order exponential delays that are used 
for the production processes as well as through the exogenous trigger for a pro-
duction disruption at board printing; a more explicit incorporation of such varia-
tions may be useful.555 Similarly, explicitly incorporating yield variations at 
board printing due to learning curve effects may also add value.556
The results of the analyses confirm that there is no single optimal strategy of 
achieving an appropriate balance of responsiveness and efficiency in the high-
tech electronics industry for products with different products at different phases 
of the product life cycle. As the previous analyses show, both push-based plan-
ning systems as well as pull-based planning systems can provide performance 
improvements over the planning approach that is currently common in the in-
dustry, while simultaneous improvements of responsiveness and efficiency 
within the planning approach with cascading forecasts are difficult. In the high-
tech electronics sector, high responsiveness is an important success factor espe-
cially at the beginning of the product life cycle, which may warrant intentional 
reductions in the efficiency of the supply chain in order to accommodate cus-
tomer demand in this critical phase. The appropriateness of different planning 
approaches depends to a large extent to the flexibility of component suppliers to 
react to changes in demand. Even if lead times for components are long, a pull-
based planning approach can be appropriate, as long as the product introduction 
phase is planned and suppliers can accommodate variations in demand well. An 
interesting area of future research would be an empirical study examining to 
                                                          
553  See Gonçalves: Demand Bubbles and Phantom Orders in Supply Chains, p. 74, who 
argues that the long delays involved in adding new capacity have the consequence 
that in the short run production can only be changed by changing capacity utilization. 
This approach of assuming a fixed capacity is also taken in this work. See also 
Lertpattarapong: Applying system dynamics approach to the supply chain manage-
ment problem, p. 7, and Vaidyanathan, Metcalf and Martin: Using Capacity Options 
to Better Enable Our Factory Ramps, p. 185. 
554  See Gonçalves, Hines and Sterman: The impact of endogenous demand on push-pull 
production systems; Gonçalves: Demand Bubbles and Phantom Orders in Supply 
Chains; Lertpattarapong: Applying system dynamics approach to the supply chain 
management problem. 
555  See Kok et al.: Philips Electronics Synchronizes Its Supply Chain to End the Bull-
whip Effect, p. 40. 
556  See Kok et al.: Philips Electronics Synchronizes Its Supply Chain to End the Bull-
whip Effect, p. 40. 
233 
what extent these conclusions drawn from the simulation model can be tested in 
real-world high-tech electronics supply chains.557
High-tech electronics companies are recognizing the importance of supply 
chain management as a competitive differentiator and important lever for busi-
ness success. Using System Dynamics simulation models such as that developed 
in this work can support these organizations in transforming their supply chains 
into systems that are both responsive to customer demand and efficient. 
                                                          
557  This need is also identified by Reichhart and Holweg: Creating the Customer-
responsive Supply Chain, pp. 27–28. 
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Appendices
I. Listing of Model Equations: Cascade 
added forecast error 35= 
  RANDOM NORMAL(0, 2, 1, 0 ,0 ) 
 Units: Dimensionless 
added forecast error 75= 
 RANDOM NORMAL(0, 2, 1, 0 ,0 ) 
Units: Dimensionless 
adjusted forecast for BP by SWF= 
 MAX(0,((forecast 76 days out*adjustment to demand for BP SWF) 
 +adjustment to Inventory RM SWF)) 
Units: Widgets/Day 
adjusted forecast for supplier by SWF= 
 MAX(0, ((forecast 36 days out*adjustment to demand for Sup SWF) 
 +adjustment to Inventory RM SWF 
 )) 
Units: Widgets/Day 
adjustment time for emergency orders SWF= 
 36 
Units: Day 
adjustment to demand for BP SWF= 
 MIN(fractional difference demand and forecast for BP at SWF, 
1+XIDZ(averaged demand for the current day for BP FC at SWF 
, forecast 76 days out, 0)) 
Units: Dmnl 
adjustment to demand for Sup SWF= 
 MIN(fractional difference demand and forecast for 36 days at 
SWF, 1+XIDZ(averaged demand for the current day for Sup FC at 
SWF
, forecast 36 days out, 0)) 
Units: Dimensionless 
adjustment to forecast boards FAT= 
 adjustment to inventory boards FAT/boards used per FG unit 
Units: Widget/Day 
adjustment to forecast BP= 
 adjustment to Inventory RM BP/materials used per FG unit 
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Units: Widget/Day 
adjustment to forecast RM FAT= 
 adjustment to inventory RM FAT/materials used per FG unit 
Units: Widget/Day 
adjustment to forecast Sup= 
 adjustment to Inventory RM Sup/materials used per FG unit Sup 
Units: Widget/Day 
adjustment to inventory boards FAT= 
 ((gap desired inventory and average inventory boards FAT-
(cumulated adjustment to inventory boards FAT 
*switch to consider cum adj to inventory boards FAT)) 
 /inventory adjustment time boards FAT) 
 *switch adjustment to Inventory boards FAT 
Units: Board/Day 
adjustment to Inventory RM BP= 
 ((gap between desired inventory and average inventory RM BP-
(cumulated adjustment to inventory RM BP 
*switch to consider cum adj to inventory RM BP)) 
 /inventory adjustment time BP) 
 *switch adjustment to Inventory RM BP 
Units: Materials/Day 
adjustment to inventory RM FAT= 
 ((gap desired inventory and average inventory RM FAT-(cumulated 
adjustment to inventory RM FAT 
*switch to consider cum adj to inventory RM FAT)) 
 /inventory adjustment time RM FAT) 
 *switch adjustment to Inventory RM FAT 
Units: material/Day 
adjustment to Inventory RM Sup= 
 ((gap between desired inventory and average inventory RM Sup-
(cumulated adjustment to inventory RM Sup 
*switch to consider cum adj to inventory RM Sup)) 
 /inventory adjustment time Sup) 
 *switch adjustment to Inventory RM Sup 
Units: material/Day 
adjustment to Inventory RM SWF= 
 ((gap desired inventory and average inventory RM SWF-(cumulated 
adjustment to inventory RM SWF 
*switch consider cum adj to inventory RM SWF)) 
 /inventory adjustment time SWF) 
 *switch adjustment to Inventory RM SWF 
Units: Widget/Day 
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average backlog SWF= 
 SMOOTH(Backlog SWF,averaging time backlog SWF) 
Units: Widgets 
average inventory boards FAT= 
 smooth3(Inventory Boards FAT, inventory adjustment time boards 
FAT)
Units: Boards 
average inventory RM BP= 
 smooth3(Inventory RM BP,inventory adjustment time BP) 
Units: Materials 
average inventory RM FAT= 
 smooth3(Inventory RM FAT, inventory adjustment time RM FAT) 
Units: Materials 
average inventory RM Sup= 
 smooth3(Inventory RM Sup, inventory adjustment time Sup) 
Units: Materials 
average inventory RM SWF= 
 smooth3(Inventory RM SWF, inventory adjustment time SWF) 
Units: material 
average total inventory cost over time= 
 ZIDZ(cum total total inventory cost, Time) 
Units: Dollars/Day 
averaged demand for the current day for BP FC at SWF= 
 SMOOTH(demand for the current day, avg time for difference de-
mand and 76 day forecast SWF 
)
Units: Widget/Day 
averaged demand for the current day for Sup FC at SWF= 
 SMOOTH(demand for the current day, averaging time adjustment for 
difference demand and 36 day forecast SWF 
)
Units: Widget/Day 
averaged forecast 36 days out shifted to match demand at SWF= 
 SMOOTH(forecast 36 days out shifted to match demand at SWF, av-
eraging time adjustment for difference demand and 36 day fore-
cast SWF 
)
Units: Widget/Day 
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averaged forecast for BP shifted to match demand SWF= 
 SMOOTH(forecast 76 days out shifted to match demand at SWF, avg 
time for difference demand and 76 day forecast SWF 
)
Units: Widget/Day 
averaging time adjustment for difference demand and 36 day forecast 
SWF=
 10 
Units: Day 
averaging time backlog SWF= 
 14 
Units: Days 
avg time for difference demand and 76 day forecast SWF= 
 10 
Units: Day 
Backlog BP= INTEG ( 
 incoming order rate BP-order fulfillment rate BP, 
  0) 
Units: Boards 
Backlog Emergency IC supplier= INTEG ( 
 +incoming emergency IC orders-backlog reduction emergency IC 
supplier,
  0) 
Units: Materials 
Backlog FAT= INTEG ( 
 +incoming forecast FAT-forecast fulfillment rate FAT, 
  0) 
Units: Widget 
backlog reduction emergency IC supplier= 
 emergency IC deliveries 
Units: Materials/Day 
Backlog Sup= INTEG ( 
 incoming order rate Sup-order fulfillment rate Sup, 
  0) 
Units: Widgets 
Backlog SWF= INTEG ( 
 incoming production requests SWF-production starts SWF, 
  0) 
Units: Widgets 
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batch size BP= 
 5000 
Units: Boards/Day 
boards per material= 
 1 
Units: Board/material 
boards used per FG unit= 
 1 
Units: Boards/Widget 
boards used per FG unit FAT= 
 1 
Units: Board/Widget 
capacity FAT= 
 50000 
Units: Widget/Day 
capacity limit BP= 
 20000 
Units: Boards/Day 
capacity limit FAT= 
 MIN(capacity FAT,feasible production based on inventory FAT) 
Units: Widget/Day 
Change in Pink Noise = (White Noise - Pink Noise)/Noise Correlation 
Time
Units: 1/Day 
cum demand requested for the current week= INTEG ( 
 demand for the current day, 
  0) 
Units: Widgets 
cum orders not filled on time= INTEG ( 
 IF THEN ELSE((customer backlog/dimensional consistency 
day+inflow customer backlog 
-outflow customer backlog)>0, MIN(demand for the current day, cus-
tomer backlog 
/dimensional consistency day+inflow customer backlog-outflow cus-
tomer backlog 
), 0), 
  0) 
Units: Widgets 
cum total total inventory cost= 
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 total cumulated inventory cost BP+total cumulated inventory cost 
FAT+total cumulated inventory cost Sup 
+total cumulated inventory cost SWF 
Units: Dollars 
cumulated adjustment to inventory boards FAT= INTEG ( 
 adjustment to inventory boards FAT, 
  0) 
Units: Boards 
cumulated adjustment to inventory RM BP= INTEG ( 
 adjustment to Inventory RM BP, 
  0) 
Units: Materials 
cumulated adjustment to inventory RM FAT= INTEG ( 
 adjustment to inventory RM FAT, 
  0) 
Units: Materials 
cumulated adjustment to inventory RM Sup= INTEG ( 
 adjustment to Inventory RM Sup, 
  0) 
Units: Materials 
cumulated adjustment to inventory RM SWF= INTEG ( 
 adjustment to Inventory RM SWF, 
  0) 
Units: Widget 
Cumulated emergency orders SWF= INTEG ( 
 Emergency orders to account for Backlog SWF, 
  0) 
Units: Boards 
Cumulated Inventory Cost Boards FAT= INTEG ( 
 Inventory Cost Boards FAT, 
  0) 
Units: Dollars 
Cumulated Inventory Cost FG BP= INTEG ( 
 Inventory Cost FG BP, 
  0) 
Units: Dollars 
Cumulated Inventory Cost FG FAT= INTEG ( 
 Inventory Cost FG FAT, 
  0) 
Units: Dollars 
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Cumulated Inventory Cost FG Sup= INTEG ( 
 Inventory Cost FG Sup, 
  0) 
Units: Dollars 
Cumulated Inventory Cost FG SWF= INTEG ( 
 Inventory Cost FG SWF, 
  0) 
Units: Dollars 
Cumulated Inventory Cost RM BP= INTEG ( 
 Inventory Cost RM BP, 
  0) 
Units: Dollars 
Cumulated Inventory Cost RM FAT= INTEG ( 
 Inventory Cost RM FAT, 
  0) 
Units: Dollars 
Cumulated Inventory Cost RM Sup= INTEG ( 
 Inventory Cost RM Sup, 
  0) 
Units: Dollars 
Cumulated Inventory Cost RM SWF= INTEG ( 
 Inventory Cost RM SWF, 
  0) 
Units: Dollars 
Cumulated Inventory Cost WIP BP= INTEG ( 
 Inventory Cost WIP BP, 
  0) 
Units: Dollars 
Cumulated Inventory Cost WIP FAT= INTEG ( 
 Inventory Cost WIP FAT, 
  0) 
Units: Dollars 
Cumulated Inventory Cost WIP Sup= INTEG ( 
 Inventory Cost WIP Sup, 
  0) 
Units: Dollars 
Cumulated Inventory Cost WIP SWF= INTEG ( 
 Inventory Cost WIP SWF, 
  0) 
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Units: Dollars 
customer backlog= INTEG ( 
 inflow customer backlog-outflow customer backlog, 
  0) 
Units: Widget 
delivery delay SWF= 
 ZIDZ(Backlog SWF, shipment rate SWF) 
Units: Days 
delivery performance to customer request= 
 XIDZ((cum demand requested for the current week-cum orders not 
filled on time 
), cum demand requested for the current week,1) 
Units: Dimensionless 
delivery time= 
 1 
Units: Days 
demand adj Cust 9 days ahead= 
 MIN(demand Cust 9 days ahead,Market potential/delivery time) 
Units: Widgets/Day 
demand Cust 9 days ahead= 
 input from excel file 9 days out*Input 
Units: Widgets/Day 
demand for the current day= DELAY FIXED ( 
  demand adj Cust 9 days ahead, 9, demand adj Cust 9 days ahead) 
Units: Widget/Day 
desired Backlog SWF= 
 0 
Units: Widgets 
desired days of stock SWF= 
 10 
Units: Days 
desired Inventory boards FAT= 
 STEP(inventory size boards FAT, inventory begin time boards 
FAT)-STEP(inventory size boards FAT 
,inventory end time boards FAT) 
Units: Board 
desired Inventory RM BP= 
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 STEP(inventory size BP, inventory begin time BP)-STEP(inventory 
size BP,inventory end time BP 
)
Units: material 
desired Inventory RM FAT= 
 STEP(inventory size RM FAT, inventory begin time RM FAT)-
STEP(inventory size RM FAT 
,inventory end time RM FAT) 
Units: Materials 
desired Inventory RM Sup= 
 STEP(inventory size Sup, inventory begin time Sup)-
STEP(inventory size Sup 
,inventory end time Sup) 
Units: Materials 
desired inventory RM SWF= 
 desired days of stock SWF*averaged demand for the current day 
for Sup FC at SWF 
*materials used per FG unit SWF 
Units: material 
desired no of batches BP= 
 INTEGER( 
    ((waiting for production BP 
      /minimum time to start production BP 
      +inflow waiting for production BP) 
     /batch size BP) 
   ) 
Units: Dimensionless 
desired orders in production SWF= 
 MAX(0,Backlog SWF/minimum time to start production SWF+incoming 
production requests SWF 
)
Units: Widgets/Day 
desired production batched BP= 
 MAX(0, 
 MIN(desired no of batches BP*batch size BP, maximum possible no 
of batches BP 
*batch size BP) 
 *(1-probablity of problem BP) 
 ) 
Units: Boards/Day 
desired production Sup= 
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 MIN(waiting for production Sup/minimum time to start production 
Sup+inflow waiting for production Sup 
, Inventory RM Sup/materials used per FG unit Sup/minimum time to 
start production Sup 
)
Units: Widget/Day 
dimensional consistency day= 
 1 
Units: Day 
emergency IC deliveries= 
 IF THEN ELSE(Emergency Inventory ICs at IC supplier/minimum time 
to start shipping from inventory emergency IC supplier 
>0, MIN(Backlog Emergency IC supplier/minimum time to start ship-
ping from inventory emergency IC supplier 
, Emergency Inventory ICs at IC supplier/minimum time to start 
shipping from inventory emergency IC supplier 
), Emergency Inventory ICs at IC supplier/minimum time to start 
shipping from inventory emergency IC supplier 
)
Units: Materials/Day 
Emergency Inventory ICs at IC supplier= INTEG ( 
 +receiving rate ICs IC supplier-emergency IC deliveries, 
  initial level emergency inventory supplier) 
Units: Materials 
emergency material orders= 
 emergency orders placed at BP/boards per material 
Units: Materials/Day 
emergency orders placed at BP= 
 MAX(0,Emergency orders to account for Backlog SWF) 
Units: Boards/Day 
emergency orders placed at Sup= 
 MAX(0,Emergency orders to account for Backlog SWF) 
Units: Boards/Day 
Emergency orders to account for Backlog SWF= 
 switch emergency orders to account for Backlog SWF*MAX(0, 
((((gap desired BL and average BL SWF 
)-(Cumulated emergency orders SWF*switch consider emergency orders 
already placed 
)))/adjustment time for emergency orders SWF)) 
Units: Boards/Day 
expected emergency IC arrival rate BP= 
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 DELAY3(emergency IC deliveries, shipment delay emergency IC de-
liveries)
Units: material/Day 
expected material arrival rate BP= DELAY FIXED ( 
 material orders BP, expected order lead time BP, 0) 
Units: Materials/Day 
expected material arrival rate IC emergency supplies at IC sup-
plier= DELAY FIXED 
 ( 
 emergency material orders, expected order lead time emergency 
ICs, 0) 
Units: Materials/Day 
expected material arrival rate Sup= DELAY FIXED ( 
 material orders Sup, expected order lead time Sup, 0) 
Units: Materials/Day 
expected order lead time BP= 
 46 
Units: Days 
expected order lead time emergency ICs= 
 15 
Units: Days 
expected order lead time Sup= 
 6 
Units: Days 
feasible production based on inventory FAT= 
 MIN(Inventory Boards FAT/boards used per FG unit FAT, Inventory 
RM FAT/materials used per FG unit FAT 
)/minimum time to start production FAT 
Units: Widget/Day 
feasible production SWF= 
 MIN(desired orders in production SWF, Inventory RM SWF/materials 
used per FG unit SWF 
/minimum time to start production SWF) 
Units: Widgets/Day 
final adjusted forecast used for material orders Sup= 
 MAX(0,forecast for supplier FAT+adjustment to forecast 
Sup+emergency orders placed at Sup 
/boards used per FG unit) 
Units: Widget/Day 
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FINAL TIME  = 500 
Units: Day 
forecast 36 days out:= 
 forecast 36 days out read from excel*systematic forecast error 
factor
Units: Widgets/Day 
forecast 36 days out read from excel:= 
 GET XLS DATA('input.xls', 'input', 'B', 'D1') 
Units: Widget/Day 
forecast 36 days out shifted to match demand at SWF= DELAY FIXED ( 
 forecast 36 days out, 36, 0) 
Units: Widget/Day 
forecast 76 days out:= 
 forecast 76 days out read from excel*systematic forecast error 
factor
Units: Widgets/Day 
forecast 76 days out read from excel:= 
 GET XLS DATA('input.xls', 'input', 'B', 'E1') 
Units: Widget/Day 
forecast 76 days out shifted to match demand at SWF= DELAY FIXED ( 
 forecast 76 days out, 76, 0) 
Units: Widget/Day 
forecast for board printing FAT= 
 MAX(0,forecast for board printing SWF+adjustment to forecast 
boards FAT) 
Units: Widget/Day 
forecast for board printing SWF= 
 MAX( switch adjustment to forecast*adjusted forecast for BP by 
SWF, (1-switch adjustment to forecast 
)*forecast 76 days out 
 ) 
Units: Widgets/Day 
forecast for material orders BP= 
 MAX(0,forecast for board printing FAT+adjustment to forecast BP) 
Units: Widget/Day 
forecast for supplier FAT= 
 MAX(0,forecast for supplier SWF+adjustment to forecast RM FAT) 
Units: Widget/Day 
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forecast for supplier SWF= 
 MAX(switch adjustment to forecast*adjusted forecast for supplier 
by SWF, ( 
1-switch adjustment to forecast)*forecast 36 days out) 
Units: Widgets/Day 
forecast fulfillment rate FAT= 
 shipment rate FAT 
Units: Widget/Day 
forecast used for FAT= 
 DELAY FIXED(forecast for supplier SWF, 16, 0) 
Units: Widget/Day 
fractional difference demand and forecast for 36 days at SWF= 
 XIDZ(averaged demand for the current day for Sup FC at SWF, av-
eraged forecast 36 days out shifted to match demand at SWF 
, 1) 
Units: Dimensionless 
fractional difference demand and forecast for BP at SWF= 
 XIDZ(averaged demand for the current day for BP FC at SWF, aver-
aged forecast for BP shifted to match demand SWF 
, 1) 
Units: Dmnl 
gap between desired inventory and average inventory RM BP= 
 (desired Inventory RM BP-average inventory RM BP) 
Units: Materials 
gap between desired inventory and average inventory RM Sup= 
 (desired Inventory RM Sup-average inventory RM Sup) 
Units: Materials 
gap desired BL and average BL SWF= 
 (average backlog SWF-desired Backlog SWF)*boards used per FG 
unit FAT 
Units: Boards 
gap desired inventory and average inventory boards FAT= 
 (desired Inventory boards FAT-average inventory boards FAT) 
Units: Board 
gap desired inventory and average inventory RM FAT= 
 (desired Inventory RM FAT-average inventory RM FAT) 
Units: Materials 
gap desired inventory and average inventory RM SWF= 
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 (desired inventory RM SWF-average inventory RM SWF)/materials 
used per FG unit SWF 
Units: Widgets 
incoming emergency IC orders= 
 emergency material orders 
Units: Materials/Day 
incoming forecast board orders BP= 
 ((forecast for board printing FAT*boards used per FG 
unit+emergency orders placed at BP 
))
Units: Boards/Day 
incoming forecast FAT= 
 forecast used for FAT+(Emergency orders to account for Backlog 
SWF/boards used per FG unit FAT 
)
Units: Widget/Day 
incoming forecast material orders SUP= 
 ((forecast for supplier FAT*materials used per FG unit+emergency 
orders placed at Sup 
/boards per material)) 
Units: material/Day 
incoming order rate BP= 
 incoming forecast board orders BP 
Units: Boards/Day 
incoming order rate Sup= 
 (incoming forecast material orders SUP)*widgets per material Sup 
Units: Widget/Day 
incoming production requests SWF= 
 demand adj Cust 9 days ahead 
Units: Widget/Day 
inflow customer backlog= 
 demand for the current day 
Units: Widget/Day 
inflow waiting for production BP= 
 incoming order rate BP 
Units: Boards/Day 
inflow waiting for production FAT= 
 incoming forecast FAT 
Units: Widget/Day 
273 
inflow waiting for production Sup= 
 incoming order rate Sup 
Units: Widget/Day 
ini installed base= 
 0 
Units: Widgets 
ini market potential= 
 7e+006 
Units: Widgets 
ini materials on order BP= 
 0 
Units: Materials 
ini materials on order Sup= 
 0 
Units: Materials 
initial Inventory Boards Man= 
 0 
Units: Boards 
initial inventory FG BP= 
 0 
Units: Boards 
initial inventory FG Man= 
 0 
Units: Widgets 
initial inventory FG Sup= 
 0 
Units: Widgets 
initial inventory FG SWF= 
 0 
Units: Widgets 
initial inventory RM BP= 
 0 
Units: Materials 
initial inventory RM FAT= 
 0 
Units: Materials 
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initial inventory RM Sup= 
 0 
Units: Materials 
initial inventory RM SWF= 
 0 
Units: material 
initial level emergency inventory supplier= 
 10000 
Units: Materials 
INITIAL TIME  = 0 
Units: Day 
Input=
 MAX(0,  
 ( 
 1+STEP(Step Height,Step Time) 
 +STEP(Step2 Height,Step2 Time)+ 
 (Pulse Quantity/TIME STEP)*PULSE(Pulse Time,TIME STEP)+ 
 RAMP(Ramp Slope,Ramp Start Time,Ramp End Time)+ 
 Sine Amplitude*SIN(2*3.14159*Time/Sine Period)+ 
 (Life Cycle Test Input*switch Life Cycle Test Input)+ 
    STEP(1,Noise Start Time)*Pink Noise 
 ) 
  ) 
Units: Dimensionless 
input from excel file 9 days out:= 
 GET XLS DATA('input.xls', 'input', 'B', 'C1') 
Units: Widget/Day 
input from excel shifted to be demand requested for the current 
week:=
 TIME SHIFT(input from excel file 9 days out, -9) 
Units: Widget/Day 
Installed base= INTEG ( 
 demand adj Cust 9 days ahead, 
  ini installed base) 
Units: Widgets 
inventory adjustment time boards FAT= 
 6 
Units: Day 
inventory adjustment time BP= 
 46 
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Units: Day 
inventory adjustment time RM FAT= 
 6 
Units: Day 
inventory adjustment time Sup= 
 6 
Units: Day 
inventory adjustment time SWF= 
 6 
Units: Day 
inventory begin time boards FAT= 
 81 
Units: Days 
inventory begin time BP= 
 71 
Units: Days 
inventory begin time RM FAT= 
 81 
Units: Days 
inventory begin time Sup= 
 71 
Units: Days 
Inventory Boards FAT= INTEG ( 
 +receiving rate Boards FAT-outgoing rate Boards FAT, 
  initial Inventory Boards Man) 
Units: Boards 
Inventory Cost Boards FAT= 
 inventory cost per unit Boards FAT*Inventory Boards FAT 
Units: Dollars/Day 
Inventory Cost FG BP= 
 inventory cost per unit FG BP*Inventory FG BP 
Units: Dollars/Day 
Inventory Cost FG FAT= 
 inventory cost per unit FG FAT*Inventory FG FAT 
Units: Dollars/Day 
Inventory Cost FG Sup= 
 inventory cost per unit FG Sup*Inventory FG Sup 
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Units: Dollars/Day 
Inventory Cost FG SWF= 
 inventory cost per unit FG SWF*Inventory FG SWF 
Units: Dollars/Day 
inventory cost per unit Boards FAT= 
 0.5 
Units: Dollars/Board/Day 
inventory cost per unit FG BP= 
 0.5 
Units: Dollars/Board/Day 
inventory cost per unit FG FAT= 
 0.9 
Units: Dollars/Widget/Day 
inventory cost per unit FG Sup= 
 0.2 
Units: Dollars/Widget/Day 
inventory cost per unit FG SWF= 
 1 
Units: Dollars/Widget/Day 
inventory cost per unit RM BP= 
 0.45 
Units: Dollars/Materials/Day 
inventory cost per unit RM FAT= 
 0.2 
Units: Dollars/Materials/Day 
inventory cost per unit RM Sup= 
 0.1 
Units: Dollars/Materials/Day 
inventory cost per unit RM SWF= 
 0.9 
Units: Dollars/Materials/Day 
inventory cost per unit WIP BP= 
 0.45 
Units: Dollars/Boards/Day 
inventory cost per unit WIP FAT= 
 0.7 
Units: Dollars/Widget/Day 
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inventory cost per unit WIP Sup= 
 0.2 
Units: Dollars/Widget/Day 
inventory cost per unit WIP SWF= 
 0.9 
Units: Dollars/Widget/Day 
Inventory Cost RM BP= 
 inventory cost per unit RM BP*Inventory RM BP 
Units: Dollars/Day 
Inventory Cost RM FAT= 
 inventory cost per unit RM FAT*Inventory RM FAT 
Units: Dollars/Day 
Inventory Cost RM Sup= 
 inventory cost per unit RM Sup*Inventory RM Sup 
Units: Dollars/Day 
Inventory Cost RM SWF= 
 inventory cost per unit RM SWF*Inventory RM SWF 
Units: Dollars/Day 
Inventory Cost WIP BP= 
 inventory cost per unit WIP BP*Inventory WIP BP var 
Units: Dollars/Day 
Inventory Cost WIP FAT= 
 inventory cost per unit WIP FAT*Inventory WIP Man var 
Units: Dollars/Day 
Inventory Cost WIP Sup= 
 inventory cost per unit WIP Sup*Inventory WIP Sup var 
Units: Dollars/Day 
Inventory Cost WIP SWF= 
 inventory cost per unit WIP SWF*Inventory WIP SWF var 
Units: Dollars/Day 
inventory end time boards FAT= 
 400 
Units: Days 
inventory end time BP= 
 400 
Units: Days 
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inventory end time RM FAT= 
 400 
Units: Days 
inventory end time Sup= 
 400 
Units: Days 
Inventory FG BP= INTEG ( 
 +production rate BP-shipment rate BP, 
  initial inventory FG BP) 
Units: Boards 
Inventory FG FAT= INTEG ( 
 product completions FAT-shipment rate FAT, 
  initial inventory FG Man) 
Units: Widgets 
Inventory FG Sup= INTEG ( 
 product completions FG Sup-shipment rate Sup, 
  initial inventory FG Sup) 
Units: Widget 
Inventory FG SWF= INTEG ( 
 product completions SWF-shipment rate SWF, 
  initial inventory FG SWF) 
Units: Widgets 
Inventory RM BP= INTEG ( 
 +receiving rate RM BP-(desired production batched BP/boards per 
material),
  initial inventory RM BP) 
Units: Materials 
Inventory RM FAT= INTEG ( 
 +receiving rate RM FAT-outgoing rate RM FAT, 
  initial inventory RM FAT) 
Units: Materials 
Inventory RM Sup= INTEG ( 
 +receiving rate RM Sup-outgoing rate RM Sup, 
  initial inventory RM Sup) 
Units: Materials 
Inventory RM SWF= INTEG ( 
 -outgoing rate RM SWF+receiving rate RM SWF, 
  initial inventory RM SWF) 
Units: Materials 
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inventory size boards FAT= 
 100000 
Units: Board 
inventory size BP= 
 100000 
Units: Materials 
inventory size RM FAT= 
 100000 
Units: Materials 
inventory size Sup= 
 100000 
Units: Materials 
inventory turns= 
 ZIDZ(cum demand requested for the current week,average total 
inventory cost over time 
)
Units: Day*Widget/Dollars 
Inventory WIP BP  =
#LV3<DELAYP(desiredproductionbatchedBP,productiontimeBP:Inventor
yWIPBP)#
             + 
#LV2<DELAYP(desiredproductionbatchedBP,productiontimeBP:Inventor
yWIPBP)#
             + 
#LV1<DELAYP(desiredproductionbatchedBP,productiontimeBP:Inventor
yWIPBP)#
 Units: Days*Boards/Day 
Inventory WIP BP var= 
 Inventory WIP BP 
Units: Boards 
Inventory WIP Man  =
#LV3<DELAYP(productionstartsFAT,productiontimeFAT:InventoryWIPMa
n)#
             + 
#LV2<DELAYP(productionstartsFAT,productiontimeFAT:InventoryWIPMa
n)#
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             + 
#LV1<DELAYP(productionstartsFAT,productiontimeFAT:InventoryWIPMa
n)#
 Units: Days*Widget/Day 
Inventory WIP Man var= 
 Inventory WIP Man 
Units: Widget 
Inventory WIP Sup  =
#LV3<DELAYP(outgoingrateRMSup/materialsusedperFGunitSup,producti
ontimeSup:InventoryWIPSup)#
             + 
#LV2<DELAYP(outgoingrateRMSup/materialsusedperFGunitSup,producti
ontimeSup:InventoryWIPSup)#
             + 
#LV1<DELAYP(outgoingrateRMSup/materialsusedperFGunitSup,producti
ontimeSup:InventoryWIPSup)#
 Units: Days*Widget/Day 
Inventory WIP Sup var= 
 Inventory WIP Sup 
Units: Widgets 
Inventory WIP SWF  =
#LV3<DELAYP(feasibleproductionSWF,productiontimeSWF:InventoryWIP
SWF)#
             + 
#LV2<DELAYP(feasibleproductionSWF,productiontimeSWF:InventoryWIP
SWF)#
             + 
#LV1<DELAYP(feasibleproductionSWF,productiontimeSWF:InventoryWIP
SWF)#
 Units: Days*Widgets/Day 
Inventory WIP SWF var= 
 Inventory WIP SWF 
Units: Widget 
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largest possible RM outflow BP= 
 MIN(capacity limit BP, Inventory RM BP/materials used per FG 
unit BP/minimum time to start production BP 
)
Units: Boards/Day 
Life Cycle Test Input= 
 lkup Life Cycle Test Input and forecast for demand nine days 
ahead(Time/FINAL TIME 
)-1
Units: Dimensionless 
lkup Life Cycle Test Input and forecast for demand nine days ahead( 
 [(0,0)-
(1,2)],(0,0),(0.18,0),(0.256881,0.298246),(0.30581,0.684211),(0.
324159
,0.95614),(0.376147,1.38596),(0.434251,1.62281),(0.498471,1.7077),(
0.547401
,1.67544),(0.587156,1.57018),(0.623853,1.34211),(0.703364,0.54386),
(0.730887
,0.280702),(0.782,0),(1,0),(1,0))
Units: Dimensionless 
lkup Life Cycle Test Input PLC standard( 
 [(0,0)-
(1,2)],(0,0),(0.185,0),(0.259939,1.21053),(0.293578,1.7193),(0.3
21101
,1.87719),(0.357798,1.95614),(0.415902,2),(0.440367,1.95614),(0.477
064,1.85965
),(0.508235,1.62989),(0.569412,1.21708),(0.651765,0.733096),(0.7364
71,0.362989
),(0.835294,0.0711744),(0.938824,0),(1,0))
Units: Dimensionless 
lkup Life Cycle Test Input SCENARIO 1( 
 [(0,0)-
(1,2)],(0,0),(0.185,0),(0.259939,1.21053),(0.293578,1.7193),(0.3
21101
,1.87719),(0.357798,1.95614),(0.415902,2),(0.461774,1.95614),(0.516
82,1.81579
),(0.571865,1.5614),(0.626911,1.19298),(0.66055,0.929825),(0.697248
,0.578947
),(0.752294,0.27193),(0.834862,0.114035),(0.938824,0),(1,0))
Units: Dimensionless 
lkup Life Cycle Test Input simple v01( 
 [(0,0)-
(1,2)],(0,0),(0.185,0),(0.185,2),(0.504587,2),(0.504587,0),(0.93
8824
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,0),(1,0))
Units: Dimensionless 
lkup Life Cycle Test Input simple v02( 
 [(0,0)-
(1,2)],(0,0),(0.185,0),(0.185,0.5),(0.287462,0.5),(0.504587,2),(
0.504587
,0),(0.938824,0),(1,0))
Units: Dimensionless 
lkup Life Cycle Test Input simple v03( 
 [(0,0)-
(1,2)],(0,0),(0.185,0),(0.185,0.5),(0.287462,0.5),(0.504587,2),(
0.9388
,2),(0.938824,0),(1,0))
Units: Dimensionless 
lkup probability of problem BP( 
 [(0,0)-
(1,2)],(0,0),(0.185,0),(0.259939,0),(0.499,0),(0.5,1),(0.519,1),
(0.52
,0),(1,0))
Units: Dimensionless 
lkup probability of problem Sup( 
 [(0,0)-
(1,2)],(0,0),(0.185,0),(0.259939,0),(0.3,0),(0.301,1),(0.302,0),
(1,
0))
Units: Dimensionless 
Market potential= INTEG ( 
 -demand adj Cust 9 days ahead, 
  ini market potential) 
Units: Widgets 
material arrival rate BP= 
 receiving rate RM BP 
Units: Materials/Day 
material arrival rate Sup= 
 receiving rate RM Sup 
Units: Materials/Day 
material order rate BP= 
 emergency material orders+material orders BP 
Units: Materials/Day 
material order rate Sup= 
283 
 material orders Sup 
Units: Materials/Day 
material orders BP= 
 MAX(0,  forecast for material orders BP*materials used per FG 
unit)
Units: Materials/Day 
material orders Sup= 
 MAX(0,final adjusted forecast used for material orders 
Sup)/widgets per material Sup 
Units: Materials/Day 
materials from Sup needed for a RM FAT= 
 1 
Units: material/Widget 
Materials on order BP= INTEG ( 
 +material order rate BP-material arrival rate BP, 
  ini materials on order BP) 
Units: Materials 
Materials on order Sup= INTEG ( 
 +material order rate Sup-material arrival rate Sup, 
  ini materials on order Sup) 
Units: Materials 
materials used per FG unit= 
 1 
Units: material/Widget 
materials used per FG unit BP= 
 1 
Units: Materials/Board 
materials used per FG unit FAT= 
 1 
Units: Materials/Widget 
materials used per FG unit Sup= 
 1 
Units: Materials/Widget 
materials used per FG unit SWF= 
 1 
Units: material/Widget 
maximum possible no of batches BP= 
 INTEGER((largest possible RM outflow BP/batch size BP)) 
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Units: Dimensionless 
mean of input data from excel 9 days out= 
 GET DATA MEAN(input from excel file 9 days out, 91, 413) 
Units: Widget/Day 
minimum time to start production BP= 
 1 
Units: Day 
minimum time to start production FAT= 
 1 
Units: Day 
minimum time to start production Sup= 
 1 
Units: Days 
minimum time to start production SWF= 
 1 
Units: Day 
minimum time to start shipping FAT= 
 1 
Units: Day 
minimum time to start shipping from inventory emergency IC sup-
plier=
 1 
Units: Days 
minimum time to start shipping SWF= 
 1 
Units: Day 
Noise Correlation Time = 4 
Units: Day 
NOISE SEED= 
 1 
Units: Dimensionless 
Noise Standard Deviation= 
 0.8 
Units: Dimensionless 
Noise Start Time= 
 92 
Units: Day 
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order fulfillment rate BP= 
 shipment rate BP 
Units: Boards/Day 
order fulfillment rate Sup= 
 shipment rate Sup 
Units: Widgets/Day 
outflow customer backlog= 
 receiving rate Cust 
Units: Widgets/Day 
outgoing rate Boards FAT= 
 MAX(0,production starts FAT*boards used per FG unit FAT) 
Units: Boards/Day 
outgoing rate RM FAT= 
 MAX(0,production starts FAT*materials used per FG unit FAT) 
Units: Materials/Day 
outgoing rate RM Sup= 
 MAX(0,IF THEN ELSE(desired production Sup*materials used per FG 
unit Sup>Inventory RM Sup 
/minimum time to start production Sup 
 , Inventory RM Sup/minimum time to start production Sup, desired 
production Sup 
*materials used per FG unit Sup)) 
Units: Materials/Day 
outgoing rate RM SWF= 
 MAX(0,feasible production SWF*materials used per FG unit SWF) 
Units: Materials/Day 
Pink Noise = INTEG(Change in Pink Noise,0) 
Units: Dimensionless 
probablity of problem BP= 
 lkup probability of problem BP(Time/FINAL TIME)*switch probabil-
ity of problem BP 
Units: Dimensionless 
probablity of problem Sup= 
 lkup probability of problem Sup(Time/FINAL TIME)*switch prob-
ability of problem Sup 
Units: Dimensionless 
product completions FAT= 
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 MAX(0,DELAYP(production starts FAT, production time FAT : Inven-
tory WIP Man 
 )) 
Units: Widget/Day 
product completions FG Sup= 
 DELAYP(outgoing rate RM Sup/materials used per FG unit Sup, pro-
duction time Sup 
 : Inventory WIP Sup ) 
Units: Widget/Day 
product completions SWF= 
 DELAYP(feasible production SWF, production time SWF : Inventory 
WIP SWF) 
Units: Widgets/Day 
production rate BP= 
 DELAYP(desired production batched BP, production time BP : In-
ventory WIP BP 
 ) 
Units: Boards/Day 
production starts FAT= 
 MAX(0, 
 MIN(waiting for production FAT/minimum time to start production 
FAT+inflow waiting for production FAT 
, capacity limit FAT) 
 ) 
Units: Widget/Day 
production starts SWF= 
 feasible production SWF 
Units: Widgets/Day 
production time BP= 
 4 
Units: Days 
production time FAT= 
 4 
Units: Days 
production time Sup= 
 4 
Units: Days 
production time SWF= 
 4 
Units: Days 
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Pulse Quantity= 
 0 
Units: Dimensionless*Day 
Pulse Time= 
 50 
Units: Day 
pulse train duration= 
 1 
Units: Day 
pulse train end= 
 500 
Units: Day 
Pulse Train Input= 
 PULSE TRAIN(pulse train start, pulse train duration , pulse 
train repeattime 
 , pulse train end ) 
Units: Dimensionless 
pulse train repeattime= 
 5 
Units: Days 
pulse train start= 
 0 
Units: Day 
Ramp End Time= 
 150 
Units: Day 
Ramp Slope= 
 0 
Units: 1/Day 
Ramp Start Time= 
 92 
Units: Day 
receiving rate Boards FAT= 
 DELAY3(shipment rate BP,shipment delay BP) 
Units: Boards/Day 
receiving rate Cust= 
 DELAY3(shipment rate SWF,shipment delay SWF) 
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Units: Widget/Day 
receiving rate ICs IC supplier= 
 expected material arrival rate IC emergency supplies at IC sup-
plier
Units: material/Day 
receiving rate RM BP= 
 expected material arrival rate BP+expected emergency IC arrival 
rate BP 
Units: Materials/Day 
receiving rate RM FAT= 
 DELAY3(shipment rate Sup,shipment delay Sup)*materials from Sup 
needed for a RM FAT 
Units: Materials/Day 
receiving rate RM Sup= 
 expected material arrival rate Sup 
Units: Materials/Day 
receiving rate RM SWF= 
 DELAY3(shipment rate FAT*materials used per FG unit SWF,shipment 
delay FAT 
)
Units: Materials/Day 
SAVEPER  =
        TIME STEP 
Units: Day 
shipment delay BP= 
 4 
Units: Days 
shipment delay emergency IC deliveries= 
 4 
Units: Days 
shipment delay FAT= 
 4 
Units: Days 
shipment delay Sup= 
 4 
Units: Days 
shipment delay SWF= 
 4 
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Units: Days 
shipment rate BP= 
 Inventory FG BP/dimensional consistency day 
Units: Boards/Day 
shipment rate FAT= 
 Inventory FG FAT/minimum time to start shipping FAT 
Units: Widgets/Day 
shipment rate Sup= 
 Inventory FG Sup/dimensional consistency day 
Units: Widget/Day 
shipment rate SWF= 
 Inventory FG SWF/minimum time to start shipping SWF 
Units: Widgets/Day 
Sine Amplitude= 
 0 
Units: Dimensionless 
Sine Period=50 
Units: Days 
stddev of input data from excel 9 days out= 
 GET DATA STDV( input from excel file 9 days out, 91, 413) 
Units: Widget/Day 
Step Height= 
 0 
Units: Dimensionless 
Step Time= 
 0 
Units: Day 
Step2 Height= 
 0 
Units: Dimensionless 
Step2 Time= 
 91 
Units: Days 
switch adjustment to forecast= 
 1 
Units: Dimensionless 
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switch adjustment to Inventory boards FAT= 
 1 
Units: Dimensionless 
switch adjustment to Inventory RM BP= 
 1 
Units: Dimensionless 
switch adjustment to Inventory RM FAT= 
 1 
Units: Dimensionless 
switch adjustment to Inventory RM Sup= 
 1 
Units: Dimensionless 
switch adjustment to Inventory RM SWF= 
 1 
Units: Dimensionless 
switch consider cum adj to inventory RM SWF= 
 0 
Units: Dmnl 
switch consider emergency orders already placed= 
 0 
Units: Dimensionless 
switch emergency orders to account for Backlog BP setup D= 
 1 
Units: Dimensionless 
switch emergency orders to account for Backlog SWF= 
 1 
Units: Dimensionless 
switch Life Cycle Test Input= 
 0 
Units: Dimensionless 
switch probability of problem BP= 
 0 
Units: Dimensionless 
switch probability of problem Sup= 
 0 
Units: Dimensionless 
switch to consider cum adj to inventory boards FAT= 
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 0 
Units: Dmnl 
switch to consider cum adj to inventory RM BP= 
 0 
Units: Dmnl 
switch to consider cum adj to inventory RM FAT= 
 0 
Units: Dmnl 
switch to consider cum adj to inventory RM Sup= 
 0 
Units: Dmnl 
systematic forecast error factor= 
 1 
Units: Dimensionless 
time base week= 
 TIME BASE(0, 0.2 ) 
Units: Dimensionless 
TIME STEP  = 0.25 
Units: Day 
total cumulated inventory cost BP= 
 Cumulated Inventory Cost FG BP+Cumulated Inventory Cost RM 
BP+Cumulated Inventory Cost WIP BP 
Units: Dollars 
total cumulated inventory cost FAT= 
 Cumulated Inventory Cost FG FAT+Cumulated Inventory Cost Boards 
FAT+Cumulated Inventory Cost WIP FAT 
+Cumulated Inventory Cost RM FAT 
Units: Dollars 
total cumulated inventory cost Sup= 
 Cumulated Inventory Cost FG Sup+Cumulated Inventory Cost RM 
Sup+Cumulated Inventory Cost WIP Sup 
Units: Dollars 
total cumulated inventory cost SWF= 
 Cumulated Inventory Cost FG SWF+Cumulated Inventory Cost RM 
SWF+Cumulated Inventory Cost WIP SWF 
Units: Dollars 
total inventory cost BP= 
 Inventory Cost FG BP+Inventory Cost RM BP+Inventory Cost WIP BP 
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Units: Dollars/Day 
total inventory cost FAT= 
 Inventory Cost FG FAT+Inventory Cost Boards FAT+Inventory Cost 
WIP FAT+Inventory Cost RM FAT 
Units: Dollars/Day 
total inventory cost Sup= 
 Inventory Cost FG Sup+Inventory Cost RM Sup+Inventory Cost WIP 
Sup
Units: Dollars/Day 
total inventory cost SWF= 
 Inventory Cost FG SWF+Inventory Cost RM SWF+Inventory Cost WIP 
SWF
Units: Dollars/Day 
Total products shipped to Cust= INTEG ( 
 receiving rate Cust, 
  0) 
Units: Widgets 
waiting for production BP= INTEG ( 
 +inflow waiting for production BP-desired production batched BP, 
  0) 
Units: Boards 
waiting for production FAT= INTEG ( 
 +inflow waiting for production FAT-production starts FAT, 
  0) 
Units: Widgets 
waiting for production Sup= INTEG ( 
 +inflow waiting for production Sup-desired production Sup, 
  0) 
Units: Widget 
White Noise= 
 Noise Standard Deviation*((24*Noise Correlation Time/TIME 
STEP)^0.5*(RANDOM UNIFORM 
(0, 1, NOISE SEED) - 0.5 
 )) 
Units: Dimensionless 
widgets per material Sup= 
 1 
Units: Widget/material 
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II. Listing of Model Equations: Push 
added forecast error 35= 
  RANDOM NORMAL(0, 2, 1, 0 ,0 ) 
 Units: Dimensionless 
added forecast error 75= 
 RANDOM NORMAL(0, 2, 1, 0 ,0 ) 
Units: Dimensionless 
adjusted forecast for BP by SWF= 
 MAX(0,((forecast 76 days out*adjustment to demand for BP SWF) 
 +adjustment to Inventory RM SWF)) 
Units: Widgets/Day 
adjusted forecast for supplier by SWF= 
 MAX(0, ((forecast 36 days out*adjustment to demand for Sup SWF) 
 +adjustment to Inventory RM SWF 
 )) 
Units: Widgets/Day 
adjustment time for emergency orders SWF= 
 36 
Units: Day 
adjustment to demand for BP SWF= 
 MIN(fractional difference demand and forecast for 76 days at 
SWF, 1+XIDZ(averaged demand requested for the current week 76 
day FC at SWF 
, forecast 76 days out, 0)) 
Units: Dimensionless 
adjustment to demand for Sup SWF= 
 MIN(fractional difference demand and forecast for 36 days at 
SWF, 1+XIDZ(averaged demand requested for the current week 36 
day FC at SWF 
, forecast 36 days out, 0)) 
Units: Dimensionless 
adjustment to Inventory RM SWF= 
 ((gap between desired inventory and average inventory RM SFW-
(cumulated adjustment to inventory RM SWF 
*switch to consider cum adj to inventory RM SWF)) 
 /inventory adjustment time SWF) 
 *switch adjustment to Inventory RM SWF 
Units: Widget/Day 
average Backlog SWF= 
 SMOOTH(Backlog SWF,averaging time backlog SWF) 
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Units: Widgets 
average cum positive customer backlog= 
 ZIDZ(cum positive customer backlog, Time-150) 
Units: Widget/Day 
average demand requested for the current day= 
 ZIDZ(cum demand requested for the current day, Time-150) 
Units: Widget/Day 
average inventory RM SWF= 
 smooth3(Inventory RM SWF, inventory adjustment time SWF) 
Units: material 
average total inventory cost over time= 
 ZIDZ(cum total total inventory cost, Time) 
Units: Dollars/Day 
averaged demand requested for the current week 36 day FC at SWF= 
 SMOOTH(demand requested for the current day, averaging time ad-
justment for difference demand and 36 day forecast SWF 
)
Units: Widget/Day 
averaged demand requested for the current week 76 day FC at SWF= 
 SMOOTH(demand requested for the current day, averaging time ad-
justment for difference demand and 76 day forecast SWF 
)
Units: Widget/Day 
averaged forecast 36 days out shifted to match demand at SWF= 
 SMOOTH(forecast 36 days out shifted to match demand at SWF, av-
eraging time adjustment for difference demand and 36 day fore-
cast SWF 
)
Units: Widget/Day 
averaged forecast 76 days out shifted to match demand at SWF= 
 SMOOTH(forecast 76 days out shifted to match demand at SWF, av-
eraging time adjustment for difference demand and 76 day fore-
cast SWF 
)
Units: Widget/Day 
averaging time adjustment for difference demand and 36 day forecast 
SWF=
 10 
Units: Day 
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averaging time adjustment for difference demand and 76 day forecast 
SWF=
 10 
Units: Day 
averaging time backlog SWF= 
 14 
Units: Days 
Backlog BP= INTEG ( 
 incoming order rate BP-order fulfillment rate BP, 
  0) 
Units: Boards 
Backlog Emergency IC supplier= INTEG ( 
 +incoming emergency IC orders-backlog reduction emergency IC 
supplier,
  0) 
Units: Materials 
backlog reduction emergency IC supplier= 
 emergency IC deliveries 
Units: Materials/Day 
Backlog Sup= INTEG ( 
 incoming order rate Sup-order fulfillment rate Sup, 
  0) 
Units: Widgets 
Backlog SWF= INTEG ( 
 incoming production requests SWF-production starts SWF, 
  0) 
Units: Widgets 
batch size BP= 
 5000 
Units: Boards/Day 
boards per material= 
 1 
Units: Board/material 
boards used per FG unit= 
 1 
Units: Boards/Widget 
boards used per FG unit FAT= 
 1 
Units: Board/Widget 
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capacity FAT= 
 50000 
Units: Widget/Day 
capacity limit BP= 
 20000 
Units: Boards/Day 
capacity limit FAT= 
 MIN(capacity FAT,feasible production based on inventory FAT) 
Units: Widget/Day 
Change in Pink Noise = (White Noise - Pink Noise)/Noise Correlation 
Time
Units: 1/Day 
cum demand requested for the current day= INTEG ( 
 demand requested for the current day, 
  0) 
Units: Widgets 
cum orders not filled on time= INTEG ( 
 IF THEN ELSE((customer backlog/dimensional consistency 
day+inflow customer backlog 
-outflow customer backlog)>0, MIN(demand requested for the current 
day, customer backlog 
/dimensional consistency day+inflow customer backlog-outflow cus-
tomer backlog 
), 0), 
  0) 
Units: Widgets 
cum positive customer backlog= INTEG ( 
 positive customer backlog, 
  0) 
Units: Widget 
cum total total inventory cost= 
 total cumulated inventory cost BP+total cumulated inventory cost 
FAT+total cumulated inventory cost Sup 
+total cumulated inventory cost SWF 
Units: Dollars 
cumulated adjustment to inventory RM SWF= INTEG ( 
 adjustment to Inventory RM SWF, 
  0) 
Units: Widget 
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Cumulated emergency orders to account for Backlog SWF= INTEG ( 
 Emergency orders to account for Backlog SWF, 
  0) 
Units: Boards 
Cumulated Inventory Cost Boards FAT= INTEG ( 
 Inventory Cost Boards FAT, 
  0) 
Units: Dollars 
Cumulated Inventory Cost FG BP= INTEG ( 
 Inventory Cost FG BP, 
  0) 
Units: Dollars 
Cumulated Inventory Cost FG FAT= INTEG ( 
 Inventory Cost FG FAT, 
  0) 
Units: Dollars 
Cumulated Inventory Cost FG Sup= INTEG ( 
 Inventory Cost FG Sup, 
  0) 
Units: Dollars 
Cumulated Inventory Cost FG SWF= INTEG ( 
 Inventory Cost FG SWF, 
  0) 
Units: Dollars 
Cumulated Inventory Cost RM BP= INTEG ( 
 Inventory Cost RM BP, 
  0) 
Units: Dollars 
Cumulated Inventory Cost RM FAT= INTEG ( 
 Inventory Cost RM FAT, 
  0) 
Units: Dollars 
Cumulated Inventory Cost RM Sup= INTEG ( 
 Inventory Cost RM Sup, 
  0) 
Units: Dollars 
Cumulated Inventory Cost RM SWF= INTEG ( 
 Inventory Cost RM SWF, 
  0) 
Units: Dollars 
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Cumulated Inventory Cost WIP BP= INTEG ( 
 Inventory Cost WIP BP, 
  0) 
Units: Dollars 
Cumulated Inventory Cost WIP FAT= INTEG ( 
 Inventory Cost WIP FAT, 
  0) 
Units: Dollars 
Cumulated Inventory Cost WIP Sup= INTEG ( 
 Inventory Cost WIP Sup, 
  0) 
Units: Dollars 
Cumulated Inventory Cost WIP SWF= INTEG ( 
 Inventory Cost WIP SWF, 
  0) 
Units: Dollars 
customer backlog= INTEG ( 
 inflow customer backlog-outflow customer backlog, 
  0) 
Units: Widget 
delivery delay SWF= 
 ZIDZ(Backlog SWF, shipment rate SWF) 
Units: Days 
delivery performance to customer request= 
 XIDZ((cum demand requested for the current day-cum orders not 
filled on time 
), cum demand requested for the current day,1) 
Units: Dimensionless 
delivery time= 
 1 
Units: Days 
demand adj Cust 4 days ahead= DELAY FIXED ( 
 demand adj Cust 9 days ahead,5,demand adj Cust 9 days ahead) 
Units: Widget/Day 
demand adj Cust 9 days ahead= 
 MIN(demand Cust 9 days ahead,Market potential/delivery time) 
Units: Widgets/Day 
demand Cust 9 days ahead= 
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 input from excel file 9 days out*Input 
Units: Widgets/Day 
demand requested for the current day= DELAY FIXED ( 
  demand adj Cust 9 days ahead, 9, demand adj Cust 9 days ahead) 
Units: Widget/Day 
desired Backlog SWF= 
 0 
Units: Widgets 
desired days of stock SWF= 
 10 
Units: Days 
desired inventory RM SWF= 
 desired days of stock SWF*averaged demand requested for the cur-
rent week 36 day FC at SWF 
*materials used per FG unit SWF 
Units: material 
desired orders in production SWF= 
 MAX(0,Backlog SWF/minimum time to start production SWF+incoming 
production requests SWF 
)
Units: Widgets/Day 
desired production batched BP= 
 MAX(0, 
 IF THEN ELSE( 
      (INTEGER(((waiting for production BP/minimum time to start 
production BP 
+inflow waiting for production BP)/batch size BP))*batch size 
BP<largest possible RM outflow BP 
),
      (INTEGER(((waiting for production BP/minimum time to start 
production BP 
+inflow waiting for production BP)/batch size BP))*batch size BP),
      (INTEGER((largest possible RM outflow BP/batch size 
BP))*batch size BP 
)
 )*(1-probablity of problem BP) 
   ) 
Units: Boards/Day 
desired production Sup= 
 MIN(waiting for production Sup/dimensional consistency 
day+inflow waiting for production Sup 
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, Inventory RM Sup/materials used per FG unit Sup/dimensional con-
sistency day 
)
Units: Widget/Day 
dimensional consistency day= 
 1 
Units: Day 
emergency IC deliveries= 
 IF THEN ELSE(Emergency Inventory ICs at IC supplier/minimum 
shipment time from inventory emergency IC supplier 
>0, MIN(Backlog Emergency IC supplier/minimum shipment time from 
inventory emergency IC supplier 
, Emergency Inventory ICs at IC supplier/minimum shipment time from 
inventory emergency IC supplier 
), Emergency Inventory ICs at IC supplier/minimum shipment time 
from inventory emergency IC supplier 
)
Units: Materials/Day 
Emergency Inventory ICs at IC supplier= INTEG ( 
 +receiving rate ICs IC supplier-emergency IC deliveries, 
  initial level emergency inventory supplier) 
Units: Materials 
emergency material orders= 
 emergency orders placed at BP/boards per material 
Units: Materials/Day 
emergency orders placed at BP= 
 MAX(0,Emergency orders to account for Backlog SWF) 
Units: Boards/Day 
emergency orders placed at Sup= 
 MAX(0,Emergency orders to account for Backlog SWF) 
Units: Boards/Day 
Emergency orders to account for Backlog SWF= 
 switch emergency orders to account for Backlog SWF*MAX(0, ((gap 
desired BL and average BL SWF 
-(Cumulated emergency orders to account for Backlog SWF*switch con-
sider emergency orders already placed 
))/adjustment time for emergency orders SWF)) 
Units: Boards/Day 
expected emergency IC arrival rate BP= 
 DELAY3(emergency IC deliveries, shipment delay emergency IC de-
liveries)
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Units: material/Day 
expected material arrival rate BP= DELAY FIXED ( 
 material orders BP, expected order lead time BP, 0) 
Units: Materials/Day 
expected material arrival rate IC emergency supplies at IC supplier 
FG inventory 
= DELAY FIXED ( 
 emergency material orders, expected order lead time emergency 
ICs, 0) 
Units: Materials/Day 
expected material arrival rate Sup= DELAY FIXED ( 
 material orders Sup, expected order lead time Sup, 0) 
Units: Materials/Day 
expected order lead time BP= 
 46 
Units: Days 
expected order lead time emergency ICs= 
 15 
Units: Days 
expected order lead time Sup= 
 6 
Units: Days 
Feasible FG production SWF= 
 MIN(desired orders in production SWF, Inventory RM SWF/materials 
used per FG unit SWF 
/minimum time to start production SWF) 
Units: Widgets/Day 
feasible production based on inventory FAT= 
 MIN(Inventory Boards FAT/boards used per FG unit FAT, Inventory 
RM FAT/materials used per FG unit FAT 
)/minimum time to start production FAT 
Units: Widget/Day 
FINAL TIME  = 500 
 Units: Day 
forecast 36 days out:= 
 forecast 36 days out read from excel*systematic forecast error 
factor
Units: Widgets/Day 
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forecast 36 days out read from excel:= 
 GET XLS DATA('input.xls', 'input', 'B', 'D1') 
Units: Widget/Day 
forecast 36 days out shifted to match demand at SWF= DELAY FIXED ( 
 forecast 36 days out, 36, 0) 
Units: Widget/Day 
forecast 76 days out:= 
 forecast 76 days out read from excel*systematic forecast error 
factor
Units: Widgets/Day 
forecast 76 days out read from excel:= 
 GET XLS DATA('input.xls', 'input', 'B', 'E1') 
Units: Widget/Day 
forecast 76 days out shifted to match demand at SWF= DELAY FIXED ( 
 forecast 76 days out, 76, 0) 
Units: Widget/Day 
forecast for board printing SWF= 
 MAX( switch adjustment to forecast*adjusted forecast for BP by 
SWF, (1-switch adjustment to forecast 
)*forecast 76 days out 
 ) 
Units: Widgets/Day 
forecast for supplier SWF= 
 MAX(switch adjustment to forecast*adjusted forecast for supplier 
by SWF, ( 
1-switch adjustment to forecast)*forecast 36 days out) 
Units: Widgets/Day 
fractional difference demand and forecast for 36 days at SWF= 
 XIDZ(averaged demand requested for the current week 36 day FC at 
SWF, averaged forecast 36 days out shifted to match demand at 
SWF
, 1) 
Units: Dimensionless 
fractional difference demand and forecast for 76 days at SWF= 
 XIDZ(averaged demand requested for the current week 76 day FC at 
SWF, averaged forecast 76 days out shifted to match demand at 
SWF
, 1) 
Units: Dimensionless 
gap between desired inventory and average inventory RM SFW= 
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 (desired inventory RM SWF-average inventory RM SWF)/materials 
used per FG unit SWF 
Units: Widgets 
gap desired BL and average BL SWF= 
 (average Backlog SWF-desired Backlog SWF)*boards used per FG 
unit FAT 
Units: Boards 
incoming emergency IC orders= 
 emergency material orders 
Units: Materials/Day 
incoming forecast board orders BP= 
 ((forecast for board printing SWF*boards used per FG 
unit+emergency orders placed at BP 
))
Units: Boards/Day 
incoming order rate BP= 
 incoming forecast board orders BP 
Units: Boards/Day 
incoming order rate Sup= 
 (incoming orders Sup)/materials used per FG unit Sup 
Units: Widget/Day 
incoming orders Sup= 
 ((forecast for supplier SWF*materials per FG unit+emergency or-
ders placed at Sup 
/boards per material)) 
Units: material/Day 
incoming production requests SWF= 
 demand adj Cust 9 days ahead 
Units: Widget/Day 
inflow customer backlog= 
 demand requested for the current day 
Units: Widget/Day 
inflow waiting for production BP= 
 incoming order rate BP 
Units: Boards/Day 
inflow waiting for production FAT= 
 feasible production based on inventory FAT 
Units: Widget/Day 
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inflow waiting for production Sup= 
 incoming order rate Sup 
Units: Widget/Day 
ini installed base= 
 0 
Units: Widgets 
ini market potential= 
 7e+006 
Units: Widgets 
ini materials on order BP= 
 0 
Units: Materials 
ini materials on order Sup= 
 0 
Units: Materials 
initial Inventory Boards Man= 
 0 
Units: Boards 
initial inventory FG BP= 
 0 
Units: Boards 
initial inventory FG Man= 
 0 
Units: Widgets 
initial inventory FG Sup= 
 0 
Units: Widgets 
initial inventory FG SWF= 
 0 
Units: Widgets 
initial inventory RM BP= 
 0 
Units: Materials 
initial inventory RM FAT= 
 0 
Units: Materials 
initial inventory RM Sup= 
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 0 
Units: Materials 
initial inventory RM SWF= 
 0 
Units: material 
initial level emergency inventory supplier= 
 10000 
Units: Materials 
INITIAL TIME  = 0 
 Units: Day 
Input=
 MAX(0,  
 ( 
 1+STEP(Step Height,Step Time) 
 +STEP(Step2 Height,Step2 Time)+ 
 (Pulse Quantity/TIME STEP)*PULSE(Pulse Time,TIME STEP)+ 
 RAMP(Ramp Slope,Ramp Start Time,Ramp End Time)+ 
 Sine Amplitude*SIN(2*3.14159*Time/Sine Period)+ 
 (Life Cycle Test Input*switch Life Cycle Test Input)+ 
    STEP(1,Noise Start Time)*Pink Noise 
 ) 
  ) 
Units: Dimensionless 
input from excel file 9 days out:= 
 GET XLS DATA('input.xls', 'input', 'B', 'C1') 
Units: Widget/Day 
input from excel shifted to be demand requested for the current 
week:=
 TIME SHIFT(input from excel file 9 days out, -9) 
Units: Widget/Day 
Installed base= INTEG ( 
 demand adj Cust 9 days ahead, 
  ini installed base) 
Units: Widgets 
inventory adjustment time SWF= 
 30 
Units: Day 
Inventory Boards FAT= INTEG ( 
 +receiving rate Boards FAT-outgoing rate Boards FAT, 
  initial Inventory Boards Man) 
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Units: Boards 
Inventory Cost Boards FAT= 
 inventory cost per unit Boards FAT*Inventory Boards FAT 
Units: Dollars/Day 
Inventory Cost FG BP= 
 inventory cost per unit FG BP*Inventory FG BP 
Units: Dollars/Day 
Inventory Cost FG FAT= 
 inventory cost per unit FG FAT*Inventory FG FAT 
Units: Dollars/Day 
Inventory Cost FG Sup= 
 inventory cost per unit FG Sup*Inventory FG Sup 
Units: Dollars/Day 
Inventory Cost FG SWF= 
 inventory cost per unit FG SWF*Inventory FG SWF 
Units: Dollars/Day 
inventory cost per unit Boards FAT= 
 0.5 
Units: Dollars/Board/Day 
inventory cost per unit FG BP= 
 0.5 
Units: Dollars/Board/Day 
inventory cost per unit FG FAT= 
 0.9 
Units: Dollars/Widget/Day 
inventory cost per unit FG Sup= 
 0.2 
Units: Dollars/Widget/Day 
inventory cost per unit FG SWF= 
 1 
Units: Dollars/Widget/Day 
inventory cost per unit RM BP= 
 0.45 
Units: Dollars/Materials/Day 
inventory cost per unit RM FAT= 
 0.2 
Units: Dollars/Materials/Day 
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inventory cost per unit RM Sup= 
 0.1 
Units: Dollars/Materials/Day 
inventory cost per unit RM SWF= 
 0.9 
Units: Dollars/Materials/Day 
inventory cost per unit WIP BP= 
 0.45 
Units: Dollars/Boards/Day 
inventory cost per unit WIP FAT= 
 0.7 
Units: Dollars/Widget/Day 
inventory cost per unit WIP Sup= 
 0.2 
Units: Dollars/Widget/Day 
inventory cost per unit WIP SWF= 
 0.9 
Units: Dollars/Widget/Day 
Inventory Cost RM BP= 
 inventory cost per unit RM BP*Inventory RM BP 
Units: Dollars/Day 
Inventory Cost RM FAT= 
 inventory cost per unit RM FAT*Inventory RM FAT 
Units: Dollars/Day 
Inventory Cost RM Sup= 
 inventory cost per unit RM Sup*Inventory RM Sup 
Units: Dollars/Day 
Inventory Cost RM SWF= 
 inventory cost per unit RM SWF*Inventory RM SWF 
Units: Dollars/Day 
Inventory Cost WIP BP= 
 inventory cost per unit WIP BP*Inventory WIP BP var 
Units: Dollars/Day 
Inventory Cost WIP FAT= 
 inventory cost per unit WIP FAT*Inventory WIP Man var 
Units: Dollars/Day 
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Inventory Cost WIP Sup= 
 inventory cost per unit WIP Sup*Inventory WIP Sup var 
Units: Dollars/Day 
Inventory Cost WIP SWF= 
 inventory cost per unit WIP SWF*Inventory WIP SWF var 
Units: Dollars/Day 
Inventory FG BP= INTEG ( 
 +production rate BP-shipment rate BP, 
  initial inventory FG BP) 
Units: Boards 
Inventory FG FAT= INTEG ( 
 product completions FAT-shipment rate FAT, 
  initial inventory FG Man) 
Units: Widgets 
Inventory FG Sup= INTEG ( 
 product completions FG Sup-shipment rate Sup, 
  initial inventory FG Sup) 
Units: Widget 
Inventory FG SWF= INTEG ( 
 product completions SWF-shipment rate SWF, 
  initial inventory FG SWF) 
Units: Widgets 
Inventory RM BP= INTEG ( 
 +receiving rate RM BP-(desired production batched BP/boards per 
material),
  initial inventory RM BP) 
Units: Materials 
Inventory RM FAT= INTEG ( 
 +receiving rate RM FAT-outgoing rate RM FAT, 
  initial inventory RM FAT) 
Units: Materials 
Inventory RM Sup= INTEG ( 
 +receiving rate RM Sup-outgoing rate RM Sup, 
  initial inventory RM Sup) 
Units: Materials 
Inventory RM SWF= INTEG ( 
 -outgoing rate RM SWF+receiving rate RM SWF, 
  initial inventory RM SWF) 
Units: Materials 
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inventory turns= 
 ZIDZ(cum demand requested for the current day,average total in-
ventory cost over time 
)
Units: Day*Widget/Dollars 
Inventory WIP BP  =
#LV3<DELAYP(desiredproductionbatchedBP,productiontimeBP:Inventor
yWIPBP)#
             + 
#LV2<DELAYP(desiredproductionbatchedBP,productiontimeBP:Inventor
yWIPBP)#
             + 
#LV1<DELAYP(desiredproductionbatchedBP,productiontimeBP:Inventor
yWIPBP)#
 Units: Board 
Inventory WIP BP var= 
 Inventory WIP BP 
Units: Boards 
Inventory WIP Man  =
#LV3<DELAYP(productionstartsFAT,productiontimeFAT:InventoryWIPMa
n)#
             + 
#LV2<DELAYP(productionstartsFAT,productiontimeFAT:InventoryWIPMa
n)#
             + 
#LV1<DELAYP(productionstartsFAT,productiontimeFAT:InventoryWIPMa
n)#
 Units: Widget 
Inventory WIP Man var= 
 Inventory WIP Man 
Units: Widget 
Inventory WIP Sup  =
#LV3<DELAYP(outgoingrateRMSup/materialsusedperFGunitSup,producti
ontimeSup:InventoryWIPSup)#
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             + 
#LV2<DELAYP(outgoingrateRMSup/materialsusedperFGunitSup,producti
ontimeSup:InventoryWIPSup)#
             + 
#LV1<DELAYP(outgoingrateRMSup/materialsusedperFGunitSup,producti
ontimeSup:InventoryWIPSup)#
 Units: Widget 
Inventory WIP Sup var= 
 Inventory WIP Sup 
Units: Widgets 
Inventory WIP SWF  =
#LV3<DELAYP(FeasibleFGproductionSWF,productiontimeSWF:InventoryW
IPSWF)#
             + 
#LV2<DELAYP(FeasibleFGproductionSWF,productiontimeSWF:InventoryW
IPSWF)#
             + 
#LV1<DELAYP(FeasibleFGproductionSWF,productiontimeSWF:InventoryW
IPSWF)#
 Units: Widget 
Inventory WIP SWF var= 
 Inventory WIP SWF 
Units: Widget 
largest possible RM outflow BP= 
 MIN(capacity limit BP, Inventory RM BP/materials used per FG 
unit BP/minimum time to start production BP 
)
Units: Boards/Day 
Life Cycle Test Input= 
 lkup Life Cycle Test Input and forecast for demand nine days 
ahead(Time/FINAL TIME 
)-1
Units: Dimensionless 
lkup Life Cycle Test Input and forecast for demand nine days ahead( 
 [(0,0)-
(1,2)],(0,0),(0.18,0),(0.256881,0.298246),(0.30581,0.684211),(0.
324159
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,0.95614),(0.376147,1.38596),(0.434251,1.62281),(0.498471,1.7077),(
0.547401
,1.67544),(0.587156,1.57018),(0.623853,1.34211),(0.703364,0.54386),
(0.730887
,0.280702),(0.782,0),(1,0),(1,0))
Units: Dimensionless 
lkup Life Cycle Test Input PLC standard( 
 [(0,0)-
(1,2)],(0,0),(0.185,0),(0.259939,1.21053),(0.293578,1.7193),(0.3
21101
,1.87719),(0.357798,1.95614),(0.415902,2),(0.440367,1.95614),(0.477
064,1.85965
),(0.508235,1.62989),(0.569412,1.21708),(0.651765,0.733096),(0.7364
71,0.362989
),(0.835294,0.0711744),(0.938824,0),(1,0))
Units: Dimensionless 
lkup Life Cycle Test Input SCENARIO 1( 
 [(0,0)-
(1,2)],(0,0),(0.185,0),(0.259939,1.21053),(0.293578,1.7193),(0.3
21101
,1.87719),(0.357798,1.95614),(0.415902,2),(0.461774,1.95614),(0.516
82,1.81579
),(0.571865,1.5614),(0.626911,1.19298),(0.66055,0.929825),(0.697248
,0.578947
),(0.752294,0.27193),(0.834862,0.114035),(0.938824,0),(1,0))
Units: Dimensionless 
lkup Life Cycle Test Input simple v01( 
 [(0,0)-
(1,2)],(0,0),(0.185,0),(0.185,2),(0.504587,2),(0.504587,0),(0.93
8824
,0),(1,0))
Units: Dimensionless 
lkup Life Cycle Test Input simple v02( 
 [(0,0)-
(1,2)],(0,0),(0.185,0),(0.185,0.5),(0.287462,0.5),(0.504587,2),(
0.504587
,0),(0.938824,0),(1,0))
Units: Dimensionless 
lkup Life Cycle Test Input simple v03( 
 [(0,0)-
(1,2)],(0,0),(0.185,0),(0.185,0.5),(0.287462,0.5),(0.504587,2),(
0.9388
,2),(0.938824,0),(1,0))
Units: Dimensionless 
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lkup probability of problem BP( 
 [(0,0)-
(1,2)],(0,0),(0.185,0),(0.259939,0),(0.499,0),(0.5,1),(0.519,1),
(0.52
,0),(1,0))
Units: Dimensionless 
lkup probability of problem Sup( 
 [(0,0)-
(1,2)],(0,0),(0.185,0),(0.259939,0),(0.3,0),(0.301,1),(0.302,0),
(1,
0))
Units: Dimensionless 
Market potential= INTEG ( 
 -demand adj Cust 9 days ahead, 
  ini market potential) 
Units: Widgets 
material arrival rate BP= 
 receiving rate RM BP 
Units: Materials/Day 
material arrival rate Sup= 
 receiving rate RM Sup 
Units: Materials/Day 
material order rate BP= 
 emergency material orders+material orders BP 
Units: Materials/Day 
material order rate Sup= 
 material orders Sup 
Units: Materials/Day 
material orders BP= 
 MAX(0,  forecast for board printing SWF*materials per FG unit) 
Units: Materials/Day 
material orders Sup= 
 MAX(0,incoming orders Sup) 
Units: Materials/Day 
materials from Sup needed for a RM FAT= 
 1 
Units: material/Widget 
Materials on order BP= INTEG ( 
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 +material order rate BP-material arrival rate BP, 
  ini materials on order BP) 
Units: Materials 
Materials on order Sup= INTEG ( 
 +material order rate Sup-material arrival rate Sup, 
  ini materials on order Sup) 
Units: Materials 
materials per FG unit= 
 1 
Units: material/Widget 
materials used per FG unit BP= 
 1 
Units: Materials/Board 
materials used per FG unit FAT= 
 1 
Units: Materials/Widget 
materials used per FG unit Sup= 
 1 
Units: Materials/Widget 
materials used per FG unit SWF= 
 1 
Units: material/Widget 
mean of input data from excel 9 days out= 
 GET DATA MEAN(input from excel file 9 days out, 91, 413) 
Units: Widget/Day 
minimum shipment time from inventory emergency IC supplier= 
 1 
Units: Days 
minimum time to start production BP= 
 1 
Units: Day 
minimum time to start production FAT= 
 1 
Units: Day 
minimum time to start production SWF= 
 1 
Units: Day 
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Noise Correlation Time = 4 
Units: Day 
NOISE SEED= 
 1 
Units: Dimensionless 
Noise Standard Deviation= 
 0.8 
Units: Dimensionless 
Noise Start Time= 
 92 
Units: Day 
order fulfillment rate BP= 
 shipment rate BP 
Units: Boards/Day 
order fulfillment rate Sup= 
 shipment rate Sup 
Units: Widgets/Day 
outflow customer backlog= 
 receiving rate Cust 
Units: Widgets/Day 
outgoing rate Boards FAT= 
 MAX(0,production starts FAT*boards used per FG unit FAT) 
Units: Boards/Day 
outgoing rate RM FAT= 
 MAX(0,production starts FAT*materials used per FG unit FAT) 
Units: Materials/Day 
outgoing rate RM Sup= 
 MAX(0,IF THEN ELSE(desired production Sup*materials used per FG 
unit Sup>Inventory RM Sup 
/dimensional consistency day 
 , Inventory RM Sup/dimensional consistency day, desired produc-
tion Sup*materials used per FG unit Sup 
))
Units: Materials/Day 
outgoing rate RM SWF= 
 MAX(0,Feasible FG production SWF*materials used per FG unit SWF) 
Units: Materials/Day 
Pink Noise = INTEG(Change in Pink Noise,0) 
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Units: Dimensionless 
positive customer backlog= 
 MAX(0,customer backlog/dimensional consistency day) 
Units: Widget/Day 
probablity of problem BP= 
 lkup probability of problem BP(Time/FINAL TIME)*switch probabil-
ity of problem BP 
Units: Dimensionless 
probablity of problem Sup= 
 lkup probability of problem Sup(Time/FINAL TIME)*switch prob-
ability of problem Sup 
Units: Dimensionless 
product completions FAT= 
 MAX(0,DELAYP(production starts FAT, production time FAT : Inven-
tory WIP Man 
 )) 
Units: Widget/Day 
product completions FG Sup= 
 DELAYP(outgoing rate RM Sup/materials used per FG unit Sup, pro-
duction time Sup 
 : Inventory WIP Sup ) 
Units: Widget/Day 
product completions SWF= 
 DELAYP(Feasible FG production SWF, production time SWF : Inven-
tory WIP SWF 
)
Units: Widgets/Day 
production rate BP= 
 DELAYP(desired production batched BP, production time BP : In-
ventory WIP BP 
 ) 
Units: Boards/Day 
production starts FAT= 
 MAX(0, 
 MIN(waiting for production FAT/minimum time to start production 
FAT+inflow waiting for production FAT 
, capacity limit FAT) 
 ) 
Units: Widget/Day 
production starts SWF= 
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 Feasible FG production SWF 
Units: Widgets/Day 
production time BP= 
 4 
Units: Days 
production time FAT= 
 4 
Units: Days 
production time Sup= 
 4 
Units: Days 
production time SWF= 
 4 
Units: Days 
Pulse Quantity= 
 0 
Units: Dimensionless*Day 
Pulse Time= 
 50 
Units: Day 
pulse train duration= 
 1 
Units: Day 
pulse train end= 
 500 
Units: Day 
Pulse Train Input= 
 PULSE TRAIN(pulse train start, pulse train duration , pulse 
train repeattime 
 , pulse train end ) 
Units: Dimensionless 
pulse train repeattime= 
 5 
Units: Days 
pulse train start= 
 0 
Units: Day 
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Ramp End Time= 
 150 
Units: Day 
Ramp Slope= 
 0 
Units: 1/Day 
Ramp Start Time= 
 92 
Units: Day 
receiving rate Boards FAT= 
 DELAY3(shipment rate BP,shipment delay BP) 
Units: Boards/Day 
receiving rate Cust= 
 DELAY3(shipment rate SWF,shipment delay SWF) 
Units: Widget/Day 
receiving rate ICs IC supplier= 
 expected material arrival rate IC emergency supplies at IC sup-
plier FG inventory 
Units: material/Day 
receiving rate RM BP= 
 expected material arrival rate BP+expected emergency IC arrival 
rate BP 
Units: Materials/Day 
receiving rate RM FAT= 
 DELAY3(shipment rate Sup,shipment delay Sup)*materials from Sup 
needed for a RM FAT 
Units: Materials/Day 
receiving rate RM Sup= 
 expected material arrival rate Sup 
Units: Materials/Day 
receiving rate RM SWF= 
 DELAY3(shipment rate FAT*materials used per FG unit SWF,shipment 
delay FAT 
)
Units: Materials/Day 
SAVEPER  =
        TIME STEP
 Units: Day 
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shipment delay BP= 
 4 
Units: Days 
shipment delay emergency IC deliveries= 
 4 
Units: Days 
shipment delay FAT= 
 4 
Units: Days 
shipment delay Sup= 
 4 
Units: Days 
shipment delay SWF= 
 4 
Units: Days 
shipment rate BP= 
 Inventory FG BP/dimensional consistency day 
Units: Boards/Day 
shipment rate FAT= 
 Inventory FG FAT/dimensional consistency day 
Units: Widgets/Day 
shipment rate Sup= 
 Inventory FG Sup/dimensional consistency day 
Units: Widget/Day 
shipment rate SWF= 
 Inventory FG SWF/dimensional consistency day 
Units: Widgets/Day 
Sine Amplitude= 
 0 
Units: Dimensionless 
Sine Period=50 
Units: Days 
stddev of input data from excel 9 days out= 
 GET DATA STDV( input from excel file 9 days out, 91, 413) 
Units: Widget/Day 
Step Height= 
 0 
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Units: Dimensionless 
Step Time= 
 0 
Units: Day 
Step2 Height= 
 0 
Units: Dimensionless 
Step2 Time= 
 91 
Units: Days 
switch adjustment to forecast= 
 1 
Units: Dimensionless 
switch adjustment to Inventory RM SWF= 
 1 
Units: Dimensionless 
switch consider emergency orders already placed= 
 0 
Units: Dimensionless 
switch emergency orders to account for Backlog BP setup D= 
 1 
Units: Dimensionless 
switch emergency orders to account for Backlog SWF= 
 1 
Units: Dimensionless 
switch Life Cycle Test Input= 
 0 
Units: Dimensionless 
switch probability of problem BP= 
 0 
Units: Dimensionless 
switch probability of problem Sup= 
 0 
Units: Dimensionless 
switch to consider cum adj to inventory RM SWF= 
 0 
Units: Dimensionless 
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systematic forecast error factor= 
 1 
Units: Dimensionless 
time base week= 
 TIME BASE(0, 0.2 ) 
Units: Dimensionless 
TIME STEP  = 0.25 
 Units: Day 
total cumulated inventory cost BP= 
 Cumulated Inventory Cost FG BP+Cumulated Inventory Cost RM 
BP+Cumulated Inventory Cost WIP BP 
Units: Dollars 
total cumulated inventory cost FAT= 
 Cumulated Inventory Cost FG FAT+Cumulated Inventory Cost Boards 
FAT+Cumulated Inventory Cost WIP FAT 
+Cumulated Inventory Cost RM FAT 
Units: Dollars 
total cumulated inventory cost Sup= 
 Cumulated Inventory Cost FG Sup+Cumulated Inventory Cost RM 
Sup+Cumulated Inventory Cost WIP Sup 
Units: Dollars 
total cumulated inventory cost SWF= 
 Cumulated Inventory Cost FG SWF+Cumulated Inventory Cost RM 
SWF+Cumulated Inventory Cost WIP SWF 
Units: Dollars 
total inventory cost BP= 
 Inventory Cost FG BP+Inventory Cost RM BP+Inventory Cost WIP BP 
Units: Dollars/Day 
total inventory cost FAT= 
 Inventory Cost FG FAT+Inventory Cost Boards FAT+Inventory Cost 
WIP FAT+Inventory Cost RM FAT 
Units: Dollars/Day 
total inventory cost Sup= 
 Inventory Cost FG Sup+Inventory Cost RM Sup+Inventory Cost WIP 
Sup
Units: Dollars/Day 
total inventory cost SWF= 
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 Inventory Cost FG SWF+Inventory Cost RM SWF+Inventory Cost WIP 
SWF
Units: Dollars/Day 
Total products shipped to Cust= INTEG ( 
 receiving rate Cust, 
  0) 
Units: Widgets 
waiting for production BP= INTEG ( 
 +inflow waiting for production BP-desired production batched BP, 
  0) 
Units: Boards 
waiting for production FAT= INTEG ( 
 +inflow waiting for production FAT-production starts FAT, 
  0) 
Units: Widgets 
waiting for production Sup= INTEG ( 
 +inflow waiting for production Sup-desired production Sup, 
  0) 
Units: Widget 
White Noise= 
 Noise Standard Deviation*((24*Noise Correlation Time/TIME 
STEP)^0.5*(RANDOM UNIFORM 
(0, 1, NOISE SEED) - 0.5 
 )) 
Units: Dimensionless 
III. Listing of Model Equations: Pull 
acclength FAT= 
  10 
 Units: Days 
acclength SWF= 
 10 
Units: Days 
adjusted forecast sent to BP by SWF= 
 MAX(0,((forecast 76 days out*adjustment to demand for BP SWF))) 
Units: Widget/Day 
adjusted forecast sent to supplier by SWF= 
 MAX(0, ((forecast 36 days out*adjustment to demand for Sup 
SWF)))
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Units: Widget/Day 
adjustment for difference demand and forecast BP= 
 (((difference demand and forecast for 75 days BP*materials used 
per FG unit Sup 
*dimensional consistency day 
 ))/dimensional consistency day)*switch adjustmentfor difference 
demand and forecast BP 
Units: material/Day 
adjustment for difference demand and forecast Sup= 
 (((difference demand and forecast for 35 days Sup*materials used 
per FG unit Sup 
)))        *switch adjustmentfor difference demand and forecast Sup 
Units: material/Day 
adjustment time for emergency orders SWF= 
 36 
Units: Day 
adjustment to demand for BP SWF= 
 MIN(fractional difference demand and forecast for 76 days at 
SWF, 1+XIDZ(averaged demand requested for the current week 76 
day FC at SWF 
, forecast 76 days out, 0)) 
Units: Dimensionless 
adjustment to demand for Sup SWF= 
 MIN(fractional difference demand and forecast for 36 days at 
SWF, 1+XIDZ(averaged demand requested for the current week 36 
day FC at SWF 
, forecast 36 days out, 0)) 
Units: Dimensionless 
adjustment to desired material order rate BP= 
 0+STEP( adjustment for difference demand and forecast 
BP+adjustment to Inventory RM BP 
, starting time for forecast adjustments BP) 
Units: Materials/Day 
adjustment to desired material order rate Sup= 
 0+STEP(adjustment for difference demand and forecast 
Sup+adjustment to Inventory RM Sup 
, starting time for forecast adjustments Sup) 
Units: material/Day 
adjustment to Inventory RM BP= 
 ((gap between desired inventory and average inventory RM BP-
(cumulated adjustment to inventory RM BP 
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*switch to consider cum adj to inventory RM BP)) 
 /inventory adjustment time BP) 
 *switch adjustment to Inventory RM BP 
Units: Materials/Day 
adjustment to Inventory RM Sup= 
 ((gap between desired inventory and average inventory RM Sup-
(cumulated adjustment to inventory RM Sup 
*switch to consider cum adj to inventory RM Sup)) 
 /inventory adjustment time Sup) 
 *switch adjustment to Inventory RM Sup 
Units: material/Day 
average Backlog SWF= 
 SMOOTH(Backlog SWF,averaging time backlog SWF) 
Units: Widgets 
average cum positive customer backlog= 
 ZIDZ(cum positive customer backlog, Time-150) 
Units: Widget/Day 
average inventory RM BP= 
 smooth3(Inventory RM BP,inventory adjustment time BP) 
Units: Materials 
average inventory RM Sup= 
 smooth3(Inventory RM Sup, inventory adjustment time Sup) 
Units: Materials 
average total inventory cost over time= 
 ZIDZ(cum total total inventory cost, Time) 
Units: Dollars/Day 
averaged demand requested for the current week 36 day FC at SWF= 
 SMOOTH(demand requested for the current day, averaging time ad-
justment for difference demand and 36 day forecast SWF 
)
Units: Widget/Day 
averaged demand requested for the current week 76 day FC at SWF= 
 SMOOTH(demand requested for the current day, averaging time ad-
justment for difference demand and 76 day forecast SWF 
)
Units: Widget/Day 
averaged demand requested for the current week BP= 
 SMOOTH(incoming order rate BP/boards used per FG unit FAT, aver-
aging time adjustment for difference demand and forecast BP 
)
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Units: Widget/Day 
averaged demand requested for the current week Sup= 
 SMOOTH(incoming order rate Sup, averaging time adjustment for 
difference demand and forecast Sup 
)
Units: Widget/Day 
averaged forecast 35 days out delayed to match demand= 
 SMOOTH(forecast 35 days out shifted to match demand, averaging 
time adjustment for difference demand and forecast Sup 
)
Units: Widget/Day 
averaged forecast 36 days out shifted to match demand at SWF= 
 SMOOTH(forecast 36 days out shifted to match demand at SWF, av-
eraging time adjustment for difference demand and 36 day fore-
cast SWF 
)
Units: Widget/Day 
averaged forecast 75 days out delayed to match demand= 
 SMOOTH(forecast 75 days out shifted to match demand, averaging 
time adjustment for difference demand and forecast BP 
)
Units: Widget/Day 
averaged forecast 76 days out shifted to match demand at SWF= 
 SMOOTH(forecast 76 days out shifted to match demand at SWF, av-
eraging time adjustment for difference demand and 76 day fore-
cast SWF 
)
Units: Widget/Day 
averaging time adjustment for difference demand and 36 day forecast 
SWF=
 10 
Units: Day 
averaging time adjustment for difference demand and 76 day forecast 
SWF=
 10 
Units: Day 
averaging time adjustment for difference demand and forecast BP= 
 5 
Units: Day 
averaging time adjustment for difference demand and forecast Sup= 
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 5 
Units: Day 
averaging time backlog SWF= 
 14 
Units: Days 
averaging time FAT= 
 5 
Units: Days 
avg cum sq diff demand and FC for 35 days setup A= 
 ZIDZ(cumulated sq diff demand and FC for 35 days setup A, Time) 
Units: Dimensionless 
avg cum sq diff demand and FC for 75 days setup A 0= 
 ZIDZ(cumulated sq diff demand and FC for 75 days setup A 0, 
Time)
Units: Dimensionless 
avg forecast demand during LT materials SWF= 
 forecast demand in materials LT SWF/lead time materials SWF 
Units: material/Day 
Backlog BP= INTEG ( 
 incoming order rate BP-order fulfillment rate BP, 
  0) 
Units: Boards 
Backlog Emergency IC supplier= INTEG ( 
 +incoming emergency IC orders-backlog reduction emergency IC 
supplier,
  0) 
Units: Materials 
Backlog FAT= INTEG ( 
 incoming order rate FAT-order fulfillment rate FAT, 
  0) 
Units: Widgets 
backlog reduction emergency IC supplier= 
 emergency IC deliveries 
Units: Materials/Day 
Backlog Sup= INTEG ( 
 incoming order rate Sup-order fulfillment rate Sup, 
  0) 
Units: Widgets 
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Backlog SWF= INTEG ( 
 incoming production requests SWF-production starts SWF, 
  0) 
Units: Widgets 
batch size BP= 
 5000 
Units: Boards/Day 
board arrival rate FAT= 
 receiving rate Boards FAT 
Units: Boards/Day 
board orders FAT= 
 MAX(0,orders boards FAT) 
Units: Boards/Day 
Boards on order FAT= INTEG ( 
 +board orders FAT-board arrival rate FAT+Emergency orders to 
account for Backlog SWF 
,
  ini boards on order FAT) 
Units: Boards 
boards per material= 
 1 
Units: Boards/Materials 
boards used per FG unit FAT= 
 1 
Units: Board/Widget 
capacity FAT= 
 50000 
Units: Widget/Day 
capacity limit BP= 
 20000 
Units: Boards/Day 
capacity limit FAT= 
 MIN(capacity FAT,feasible FG production based on inventory FAT) 
Units: Widget/Day 
Change in Pink Noise = (White Noise - Pink Noise)/Noise Correlation 
Time
Units: 1/Day 
counter annual acc FAT= 
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 AnnualAccumulation(pick FAT,acclength FAT,Time,TIME STEP) 
Units: Dmnl 
counter annual acc SWF= 
 AnnualAccumulation(pick SWF,acclength SWF,Time,TIME STEP) 
Units: Dmnl 
cum demand requested for the current day= INTEG ( 
 demand requested for the current day, 
  0) 
Units: Widget 
cum orders not filled on time= INTEG ( 
 IF THEN ELSE((customer backlog/dimensional consistency 
day+inflow customer backlog 
-outflow customer backlog)>0, MIN(demand requested for the current 
day, customer backlog 
/dimensional consistency day+inflow customer backlog-outflow cus-
tomer backlog 
), 0), 
  0) 
Units: Widgets 
cum positive customer backlog= INTEG ( 
 positive customer backlog, 
  0) 
Units: Widget 
cum positive customer backlog for optimization= 
 IF THEN ELSE(Time > FINAL TIME-TIME STEP/2, cum positive cus-
tomer backlog, 
 0) 
Units: Widgets 
cum total total inventory cost= 
 total cumulated inventory cost BP+total cumulated inventory cost 
FAT+total cumulated inventory cost Sup 
+total cumulated inventory cost SWF 
Units: Dollars 
cum total total inventory cost for optimization= 
 IF THEN ELSE(Time > FINAL TIME-TIME STEP/2, cum total total in-
ventory cost 
, 0) 
Units: Dollars 
cumulated adjustment for difference demand and forecast BP= INTEG ( 
 adjustment for difference demand and forecast BP, 
  0) 
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Units: Materials 
cumulated adjustment for difference demand and forecast Sup= INTEG 
(
 adjustment for difference demand and forecast Sup, 
  0) 
Units: material 
cumulated adjustment to inventory RM BP= INTEG ( 
 adjustment to Inventory RM BP, 
  0) 
Units: Materials 
cumulated adjustment to inventory RM Sup= INTEG ( 
 adjustment to Inventory RM Sup, 
  0) 
Units: Materials 
Cumulated emergency orders to account for Backlog SWF= INTEG ( 
 Emergency orders to account for Backlog SWF, 
  0) 
Units: Boards 
Cumulated Inventory Cost Boards FAT= INTEG ( 
 Inventory Cost Boards FAT, 
  0) 
Units: Dollars 
Cumulated Inventory Cost FG BP= INTEG ( 
 Inventory Cost FG BP, 
  0) 
Units: Dollars 
Cumulated Inventory Cost FG FAT= INTEG ( 
 Inventory Cost FG FAT, 
  0) 
Units: Dollars 
Cumulated Inventory Cost FG Sup= INTEG ( 
 Inventory Cost FG Sup, 
  0) 
Units: Dollars 
Cumulated Inventory Cost FG SWF= INTEG ( 
 Inventory Cost FG SWF, 
  0) 
Units: Dollars 
Cumulated Inventory Cost RM BP= INTEG ( 
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 Inventory Cost RM BP, 
  0) 
Units: Dollars 
Cumulated Inventory Cost RM FAT= INTEG ( 
 Inventory Cost RM FAT, 
  0) 
Units: Dollars 
Cumulated Inventory Cost RM Sup= INTEG ( 
 Inventory Cost RM Sup, 
  0) 
Units: Dollars 
Cumulated Inventory Cost RM SWF= INTEG ( 
 Inventory Cost RM SWF, 
  0) 
Units: Dollars 
Cumulated Inventory Cost WIP BP= INTEG ( 
 Inventory Cost WIP BP, 
  0) 
Units: Dollars 
Cumulated Inventory Cost WIP FAT= INTEG ( 
 Inventory Cost WIP FAT, 
  0) 
Units: Dollars 
Cumulated Inventory Cost WIP Sup= INTEG ( 
 Inventory Cost WIP Sup, 
  0) 
Units: Dollars 
Cumulated Inventory Cost WIP SWF= INTEG ( 
 Inventory Cost WIP SWF, 
  0) 
Units: Dollars 
cumulated sq diff demand and FC for 35 days setup A= INTEG ( 
 squared diff demand and FC for 35 days setup A 0 0, 
  0) 
Units: Day 
cumulated sq diff demand and FC for 75 days setup A 0= INTEG ( 
 squared diff demand and FC for 75 days setup A 0, 
  0) 
Units: Day 
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customer backlog= INTEG ( 
 inflow customer backlog-outflow customer backlog, 
  0) 
Units: Widget 
delay fixed 10 cum sq diff demand and FC for 35 days setup= 
 DELAY FIXED(cumulated sq diff demand and FC for 35 days setup A, 
10, 0) 
Units: Day 
delivery delay SWF= 
 ZIDZ(Backlog SWF, shipment rate SWF) 
Units: Days 
delivery performance to customer request= 
 XIDZ((cum demand requested for the current day-cum orders not 
filled on time 
), cum demand requested for the current day,1) 
Units: Dimensionless 
delivery time= 
 1 
Units: Days 
demand adj Cust 4 days ahead= DELAY FIXED ( 
 demand adj Cust 9 days ahead,5,demand adj Cust 9 days ahead) 
Units: Widget/Day 
demand adj Cust 9 days ahead= 
 MIN(demand Cust 9 days ahead,Market potential/delivery time) 
Units: Widgets/Day 
demand Cust 9 days ahead= 
 input from excel file 9 days out*Input 
Units: Widgets/Day 
demand requested for the current day= DELAY FIXED ( 
  demand adj Cust 9 days ahead, 9, demand adj Cust 9 days ahead) 
Units: Widget/Day 
desired Backlog SWF= 
 0 
Units: Widgets 
desired days of stock BP= 
 10 
Units: Days 
desired days of stock Sup= 
331 
 10 
Units: Days 
desired Inventory RM BP= 
 desired days of stock BP*averaged demand requested for the cur-
rent week BP 
*materials used per FG unit SWF 
Units: material 
desired Inventory RM Sup= 
 desired days of stock Sup*averaged demand requested for the cur-
rent week Sup 
*materials used per FG unit Sup 
Units: Materials 
desired orders in production SWF= 
 MAX(0,Backlog SWF/minimum time to start production SWF+incoming 
production requests SWF 
)
Units: Widgets/Day 
desired production batched BP= 
 MAX(0, 
 IF THEN ELSE( 
      (INTEGER(((waiting for production BP/minimum time to start 
production BP 
+inflow waiting for production BP)/batch size BP))*batch size 
BP<largest possible RM outflow BP 
),
      (INTEGER(((waiting for production BP/minimum time to start 
production BP 
+inflow waiting for production BP)/batch size BP))*batch size BP),
      (INTEGER((largest possible RM outflow BP/batch size 
BP))*batch size BP 
)
 )*(1-probablity of problem BP) 
   ) 
Units: Boards/Day 
desired production FAT= 
 MAX(0, 
 MIN(waiting for production FAT/minimum time to start production 
FAT+inflow waiting for production FAT 
, capacity limit FAT) 
 ) 
Units: Widget/Day 
desired production Sup= 
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 MIN(waiting for production Sup/dimensional consistency 
day+inflow waiting for production Sup 
, Inventory RM Sup/materials used per FG unit Sup/dimensional con-
sistency day 
)
Units: Widget/Day 
diff=
 (cumulated sq diff demand and FC for 35 days setup A-delay fixed 
10 cum sq diff demand and FC for 35 days setup 
)/10
Units: Day 
difference demand and forecast for 35 days Sup= 
 averaged demand requested for the current week Sup-averaged 
forecast 35 days out delayed to match demand 
Units: Widget/Day 
difference demand and forecast for 36 days SWF= 
 averaged demand requested for the current week 36 day FC at SWF-
averaged forecast 36 days out shifted to match demand at SWF 
Units: Widget/Day 
difference demand and forecast for 75 days BP= 
 averaged demand requested for the current week BP-averaged fore-
cast 75 days out delayed to match demand 
Units: Widget/Day 
difference demand and forecast for 76 days SWF= 
 averaged demand requested for the current week 76 day FC at SWF-
averaged forecast 76 days out shifted to match demand at SWF 
Units: Widget/Day 
dimensional consistency day= 
 1 
Units: Day 
dimensional consistency days per widget= 
 1 
Units: Days/Widget 
dimensional difference demand and forecast for 35 days Sup= 
 difference demand and forecast for 35 days Sup*dimensional con-
sistency days per widget 
Units: Dimensionless 
dimensionless difference demand and forecast for 75 days BP= 
 difference demand and forecast for 75 days BP*dimensional con-
sistency days per widget 
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Units: Dimensionless 
emergency IC deliveries= 
 IF THEN ELSE(Emergency Inventory ICs at IC supplier/minimum 
shipment time from inventory emergency IC supplier 
>0, MIN(Backlog Emergency IC supplier/minimum shipment time from 
inventory emergency IC supplier 
, Emergency Inventory ICs at IC supplier/minimum shipment time from 
inventory emergency IC supplier 
), Emergency Inventory ICs at IC supplier/minimum shipment time 
from inventory emergency IC supplier 
)
Units: Materials/Day 
Emergency Inventory ICs at IC supplier= INTEG ( 
 +receiving rate ICs IC supplier-emergency IC deliveries, 
  initial level emergency inventory supplier) 
Units: Materials 
emergency material orders= 
 MAX(0,Emergency orders to account for Backlog SWF/boards per 
material)
Units: Materials/Day 
emergency orders placed at Sup= 
 MAX(0,Emergency orders to account for Backlog SWF) 
Units: Boards/Day 
Emergency orders to account for Backlog SWF= 
 switch emergency orders to account for Backlog SWF*MAX(0, (((gap 
desired BL and average BL SWF 
-(Cumulated emergency orders to account for Backlog SWF*switch con-
sider emergency orders already placed 
)))/adjustment time for emergency orders SWF)) 
Units: Boards/Day 
End Time FAT= 
 FINAL TIME 
Units: Days 
End Time SWF= 
 FINAL TIME 
Units: Days 
expected demand in LT boards FAT= 
 five day average of FG orders FAT*boards used per FG unit 
FAT*lead time boards FAT 
Units: Boards 
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expected demand in LT materials FAT= 
 five day average of FG orders FAT*materials used per FG unit 
FAT*lead time materials FAT 
Units: Materials 
expected emergency IC arrival rate BP= 
 DELAY3(emergency IC deliveries, shipment delay emergency IC de-
liveries)
Units: Materials/Day 
expected material arrival rate BP= DELAY FIXED ( 
 material orders BP, expected order lead time BP, 0) 
Units: Materials/Day 
expected material arrival rate IC emergency supplies at IC supplier 
FG inventory 
= DELAY FIXED ( 
 emergency material orders, expected order lead time emergency 
ICs, 0) 
Units: Materials/Day 
expected material arrival rate Sup= DELAY FIXED ( 
 material orders Sup, expected order lead time Sup, 0) 
Units: Materials/Day 
expected order lead time BP= 
 46 
Units: Days 
expected order lead time emergency ICs= 
 15 
Units: Days 
expected order lead time Sup= 
 6 
Units: Days 
feasible FG production based on inventory FAT= 
 MIN(Inventory Boards FAT/boards used per FG unit FAT, Inventory 
RM FAT/materials used per FG unit FAT 
)/minimum time to start production FAT 
Units: Widget/Day 
Feasible FG production SWF= 
 MIN(desired orders in production SWF, Inventory RM SWF/materials 
used per FG unit SWF 
/minimum time to start production SWF) 
Units: Widgets/Day 
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FINAL TIME  = 500 
Units: Day 
five day average of FG orders FAT= 
 SMOOTH(incoming order rate FAT, averaging time FAT ) 
Units: Widget/Day 
forecast 35 days out shifted to match demand= DELAY FIXED ( 
 forecast for supplier SWF, 6, 0) 
Units: Widget/Day 
forecast 36 days out:= 
 forecast 36 days out read from excel*systematic forecast error 
factor
Units: Widgets/Day 
forecast 36 days out read from excel:= 
 GET XLS DATA('input.xls', 'input', 'B', 'D1') 
Units: Widget/Day 
forecast 36 days out shifted to match demand at SWF= DELAY FIXED ( 
 forecast 36 days out, 36, 0) 
Units: Widget/Day 
forecast 75 days out shifted to match demand= DELAY FIXED ( 
 forecast for board printing SWF, 46, 0) 
Units: Widget/Day 
forecast 76 days out:= 
 forecast 76 days out read from excel*systematic forecast error 
factor
Units: Widgets/Day 
forecast 76 days out read from excel:= 
 GET XLS DATA('input.xls', 'input', 'B', 'E1') 
Units: Widget/Day 
forecast 76 days out shifted to match demand at SWF= DELAY FIXED ( 
 forecast 76 days out, 76, 0) 
Units: Widget/Day 
forecast demand in materials LT SWF= 
 (forecast Sup shifted to 0 days ahead+forecast Sup shifted to 1 
day ahead+ 
forecast Sup shifted to 2 days ahead+forecast Sup shifted to 3 days 
ahead+forecast Sup shifted to 4 days ahead 
+forecast Sup shifted to 5 days ahead+forecast Sup shifted to 6 
days ahead+ 
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forecast Sup shifted to 7 days ahead+forecast Sup shifted to 8 days 
ahead+forecast Sup shifted to 9 days ahead 
+forecast Sup shifted to 1 day behind)*materials used per FG unit 
SWF*dimensional consistency day 
Units: material 
forecast error BP= 
 SQRT(avg cum sq diff demand and FC for 75 days setup A 0) 
Units: Dimensionless 
forecast error Sup= 
 SQRT(avg cum sq diff demand and FC for 35 days setup A) 
Units: Dimensionless 
forecast for board printing SWF= 
 MAX( switch adjustment to forecast*adjusted forecast sent to BP 
by SWF, (1 
-switch adjustment to forecast)*forecast 76 days out) 
Units: Widget/Day 
forecast for supplier SWF= 
 MAX( switch adjustment to forecast*adjusted forecast sent to 
supplier by SWF 
, (1-switch adjustment to forecast)*forecast 36 days out) 
Units: Widget/Day 
forecast Sup shifted to 0 days ahead= DELAY FIXED ( 
 forecast for supplier SWF, 36, 0) 
Units: Widget/Day 
forecast Sup shifted to 1 day ahead= DELAY FIXED ( 
 forecast for supplier SWF, 35, 0) 
Units: Widget/Day 
forecast Sup shifted to 1 day behind= DELAY FIXED ( 
 forecast for supplier SWF, 37, 0) 
Units: Widget/Day 
forecast Sup shifted to 2 days ahead= DELAY FIXED ( 
 forecast for supplier SWF, 34, 0) 
Units: Widget/Day 
forecast Sup shifted to 3 days ahead= DELAY FIXED ( 
 forecast for supplier SWF, 33, 0) 
Units: Widget/Day 
forecast Sup shifted to 4 days ahead= DELAY FIXED ( 
 forecast for supplier SWF, 32, 0) 
Units: Widget/Day 
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forecast Sup shifted to 5 days ahead= DELAY FIXED ( 
 forecast for supplier SWF, 31, 0) 
Units: Widget/Day 
forecast Sup shifted to 6 days ahead= DELAY FIXED ( 
 forecast for supplier SWF, 30, 0) 
Units: Widget/Day 
forecast Sup shifted to 7 days ahead= DELAY FIXED ( 
 forecast for supplier SWF, 29, 0) 
Units: Widget/Day 
forecast Sup shifted to 8 days ahead= DELAY FIXED ( 
 forecast for supplier SWF, 28, 0) 
Units: Widget/Day 
forecast Sup shifted to 9 days ahead= DELAY FIXED ( 
 forecast for supplier SWF, 27, 0) 
Units: Widget/Day 
fractional difference demand and forecast for 36 days at SWF= 
 XIDZ(averaged demand requested for the current week 36 day FC at 
SWF, averaged forecast 36 days out shifted to match demand at 
SWF
, 1) 
Units: Dimensionless 
fractional difference demand and forecast for 76 days at SWF= 
 XIDZ(averaged demand requested for the current week 76 day FC at 
SWF, averaged forecast 76 days out shifted to match demand at 
SWF
, 1) 
Units: Dimensionless 
gap between desired inventory and average inventory RM BP= 
 (desired Inventory RM BP-average inventory RM BP) 
Units: Materials 
gap between desired inventory and average inventory RM Sup= 
 (desired Inventory RM Sup-average inventory RM Sup) 
Units: Materials 
gap desired BL and average BL SWF= 
 (average Backlog SWF-desired Backlog SWF)*boards used per FG 
unit FAT 
Units: Boards 
incoming board orders BP= 
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 board orders FAT 
Units: Boards/Day 
incoming emergency IC orders= 
 emergency material orders 
Units: Materials/Day 
incoming material orders SUP= 
 material orders FAT+(Emergency orders to account for Backlog 
SWF/boards per material 
)
Units: material/Day 
incoming order rate BP= 
 incoming board orders BP+Emergency orders to account for Backlog 
SWF
Units: Boards/Day 
incoming order rate FAT= 
 material orders from FAT SWF/materials used per FG unit 
FAT+(Emergency orders to account for Backlog SWF 
/boards used per FG unit FAT 
 ) 
Units: Widgets/Day 
incoming order rate Sup= 
 (incoming material orders SUP)/materials used per FG unit Sup 
Units: Widget/Day 
incoming production requests SWF= 
 demand adj Cust 9 days ahead 
Units: Widget/Day 
incorporate initial stock into forecast boards= 
 ((STEP( initial inventory size RM SWF/materials used per FG unit 
Sup+initial inventory size boards FAT 
/boards used per FG unit FAT 
 , 24)/dimensional consistency day)-(STEP( initial inventory size 
RM SWF/materials used per FG unit Sup 
+
 initial inventory size boards FAT 
 /boards used per FG unit FAT, 25)/dimensional consistency 
day))*switch incorporate base safety stock into forecasts 
Units: Widgets/Day 
incorporate initial stock into forecast materials= 
 ((STEP( initial inventory size RM SWF/materials used per FG unit 
Sup+initial inventory size RM FAT 
/materials used per FG unit Sup 
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 , 64)/dimensional consistency day)-(STEP( initial inventory size 
RM SWF/materials used per FG unit Sup 
+
 initial inventory size boards FAT 
 /boards used per FG unit FAT, 65)/dimensional consistency 
day))*switch incorporate base safety stock into forecasts 
Units: Widgets/Day 
inflow customer backlog= 
 demand requested for the current day 
Units: Widget/Day 
inflow waiting for production BP= 
 incoming order rate BP 
Units: Boards/Day 
inflow waiting for production FAT= 
 incoming order rate FAT 
Units: Widget/Day 
inflow waiting for production Sup= 
 incoming order rate Sup 
Units: Widget/Day 
ini boards on order FAT= 
 0 
Units: Boards 
ini installed base= 
 0 
Units: Widgets 
ini market potential= 
 7e+006 
Units: Widgets 
ini materials on order BP= 
 0 
Units: Materials 
ini materials on order FAT= 
 0 
Units: Materials 
ini materials on order Sup= 
 0 
Units: Materials 
ini materials on order SWF= 
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 0 
Units: Materials 
initial Inventory Boards Man= 
 0 
Units: Boards 
initial inventory FG BP= 
 0 
Units: Boards 
initial inventory FG Man= 
 0 
Units: Widgets 
initial inventory FG Sup= 
 0 
Units: Widgets 
initial inventory FG SWF= 
 0 
Units: Widgets 
initial inventory RM BP= 
 0 
Units: Materials 
initial inventory RM FAT= 
 0 
Units: Materials 
initial inventory RM Sup= 
 0 
Units: Materials 
initial inventory RM SWF= 
 0 
Units: material 
initial inventory size boards FAT= 
 100000 
Units: Boards 
initial inventory size RM FAT= 
 100000 
Units: Materials 
initial inventory size RM SWF= 
 100000 
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Units: Materials 
initial level emergency inventory supplier= 
 10000 
Units: Materials 
initial stock boards FAT= 
 STEP(initial inventory size boards FAT, inventory begin time 
boards FAT)-STEP 
(initial inventory size boards FAT,inventory end time boards FAT) 
Units: Boards 
initial stock RM FAT= 
 STEP(initial inventory size RM FAT, inventory begin time RM 
FAT)-STEP(initial inventory size RM FAT 
,inventory end time RM FAT) 
Units: Materials 
initial stock SWF= 
 STEP(initial inventory size RM SWF, inventory begin time RM 
SWF)-STEP(initial inventory size RM SWF 
,inventory end time RM SWF) 
Units: Materials 
INITIAL TIME  = 0 
Units: Day 
Input=
 MAX(0,  
 ( 
 1+STEP(Step Height,Step Time) 
 +STEP(Step2 Height,Step2 Time)+ 
 (Pulse Quantity/TIME STEP)*PULSE(Pulse Time,TIME STEP)+ 
 RAMP(Ramp Slope,Ramp Start Time,Ramp End Time)+ 
 Sine Amplitude*SIN(2*3.14159*Time/Sine Period)+ 
 (Life Cycle Test Input*switch Life Cycle Test Input)+ 
    STEP(1,Noise Start Time)*Pink Noise 
 ) 
  ) 
Units: Dimensionless 
input from excel file 9 days out:= 
 GET XLS DATA('input.xls', 'input', 'B', 'C1') 
Units: Widget/Day 
input from excel shifted to be demand requested for the current 
week:=
 TIME SHIFT(input from excel file 9 days out, -9) 
Units: Widget/Day 
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Installed base= INTEG ( 
 demand adj Cust 9 days ahead, 
  ini installed base) 
Units: Widgets 
Interval FAT= 
 1 
Units: Days 
Interval SWF= 
 1 
Units: Days 
inventory adjustment time BP= 
 46 
Units: Day 
inventory adjustment time Sup= 
 6 
Units: Day 
inventory begin time boards FAT= 
 71 
Units: Days 
inventory begin time RM FAT= 
 71 
Units: Days 
inventory begin time RM SWF= 
 81 
Units: Days 
Inventory Boards FAT= INTEG ( 
 +receiving rate Boards FAT-outgoing rate Boards FAT, 
  initial Inventory Boards Man) 
Units: Boards 
Inventory Cost Boards FAT= 
 inventory cost per unit Boards FAT*Inventory Boards FAT 
Units: Dollars/Day 
Inventory Cost FG BP= 
 inventory cost per unit FG BP*Inventory FG BP 
Units: Dollars/Day 
Inventory Cost FG FAT= 
 inventory cost per unit FG FAT*Inventory FG FAT 
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Units: Dollars/Day 
Inventory Cost FG Sup= 
 inventory cost per unit FG Sup*Inventory FG Sup 
Units: Dollars/Day 
Inventory Cost FG SWF= 
 inventory cost per unit FG SWF*Inventory FG SWF 
Units: Dollars/Day 
inventory cost per unit Boards FAT= 
 0.5 
Units: Dollars/Board/Day 
inventory cost per unit FG BP= 
 0.5 
Units: Dollars/Board/Day 
inventory cost per unit FG FAT= 
 0.9 
Units: Dollars/Widget/Day 
inventory cost per unit FG Sup= 
 0.2 
Units: Dollars/Widget/Day 
inventory cost per unit FG SWF= 
 1 
Units: Dollars/Widget/Day 
inventory cost per unit RM BP= 
 0.45 
Units: Dollars/Materials/Day 
inventory cost per unit RM FAT= 
 0.2 
Units: Dollars/Materials/Day 
inventory cost per unit RM Sup= 
 0.1 
Units: Dollars/Materials/Day 
inventory cost per unit RM SWF= 
 0.9 
Units: Dollars/Materials/Day 
inventory cost per unit WIP BP= 
 0.45 
Units: Dollars/Boards/Day 
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inventory cost per unit WIP FAT= 
 0.7 
Units: Dollars/Widget/Day 
inventory cost per unit WIP Sup= 
 0.2 
Units: Dollars/Widget/Day 
inventory cost per unit WIP SWF= 
 0.9 
Units: Dollars/Widget/Day 
Inventory Cost RM BP= 
 inventory cost per unit RM BP*Inventory RM BP 
Units: Dollars/Day 
Inventory Cost RM FAT= 
 inventory cost per unit RM FAT*Inventory RM FAT 
Units: Dollars/Day 
Inventory Cost RM Sup= 
 inventory cost per unit RM Sup*Inventory RM Sup 
Units: Dollars/Day 
Inventory Cost RM SWF= 
 inventory cost per unit RM SWF*Inventory RM SWF 
Units: Dollars/Day 
Inventory Cost WIP BP= 
 inventory cost per unit WIP BP*Inventory WIP BP var 
Units: Dollars/Day 
Inventory Cost WIP FAT= 
 inventory cost per unit WIP FAT*Inventory WIP Man var 
Units: Dollars/Day 
Inventory Cost WIP Sup= 
 inventory cost per unit WIP Sup*Inventory WIP Sup var 
Units: Dollars/Day 
Inventory Cost WIP SWF= 
 inventory cost per unit WIP SWF*Inventory WIP SWF var 
Units: Dollars/Day 
inventory end time boards FAT= 
 120 
Units: Days 
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inventory end time RM FAT= 
 120 
Units: Days 
inventory end time RM SWF= 
 120 
Units: Days 
Inventory FG BP= INTEG ( 
 +production rate BP-shipment rate BP, 
  initial inventory FG BP) 
Units: Boards 
Inventory FG FAT= INTEG ( 
 product completions FG FAT-shipment rate FAT, 
  initial inventory FG Man) 
Units: Widgets 
Inventory FG Sup= INTEG ( 
 product completions FG Sup-shipment rate Sup, 
  initial inventory FG Sup) 
Units: Widget 
Inventory FG SWF= INTEG ( 
 product completions SWF-shipment rate SWF, 
  initial inventory FG SWF) 
Units: Widgets 
Inventory RM BP= INTEG ( 
 +receiving rate RM BP-(desired production batched BP/boards per 
material),
  initial inventory RM BP) 
Units: Materials 
Inventory RM FAT= INTEG ( 
 +receiving rate RM FAT-outgoing rate RM FAT, 
  initial inventory RM FAT) 
Units: Materials 
Inventory RM Sup= INTEG ( 
 +receiving rate RM Sup-outgoing rate RM Sup, 
  initial inventory RM Sup) 
Units: Materials 
Inventory RM SWF= INTEG ( 
 -outgoing rate RM SWF+receiving rate RM SWF, 
  initial inventory RM SWF) 
Units: material 
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inventory turns= 
 ZIDZ(cum demand requested for the current day,average total in-
ventory cost over time 
)
Units: Day*Widget/Dollars 
Inventory WIP BP  =
#LV3<DELAYP(desiredproductionbatchedBP,productiontimeBP:Inventor
yWIPBP)#
             + 
#LV2<DELAYP(desiredproductionbatchedBP,productiontimeBP:Inventor
yWIPBP)#
             + 
#LV1<DELAYP(desiredproductionbatchedBP,productiontimeBP:Inventor
yWIPBP)#
 Units: Boards*Days/Day 
Inventory WIP BP var= 
 Inventory WIP BP 
Units: Boards 
Inventory WIP Man  =
#LV3<DELAYP(desiredproductionFAT,productiontimeFAT:InventoryWIPM
an)#
             + 
#LV2<DELAYP(desiredproductionFAT,productiontimeFAT:InventoryWIPM
an)#
             + 
#LV1<DELAYP(desiredproductionFAT,productiontimeFAT:InventoryWIPM
an)#
 Units: Widget*Days/Day 
Inventory WIP Man var= 
 Inventory WIP Man 
Units: Widget 
Inventory WIP Sup  =
#LV3<DELAYP(desiredproductionSup,productiontimeSup:InventoryWIPS
up)#
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             + 
#LV2<DELAYP(desiredproductionSup,productiontimeSup:InventoryWIPS
up)#
             + 
#LV1<DELAYP(desiredproductionSup,productiontimeSup:InventoryWIPS
up)#
 Units: Widget*Days/Day 
Inventory WIP Sup var= 
 Inventory WIP Sup 
Units: Widgets 
Inventory WIP SWF  =
#LV3<DELAYP(FeasibleFGproductionSWF,productiontimeSWF:InventoryW
IPSWF)#
             + 
#LV2<DELAYP(FeasibleFGproductionSWF,productiontimeSWF:InventoryW
IPSWF)#
             + 
#LV1<DELAYP(FeasibleFGproductionSWF,productiontimeSWF:InventoryW
IPSWF)#
 Units: Widgets*Days/Day 
Inventory WIP SWF var= 
 Inventory WIP SWF 
Units: Widget 
largest possible RM outflow BP= 
 MIN(capacity limit BP, Inventory RM BP/materials used per FG 
unit BP/minimum time to start production BP 
)
Units: Boards/Day 
lead time boards FAT= 
 10 
Units: Day 
lead time materials FAT= 
 10 
Units: Days 
lead time materials SWF= 
 10 
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Units: Days 
Life Cycle Test Input= 
 lkup Life Cycle Test Input and forecast for demand nine days 
ahead(Time/FINAL TIME 
)-1
Units: Dimensionless 
lkup Life Cycle Test Input and forecast for demand nine days ahead( 
 [(0,0)-
(1,2)],(0,0),(0.18,0),(0.24159,1.7),(0.324159,1.16),(0.67014,1),
(0.782
,0),(1,0),(1,0))
Units: Dimensionless 
lkup Life Cycle Test Input PLC standard( 
 [(0,0)-
(1,2)],(0,0),(0.185,0),(0.259939,1.21053),(0.293578,1.7193),(0.3
21101
,1.87719),(0.357798,1.95614),(0.415902,2),(0.440367,1.95614),(0.477
064,1.85965
),(0.508235,1.62989),(0.569412,1.21708),(0.651765,0.733096),(0.7364
71,0.362989
),(0.835294,0.0711744),(0.938824,0),(1,0))
Units: Dimensionless 
lkup Life Cycle Test Input simple v01( 
 [(0,0)-
(1,2)],(0,0),(0.185,0),(0.185,2),(0.504587,2),(0.504587,0),(0.93
8824
,0),(1,0))
Units: Dimensionless 
lkup Life Cycle Test Input simple v02( 
 [(0,0)-
(1,2)],(0,0),(0.185,0),(0.185,0.5),(0.287462,0.5),(0.504587,2),(
0.504587
,0),(0.938824,0),(1,0))
Units: Dimensionless 
lkup Life Cycle Test Input simple v03( 
 [(0,0)-
(1,2)],(0,0),(0.185,0),(0.185,0.5),(0.287462,0.5),(0.504587,2),(
0.9388
,2),(0.938824,0),(1,0))
Units: Dimensionless 
lkup PLC1( 
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 [(0,0)-
(1,2)],(0,0),(0.18,0),(0.256881,0.298246),(0.30581,0.684211),(0.
324159
,0.95614),(0.376147,1.38596),(0.434251,1.62281),(0.498471,1.7077),(
0.547401
,1.67544),(0.587156,1.57018),(0.623853,1.34211),(0.703364,0.54386),
(0.730887
,0.280702),(0.782,0),(1,0),(1,0))
Units: Dimensionless 
lkup probability of problem BP( 
 [(0,0)-
(1,2)],(0,0),(0.185,0),(0.259939,0),(0.299,0),(0.3,1),(0.319,1),
(0.32
,0),(1,0))
Units: Dimensionless 
lkup probability of problem Sup( 
 [(0,0)-
(1,2)],(0,0),(0.185,0),(0.259939,0),(0.3,0),(0.301,1),(0.302,0),
(1,
0))
Units: Dimensionless 
Market potential= INTEG ( 
 -demand adj Cust 9 days ahead, 
  ini market potential) 
Units: Widgets 
material arrival rate BP= 
 receiving rate RM BP 
Units: Materials/Day 
material arrival rate Sup= 
 receiving rate RM Sup 
Units: Materials/Day 
material arrival rate SWF= 
 receiving rate RM SWF 
Units: Materials/Day 
material order rate BP= 
 emergency material orders+material orders BP 
Units: Materials/Day 
material order rate Sup= 
 material orders Sup 
Units: Materials/Day 
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material orders BP= 
 MAX(0,     (((forecast for board printing SWF*materials used per 
FG unit SWF 
)+adjustment to desired material order rate BP+(incorporate initial 
stock into forecast boards 
*materials used per FG unit SWF) 
 ))) 
Units: Materials/Day 
material orders FAT= 
 MAX(0,orders RM FAT) 
Units: Materials/Day 
material orders from FAT SWF= 
 MAX(0,orders SWF) 
Units: Materials/Day 
material orders Sup= 
 MAX(0,   ((forecast for supplier SWF*materials used per FG unit 
Sup)+adjustment to desired material order rate Sup 
+(Emergency orders to account for Backlog SWF/boards per mate-
rial)+(incorporate initial stock into forecast materials 
*materials used per FG unit Sup))    ) 
Units: Materials/Day 
materials arrival rate FAT= 
 receiving rate RM FAT 
Units: Materials/Day 
materials from Sup needed for a RM FAT= 
 1 
Units: material/Widget 
Materials on order BP= INTEG ( 
 +material order rate BP-material arrival rate BP, 
  ini materials on order BP) 
Units: Materials 
Materials on order FAT= INTEG ( 
 +material orders FAT-materials arrival rate FAT+(Emergency or-
ders to account for Backlog SWF 
/boards per material), 
  ini materials on order FAT) 
Units: Materials 
Materials on order Sup= INTEG ( 
 +material order rate Sup-material arrival rate Sup, 
  ini materials on order Sup) 
Units: Materials 
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Materials on order SWF= INTEG ( 
 +material orders from FAT SWF-material arrival rate 
SWF+(Emergency orders to account for Backlog SWF 
/boards per material), 
  ini materials on order SWF) 
Units: Materials 
materials used per FG unit BP= 
 1 
Units: Materials/Board 
materials used per FG unit FAT= 
 1 
Units: Materials/Widget 
materials used per FG unit Sup= 
 1 
Units: Materials/Widget 
materials used per FG unit SWF= 
 1 
Units: Materials/Widget 
max order size boards FAT= 
 1e+011 
Units: Boards/Day 
max order size materials FAT= 
 1e+014 
Units: material/Day 
max order size SWF= 
 1e+017 
Units: material/Day 
mean of input data from excel 9 days out= 
 GET DATA MEAN(input from excel file 9 days out, 91, 413) 
Units: Widget/Day 
mean of var 2 FAT= 
 ZIDZ(sum of var2 annual acc FAT,counter annual acc FAT) 
Units: Widgets*Widgets/Dmnl 
mean of var 2 SWF= 
 ZIDZ(sum of var2 annual acc SWF,counter annual acc SWF) 
Units: Widgets*Widgets/Dmnl 
mean of var FAT= 
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 ZIDZ(sum of sampled var annual acc FAT,counter annual acc FAT) 
Units: Widgets/Dmnl 
mean of var SWF= 
 ZIDZ(sum of sampled var annual acc SWF,counter annual acc SWF) 
Units: Widgets/Dmnl 
minimum shipment time for inventory BP= 
 1 
Units: Day 
minimum shipment time from inventory emergency IC supplier= 
 1 
Units: Day 
minimum shipment time from inventory FAT= 
 1 
Units: Day 
minimum shipment time from inventory Sup= 
 1 
Units: Days 
minimum shipment time from inventory SWF= 
 1 
Units: Days 
minimum time to start production BP= 
 1 
Units: Day 
minimum time to start production FAT= 
 1 
Units: Day 
minimum time to start production SWF= 
 1 
Units: Day 
no of orders boards FAT= 
 (INTEGER(((incoming order rate FAT*boards used per FG unit 
FAT*dimensional consistency day 
)+expected demand in LT boards FAT 
 +safety stock size boards FAT+initial stock boards FAT+(Backlog 
FAT*boards used per FG unit FAT 
)-Boards on order FAT-Inventory Boards FAT 
 )/order size boards FAT))/dimensional consistency day 
Units: Dimensionless 
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no of orders materials FAT= 
 (INTEGER((((incoming order rate FAT*materials used per FG unit 
FAT*dimensional consistency day 
)+expected demand in LT materials FAT 
 +safety stock size materials FAT)+initial stock RM FAT+(Backlog 
FAT*materials used per FG unit FAT 
)-Materials on order FAT-Inventory RM FAT 
 )/order size materials FAT))/dimensional consistency day 
Units: Materials/Materials 
no of orders SWF= 
 INTEGER 
 (((incoming production requests SWF*materials used per FG unit 
SWF*time to place an order SWF 
)
 + forecast demand in materials LT SWF 
 + safety stock size SWF 
 + initial stock SWF 
 + (Backlog SWF*materials used per FG unit SWF) 
 - Materials on order SWF 
 - Inventory RM SWF 
 ) 
 /order size SWF) 
 /time to place an order SWF 
Units: material/material 
Noise Correlation Time = 4 
Units: Day 
NOISE SEED= 
 1 
Units: Dimensionless 
Noise Standard Deviation= 
 0.1 
Units: Dimensionless 
Noise Start Time= 
 92 
Units: Day 
order fulfillment rate BP= 
 shipment rate BP 
Units: Boards/Day 
order fulfillment rate FAT= 
 shipment rate FAT 
Units: Widgets/Day 
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order fulfillment rate Sup= 
 shipment rate Sup 
Units: Widgets/Day 
order size boards FAT= 
 1000 
Units: Boards/Day 
order size materials FAT= 
 1000 
Units: material/Day 
order size SWF= 
 1000 
Units: Materials/Day 
orders boards FAT= 
 MIN(no of orders boards FAT*order size boards FAT, max order 
size boards FAT 
)
Units: Boards/Day 
orders RM FAT= 
 MIN(no of orders materials FAT*order size materials FAT, max 
order size materials FAT 
)
Units: material/Day 
orders SWF= 
 MIN(no of orders SWF*order size SWF, max order size SWF) 
Units: material/Day 
outflow customer backlog= 
 receiving rate Cust 
Units: Widget/Day 
outgoing rate Boards FAT= 
 MAX(0,desired production FAT*boards used per FG unit FAT) 
Units: Boards/Day 
outgoing rate RM FAT= 
 MAX(0,desired production FAT*materials used per FG unit FAT) 
Units: Materials/Day 
outgoing rate RM Sup= 
 MAX(0,IF THEN ELSE(desired production Sup*materials used per FG 
unit Sup>Inventory RM Sup 
/dimensional consistency day 
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 , Inventory RM Sup/dimensional consistency day, desired produc-
tion Sup*materials used per FG unit Sup 
))
Units: Materials/Day 
outgoing rate RM SWF= 
 MAX(0,Feasible FG production SWF*materials used per FG unit SWF) 
Units: Materials/Day 
pick FAT= 
 STEP(1,Start Time FAT)*(1-STEP(1,End Time FAT + TIME STEP/2))*IF 
THEN ELSE 
(Time/Interval FAT = INTEGER(Time/Interval FAT),1 , 0 ) 
Units: Dmnl 
pick SWF= 
 STEP(1,Start Time SWF)*(1-STEP(1,End Time SWF + TIME STEP/2))*IF 
THEN ELSE 
(Time/Interval SWF = INTEGER(Time/Interval SWF),1 , 0 ) 
Units: Dmnl 
Pink Noise = INTEG(Change in Pink Noise,0) 
Units: Dimensionless 
positive customer backlog= 
 MAX(0,customer backlog/dimensional consistency day) 
Units: Widget/Day 
power two= 
 2 
Units: Dimensionless 
probablity of problem BP= 
 lkup probability of problem BP(Time/FINAL TIME)*switch probabil-
ity of problem BP 
Units: Dimensionless 
probablity of problem Sup= 
 lkup probability of problem Sup(Time/FINAL TIME)*switch prob-
ability of problem Sup 
Units: Dimensionless 
product completions FG FAT= 
 MAX(0,DELAYP(desired production FAT, production time FAT : In-
ventory WIP Man 
 )) 
Units: Widget/Day 
product completions FG Sup= 
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 DELAYP(desired production Sup, production time Sup : Inventory 
WIP Sup ) 
Units: Widget/Day 
product completions SWF= 
 DELAYP(Feasible FG production SWF, production time SWF : Inven-
tory WIP SWF 
)
Units: Widgets/Day 
production rate BP= 
 DELAYP(desired production batched BP, production time BP : In-
ventory WIP BP 
 ) 
Units: Boards/Day 
production starts SWF= 
 Feasible FG production SWF 
Units: Widgets/Day 
production time BP= 
 4 
Units: Days 
production time FAT= 
 4 
Units: Days 
production time Sup= 
 4 
Units: Days 
production time SWF= 
 4 
Units: Days 
Pulse Quantity= 
 0 
Units: Dimensionless*Day 
Pulse Time= 
 50 
Units: Day 
pulse train duration= 
 1 
Units: Day 
pulse train end= 
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 500 
Units: Day 
Pulse Train Input= 
 PULSE TRAIN(pulse train start, pulse train duration , pulse 
train repeattime 
 , pulse train end ) 
Units: Dimensionless 
pulse train repeattime= 
 5 
Units: Days 
pulse train start= 
 0 
Units: Day 
Ramp End Time= 
 150 
Units: Day 
Ramp Slope=0 
Units: 1/Day 
Ramp Start Time= 
 92 
Units: Day 
receiving rate Boards FAT= 
 DELAY3(shipment rate BP,shipment delay BP) 
Units: Boards/Day 
receiving rate Cust= 
 DELAY3(shipment rate SWF,shipment delay SWF) 
Units: Widget/Day 
receiving rate ICs IC supplier= 
 expected material arrival rate IC emergency supplies at IC sup-
plier FG inventory 
Units: Materials/Day 
receiving rate RM BP= 
 expected material arrival rate BP+expected emergency IC arrival 
rate BP 
Units: Materials/Day 
receiving rate RM FAT= 
 DELAY3(shipment rate Sup,shipment delay Sup)*materials from Sup 
needed for a RM FAT 
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Units: Materials/Day 
receiving rate RM Sup= 
 expected material arrival rate Sup 
Units: Materials/Day 
receiving rate RM SWF= 
 DELAY3(shipment rate FAT*materials used per FG unit SWF,shipment 
delay FAT 
)
Units: material/Day 
safety factor z boards FAT= 
 1.65 
Units: Dmnl 
safety factor z materials FAT= 
 1.65 
Units: Dmnl 
safety factor z SWF= 
 1.65 
Units: Dmnl 
safety stock size boards FAT= 
 safety factor z boards FAT*standard deviation of last 10 days 
FAT*boards used per FG unit FAT 
Units: Board 
safety stock size materials FAT= 
 safety factor z materials FAT*standard deviation of last 10 days 
FAT*materials used per FG unit FAT 
Units: Materials 
safety stock size SWF= 
 safety factor z SWF*standard deviation of last 10 days 
SWF*materials used per FG unit SWF 
Units: material 
sampled var FAT= 
 pick FAT*var FAT 
Units: Widget/Day 
sampled var SWF= 
 pick SWF*var SWF 
Units: Widget/Day 
SAVEPER  =
        TIME STEP 
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Units: Day 
shipment delay BP= 
 4 
Units: Days 
shipment delay emergency IC deliveries= 
 4 
Units: Days 
shipment delay FAT= 
 4 
Units: Days 
shipment delay Sup= 
 4 
Units: Days 
shipment delay SWF= 
 4 
Units: Days 
shipment rate BP= 
 Inventory FG BP/minimum shipment time for inventory BP 
Units: Boards/Day 
shipment rate FAT= 
 Inventory FG FAT/minimum shipment time from inventory FAT 
Units: Widgets/Day 
shipment rate Sup= 
 IF THEN ELSE(Backlog Sup>0, Inventory FG Sup/minimum shipment 
time from inventory Sup 
, 0) 
Units: Widget/Day 
shipment rate SWF= 
 Inventory FG SWF/minimum shipment time from inventory SWF 
Units: Widgets/Day 
Sine Amplitude=0 
Units: Dimensionless 
Sine Period=50 
Units: Days 
squared diff demand and FC for 35 days setup A 0 0= 
 POWER(dimensional difference demand and forecast for 35 days 
Sup, power two 
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)
Units: Dmnl 
squared diff demand and FC for 75 days setup A 0= 
 POWER(dimensionless difference demand and forecast for 75 days 
BP, power two 
)
Units: Dmnl 
standard deviation of last 10 days FAT= 
 AnnualAccumulation(standard deviation of var after 10 days 
FAT,acclength FAT 
,Time,TIME STEP) 
Units: Widgets 
standard deviation of last 10 days SWF= 
 AnnualAccumulation(standard deviation of var after 10 days 
SWF,acclength SWF 
,Time,TIME STEP) 
Units: Widgets 
standard deviation of var after 10 days FAT= 
 IF THEN ELSE( 
             MODULO(Time,acclength FAT)=0 
             ,standard deviation of var FAT,0) 
Units: Widgets 
standard deviation of var after 10 days SWF= 
 IF THEN ELSE( 
             MODULO(Time,acclength SWF)=0 
             ,standard deviation of var SWF,0) 
Units: Widgets 
standard deviation of var FAT= 
 IF THEN ELSE( mean of var 2 FAT-(mean of var FAT*mean of var 
FAT)>0, SQRT( 
mean of var 2 FAT-(mean of var FAT*mean of var FAT)), 0) 
Units: Widgets 
standard deviation of var SWF= 
 IF THEN ELSE( mean of var 2 SWF-(mean of var SWF*mean of var 
SWF)>0, SQRT( 
mean of var 2 SWF-(mean of var SWF*mean of var SWF)), 0) 
Units: Widgets 
Start Time FAT= 
 0 
Units: Days 
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Start Time SWF= 
 0 
Units: Days 
starting time for forecast adjustments BP= 
 0 
Units: Days 
starting time for forecast adjustments Sup= 
 0 
Units: Days 
stddev of input data from excel 9 days out= 
 GET DATA STDV( input from excel file 9 days out, 91, 413) 
Units: Widget/Day 
Step Height= 
 0 
Units: Dimensionless 
Step Time= 
 200 
Units: Day 
Step2 Height= 
 0 
Units: Dimensionless 
Step2 Time= 
 200 
Units: Days 
sum of sampled var annual acc FAT= 
 AnnualAccumulation(sampled var FAT,acclength FAT,Time,TIME 
STEP)*dimensional consistency day 
Units: Widgets 
sum of sampled var annual acc SWF= 
 AnnualAccumulation(sampled var SWF,acclength SWF,Time,TIME 
STEP)*dimensional consistency day 
Units: Widgets 
sum of var2 annual acc FAT= 
 AnnualAccumulation(((sampled var FAT*dimensional consistency 
day)*(sampled var FAT 
*dimensional consistency day)),acclength FAT,Time,TIME STEP) 
Units: Widgets*Widgets 
sum of var2 annual acc SWF= 
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 AnnualAccumulation(((sampled var SWF*dimensional consistency 
day)*(sampled var SWF 
*dimensional consistency day)),acclength SWF,Time,TIME STEP) 
Units: Widgets*Widgets 
switch adjustment to forecast= 
 1 
Units: Dmnl 
switch adjustment to Inventory RM BP= 
 1 
Units: Dimensionless 
switch adjustment to Inventory RM Sup= 
 1 
Units: Dimensionless 
switch adjustmentfor difference demand and forecast BP= 
 1 
Units: Dimensionless 
switch adjustmentfor difference demand and forecast Sup= 
 1 
Units: Dimensionless 
switch consider emergency orders already placed= 
 0 
Units: Dimensionless 
switch emergency orders to account for Backlog SWF= 
 1 
Units: Dimensionless 
switch incorporate base safety stock into forecasts= 
 1 
Units: Dmnl 
switch Life Cycle Test Input= 
 0 
Units: Dimensionless 
switch probability of problem BP= 
 0 
Units: Dimensionless 
switch probability of problem Sup= 
 0 
Units: Dimensionless 
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switch to consider cum adj to inventory RM BP= 
 0 
Units: Dmnl 
switch to consider cum adj to inventory RM Sup= 
 0 
Units: Dmnl 
systematic forecast error factor= 
 1 
Units: Dmnl 
time base week= 
 TIME BASE(0, 0.2 ) 
Units: Dimensionless 
TIME STEP  = 0.25 
Units: Day 
time to place an order SWF= 
 1 
Units: Day 
total cumulated inventory cost BP= 
 Cumulated Inventory Cost FG BP+Cumulated Inventory Cost RM 
BP+Cumulated Inventory Cost WIP BP 
Units: Dollars 
total cumulated inventory cost FAT= 
 Cumulated Inventory Cost FG FAT+Cumulated Inventory Cost Boards 
FAT+Cumulated Inventory Cost WIP FAT 
+Cumulated Inventory Cost RM FAT 
Units: Dollars 
total cumulated inventory cost Sup= 
 Cumulated Inventory Cost FG Sup+Cumulated Inventory Cost RM 
Sup+Cumulated Inventory Cost WIP Sup 
Units: Dollars 
total cumulated inventory cost SWF= 
 Cumulated Inventory Cost FG SWF+Cumulated Inventory Cost RM 
SWF+Cumulated Inventory Cost WIP SWF 
Units: Dollars 
total inventory cost BP= 
 Inventory Cost FG BP+Inventory Cost RM BP+Inventory Cost WIP BP 
Units: Dollars/Day 
total inventory cost FAT= 
364 
 Inventory Cost FG FAT+Inventory Cost Boards FAT+Inventory Cost 
WIP FAT+Inventory Cost RM FAT 
Units: Dollars/Day 
total inventory cost Sup= 
 Inventory Cost FG Sup+Inventory Cost RM Sup+Inventory Cost WIP 
Sup
Units: Dollars/Day 
total inventory cost SWF= 
 Inventory Cost FG SWF+Inventory Cost RM SWF+Inventory Cost WIP 
SWF
Units: Dollars/Day 
Total products shipped to Cust= INTEG ( 
 receiving rate Cust, 
  0) 
Units: Widgets 
var FAT= 
 incoming order rate FAT 
Units: Widget/Day 
var SWF= 
 demand Cust 9 days ahead 
Units: Widget/Day 
waiting for production BP= INTEG ( 
 +inflow waiting for production BP-desired production batched BP, 
  0) 
Units: Boards 
waiting for production FAT= INTEG ( 
 +inflow waiting for production FAT-desired production FAT, 
  0) 
Units: Widget 
waiting for production Sup= INTEG ( 
 +inflow waiting for production Sup-desired production Sup, 
  0) 
Units: Widget 
White Noise= 
 Noise Standard Deviation*((24*Noise Correlation Time/TIME 
STEP)^0.5*(RANDOM UNIFORM 
(0, 1, NOISE SEED) - 0.5 
 )) 
Units: Dimensionless 
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Organizations can design planning systems for supply chain 
management in different ways in order to achieve the multiple objectives 
of supply chain management. In this book, a System Dynamics simulation 
model is used to assess the performance of planning approaches for 
supply chains in the high-tech electronics industry on the dimensions of 
responsiveness and effi ciency. Supply chains in this industry are subject 
to a number of challenges that complicate the achievement of these two 
objectives, including short product life cycles and long component lead 
times. In recent years, companies experienced both decreasing delivery 
performance and increasing cost. The simulation results show that while 
the current planning approach in typical supply chains in this industry 
is not capable of supporting high responsiveness at the same time as 
high effi ciency, it is possible to modify the planning system to achieve 
simultaneous improvements on both of these dimensions. Building on 
this simulation model, the book provides practical guidelines on how 
organizations can align the supply chain planning approach with different 
product characteristics and transform their supply chains into systems that 
are both responsive to customer demand and effi cient.
. 
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